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 Note on Transliteration 
 
 
Wherever this dissertation uses Nepali, Yamphu or Tibetan terms, I decided to transcribe them in a very 
basic form to ensure the readers will be able to concentrate on the argumentation and the story without 
stumbling over diacritical signs. When they are introduced the first time, I use the signs [N] [Y] and [T] 
to specify which language they are. 
 
 
 Note on Anonymisation 
 
 
In line with common anthropological practice I try to conceal the identities of the people who talked to 
me during my research. Therefore, I use pseudonyms throughout the text. Despite this strategy I am well 
aware of the fact that many readers, first and foremost my interlocutors themselves, will very easily be able 
to identify who is who. This has been the case in many anthropological research projects like mine that 
rely on overt research (Murphy and Dingwall 2001: 341). 
The picture is further complicated by the fact that four of my interview partners speak about events that 
are clearly attributable to them, even for complete outsiders. As all of them agreed to appear in my work 
under their real names, I decided to lift their anonymity in these few cases in order not to compromise 
their pseudonyms for the rest of the text. For this reason I also omit where and when these conversations 
have taken place and list them separately from the other interviews.  
 
 
 	  
 
 
 1 Introduction 
 
 
Why not start with an unexpected find, right in the middle of my research? It was a grey and rainy 
evening in March 2011 when I got home from university. I had recently returned to Zurich after six 
months of fieldwork in Nepal and India and was still in the process of settling in. Wheeling my bicycle 
through the murky passage to the inner court of my apartment house, my eyes caught sight of a small heap 
of books that somebody had left on top of the paper bank. Most of them were pulp fiction in soft-cover, 
but one of them, with its sturdy, plastic binding, reminded me of a school atlas. Its spine read: Neues 
Schweizer Lesebuch (Brüschweiler 1967) – New Swiss reading book; the copyright told me it had been 
published in 1967. Curious as to what Swiss school children had to read in their German classes forty-five 
years ago, I had a look at the contents. And there it was: In the first section, placed strangely between an 
excerpt from Antoine de Saint-Exupery’s night flight and Martin Luther’s open letter on translating, I 
found a text by Hans Carossa titled Das Stauwehr – The Weir.1 Needless to say I took the reader with me. 
Upstairs in my flat I opened the book again to find a flowery short story full of proliferating adjectives that 
describes the author’s visit to a nameless lockage on an undisclosed river in the early 1920s.2 
Seven pages later I put the book down, totally startled. Some of the persistent themes that ran through my 
fieldwork on the invention, cancellation and recent reincarnation of the Arun-3 hydropower project in 
Nepal were touched upon in these few pages: the promise of mastering and harnessing the forces of 
nature, grief for a river paradise lost, and the water spirits and angels no longer dwelling in it in order that 
an urban centre far away benefits, the inseparable connection between dam and nationalism, the 
comparison of the weir with religious monuments as well as a depiction of the water engineer as a modern, 
yet humble magician. All of this is arranged in a kind of time-lapse, miniature Bildungsroman with 
Carossa changing from the romantic, who introduces the dam in martial vocabulary and bemoans the 
drowned river banks to the rational hero, who understands the environmental sacrifice as a necessary evil 
for the greater good of progress: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The author’s name meant nothing to me. Only later did I find out that Carossa was included in the list of the six 
most important writes of Nazi Germany in 1944 by Adolf Hitler himself. The following year, however, he was 
sentenced to death in absence for a letter to the mayor of Passau urging him to surrender his hometown peacefully to 
the Allied Forces. In the literature on artists under the Nazi regime he features prominently as an example of ‘inner 
emigration’ (Trommler 2003). 
2 Judging from his mentioning of the mythological Nibelungen I assume that the events take place on the Rhine. 
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Now I finally stood in front of the mighty barrage that gives our stream its big new depth. 
With the force and severity of a medieval fort it bridges the grey green floods on granite 
abutment piers; the whole seems assembled only from iron, stone, glass and puce brick, as if 
for millennia. How often did I pass the work glowering, full of contradictions against its 
violent presence. I could not forget the beautiful riparian world that now lies buried in the 
mud of the slowed river. Always new losses I was indulging in. The squill blossoms that 
covered the embankment like spilled blue colour dust in early spring, the summer shrubs 
redolent of calamus where sometimes Puck, sometimes Ariel were dwelling, the black, white 
grained cliffs on which perhaps already the eye of the Nibelungen rested when they sailed 
down to the land of their death - everything drowned, without return, bemoaned by no one 
(Carossa 1967 [1923]: 17, Translation MR)! 
 
Despite this glowing accusation something “must have happened within” for Carossa to visit the dam after 
all, although we are left in the dark as to what had changed his mind. Although arriving in the early dawn, 
he is not alone: “A lot of people were standing here, devoutly admiring, like earlier one was only standing 
in front of the façade of a cathedral. Moved, they looked at the huge clenches […] that sustain the iron 
control gates to contain the tremendous pressure of the water jump” (ibid: 18). 
Later, while observing the engineers in their control room, these “good sons of their times,” he completely 
reverses the previous picture of the dam as a castle of dark forces and instead introduces it as an obedient 
and modest machine ready to serve modern society: 
 
Yes, no longer is it too early for me to do justice to this facility; it is not a fighting castle, 
demands nothing for itself, only wants to serve through urging the natural forces to accurate 
performance. Even those iron producers of the electrical currents, minotauric as they look, are 
in principle submissive, they comply with a guiding pull; and where one perceives the least, 
the most is happening (ibid: 19). 
 
After a whole day at the lockage, Carossa leaves at night in total harmony with the structure. The 
environmental damage connected to its construction “should not worry us today” and it has finally 
transcended itself from a medieval fortress to a magic castle, removed from this world. At the same time, 
he reminds us of the efficiency of the structure that was built to increase ship traffic while the electricity 
generation is “only happening on the side:” 
 
I looked back and there it was: an enchanted castle radiating glitter in the night’s blackness. 
The high windows of the turbine hall transmitted white rays widely; from the outer lamps, 
however, reddishly mild light sparkled downward like from showers. A white cargo ship, 
greyly laden, with yellow and blue lantern, swooshed along, carried by its mirror image, and 
reminded how the accomplishments of the bold working castle ceaselessly complement each 
other. To enhance the ship traffic, the stream was dammed; the other thing, the arousal of 
the electric force from the never declining rush of water, is only happening on the side; but 
precisely this is unforgettable. Whether we will ever understand why a blooming riparian 
world close by has to drown for that somewhere in the distant night lights may burn, this 
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question should not worry us today. But sometimes it may be beneficial to visit the halls 
where superhuman obedience tames elemental forces or to wander through the silent room 
where there is nothing but deadly touches (ibid: 23). 
 
 
The argument: Arun-3 as a complex set of force transmissions 
This thesis is about a dam, too. But unlike the lockage in Carossa’s short story the dam that is at stake 
here so far has not been built. That does not mean, however, that this dam has not had its ramifications. 
On the contrary, the Arun-3 hydropower plant is arguably the most controversial infrastructure project in 
the history of Nepal. Furthermore, the involvement of the World Bank made sure that its cancellation in 
1995 had impacts on a global level. It was indicative of the fact that the funding of large dams in the 
global South through Western donor agencies became next to impossible at that time. The recent 
reincarnation of this dam under the aegis of a state-owned Indian company (Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam 
[SJVN]), however, shows that large dams are back on the agenda of international donor agencies and 
governments in the global South, albeit under radically altered financing and ownership arrangements. By 
now, Arun-3 has been in the making for three decades and only time will tell if it will ever see the light of 
day. For the time being, it is an invisible dam; but still a very powerful one. Thus, the overarching research 
question informing my work is how this unconstructed dam has influenced the way large dam projects 
first became next to impossible to finance in the Mid-1990s and how they recently have made a serious 
comeback. 
The main argument of my thesis runs against the widespread depiction of the cancellation of Arun-3 as a 
confrontation between the World Bank, national and global civil society as well as the people living 
around the dam site that is prevalent in the narratives of my interlocutors. Instead, I propose to read it as a 
story of how new forms of relation between these four groups of actors emerged through a complex set of 
force transmissions. Through these, Arun-3 has brought people into contact because it put them in 
oppositional camps. As it goes with forces fed to a machine as opaque as transnational infrastructure 
development, these transmissions had unintended outcomes on several levels. 
I argue that a radically new working arrangement emerged between the Bank and its critics in the course 
of the review of Arun-3 by the World Bank Inspection Panel. In light of a well-organised campaign titled 
‘50 years is enough’ (Danaher 1994) on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the 
Bretton-Woods institutions that called for the disbandment of World Bank and IMF, the Bank realised 
the urgent need to reach out to its opponents. The main reason for this change of heart was the reasonable 
fear that this campaign might seriously damage the Bank’s reputation and lessen its attraction as a donor 
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to governments in the global South. Many of its employees were also critical of the way they were doing 
business and eager to integrate new forms of expertise to improve the Bank’s work. Arun-3 served as a 
welcome example to test a new way of dealing with criticism: economically, environmentally as well as 
socially, it had been a chronically problematic project in an unimportant country that had gained the 
attention of global civil society and increasingly the media. This mélange led the newly appointed Director 
of the World Bank James Wolfensohn to cancel all credit negotiations between his organisation and the 
government of Nepal in August 1995. It was the first major decision in his new job. But while the original 
request for inspection by the Nepalese activists had mainly attacked the project - and thereby the Bank - 
for its bad economics, the official investigation and cancellation was restricted to environmental concerns, 
issues of land compensation and resettlement. This decision defined the mandate of the Inspection Panel 
ever since in spite of the fact that its founding document (IBRD and IDA 1993) clearly envisioned it as an 
independent institution mandated to investigate requests concerning all of the Bank’s directives. 
This transmission lies at the core of what Michael Goldman (2005) has so aptly termed ‘green 
neoliberalism:’ the inclusion of an unprecedented number of social scientists, ecologists and civil society 
actors into the World Bank’s system of knowledge production that happened simultaneously with the 
Arun-3 controversy. Through this new modus operandi, Goldman argues, the Bank today knows more 
about the world and the projects it funds than ever before.  
When news of the Bank’s decision arrived in the upper Arun valley where the dam was supposed to be 
built, the majority of the people were disappointed. Following the announcements of the government and 
local elites, they had had high hopes connected to Arun-3 – the promise of a road, electricity, wage labour 
and development in general. Despite several attempts to integrate them into the movement against the 
dam beforehand, the activists were unable to transmit their opposition to people who were eager to 
establish connections and become an active party to a state that had neglected most of them since its 
inception. Twenty years later, many of my interlocutors in the area have transmitted the futility of this 
hope into the strong believe that development will never arrive in the Arun valley as it is something that 
others enjoy elsewhere. The events surrounding the recent reincarnation of Arun-3, finally, point towards 
another form of force transmission: The come-back of large dams within a new, multi-polar world order 
where large scale transnational infrastructure development is no longer the exclusive realm of Western 
donor institutions and new property relations are emerging through the practice of public-private 
partnerships. 
  
Introduction 
- 5 - 
The Dam as Will and Representation 
For the better part of the 20th century, the dam has been one of the most powerful symbols of progress. 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) estimated that during this century at least 45 000 large dams3 
were built, the overwhelming majority of them between 1945 and 1990 (World Commission on Dams 
2000: ix). As Carossa’s short story impressively shows, few other technological achievements came to 
embody one of the central dreams of modernity in a similar vein: to control the forces of nature and at the 
same time to harness this power for the generation of electricity and the irrigation of an industrialised 
agriculture. With the decolonisation of the global South and the coming into being of the Third World, 
the promise of the dam became a crucial topos in the rhetoric of modernisation for politicians in the 
former colonies as well as agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For 
many within the post-colonial elites, it represented a powerful symbol for the combined virility of 
nationalism and development and its conquest of nature. Beyond that, the dam with its bold aesthetics 
and sheer magnitude also served as one the most monumental modernist structures ready to be admired. 
Not only Carossa linked dams to churches; in fact, the practice of relating them to sacred architecture is a 
reoccurring theme. Probably best known are the statements by Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime 
Minister who proclaimed dams the “temples of modern India” (D’Souza 2002: xv) and “the symbol of 
India’s progress” (Kaminsky and Long 2011: 86). All over the world, gigantic river development schemes 
were planned in an attempt to copy the US Tennessee Valley Project (Klingensmith 2007) or the 
Egyptian Aswan High Dam (Mitchell 2002). Soon, the World Bank emerged as the main financier for 
hydropower construction in the global South: According to one estimate (Sklar and McCully 1994 in 
Khagram 2004: 7) the Bank lent more than 58 billion US-Dollars for more than 604 dams in 93 countries 
from its inception until 1994. 
Apart from hydropower and irrigation and beyond nationalism and mythology, the construction of large 
dams had a number of further benefits for the elites of the industrialising national economies of the global 
South after the end of colonial rule. One was the hope to train domestic engineers through the exchange 
with Western hydropower companies and consultants. Two more potential benefits were connected to the 
fact that large dams require large investments. On the one hand this enabled governments to start 
negotiations about huge loans with Western donors that would (in the best of all cases) dramatically 
increase the locally available capital and thereby boost the economy. On the other hand projects of this 
size would in almost every case come with numerous possibilities for the ruling parties and their 
representatives to receive kickbacks for their own benefit (Transparency International 2008). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) defines a large dam as being more than fifteen meters 
high “or, if between 5 and 15m in height, as having a storage capacity of over 3,000,000m3” (Scudder 2005: 2). 
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Dam projects, however, have at least two major downsides: They tend to submerge human settlements 
and severely change river ecologies. The plight of displaced people was often dismissed through narratives 
of sacrificial patriotism – in 1948, Nehru told affected villagers: “If you are to suffer, you should suffer in 
the interest of the country” (Khagram 2004: 37). Due to the fact that big hydropower schemes, especially 
storage facilities, were often constructed in mountainous areas far away from urban centres, the affected 
people often were part of indigenous or minority groups. Until the 1970s, opposition to dam projects in 
the global South was infrequent and scattered. In South Asia, the first schemes that almost simultaneously 
led to opposition in the Mid-1970s were the Silent Valley project in Kerala (ibid: 42-49) and the Tehri 
dam in present-day Uttarakhand (Kumar 1996). Whereas the former was never constructed, the latter 
came online in 2006 after forty years of protest. 
Subsequently, with the rise of civil society organisations and the global dissemination of discourses on 
environmental conservation, human and indigenous rights, things changed. Transnationally organised 
activist networks started defying the global regime of foreign funded infrastructure development and its 
leading actors. The first major case where the World Bank had to backtrack on a hydropower dam was the 
financing for the Indian Sardar Sarovar along the Narmada River. After a well-organised campaign both 
in the Narmada valley and globally, the Bank commissioned the first independent review of one of its 
projects in 1992. This so-called Morse Report (Morse and Berger 1992) indicated severe flaws concerning 
project implementation, especially connected to questions of information, resettlement and rehabilitation 
of the affected people. Subsequently, the Bank did not to transfer the last tranche of the credit and the 
government of India did not demand it. This way, both partners tried to save face. Still, to the activists the 
message was clear: the World Bank was not impregnable. 
In light of the growing resistance many people inside the Bank developed a serious concern that persistent 
civil society agitation and the accompanying bad press might severely compromise the Bank’s ability to sell 
credits to governments in the global South. Therefore, the Executive Directors decided to establish an 
independent arbitral court and requested Ibrahim Shihata, the general counsel of the Bank, to write a 
resolution for that purpose (IBRD and IDA 1993). As Richard Bissell (1997: 741) argues the legal 
architecture Shihata came up with was “conceptually almost unique: combining the possibility of access of 
individuals and private groups to rights under international law, with the opportunity to question the 
activities of international organizations.” 
The World Bank Inspection Panel began operation in August 1994 and the first complaint, filed in 
November 1994, was concerning the Arun-3 project (Arun Concerned Group 1994a). After ten months 
of investigation, a number of critical reports by the Panel and three more rounds of internal project 
evaluation by Bank staff, the Bank’s new director Wolfensohn decided to stop all credit negotiations in 
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August 1995. Paradoxically, the majority of the affected people in the Arun valley were outraged by the 
success of the national and transnational campaign. They had hoped to benefit from the access road to the 
dam site, the electrification of their villages and the possibility of wage labour connected to the 
construction. After cancelling the Arun-3 project the Bank pulled out of hydropower construction 
altogether and also established the World Commission on Dams to work on a new framework for big 
dams. For the next ten years, their financing through the World Bank came almost completely to a halt 
and without the Bank’s backing it became almost impossible for governments in the global South to build 
them. 
Recently, however, the rapid economic rise of emerging regional powers like India, China or Brazil and 
the global discourse on climate change and carbon dioxide has brought big dams back on the agenda of 
governments, international agencies and big business. And so also the Arun-3 project has been revived. 
This time, the Indian state-owned company Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVN) is developing and financing 
the project predominantly for the export of the generated electricity to India. This export orientation has 
caused considerable controversy in Nepal as the country faces power outages of up to fourteen hours per 
day. This case shows the considerable changes in the institutional and financial framework of hydropower 
construction in the global South that have occurred since the withdrawal of the World Bank after the 
Inspection Panel’s report on the Arun-3 in the mid-1990. For the most part, big dams are no longer 
constructed under the leadership of Western agencies, donors and companies. Nowadays, countries like 
China, Brazil or India have their own hydropower industries, contractors and investors. Often, these 
actors are parastatal entities that are eager to compete internationally for large-scale projects. Beyond the 
economic benefits for the companies involved, these activities are part of a strategy to secure resources and 
geopolitical influence spheres by emerging regional powers, a process that is well under way in Nepal as 
both India and China are keen to expand their power position in the region. This process is transforming 
formerly peripheral places like the upper Arun valley into areas of high strategic importance. 
 
 
The dream of a dam 
The Arun, or Bum-chu in Tibetan, is one of the seven tributaries of the Kosi (or Koshi) River, a left 
tributary of the Ganges. The Kosi is also known as the ‘sorrow of Bihar’ that every few years floods big 
areas of the eastern Gangetic Plain of Northern India. Draining the highest part of the Himalayas, the 
Kosi’s catchment area contains six of the world’s fourteen eight-thousanders, with Mount Everest at its 
centre. Unlike most of Nepal’s streams, the Arun originates in Tibet, on the northern slopes of Mount 
Shishapangma in Nyalam County. After heading east for 300km, she suddenly turns south and breaks 
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through the Himalayan main ridge right between the massifs of Makalu and Kanchenjunga; hence she 
drains a much larger catchment area than most rivers in the country. Despite the arid character of her 
Tibetan watershed, this gives the Arun a higher minimum flow than the streams originating on the south 
slope of the Himalayas. Therefore, she has for a long time been considered as one of the most suitable 
rivers for hydropower development, since in Nepal, where half of the annual rainfall is concentrated on 
fifteen days, hydropower plants can only run at a fraction of their potential during most of the year. A 
second explanation why Japanese, Canadian and German hydropower companies (and later Indian and 
US-American as well) were so eager to develop this particular dam so far removed from any existing 
infrastructure, was provided to me by Sushil, one of the former Anti-Arun activists. According to him, all 
this interest was directly connected to the fantastic Karnali Chisapani Multipurpose Project in the Far 
West of Nepal. Similarly to Arun-3, this massive storage and irrigation project with an estimated installed 
capacity of 10,800 MW was also invented in the Mid-1980s. Arun-3 would have then only served as a 
first test balloon and a way of establishing a strong presence in Nepal (Interview 1). 
 
	  
Ill. 2: The seven tributaries of the Kosi with the Arun watershed hachured (Shrestha 1989: 7). 	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Already in 1982, a Japanese feasibility study had defined the sinuosity of the Arun near Phyaksinda in the 
upper Arun valley in Sankhuwasabha district as the best location for a dam in the whole Kosi river system 
in Nepal and labelled the site as Arun No. 3 (MoWR and JICA 1985). There, the Arun leaves its 
southern course, turns for nearly 180 degrees and runs north for three kilometres before performing a 
second turn that brings its course back to a southern direction. This river loop seemed very favourable for 
the construction of a diversion tunnel. At this time, democratic parties were banned in Nepal and King 
Birendra ruled the country autocratically through a corporative structure based ostensibly on traditional 
South Asian village councils. This regime was euphemistically called ‘party-less Panchayat democracy.’4 
 
Ill. 2: An invisible dam, seen from the south (His Majesty’s Government et.al. 1987a: no page). 
 
When a popular uprising that came to be known as Jana Andolan [N] (People’s Movement) led to the re-
establishment of multiparty democracy in 1990, the exploratory drillings for the tunnelling system were 
well underway. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the German Kreditanstalt für 
Wideraufbau (KfW) served as the prospective lead donors for the 1.1 billion US dollar project – by far the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Panchayat [N] literally means council of five. 
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largest investment ever to be made in Nepal. With the end of the Panchayat regime and its tight 
censorship of the press, the first overt criticism of the project appeared in the government-owned English 
daily The Rising Nepal (TRN) on 13 June 1990. Its author Dipak Gyawali (2003 [1990]) attacked the dam 
as being too expensive, too big and too far up the Arun valley to be a viable option for Nepal. As the 
project moved ahead without changes, in 1993 a small group of activists started organising a campaign 
against the scheme in Kathmandu. It mainly consisted of foreign-trained engineers, journalists, social 
scientists and lawyers. Some of them had been active in the popular uprising, some had just returned from 
abroad and all of them were keen to expand the mobilisation for democratic change into one of the most 
opaque sectors of Nepalese politics and economy: foreign-funded development. Soon they organised 
themselves into non-governmental organisations (NGOs), most notably the Alliance for Energy (AfE) and 
later the Arun Concerned Group (ACG). The first criticised Arun-3 mainly on economic grounds. 
Doubting the country’s capacity to cope with a capital expenditure twice as high as the annual budget, 
they strongly opposed the World Bank’s forty-two conditionalities tied to the loan and claimed that Nepal 
could generate the same amount of electricity much cheaper with four or five smaller hydropower projects 
in Central Nepal (Alliance for Energy 1993). The ACG activists followed this line of critique developed 
by the AfE, but aware of emerging global discourses in the 1990s, they added two more arguments to 
consolidate their campaign: the claim that the dam project would seriously threaten indigenous groups and 
the environment in the project area. It was mainly through these additional arguments that the 
international civil society realised the potential of the Arun-3 controversy for its purposes. 
In 1994, the ACG brought the complaint against the Arun-3 dam before the newly established Inspection 
Panel of the World Bank. It was the first case to be examined through this mechanism. After nine months 
of investigation, the panel delivered a highly critical report concluding that it is “doubtful that the project’s 
mitigatory environmental and social measures can be implemented within the time frame proposed by 
IDA” (The Inspection Panel 1995: 5). Within five weeks of the final report of the Panel, the newly 
appointed President of the World Bank James Wolfensohn decided to withdraw funding for the 
controversial project. Other donors followed suit and the project was frozen in 1995 (Bissell 2003). 
Wolfensohn’s decision has to be understood in the context of the intense pressure exerted on the World 
Bank through a well-organised transnational campaign by a network of local, national and transnational 
NGOs. It accused the Bank of not taking responsibility for the often-disastrous effects of their credits and 
thus not being accountable to those adversely affected by its projects (Clark et al. 2003; Fox and Brown 
1998; Danaher 1994). Both the Inspection Panel and the World Commission on Dams were created in 
response to numerous cases of resistance against Bank funded projects around the world. The most iconic 
of these struggles was arguably the successful campaign against the highly controversial Sardar Sarovar 
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dam, the largest scheme in the Narmada Valley Development Project in India. The activists had shown 
that, contrary to the claims of the Bank, the dam would displace several hundred thousand people without 
a proper mitigation plan and create significant environmental destruction (Khagram 2004; Baviskar 1995). 
This campaign was one of the first examples were NGOs from the global South and the West 
campaigned side by side for mutual benefit. Whereas the former could provide powerful narratives of the 
displaced people and a very direct account of their plight, the latter were versed in the workings of donor 
agencies and Western media outlets. Therefore, when the ACG made its appearance through the request 
for inspection, organisations like the International Rivers Network, Friends of the Earth, Urgewald or the 
Environmental Defense Fund were all too ready to jump on board and join the protest. As I will show, 
however, this collaboration severely altered the line of critique: from a project that had been attacked for 
its bad economics by engineers and economists in Kathmandu, Arun-3 was now criticised along the lines 
established during the Narmada controversy and depicted as a social and environmental disaster by the 
Anti-World Bank coalition in Washington, DC, Bonn and elsewhere. 
 
 
The Maoist Insurgency and the Civil War 
Arguably the most important reason why thirteen years elapsed between the cancellation and the 
reincarnation of the Arun-3 dam was the armed Maoist insurgency in 1996 that led to a decade long 
conflict between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Nepalese state. While both the Indian Tata 
as well as Enron from the United States unsuccessfully tried to revive the project shortly after the World 
Bank’s exit in 1995, around the millennium foreign investors, their governments and finally even the 
Nepalese state apparatus came to understand that the Maoist uprising would not take care of itself and 
would make any large-scale infrastructure projects outside the urban centres next to impossible. In 2001 
King Gyanendra Shah decided to deploy the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) to fight the PLA as he saw both 
the police as well as the newly established Armed Police Force not fit to deal with the insurgency. Until 
then the conflict had been relatively confined, both geographically (in the Mid-Western hill districts 
around Rolpa and Rukum) as well as in terms of causalities. This decision, however, turned the armed 
uprising into a full-fledged civil war. The following four years saw an exponential increase in the number 
of fatalities (according to (Einsiedel et al. 2012: 20) 80% of the people reported dead during the whole 
conflict were killed between 2002 and 2005). Furthermore, this militarization did not stop the PLA’s 
advance and by the time then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006, the Maoists were able to deny the state 
control over around 80% of its territory. While this does not mean that they were ruling over all this 
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territory, in many areas they indeed had established their own parastatal structures, especially ‘People’s 
Governments’ and ‘People’s Courts.’ Two years later, in 2008, the King had to resign after a month long 
mass-movement against monarchy (either referred to as loktantrik andolan [N] [democracy movement] or 
as jana andolan II [N] [people’s movement-II, thereby understanding it as a continuation of the 1990 jana 
andolan]) that was backed by both the Maoists and the parliamentary parties. With the parliament 
declaring the state a republic in May 2008 one of the main demands that sparked the civil war was 
fulfilled. During the conflict at least 13,000 people died (OHCHR 2012: 3) while tens of thousands were 
internally displaced. Thousands have disappeared and in 2013 still 951 persons were missing (ICRC 2013: 
3). 
The uprising started on 13 February 1996 with a series of coordinated attacks on police stations, foreign 
companies and the family of a moneylender in six different districts of the country. Shortly beforehand, 
the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN [M], now UCPN [M]) had submitted a list of forty 
demands to the government complete with the threat that non-compliance would lead to an armed 
insurrection. Among these was the call for an end to monarchy and the introduction of ‘people’s 
democracy,’ a land reform and the repeal of the Mahakali treaty that “allows Indian imperialist monopoly 
of Nepal’s water resources,” (Thapa and Sijapati 2003: 392) but also the postulation that “vulgar Hindi 
films, videos and magazines should be immediately outlawed” (ibid). For the first years, the strategy of the 
PLA followed the first attack with remote police stations, branch offices of banks, large landowners and 
moneylenders in the hill districts of Mid-Western Nepal as main targets. Especially the redistribution of 
land and money that often followed successful assaults combined with their anti-feudal, anti-casteist 
rhetoric strengthened their following among the underprivileged and marginalised, especially dalit 
communities and indigenous minorities. Another important reason for the Maoists’ popularity was their 
strong commitment to women’s emancipation: not only was approximately one third of the troops female, 
but the women’s wing of the party – the All Nepal Women’s Association (Revolutionary) – grew into a 
mass organisation during the armed conflict. After the deployment of the army, its campaigns banning 
alcoholism and gambling were among the most visible techniques of establishing rule in a highly 
complicated war with frequently shifting front lines. Despite all of this it is important to note that the 
central committee of the party nonetheless has been clearly dominated by high caste men since the 
inception of the ‘people’s war (jana yuddha [N])’. With the deployment of the army and the escalation of 
the war over most of Nepal’s territory, however, the Maoists lost many supporters as some of their wings 
started to abduct and kill human rights activists and journalists. While the central command of the party 
had always been careful to condemn any atrocities against civilians, in the last years of the conflict it often 
seemed as if it was unable to exert direct control over all its cadres. Furthermore, many civilians were 
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caught between the lines of PLA and RNA with both armies demanding food, shelter and forcing people 
to provide them with information about the enemy. Both armies also conducted forced recruitment in 
many areas, further increasing the rural flight in connection to the conflict. 
In 2005 King Gyanendra dissolved the government under the pretext of its apparent inability to organise 
general elections and assumed absolute power. He suspended rights of association, put the media under 
tight censorship and appointed a number of ministers directly while the army started to arrest senior 
political leaders, journalists and members of civil society. This move was the main reason for the broad 
alliance between the parliamentary parties, the Maoists and wide sections of civil society that led to the 
end of the armed conflict in the following year. An interim government stripped King Gyanendra of all 
his rights in May 2006, but it took until May 2008 for him to officially resign and the declaration of 
republic (Lecomte-Tilouine 2009: 268). 
With the main bases of the Maoists in the hill districts of Mid-Western Nepal, it took a couple of years 
until the conflict reached Eastern Nepal. But by the time the peace agreement was signed in November 
2006, most of North Eastern Nepal was under Maoist control as well. During my fieldwork in 2010 and 
2011, the Maoist movement still was a very important political factor in the upper Arun valley. It had a 
strong following among the indigenous communities in the area and its candidate Purna Prasad Rai came 
first in the Constituent Assembly elections in 2008. As late as 2010, the UCPN (M) in Sankhuwasabha 
reactivated its People’s Court in clear violation of the peace accord and started handing out verdicts (The 
Himalayan Times 2010). 
During the 2013 Constituent Assembly elections, however, the UCPN (M) was clearly defeated by both 
other major political parties, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-
Leninist) (CPN [UML]). This result followed a trend throughout the country with the Maoists losing the 
majority of their constituencies outside their strongholds in the Mid-Western hill districts where the 
armed insurgency originated. 
 
 
The cancelation of the cancelation 
In spring 2008, while the seven parliamentary parties and the CPN (M) were still negotiating the terms 
for an end of the armed conflict, the interim government under Nepali Congress veteran Girija Prasad 
Koirala floated a tender for the resumption of Nepal’s most controversial infrastructure project. But the 
institutional circumstances for such projects had fundamentally changed between 1990 and 2008. Whereas 
the first incarnation of Arun-3 was planned under the guidance of the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) 
with the government as borrower and with the intention of satisfying the growing electricity demand 
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within the country, the recent attempt is guided by a completely different logic: the framework of Build-
Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) within the new public management logic of public-private-partnerships 
(PPP). After an international bidding procedure, the project was awarded to the Indian state-owned Satluj 
Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited (SJVN) in return for the better part of the generated energy that will be exported 
to India. In the meantime, SJVN has announced that it plans to increase the installed capacity from 402 
MW according to the old project design to 900 MW. 
So, one of the main paradoxes in the history of the Arun-3 is how a dam supposed to secure the domestic 
electricity supply of Nepal was transformed into an export-oriented project that will be built by a foreign 
company. Due to the severe power shortage, a wide set of people interested in hydropower – academics, 
consultants, activists, former or current bureaucrats, environmentalists, Nepalese and foreign NGO staff 
members, as well as former members of the NEA - in Kathmandu oppose this new arrangement. This is 
not to say they have a shared opinion on the project as such; quite the contrary is the case. But no matter 
whether they believe the dam should have been built long ago or not, none of my interlocutors were in 
favour of the reincarnation of Arun-3 as a project for exporting electricity to India. 
 
 
An influential Thing 
Despite the fact that the Arun-3 dam remains unbuilt to this day, it is a very good thing to think with – 
probably even more so because of its non-existence. Not only has it become an infamous topos that is 
invoked on a regular basis in discussion of failed development in Nepal, it has also had far-reaching 
repercussions on a global level. This work will show, its evaluation, re-evaluation and eventual cancellation 
were fundamental in the coming into being of a new paradigm of doing big hydropower in the global 
South for Western agencies while its recent reincarnation shows how much the industry and the property 
relations are changing with the advent of new actors from emerging powers like India and China. 
Contemplating the chequered history of Arun-3, I soon became aware of the fact that conceptualising the 
dam itself as a simple object – or, even, a non-object – hardly takes account of the multiplicity of 
entangled relations and exchanges its cancellation and reincarnation represent. As Timothy Mitchell 
(2002: 30) has argued with recourse to Karl Marx: “Through exchange, the powers of objects take on a 
consciousness and a will.” His insightful discussion of the relations between the construction of the Aswan 
High Dam in Egypt and the triangle of war, malaria and agriculture shows impressively that “[i]n practice 
the nonhuman elements are never so passive” (ibid: 299).  
Recently there has been an ever-increasing interest in tracing the various ways in which humans and non-
humans are co-constituted. This return to one of the classic themes of social and cultural anthropology has 
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most pronouncedly emerged from the field of science and technology studies. The most influential figure 
in this respect has arguably been Bruno Latour. His reconsideration and expansion of notions of agency 
beyond human actors has yielded the by now widespread concept of the actant: “an actant is a source of 
action that can be either human or nonhuman; it is that which has efficacy, can do things, has sufficient 
coherence to make a difference, produce effects, alter the course of events,” as Jane Bennett (2001: viii, 
emphasis in original) summarises. Along these lines, Latour criticises the poverty of predominant 
conceptualisations of objects as purely passive matter and instead proposes his concept of the thing. For 
him a thing is an entity that escapes its materiality, an entanglement of material, semiotic and affective 
practices, or a “pattern of emotions and disruptions, of disagreements and agreements” (Latour 2005a: 15). 
For too long, he claims, things have been wrongly portrayed as matters-of-facts whereas he demands to 
reconceptualise them as matters-of-concern. “They are much more interesting, variegated, uncertain, 
complicated, far reaching, heterogeneous, risky, historical, local, material and networky than the pathetic 
version offered for too long by philosophers” (ibid: 21). Taking recourse to Martin Heidegger, he defines 
the thing through its peculiar etymology “that designated originally a certain type of archaic assembly” 
(ibid: 22), still alive in the Icelandic Allthing and relates it thereby to the Latin res – as in res publica. Such a 
thing, then, is “the issue that brings people together because it divides them” (ibid, emphasis in original). 
I believe this is a very suitable way of framing the Arun-3 project and to come to terms with the complex 
and far-reaching consequences this never realised dam has had so far. Following James Ferguson’s (2011) 
suggestion to consider objects of anthropological inquiry both as relations and as sets of practices, this 
thesis is an attempt to trace the relations the Arun-3 project has created among a far-reaching set of actors 
around the globe. It also investigates the new sets of practices that emerged out of its cancelation and as 
well as those that are driving its recent reincarnation. I argue that this specific hydropower scheme is a 
particularly rich vantage point from which to understand what has happened to large dams in the global 
South over the last twenty-five years and, why despite all these changes, they still serve as a remarkably 
powerful symbol of development and a promise for progress. 
 
 
Arun-3 in perspective 
The literature on Arun-3 is not particularly rich. The project and its cancellation are often cited in passing 
in the literature on transnational organisations, environmentalism and the global civil society (Jones 2012; 
Bosshard 2010; Hill 2008; Hachhethu 2006; Gutner 2005; Goldman 2005, 2004; Mallaby 2004; Delcore 
2003; World Commission on Dams 2000; Guthman 1997; Nelson 1997; Caufield 1996; Chatterjee 1996) 
and in work on hydropower, Himalayan water resources and India-Nepal trans-border issues (Dhungel 
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and Pun 2009; Biggs 2008; Gautam and Karki 2004; Bandyopadhyay 2002; Pandey 1996). There are a 
handful of papers dealing directly with the controversy (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007; Bissell 2003; Gyawali 2003 
[1997]; Armbrecht Forbes 1999a; Udall 1998; Paranjapye 1994). Beyond that, the conflict between those 
who bemoan the cancellation of the dam in 1995 and those who were instrumental in the abandoning of 
the project, is far from resolved in Nepal. Every now and then, a new piece on the issue appears, mostly in 
the national media, but also in scientific papers and books (for the perspective of the proponents see Pun 
2010 or Mahat 2005, for the opponents Shrestha 2009). Since his first public criticism of the project in 
the government-owned daily The Rising Nepal in 1990 (see Chapter 3), Dipak Gyawali has been writing 
on Arun-3 extensively over the last twenty years, consistently arguing that the cancellation had nothing to 
do with issues of resettlement and environmental concerns, but was a purely economic decision (e.g. 
Gyawali 2013; Gyawali and Dixit 2010) – an explanation that stems from his personal and consistent 
involvement in the opposition against the project but tends to gloss over the complexity of the issues at 
hand. Chapters 3 and 4 will be an attempt to put the different strands of opposition in perspective and 
show that is was actually the interplay of several different events at a specific historical moment that 
rendered the Arun-3 dam impossible. The only book so far dealing exclusively with the project is Anna 
Paskal’s “The Water Gods” (2000), a revised version of her 1995 Bachelor thesis that tells the story of a 
visit to Nepal including a trek to the dam site as part of an international activists’ campaign. I will engage 
with her account in Chapter 3. 
Only one paper seems to use the Arun case to illustrate a more general argument. In a recent contribution 
to a theory of democratisation based on what he calls ‘a culture of decency,’ Michael Thompson (2002: 
356) refers to Arun-3 to prove that “‘development’ in Nepal […] is destructive of democracy both at the 
macro-level […] and at the micro-level.” Unfortunately, his attempt to juxtapose the political ethics of the 
Duke of Wellington with cultural theory of risk in the tracks of Mary Douglas and underpin it with 
examples like the Arun-3 dam remains sketchy at best. 
 
 
Dams and social science 
Beyond the narrow discussion of this specific dam, there is of course a rich literature on hydropower in the 
social sciences (e.g. Spilsbury 2011; Johansson & Kriström 2011; UNDP 2011; Cummings 2009; 
McCully 2001). And while many of these studies engage with controversial interventions, displacement 
and resistance, practically all of them deal with actually existing dams. One of the rare examples that 
discuss another cancelled dam is Kaushik Ghosh’s (2006) work on the Koel-Karo project in Jharkhand, 
Central India – and as it seems this one has been revived recently as well (Biswas 2011). Koel-Karo 
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represents one of the few examples of an indigenous, grass-roots campaign that successfully prevented a 
dam project over a period of now nearly forty years. Still, it has attracted little media attention, according 
to Ghosh – and even less academic interest, one could add to prove the apparent disinterest of social 
scientists in cancelled dams. Starting from the affected adivasis’5 staunch refusal to be co-opted into the 
dam project, Ghosh presents a rich account of the dividing lines between them and the middle-class 
indigenous activists who, in the name of development, try to convince them to accept the government’s 
plans to resettlement and compensation. Therefore, Koel-Karo represents a counter-example to my case at 
hand where the majority of affected people are strongly in favour of the dam while the indigenous activists 
are critical towards it. Gosh draws a fine-grained picture of how the recognition of indigenous claims to 
land actually reinforces essentialist practices of tribal othering and leads to a form of ‘exclusive 
governmentality.’ 
The anthropological engagement with hydropower development and its impacts on displaced people 
started already in the 1960s (Ingersoll 1968), but publications remained scarce and mostly restricted to 
Canada (e.g. Rogers 1971) and Europe (e.g. Paine 1982) until the late 1980s. With the growing 
controversies over dam building in the 1990s, research increased steadily. Seen in the wider context of 
social science, most of the publications on large-scale hydropower development focus on three topics: (a) 
‘local’ resistance, (b) transnational donors and questions of accountability and (c) civil society and 
transnational networks of activists. Studies on resistance by affected people include Erich Haag’s (2004) 
historical account of the movement against the Urseren project that resulted in the employment of the 
Swiss Army in Andermatt in 1946 or Jun Jing’s (1999) and Robert Fletcher’s (2001) work on resettlement 
in Northwest China respectively Chile. Other scholars have focused on the practice of foreign donors and 
transnational organisations like the World Bank and the transnational networks of activists that have been 
challenging the global development regime for the past three decades (e.g. Anders 2008; Clark, Fox, and 
Treakle 2003; Fox and Brown 1998; Harper 1998). Sometimes, all three groups of actors are integrated in 
the analysis with activists forming alliances with local communities against resettlement plans and the loss 
of patrimonial land financed by international institutions as in some of the work on the Sardar Sarovar 
project on the Indian Narmada river (e.g. Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007; Khagram 2004; Fisher 1995). The dam 
controversies in India, especially the conflicts around the Tehri and the Narmada projects, represented 
important conditions of possibility for the Anti-Arun-3 mobilisation, as Chapter 3 will show. 
Amita Baviskar’s (1995) astute analysis of the relations between Bhilala adivasis and the Narmada Bachao 
Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement – NBA) serves as an important point of reference for my work. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The word adivasi is used all over South Asia as an umbrella term for minority groups that claim to be indigenous to 
a certain territory. 
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Baviskar develops a theoretical framework that draws heavily on Ecological Marxism to explain how a 
gigantic river development scheme like the Narmada project could take shape in post-colonial India. She 
sees the project as a mistaken endeavour guided by a high-modernist ideology based on heavy 
industrialisation and irrigated agriculture that solely focuses on the aspirations of a small nationalist elite 
while neglecting the needs of the poor half of the population for whom “development has been a distant 
phenomenon, watched from the wayside” (ibid: 25). Baviskar recounts her motivation to live with the 
adivasis to “discover their relationship with nature, how it changed with development […], and their 
struggle to create an ecologically sustainable and socially just alternative world” (ibid: 48). Her 
preconception of these people is informed by the way intellectuals sympathetic to post-development 
approaches tended to depict them as noble savages who live in perfect harmony with nature and resist 
development interventions in an attempt to save their modes of livelihood and cultural difference. As her 
ethnography of the Bhilala shows, things are way more complex than these romanticising and patronising 
representations. Consequently, she asks:  
 
Does the lived reality of tribal people today allow the formulation of a critique of 
development? What is the tribal relationship with nature today? How do people, whose 
struggles are the subject of theories of liberation and social change, perceive their own 
situation? […] Given the problematic nature of tribal resource use, how accurately are the 
lives of tribal people represented by intellectuals in the environmental movement who speak 
on their behalf (ibid: vii-viii)? 
 
For one, she shows that adivasi politics is not restricted to the NBA. But beyond that, her book 
impressively engages with the messy internal politics of this movement, the complex relationship between 
adivasi, upper-caste landowners and urban intellectuals who have been concerned with  
 
ironing out the awkward parts of the movement […] in order to demonstrate that the 
movement constitutes a theoretically satisfying challenge to the developmental state, even 
though the reality in the valley is more ambiguous” (ibid: 227).  
 
These practices, Baviskar concludes, reify the grassroots and with their attempts “to demonstrate that the 
critique of development actually exists in the lives of adivasis […they…] end up creating caricatures (ibid: 
240). This attempt to deal with the micro-politics, the internal conflict lines and contradictions within 
NGO networks that encompass a complex set of different actors was an important sources of inspiration 
for my own work on the front lines within the Anti-Arun network and those between the activists and the 
people in Arun valley (see Chapter 3). 
One recent example that attempts to analyse an even further-reaching network of contradicting opinions 
on a dam is Jon Abbink’s (2012) discussion of the Ethiopian Gibe-3 project. His article juxtaposes the 
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positions of the government, international financial institutions, Western press and NGOs, the Ethiopian 
diaspora opposition and independent researchers with the “views and interests of local people” (ibid: 126). 
As I hope has become obvious by now, this research focus resembles mine (and the unfinished business of 
Gibe-3 is another similarity between the two cases), but given the restricted space of a journal article, 
Abbink’s account of the controversies between a ‘high-modernist’ developmental state obsessed with dam 
construction and the other mentioned actors lack in detail. Despite his critique that there is very little 
knowledge about the affected people, their ideas or opinions on the dam, Abbink himself fails to engage 
intensively with their position and mentions only in passing their fears about food insecurity and conflicts 
between different groups as well as their rejection of planned irrigated plantations on their grazing lands. 
Ironically, he also does not shed any light on who these people are. Building on James Scott’s (1998) 
analysis of state interventions for the purposes of social engineering, Abbink identifies Gibe-3 and the 
accompanying irrigation schemes as a project by the Ethiopian state to extend its reach, bring in foreign 
companies and workers and disempower the local population. In his very schematic projection of the 
future, he sees these people then rendered dispensable, a surplus population (Li 2009) with little political 
autonomy and marginal agency that can easily be displaced. 
Christoph Campregher (2010) presents a more ethnographically grounded account of a dam controversy. 
He works on the Costa Rican El Diquis dam – another project that is currently in the planning stages – 
and confines his investigation to the social scientists employed by the project, a group of indigenous 
activists opposing it, and a study he himself had conducted on the issue several years earlier as an 
independent researcher. These three contradicting versions of the dam, Campregher claims, correspond 
with the three main lines of thought in the anthropology of development as outlined by David Lewis and 
David Mosse (2006): instrumental, deconstructivist and interactional. Following the tradition of Actor-
Network-Theory he treats these three accounts as ‘symmetrical:’ that means he conceptualises them as 
equally valid accounts of the world and abstains from considering any of them more ‘correct’ than the 
others. Through his exact mapping of the mutual relations of and the internal conflicts within the three 
actors involved, he shows how, despite the contrariety of their representations of reality, all of them 
depend on each other in order to construct their contradicting versions of the dam. Thereby, he argues, 
they form chains of translation and “intend to become obligatory points of passage for the others in the 
network of human and non-human allies” (Campregher 2010: 799). 
Considering the social scientific literature on hydropower construction in Nepal, the most extensive recent 
account is Kavita Rai’s (2005, 2007) work on the Kali Gandaki ‘A’ project in Central Nepal. Interestingly 
enough, the development of this scheme was one of the main consequences of the Arun-3 cancellation. It 
featured prominently in the ‘alternative scenario’ of the Alliance for Energy and was mainly financed by 
Introduction 
- 20 - 
the Asian Development Bank and the Japan International Cooperation Agency that had stayed out of 
Arun-3. Rai’s work is focused on the impacts of the dam on social inequality in the affected villages 
surrounding the dam site. Rai argues that through the influx of compensation payments as well as project 
officials, external contractors and wage labourers the local economy and old patron-client relations 
underwent considerable changes. Against the argument that such interventions tend to enrich the already 
better-off while putting an extra burden on marginal households, her material actually shows the opposite: 
Rai (2005: 199) argues that in the case of Kali Gandaki ‘A,’ poor, lower-caste households managed to 
lessen the dependency from their patrons. On the other hand, this increased economic equality has not 
removed the boundaries of purity and impurity. Not surprisingly, Rai also points to the fact that the dam 
construction reinforced patriarchal decision-making structures in high-caste Hindu families much 
stronger than in others, as girls were married off earlier “as a step to protect them from men from outside” 
(ibid: 201). 
 
 
Anthropology and Development 
This thesis is an attempt to delineate the transition of a development project from post-World War II 
foreign aid planning to its privatised reincarnation within a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer framework. In 
1990, when the masses flocked the streets of Kathmandu to force King Birendra to re-establish democracy 
and German consultants were overseeing exploratory drillings at the Arun-3 dam site, James Ferguson 
published his landmark study on development and bureaucratisation in Lesotho. This book was followed 
by a multiplicity of publications that led to a radically altered discussion of the very concept of 
development in anthropology. Ferguson’s ‘anti-politics machine’ (1990) broke away from an instrumental 
view of development so far prevalent in anthropology and applied the approach of Michel Foucault’s 
discourse analysis to the study of a development programme in Lesotho. His main argument was that the 
alleged failures of development interventions were indeed success stories on a different level: in the 
strengthening of governmental structures through an increased bureaucratisation. This is what Ferguson 
calls the development apparatus, a complex of institutions that generates its own form of discourse and 
constantly reproduces itself through its very own failure, thereby manufacturing specific forms of 
governmentality that depoliticise everything they touch. Development becomes an unquestionable meta-
narrative, an anti-politics machine. Ferguson states that the effects of development occur “behind the 
backs or against the wills of even the most powerful actors” (ibid: 18). Therefore, he chooses to use the 
term machine 
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to capture something of the way that conceptual and discursive systems link up with social 
institutions and processes without even approximately determining the form or defining the 
logic of the outcome. As one cog in the ‘machine,’ the planning apparatus is not the ‘source’ 
of whatever structural changes may have come about, but only one among a number of links 
in the mechanism that produces them (ibid: 275). 
 
Shortly after that, in 1992, the sociologist Wolfgang Sachs published his Development Dictionary, 
starting with the programmatic statement: “The last forty years can be called the age of development. This 
epoch is coming to an end. The time is ripe to write its obituary” (Sachs 1992: 1). Similar in its approach 
to analyse development as a discursive practice, this edited volume went a step further than Ferguson with 
its normative claim that development was first and foremost a form of power/knowledge invented by the 
West as a reaction to the independence of the former colonies in the aftermath of World War II that 
should be abandoned. As many before and after him, in his dictionary entry on development Gustavo 
Esteva identifies 20 January 1949 as foundational moment for the age of development when Harry S. 
Truman in his inaugural speech promised “a program of development based on the concepts of democratic 
fair dealing” (ibid: 6). Esteva (ibid: 7), however, turns this proclamation on its head by stating that on this 
very day “two billion people became underdeveloped.” Sachs’ dictionary was probably the first academic 
work that took such a resolutely anti-development stance. But it stands out for a second particularity that 
should prove to be another important defining feature of this new school of thought and the struggles for 
an end of the oppression of the global South through the omnipresent discursive practices of development 
that were taking shape in the early 1990s: the strong inter-linkage between scholars and activists from all 
over the world on theoretical, political as well as personal levels. “This book […] is the fruit of friendship. 
Over the years, all of us authors […] have been involved in a continuous conversation, spending days or 
weeks together chatting, cooking, travelling, studying and celebrating” (ibid: 5). In other words, the 
subsequent rise of the global civil society, the transnational campaign under the heading ‘50 years is 
enough’ that told the Bretton-Woods Institutions to either ‘reform or die’ was closely connected to this 
intellectual project of post-development and can not be thought about without considering it. Activists 
and intellectuals around the globe enthusiastically greeted this paradigmatic shift of perspective from the 
actuality of development and its failures to the discursive frame that sustained it (e.g. Roy 2001; Danaher 
1994). 
The anthropologist most directly related to post-development approaches is arguably Arturo Escobar. His 
highly influential work on ‘encountering development’ also starts from Foucault and argues that “the 
development discourse […] has created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, 
and the exercise of power over, the Third World” (Escobar 1995: 9). Building on the work of Edward 
Said (1979), V. Y. Mudimbe (1988), Timothy Mitchell (1988), Chandra Mohanty (1991) and Homi 
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Bhabha (1990), he identifies development as a regime of representation as well as a place of encounter 
“where identities are constructed and also where violence is originated, symbolized, and managed” 
(Escobar 1995: 10) and reads it as a continuation of ‘the colonial encounter’ (cf. Asad 1973). Following 
from this unmasking of development as a historically produced discourse, Escobar claims that the way 
forward could only be a deconstruction of this discourse. At the same time, he argues in line with 
Mohanty (1991), this deconstructive mission has to go hand in hand with a project of reconstruction. To 
him “this simultaneous project could focus strategically on the collective action of social movements: they 
struggle not only for goods and services but also for the very definition of life, economy, nature, and 
society. They are, in short, cultural struggles” (Escobar 1995: 16). One of his main conclusions – and one 
of the main lines of his subsequent work – is therefore, a call to focus on the ways in which people in the 
global South have been resisting development interventions and to engage them in a discussion to imagine 
an alternative to development. Subsequently, post-development gained traction among academics and 
activists around the globe, leading to a highly productive discussion (e.g. Ziai 2007; Rahnema 1997; Rist 
1997).  
While the two most significant hypotheses of this school of thought have seldom been contested – i.e. that 
the classic concept of development on the one hand is Eurocentric and on the other hand has 
authoritarian and technocratic implications – this categorical attack on development and the call for its 
outright abandonment led to a heated debate. One common line of critique on these deconstructivist 
approaches from within anthropology has been the pragmatic demurral that the issues connected to both 
development work and discourse – from growing global inequality to environmental degradation – are real 
and therefore there remains an urgent need for anthropologists to engage with them (e.g. Edelman and 
Haugerud 2005; Olivier de Sardan 2005). Another objection, structurally related to some of the responses 
to Edward Said’s (1979) landmark work on Orientalism, accused the ‘post-developmentalists’ of not 
taking into account the heterogeneity of development projects and their tendency to represent 
development discourse as omnipotent and monolithic. Recent studies (e.g. Mosse 2005; Harrison 2003) 
have argued that the ‘development machine’ is far from being a consistent system of domination that turns 
whole societies into passive recipients of foreign aid. 
Other critics have pointed to post-development’s essentializing praise for social movements that was 
considered methodologically inconsistent as they on one side proclaimed an all-pervasive discourse, while 
on the other side social movements seemed somehow to operate outside of it. Beyond that, the celebration 
of the indigenous and its juxtaposition to an authoritative, extractive, often corrupt state was accused of a 
covert neoliberal agenda of privatisation that did not take into account that the interventions of NGOs 
could be as destructive as those of the state (Kiely 1999). The most astute critique of post-development I 
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find however the observation put forward by James Smith (2008: 3-4) that the deconstructivist movement 
starting in the late 1980s was attacking a development regime that was already ceasing to exist. With the 
emergence of structural adjustment and radical free-market ideology, its attack on large state and 
international institutions was happening at the same time as these actors were radically changing the rules 
of the game and their own rules of engagement. 
Two decades later, development is still around and I believe it is safe to say that the end of its age is 
nowhere to be seen. This, however, does not mean that the deconstructivist critique put forward did not 
have an impact. This thesis is an attempt to show how developmental agencies like the World Bank 
reacted to the challenges by critical scholarship and civil society mobilisation in the 1990s and how these 
interventions changed the way the World Bank is doing business in an unforeseeable way: it managed to 
incorporate the critique, co-opt many of its fiercest opponents into its system of knowledge production 
and re-invented itself through a new modus operandi that Michael Goldman (2005) aptly identified as 
green neoliberalism (see Chapter 3). The Arun-3 project was instrumental in the coming-into being of 
this new development paradigm. But there is a second tectonic shift in international development politics 
that might prove to be even more important than the greening of Western donor agencies following the 
example of the Bank: the manifold increase of the money spent on development projects abroad by 
countries like China, India or Brazil as a result of the rise of a new, multi-polar system of world politics 
and economics. I will deal with this topic in more detail in connection to the reincarnation of the Arun-3 
dam through the Indian company SJVN in Chapter 7. 
Coming back to the anthropology of development, recently several voices have proposed to move beyond 
the normative debate of whether development should be reformed or abandoned and focus on an 
ethnographic engagement with development as a practice. David Mosse argues for a ‘new ethnography of 
development’ reminding us that “the ethnographic question is not whether but how development projects 
work” (Mosse 2005: 8, emphasis in original). One example for such an approach is Tania Li’s (2007) 
ethnography on improvement programs in Indonesia that explores both the ‘improvers,’ the agencies and 
their employees who plan these interventions as well as the rural populations and places they target. To 
translate the ‘will to improve’ into concrete programs, she argues, two key practices are required: 
problematization, i.e. the ability to identify “deficiencies that need to be rectified” (ibid: 7) and “rendering 
technical,” following the aforementioned work by Ferguson and Mitchell who show how this process is 
disembowelling development interventions of their political implications. While drawing heavily on work 
informed by Foucauldian conceptions of discourse and governmentality, Li cautions us not to imagine 
these as all-persuasive and instead draws our attention on the limits of their reach. Skilfully connecting 
this body of theory with both Marxian political economy and Gramsci’s work on hegemony, she shows 
Introduction 
- 24 - 
how fragile attempts to improvement through specific development projects are. This theoretical hybridity 
– Li calls it untidiness – leads to a highly productive account that brings together an “analysis of 
governmental interventions (their genealogy, their diagnoses and prescriptions, their constitutive 
exclusions) and analysis of what happens when those interventions become entangled with the processes 
they would regulate and improve” (ibid: 27). What is relevant for my case here and where I see a similarity 
in Li’s project and mine is her intention “to explore the positionings that enable people to practice a 
critical politics. I also explore positionings formed through the will to improve: the position of trustee, and 
the position of deficient subjects whose conduct is to be conducted” (ibid: 24). These three positionings 
are fundamental in the Arun-3 controversy as well: the activists, the experts and the directly affected 
people. 
 
 
Situating civil society and the state of Nepal 
The second thematic thread that is running through this work is its concern with another chronically 
fickle subject: the concept of civil society. Not only was the Anti-Arun-3 campaign the first transnational 
civil society movement that originated from Nepal, but also the recent re-invention of the controversial 
dam project has sparked civil society mobilisation in the region, Kathmandu and Europe. Despite the fact 
that the term ‘civil society’ already appears in John Locke’s (1960 [1690]) Two Treatises of Government 
and was a significant category in the work of the Scottish enlightenment philosopher Adam Ferguson 
(1995 [1767]), the concept did not gain much prominence until the 1990s. Adam Seligman (2002: 14) 
proposes that the idea of civil society emerged at the end of the seventeenth century to come to terms with 
a crisis in social order similar to the one that has led to its recent resurgence. But, as Richard Day (2005: 
53) notes, in the context of early liberalism, the meaning of ‘civil’ is much closer to ‘civilised’ than it is to 
‘private’. In Locke’s understanding, civil society is not opposed to or even differentiated from political 
society in the way it is conceptualized by recent theorists, but mainly different from an imagined ‘natural’ 
state of affairs. While this understanding is still visible in Hegel’s and Marx’s discussions of ‘bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft,’ Alexis de Tocqueville argued that the big number of associations in the United States was a 
source of democratic strength (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 124), thereby anticipating the shift in meaning that 
would only much later fully take shape. 
In the early twentieth century, Antonio Gramsci conceptualised civil society as the central venue where 
the struggle for hegemony in modern societies is enacted, the site “into which state power was projected 
and consolidated in capitalist societies, but also as a location where contestation and resistance to 
hegemonic power was possible” (ibid). In his prison notebooks (Hoare and Nowell Smith 1971: 12), he 
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asserts that modern Western societies contain of two major superstructural levels: civil society and political 
society or the state, but as his editors complain, Gramsci “did not succeed in finding a single, wholly 
satisfactory conception of ‘civil society’ or the state” (ibid: 207). Seventy years after Gramsci’s death, 
scholars are still struggling with the term and the global eruption of activist networks and non-
governmental organisations since the fall of the iron curtain has further complicated the search for a clear 
demarcation. Despite the effort of many scholars (e.g. Rupnik 1979; Keane 1988) to establish a systematic 
classification, there is very little consensus on the defining features of civil society when reviewing the vast 
literature on the subject. John and Jean Comaroff (1999: 6) suggest that its transnational appeal stems 
exactly from this polyvalence, its intrinsically protean characteristics. Along those lines Shalini Randeria 
(2007: 105) calls it a relational concept “that can only be understood in the matrix of a set of 
interdependent ideas and institutions - nation-state, market, public sphere, citizenship, rights-bearing 
individuals.” The pragmatic solution, then, is to define civil society negatively (Gellner 2010: 1), that is, to 
state what it is not: “not a part of the household, the state or the market” (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 121) – a 
strategy that is also apparent in the somehow awkward collective name ‘non-governmental organisation.’  
Furthermore, as many scholars have argued, “analysts who refer to civil society are not all talking about the 
same set of associations” (Fisher 2010: 252). To prove this point, Michael Edwards contrasts the 
libertarian Cato Institute’s vision of civil society with that of the leftist Advocacy Institute. While for the 
former it means “fundamentally reducing the role of politics in society by expanding free markets and 
individual liberty,” it is “the single most viable alternative to the authoritarian state and the tyrannical 
market” for the latter (Edwards 2009: 2). When it comes to a characterisation of NGOs, analogously 
contradictory testimonials can be found (Fisher 1997b). 
These statements show that the concepts of civil society and non-governmental organisation are highly 
essentialized categories that too often are used “as if they carry some analytic meaning when in fact they 
carry very little” (Fisher 2010: 252). Following William Fisher’s (1997b: 447) call to “break down the 
‘black box’ categories of NGO and civil society and examine the way organisations so designated operate 
in local, national, and transnational context,” Chapters 3 and 4 will retrace the civil society movement 
around the Arun-3 project from 1990 until the building freeze of the dam in 1995. Instead of thinking 
about civil society as a sector that is either in favour of or in opposition to government actions, Fisher 
suggests to focus “on the processes and not merely the institutions of civil society” (Fisher 2010: 255). To 
push this point further, I will engage with Partha Chatterjee’s (2002, 2004, 2011) new take on Gramsci’s 
distinction between civil society and political society in Chapter 3. I will argue that the main reason why 
the majority of the affected people in the Arun valley were positive towards the dam project was the 
promise to be included into the realm that Chatterjee calls political society; or, to put it differently, the 
Introduction 
- 26 - 
hope that the through the dam project the state would start to take care of its rural, marginalised citizens 
that for centuries had been discriminated against. 
Sudipta Kaviraj (2001) highlights another problem: in applying Western political and sociological theory 
to the conditions of civil society in the global South, a number of false assumptions arise. Most 
importantly, he points to the totally different relationship between the state and civil society in European 
and non-European history. Because the European bourgeoisie was generally in favour of democratisation, 
(post)colonial elites were often considered to behave in a similar fashion after the end of colonial rule over 
most of the world. But whereas Western democracies emerged out of a centuries-long struggle and a 
clear-cut opposition between civil society and the state, this was hardly the case in the postcolony. 
Through the success of nationalist movements, Kaviraj (ibid: 314) argues, “these elites laid claim to a right 
to mobilise all sections of society, and extended the state’s influence over all spheres of social life. This is 
one significant paradox of post-colonial ‘civil society’ or rather its absence.” Out of this “rare combination 
of power and utter dominance over the moral imagination of its people” (ibid.), postcolonial nationalisms 
tended towards unrealistic expectations about their abilities to facilitate economic development and an 
over-extension of the state that contributed to a process of bureaucratisation. Often, the new elites were 
keen on forging alliances with the military in an attempt to secure their position and benefice. In their 
imagination of a consensus on development and nationalism, a sphere of civil society separate from the 
state was not considered necessary. 
Read against this background, the relationship between the state and civil society in Nepal has much more 
in common with the European experience. First of all, the country was never occupied by a Western 
colonial power and the monarchy of the Shah family that established the nation state in the late 18th 
century lasted until 2008. Secondly, the system introduced by the Rana Prime Ministers who effectively 
ruled the country from 1846 until 1951 had very close resemblances to European forms of absolutism 
(Gellner 2007: 7-9): opposition was brutally oppressed, dissidents executed and education severely 
restricted. The two major political parties – Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (by now split 
up in a multiplicity of fractions) were founded in exile in India in the late 1940s. After a short democratic 
experiment, all political parties were again outlawed in 1961 before the establishment of the autocratic 
Panchayat regime. This system shared many similarities with the postcolonial regimes Kaviraj describes, 
most prominently its ideological grounding in developmentalism and nationalism, but with the denial of 
democratic participation it only served a small part of the high caste bourgeoisie to establish itself within 
the structures of the state. Those who remained committed to democracy were mostly excluded from it 
and continued their illegalised activities. With the slow demise of the regime during the 1980s, the 
government reluctantly allowed the establishment of NGOs and many of these organisations were very 
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closely related to one of the parties. This history of oppression led, on the one hand, to a burgeoning civil 
society sector once democracy was reinstated in the 1990s, and on the other hand, it resulted in a very 
close relationship between NGOs and political parties that still prevails. I will return to this issue in more 
detail in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
In arranging my material for the purpose of this thesis, I decided to settle for a by and large chronological 
structure. Up next is a short discussion of the methodology and methods used in this multi-sited study, an 
introduction to my field site in the upper Arun valley, Kathmandu and elsewhere and a discussion of how 
this particular field site materialised. The two following chapters will tell the prehistory of the invention 
and cancelation of the Arun-3 hydropower project. Through a discussion of the access road to the dam 
site, Chapter 5 will serve as hinge between these two more historical chapters and the last two chapters 
that are predominantly set in the present. They are concerned with narratives on the cancelation of the 
dam in the villages surrounding the dam site and the reincarnation of the project. But let me introduce 
them in more detail. 
Chapter 3 deals with the origins of the campaign against the dam in Kathmandu in the early 1990s. It will 
first contextualise it with the popular uprising of 1990 that led to the re-instatement of multi-party 
democracy. Simultaneously, this will provide some background for the complex relationship between 
India, China and Nepal. Subsequently, I will discuss the emergence of an activist group that was critical of 
the plan to construct a dam in the upper Arun valley. After showing the conflicts within the network, I 
focus on the peculiar fact that the activists decided to establish connections with NGOs in the donor 
countries and against organising the affected people in the Arun valley against the project as the prospects 
of success for such an alliance seemed slim. Alongside Partha Chatterjee’s distinction between political 
and civil society, I will argue that the main reason for this non-alliance was the affected people’s hope that 
through the dam project the state would start to take care of them. 
The fourth chapter will continue to trace the history of the Arun-3’s first incarnation in the 1990s and 
shift its attention to the World Bank. It will answer the question of how this project became the cheapest 
option in a country full of promising hydropower sites by a close reading of the reports produced by the 
Bank’s staff and consultants. Its main focus, however, will be on the investigation by the World Bank 
Inspection Panel in 1994/95 that led to the withdrawal of the Bank and subsequently to a building freeze 
as all other foreign donors followed the example of the Bank. I will do this by examining the memories of 
former World Bank staff members, a former employee of the Inspection Panel and, to a lesser extent, the 
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anti-dam activists. I will argue that the investigation played an instrumental role in the establishment of 
the World Banks most recent development regime that Michael Goldman has termed ‘green 
neoliberalism:’ the redefinition of the Bank’s modus operandi through the integration of global discourses 
on the environment and indigenous rights in its discursive framework. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the most important change that will come along with the dam for the people in the 
upper Arun valley: the construction of an access road later to be extended to the Chinese border. I will 
discuss the centrality of road projects for modernist projects of state-making in the context of the shifting 
relationship between Nepal, China and India on the one hand and the complex history of relations 
between the Nepalese state and the upper Arun valley. To avoid a reading of roads as a simple technology 
of rule, I will follow Penny Harvey’s call for a topology of roads that is interested in the uncertain 
outcomes of their construction. This will be elaborated by reference to my interlocutor’s ambivalent 
feelings towards the access road that is full of opportunities and possible dangers. Moreover, through a 
discussion of mythology and ritualistic forms of travelling, I will argue that indigenous communities all 
over the Hill region of Nepal have a deep sense of being marginalised ‘in the middle’ between Tibet and 
India.  
The sixth chapter explores how the affected communities around the proposed dam site have coped with 
more than two decades of uncertainty. Presenting their narratives as to why the dam never materialised, I 
argue that people in the upper Arun valley, through their specific encounter with white biologists and 
conservationists, have learned to conceptualise interventions by foreigners as pretext to the appropriation 
of local resources. In combination with the practices of the state that in order to promise development at 
the same time produces a deep feeling of backwardness in its rural citizens, the narratives of my 
interlocutors often switch between a strong desire for development and the outspoken refusal of its 
possibility. To me, this was even more unsettling in light of my impression of an outright economic boom 
in the area connected to the introduction of cardamom farming. 
The final chapter then focuses on the recent reincarnation of the Arun-3 dam under radically altered 
circumstances: as a mainly export-oriented scheme to be developed by an Indian state-owned corporation. 
After a contextualisation of Indian foreign aid in the perspective of current discussions on so-called 
emerging donors, it juxtaposes the positions of four sets of actors concerned with the new Arun-3: Indian 
engineers, water activists in Kathmandu, indigenous activists in the upper Arun valley and a British NGO. 
I argue that while the position of the engineers and the Western activists is entirely antithetical, both 
operate with a similar imaginary of the indigenous other: a subject that is in need of benevolence. The 
urban water activists restrict their opposition against the dam to the Supreme Court and the parliamentary 
Introduction 
- 29 - 
system and do not intend to forge any alliances with the affected people. They understand the 
reincarnation of the project as a form of neocolonial resource extraction and accuse the political and 
bureaucratic elite of being complicit with India; therefore consistently acting against the national interest 
when it comes to water related issues. The indigenous activists of the Yamphu Kirat Samaj, finally, use the 
dam in a struggle of recognition on multiple levels. They are cautiously positive about the dam, but the 
experience that neither SJVN nor the government seems to acknowledge their demand to be included in a 
dialogue gives rise to serious concerns about the trustworthiness of the state and the company. Moreover, 
in the context of an imminent federal reform, the dam project has become a site for territorial claims over 
the upper Arun valley – not only towards the state but also in opposition to other indigenous groups.
 
 2  Constructing the Field 
 
 
Methodology and Methods 
As I hope has become apparent by now, this work deals with “an object of study that cannot be accounted 
for ethnographically by remaining focused on a single site of intensive investigation” (Marcus 1995: 96). It 
engages with the opinions and narratives of people as divergent as village teenagers from an indigenous 
minority in rural North-Eastern Nepal and retired World Bank staff members in Washington, DC. 
Therefore, it operates within the methodological framework of multi-sited ethnography. The shift to 
multiple sites of observation intends to traverse dichotomies such as the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ to account 
for the complexity of social formations in an increasingly connected world system. It constitutes a 
necessary prerequisite to follow the people and discourses that are instrumental for an exploration of the 
twisted tale of the Arun-3 project and is informed by recent calls for a practice of an anthropology of the 
contemporary (Rabinow et al. 2008: 55-71; Rabinow 2009); an anthropology that is engaged with events 
in the here and now, but at the same time keeps a certain untimeliness towards the present. Borrowing the 
term from Nietzsche’s Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, Paul Rabinow uses ‘the untimely’ to delimitate an 
anthropological mode of inquiry that is guided by a “critical distance from the present that seeks to 
establish a relationship to the present different from reigning opinion” (Rabinow et al. 2008: 59). Contrary 
to a journalist writing on contemporary issues, the anthropologist, he argues, is operating in a different 
temporality as the tools she has at hand for inquiry slow her down. This gives her the potential not to 
partake in the production of talking points or the policing of new ideas and instead focus on the 
problematization of the issue at hand. Thereby, the task of the anthropology of the contemporary is “to 
invent concepts to make visible what is emerging” (ibid: 64). 
Multi-sited ethnography has been practiced for quite some time now. Beyond that, George Marcus 
reminds us that “empirically following the thread of cultural process itself impels the move toward multi-
sited ethnography” (1995: 97) and that “fieldwork as traditionally perceived and practiced is already itself 
potentially multi-sited” (ibid: 100) – take for example anthropologists’ long-standing interest in nomadism 
(e.g. Barth 1964) or migrants (e.g. Lewis 1961). Taking this ‘pursuit’ seriously, my project aims to 
combine a thick ethnography of the processes in the upper Arun valley with the autobiographical 
narratives of experts and activists. While the latter provided rich accounts of the events of the 1990s, from 
an ethnographic point of view these remain ‘thin’ in my discussion, as the retrospective character of the 
matter restricted my possibilities for inquiry considerably. 
The discussion on the potential and dangers of multi-sited ethnography has by now attracted a great 
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amount of contributions (e.g. Coleman and von Hellermann 2011; Falzon 2009). The main point of 
criticism has been the fear of losing the thick descriptions of specific people in specific places that used to 
define ‘Malinowskian’ anthropology for a much thinner account of global networks, modern institutions 
or Western experts (Tomlinson 2011). Marcus’s (1998) response was the pragmatic proposition of an 
‘ethnography through thick and thin.’ In defining which sites in a multi-sited research should be 
investigated thickly and which not, he argues for a “strong accountability for intended structured partiality 
and incompleteness” (Marcus 2011: 21). 
But beyond that, there is another methodological problem that has to be addressed in a research project 
that relies heavily on the narratives of people whom we generally tend to call ‘experts’ to reconstruct the 
history of the Arun-3 dam: bureaucrats, World Bank staff members, scholars, lawyers, hydrologists, 
engineers. Current anthropological research is increasingly engaging with people and topics that have not 
been part of the terms of reference of the discipline as they were laid out in the early twentieth century. 
Often, the actors in multi-sited studies operate in circumstances that structurally and conceptually 
resemble the academic field. Ethnographies of mobile, transnational subjects like public health experts 
(Caduff 2012), international peace experts (Kosmatopoulos 2011) or investment bankers (Leins 2011) 
provoked anthropologists to develop the long-standing practice of self-reflexivity (e.g. Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992; Clifford and Marcus 1986) further. To come to grips with doing ethnographic fieldwork 
in these radically altered circumstances, Douglas Holmes and George Marcus (2008) argue for an 
experimental research design they call ‘para-ethnography.’ This new program conceptualises fieldwork as a 
collaborative endeavour between anthropologists and the people they work with: “Key to this 
refunctioning is drawing on the analytical acumen and existential insights of our subjects to recast the 
intellectual imperatives of our own methodological practices.” They notice that ethnographic methods 
“have been assimilated as key intellectual modalities of our time” and that our interlocutors are “fully 
capable of doing superb ethnography in their own idioms” (ibid: 82). Therefore, “[a]nthropologists are not 
needed to add ‘critique,’ moral injunction, or higher meaning to these accounts” (ibid: 84). So, in contrast 
to the bilateral encounter between researcher and native informants in traditional ethnography, para-
ethnography is much more like an ensemble production in contemporary theatre “which works through 
synchronisation, or perhaps better, a film montage, in which relations among disparate and apparently 
disconnected items are established (Westbrook 2008: 50). 
In my case, such a collaborative approach did only partially emerge out of my own methodological 
considerations and was definitely not part of a preconceived research design. To the contrary, I am not 
sure if I would have been able to avoid it. Or, to put it differently, I believe that a refusal to collaborate 
with my expert interlocutors would have seriously threatened their support for my research. And it was 
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actually an encounter with two of my interlocutors who led me to think about this approach more 
thoroughly. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, it was actually two staff members of the World Bank office in 
Kathmandu, who suggested a collaboration because they had realised that their co-workers were eager to 
learn what had happened to Arun-3 and hoped that I could shed light on this mysterious chapter of their 
organisation. 
In the villages of the upper Arun valley around the proposed dam site, on the other hand, my fieldwork 
was much more in line with the methods and methodologies developed in the anthropology of the early 
twentieth century for work in rural settings. As much time as possible I spent listening, talking and 
observing. Through a chain of fortunate coincidences I had made contact with Chun Bahadur Yamphu 
Rai before my first arrival in the area in autumn 2008. Born and raised in Hedangna, one of the villages 
directly above the proposed dam site, he was eager to work with me. A big part of the fieldwork in the 
Arun valley we conducted together, developing our research design and questions along the way through 
an extended dialogue that is still underway. For this purpose, his longstanding experience with methods of 
participatory rural appraisal (Rachbauer 2010) combined with his deep knowledge of the history, economy 
and politics of the upper Arun valley and his extensive personal networks in the region proved to be a 
decisive asset. Furthermore, his membership in the Yamphu Kirat Samaj, an organisation that represents 
the indigenous group the majority of the inhabitants around the dam site identify themselves with, and his 
involvement in the Indigenous Rights Forum in Khandbari helped me to further disseminate my findings 
among the interested public in the area. 
My position was completely different in the offices of the World Bank in Kathmandu or the living rooms 
of retired Bank staff in Europe and the United States. Yet, another problematic came to run through my 
interaction with these experts in their different domains while I was attempting to trace the invention and 
cancelation of Arun-3: the relations among themselves and the way they prompted me to reveal what 
others had told me. All the actors were of course deeply familiar with the project history and the people 
involved with it, but many of them had not spoken to each other in almost two decades. So, time and 
again, they wanted to know what their former opponents had told me and how they evaluated what had 
happened in hindsight. Often, this presented me with a very graspable crisis of representation: How could 
I speak for my interlocutors, even more so in front of their former adversaries? Confronted with these 
attempts to use me as informer, I settled for a form of ‘uneasy complicity’ (loosely borrowing from Marcus 
1997) with my present interlocutor that confirmed his6 preconception of the absent other in the hope to 
get over this interrogation without giving away too much and compromising the latter’s narrative. 
Despite the uneasiness these situations caused, they illustrate Holmes and Marcus’s (2012: 130) statement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 All of these incidents happened in conversations with men. 
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that “collaboration is overt, epistemic, and mutually invested in” as they show how my collaborators used 
my knowledge and me for their own purposes. To acknowledge these instrumentalisations as 
manifestations of a mutual investment leads to a decentring of the anthropologist in the research process: 
instead of understanding myself as the point where all the information would come together, I realised 
that my position was only one node in a rhizomatic network of entangled relations and opaque agency.7 
That I was navigating a field of ‘always already’ collaborating actors became all too apparent when at some 
point a retired World Bank staff member living in Washington, DC contacted me to arrange a meeting in 
Zurich. He had heard about my work from one of my collaborators at the Bank’s office in Kathmandu. 
To cope with this highly dispersed field site and the multiplicity of actors, languages and types of texts 
involved, I used a mix of methods (participant observation, informal interviews, formal semi-structured 
interviews, archival research) in a transversal manner across all of the research sites. These include the 
villages around the dam site in the upper Arun valley, the district headquarter Khandbari (a one-day walk 
south of the dam site) as well as Kathmandu, New Delhi and Washington, DC. Apart from that, I also 
conducted interviews in Zurich, Munich, Berlin, Oxford and Santa Barbara and visited the archive of a 
German NGO in Sassenberg. Altogether 120 formal interviews were conducted of which 72 were 
recorded and transcribed. The Nepali interviews were translated and transcribed with the help of Sarbani 
Kattel and Sushil Manandhar. Beyond that, more than a hundred informal conversations took place 
between 2008 and 2013, spread across the field, but most of them in the villages around the dam site in 
the upper Arun valley. I spent seven months in Nepal for this research project with the main fieldwork 
period from September 2010 until March 2011. 
Most of the direct quotes I will cite throughout this thesis come from the recorded interviews. When my 
interlocutors did not want to be recorded, I felt it to be inappropriate to ask for their permission or I had 
no recording device at hand, I took exact notes and reconstructed the quotes I found most important as 
soon as possible after the end of the interview. All these conversations were semi-structured formal 
interviews, but they took two distinctly separate forms: in the upper Arun valley, I had a set of ten 
questions that I tried to follow through with most of my interlocutors to achieve a level of comparability 
that would allow me to estimate what the most common opinions on the dam and development in general 
were. After these questions, I tried to open up the discussion by coming back to things my interlocutor 
had mentioned and adding specific questions. Many of these conversations I led together with Chun 
Bahadur whose interventions often prompted our counterparts to discuss the raised topics much more 
controversially than had it just been me alone with my hesitant Nepali. Considering the complex 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I thank Salla Sariola for pointing this out to me. 
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composition of society in the upper Arun valley when it comes to ethnic/caste affiliations, I tried to talk to 
as many ‘different’ people as possible. Due to the demographics in the villages around the proposed dam 
site and my entry to the field, however, there is a clear dominance of people defining their caste identity as 
Yamphu Rai in my sample. The ratio between men and women is about three to two.  
The conversations with the people considered as experts followed a different script. While I also went into 
these encounters with a clear set of talking points, my approach was far less structured and much more 
committed to improvisation. To some extent, this is owed to my better language skills in English than in 
Nepali. But beyond that, my interlocutors often made it clear from the outset that our conversation would 
not be a simple Q&A and a different set of interview techniques was indicated. In many cases, these 
dialogues started with them checking my credentials through asking me who I had already talked to, what 
I knew about the resumption of the dam project and what my opinion on the issue was in general. My 
main aim was to collect personal narratives of how they had become related to the dam and how they 
remembered this relationship for as long as it lasted. To do this, I drew on my previous experience with 
biographical interviews, mostly derived from my work with Holocaust survivors and youth groups for an 
Austrian NGO between 2000 and 2009. In the course of a conversation and once a narrative flow had 
been established, I often left the self-restrained attitude common to conducting narrative interviews and 
provoked my collaborators with opinions contrary to their own. 
One more site of inquiry requires mentioning. As in many recent anthropological research projects, my 
interaction was not restricted to human counterparts, but also included a great number of documents and 
reports. Those had been issued by the institutions planning the Arun-3 scheme, activists opposing it and 
organisations like the World Bank Inspection Panel evaluating it. In his ethnography of paperwork in 
Islamabad/Rawalpindi, Matthew Hull (2012) puts his focus on how bureaucratic documents are produced 
but at the same time how documents produce realities themselves. He claims they have been overlooked 
by anthropologists for such a long time “because it’s easy to see them as simply standing between the 
things that really matter, giving immediate access to what they document” (ibid: 13). Against such a 
reading and following Latour, Hull suggests to treat documents as mediators: things that “transform, 
translate, distort, and modify the meaning of or the elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour 2005b: 
39). To do this, he meticulously engages with the materiality of the documents he studies, their surfaces, 
the ways of inscription and the ‘graphic ideologies’ defining specific forms of documents as well as their 
movements through institutions. 
His book describes “the heterogeneous relations that come into being through the use and circulation of 
the artefacts that mediate almost all bureaucratic activities” (Hull 2012: 21). Such an understanding of 
documents is a very promising vantage point for my discussion of the history of the Arun-3 as well. And 
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while, unlike Hull, I was not able to trace the production of “my” documents in the making (nor their 
materiality, as I never dealt with the originals but with their electronic versions or photocopies retrieved 
from the archives of NGOs in Nepal and Germany), but am confined to a historical reconstruction, the 
narratives of my interlocutors show this interaction between people and papers, or, to borrow from 
Annemarie Mol (2003: vii), how documents are “enacted in practices.” 
 
 
Mapping the Field 
In November 2010 I was invited to celebrate Tihar at Chun Bahadur’s house in Khandbari. This festival 
concludes the autumn festival season in Nepal. For the past six weeks I had been living in the villages 
around the proposed dam site of the Arun-3 hydropower project. With around 26,000 inhabitants, 
Khandbari is the biggest town in the area. It is the headquarters of Sankhuwasabha district and the main 
hub for information and commodities in the upper Arun valley of Eastern Nepal. Its centre hosts a large 
commercial area with government offices, outlets of the main national banks, hotels and hostels catering 
to both Nepalese and foreign tourists, travel agents and all kinds of small-trade. Adjacent to this area is a 
big marketplace where a weekly market (haat bazaar [N]) is held every Saturday. Khandbari proved to be 
one important node in the complex field of Arun-3. At the time, the company in charge of the 
reincarnated Arun-3, the Indian SJVN, had recently opened a project office there. It had also been an 
important location during the campaign against the project in the 1990s.  
Soon after I had arrived, Chun Bahadur reminded me of Rohit. I had heard his name already from one of 
the former activists in Kathmandu. Rohit had been among a group of people in Khandbari who initially 
joined one of groups critical of the project. They soon, however, left this network to form an organisation 
called Arun Support Committee (see Chapter 3). In retrospect, he told me:  
 
Arun-3 was a topic of interest to outsiders more than the local people. People from 
Kathmandu, New York, India talked about it a lot. Still now when I think about Arun-3, I 
wonder who has vested interests in it (Interview 2). 
 
Apart from highlighting the severe suspicions people in the region had towards outsiders involved in 
Arun-3, this comment shows how far reaching the network of people and places engaged in this dam is. I 
thus conceptualise Arun-3 as a global assemblage (Ong and Collier 2005) that is dependent on a large 
number of actors spread out around the globe. For this study, four places proved to be decisive: the upper 
Arun valley with the dam site, the surrounding villages and Khandbari, Kathmandu, Washington, DC, 
and New Delhi where SJVN has one of its two headquarters. Except for the upper Arun valley my 
fieldwork was mostly restricted to offices and archives and most of the interaction with my interlocutors 
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happened during formal interviews. In the villages around the dam site, on the other hand, my 
methodology was strongly driven by methods of participant observation and informal interviews. In order 
to contextualise these different arenas, let me introduce the people I met in the upper Arun valley, their 
economic and social relations and the environment they live in before briefly discussing my fieldwork 
experiences in Kathmandu and elsewhere. 
 
 
The dam site 
The Arun-3 dam site is located around 200 km east of Kathmandu, 300 meters upstream the hamlet of 
Phyaksinda in the upper Arun valley at an altitude of approximately 800 meters. Here, a sinuosity in the 
course of the Arun River creates favourable conditions for a pondage run-of-the-river hydropower scheme. 
Phyaksinda is only 30 km south of the Chinese border and the Arun is one of the very few rivers in Nepal 
that break through the main ridge of the Himalayas: “Cold and grey, the Arun River is older than the 
Himalayas. Her advanced age is indicated by her drainage, for she defies the normal laws of watershed and 
cuts right through the axis of the mountains” (Cronin 1979: 15). Because the two main summits to the 
east and west are Kanchenjunga and Makalu, the world’s third and fifth highest mountains, Edward 
Cronin (1979) labelled the Arun valley as the “the world’s deepest valley.” For centuries, it has served as a 
corridor for migration between India and Tibet and was an important route in the salt trade network 
between the two regions. Only with the recent political and technological transformations – namely the 
closure of the Tibetan border with the Chinese annexation in 1950/51 and the invention of the 
combustion engine – has the Arun valley attained a peripheral status. With Arun-3 and the proposed 
Kosi-Lhasa Rajmarg [N] (Kosi-Lhasa Highway), it seems fair to assume that this period of marginality 
will eventually pass and the region might serve as one important node in the emerging network of 
overland routes between India and China. 
Since 1987, the plan has been to construct a dam of around 65 meters height and divert the ponded water 
through an eleven kilometre long tunnel to a powerhouse with an installed capacity of either 201 MW, 
402 MW or 900 MW (for more technical details see Chapter 4). The two municipalities affected by the 
dam site are the Village Development Committees8 (VDCs) of Num and Pathibhara while Diding VDC 
a day’s walk downstream will host the powerhouse. In 2011, Phyaksinda comprised of six houses, one of 
them newly built to accommodate the needs of visiting engineers from SJVN. As the whole settlement is 
below the proposed dam, none of the houses would be submerged by it. There is, however, one family 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 VDCs represent the lowest level of administration in Nepal. Their functioning is similar to municipalities in other 
countries. 
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further up on the western ridge that might have to leave their farmstead once the dam would be 
constructed according to several of my interlocutors. This house – the only one that might actually drown 
in the storage lake – is part of a hamlet called Chillingte whose inhabitants, approximately fifteen 
households, will be the most directly affected in terms of land lost due to the reservoir lake. Because of the 
steep gradient most of the forest on these plots has never been cleared and is used extensively as grazing 
areas, for timber, fire wood and non-timber forest products. Only recently, with the introduction of 
cardamom to the area, the usage of forest areas has undergone a radical change that that has led to a 
massive revaluation. Therefore on both sides of the valley, several small cardamom plantations will fall 
victim to the storage lake. 
As in many parts of Nepal’s mid-hills, the bigger settlements are located further uphill where the slopes 
are less steep and the soil often is more fertile than on the valley floor. The two villages directly above the 
dam site are called Hedangna and Num. Both are located approximately a one-hour walk above it, lie at 
an altitude between 1200 and 1500 meters and comprise of approximately 250 households each. Num is 
situated on the south eastern side of the valley and at its centre, on top of the ridge; it spots the central 
bazaar of the upper Arun valley. This market is the most important transit point for cardamom traded to 
Khandbari and further to India and the northernmost market on the way towards the Chinese border. 
Unlike Hedangna, Num is also on the main trail to the Makalu-Barun Trekking Area and among a 
handful of guesthouses catering for the few individual Western trekking tourists, SJVN has established a 
branch office. Hedangna, on the other hand, lies within the buffer zone of the Makalu-Barun National 
Park whose eastern boundary runs along the right bank of the Arun. The main argument put forward by 
Nepalese and American ecologists for the establishment of this nature reserve was the Arun-3 dam that 
would require a decisive conservation strategy as compensatory measure. When it became operational in 
1992, it represented a decisively participatory approach to nature conservation in Nepal as it was 
committed to integrate the people living in the area and see them as partners in the process, not as 
obstacle to conservation. Today the Park does not severely affect everyday life in the village (see Chapter 
6). Its main offices are located further south, hardly any tourists pass through Hedangna and despite the 
restrictions concerning hunting and forest use, the park rangers rarely show up in the village. 
 
 
Economy 
Despite these new opportunities, the vast majority of the residents in both settlements are subsistence 
farmers, who grow rice, red millet and maize as main crops as well as different pulses. Apart from teaching 
positions and a few other government jobs, wage labour is mostly restricted to small trade like shop  
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Ill. 3: The Arun-3 project area (Dunsmore 1988: 2). 
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keeping, tailoring, gold and blacksmithing with the main new addition to local economy being electricians’ 
workshops. Due to the steep gradient of most of the arable land, crops are predominantly cultivated on 
terraced fields with the lower lying stretches with better soil quality being used for rice. During winter, 
potatoes, wheat, soybean and rapeseed are grown and the livestock (mostly goats and cows) is brought 
down from the alpine pastures where it spends the summers to graze on the unused terraces. Most 
households across the caste spectrum have access to agricultural land, although the size of landholdings 
varies greatly from family to family. Practically every house is accompanied by a small house garden where 
one can find leaf vegetables, chayote, bananas, garlic, chillies, onions and different kinds of yams. 
Additionally, chickens are kept around the house and most of the Non-high-caste families fatten one or 
two pigs. Moreover, non-timber forest products serve as an important addition to people’s diets, especially 
nettle that is regularly prepared as soup.  
This, however, does not mean that the area is self sufficient in its food production; even in Hedangna, a 
village renowned for its impressive stretch of terraced paddy fields right to the north of its centre, the 
majority of families have for decades been forced to buy rice and other foodstuffs.9 Therefore, the local 
economy has long been dependent on work migration abroad. While a considerable percentage of men 
from the area have been leaving for Northern India after the rice harvest to spend the winters as day 
labourers in tea plantations or construction workers at least since the early 20th century, these days 
especially young people (increasingly more women) apply for three-year work visa to the Gulf countries 
and Malaysia. With the recent introduction of cardamom farming, however, work migration is no longer 
the only possibility to earn money as for the first time a cash crop is available locally (for an extended 
discussion of cardamom and the transformations it has brought to the upper Arun valley see Chapter 6). 
Even for Nepalese standards, the Arun valley has been connected rather late to the national road network. 
Khandbari, the headquarters of Sankhuwasabha district, waited until 1999 for the first motorable road 
connection (Armbrecht Forbes 1999a: 337) while the dam site a day’s walk further up the valley was only 
connected in 2013 (Magar Yamphu Rai 2013). When the hydro project was cancelled in 1995, it was a 
hard five-day walk from there to the next road head in Basantapur (Armbrecht Forbes 1999a: 327). Until 
the 1950s, the Arun valley was an important route in the trans-Himalayan salt trade network. The 
Chinese annexation of Tibet, the subsequent closure of the border and the newly established 
independence of India constituted a radical change in this respect: Whereas all the salt had come from 
Tibet beforehand, it suddenly arrived from India. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 According to a survey among 75 households in 1992, 68% of them “were unable to produce all of the grain needed 
to feed their family throughout the year” (Armbrecht Forbes 1995: 41). 
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Ill. 4: Phyaksinda and the Arun-3 dam site, 21 November 2008. 
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The Yamphu Rai 
The upper Arun valley, as most areas of the central and eastern hills of Nepal, is inhabited by a big 
number of different ethnic groups/castes (jat [N]). In the villages affected by Arun-3 people identify as 
Bahun, Chhetri, occupational castes, Newar, Tamang, Magar, Sherpa/Khumbo while the majority refer to 
themselves as either Lohorung Rai or Yamphu Rai. Members of these two groups claim that their 
ancestors were the first people to settle the area. So far, there is no reason to contradict this assertion that 
is voiced by the different Rai subgroups all over Eastern Nepal and their eastern neighbours, the Limbu. 
They all refer to these ancestors as Kiranti, a half mythological half historical people depicted in the old 
Sanskrit epics “as an infamous warring ‘race’ inhabiting the mountains of the north and northeast. […] It 
is only after the Kirāta – one might say with some simplification – that authentic history begins” 
(Gaenszle 2000: 4, emphasis in original).10 The assumption of this shared genealogy is an important 
theme in discourses of indigeneity in Eastern Nepal. 
Num and Hedangna, the villages closest to the dam site, are dominated by the Yamphu Rai. They 
constitute the northernmost subgroup of the Rai, an ethnonym ascribed to an unclear number of 
linguistically distinct groups that mostly live in the valleys between the Dudh Kosi and the Arun in eastern 
Nepal. Based on an unpublished diagram by the Linguistic Survey of Nepal, Martin Gaenszle (ibid: 3) 
speaks of “more than 50 more or less distinct Rai dialects or languages.” According to the latest census 
data (Central Bureau of Statistics 2012: 144), 620,004 persons or 2.3 per cent of the population of Nepal 
identify as Rai. The difficulty with this number, however, becomes immediately apparent when the same 
statistic lists 6,933 people who declared their ethnic identity to be Yamphu (ibid: 146) with around a 
dozen other Rai subgroups mentioned in the table as well. As the census only permitted respondents to 
state one caste affiliation, its methodology is not capable to reflect the complex ethnicity of Rai groups. 
Therefore, the size of groups like the Yamphu remains uncertain. Probably the more accurate number can 
be retrieved from the table on mother tongues. Here (ibid: 175), 9,208 people responded with 
Yamphu/Yamphe. A different census report (Central Bureau of Statistics 2013: 85-127) lists 5,064 
speakers of Yamphu in Sankhuwasabha district and around 1,000 each for Morang, Ilam and Dhankuta 
districts to the south and east. 
The majority of these five thousand Yamphu speakers in Sankhuwasabha live in Hedangna, Num and five 
more villages in the vicinity of the Arun-3 dam site within the borders of Pathibhara and Num VDCs. All 
of these villages are also inhabited by people of the above mentioned, differing jat affiliations. Although 
the sample of this study includes people from all of these groups, the majority of my interlocutors were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Gaenszle (2000: 4-15) discusses the origin of the term extensively and despite the obvious etymological relatedness 
of Kirāta to Kiranti, he finds no evidence that would directly link the present-day Kiranti to the mythological Kirāta. 
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Ill. 5: The northern part of Hedangna, 1 November 2010. 
 
Yamphu Rai. This happened not only because of my mentioned entry to the field and the fact that the 
majority of the people living around the dam site identify as Yamphu. Furthermore, many Yamphu claim 
sovereignty over this territory and members of other groups by and large accept this territorial claim and 
the Yamphu’s claim that their ancestors were the first people who settled the area. As I will show 
throughout my work, this longstanding struggle for autonomy from the Nepalese state is strongly 
entangled with the question of Arun-3. Especially the activists of the Yamphu Kirat Samaj (YKS), an 
NGO concerned with the political and cultural representation of the group, connect their political agenda 
for the recognition of Yamphu as a separate caste term and an exit from “the problematic ethnic unit 
called Rai” (Gaenszle 1997: 353) with threats to halt dam construction. I will come back to this point 
soon. 
Hedangna, where I spent most of my time in the Arun valley, is the central place of reference in Yamphu 
geography. Here, the mythological forefathers Minaba and Sepa decided to settle down and clear the 
forest after migrating south from Tibet. Still, it is considered the centre of the group’s territory and history 
and most of the ancestral springs called tsawa [Y] are located there. These springs serve as mythological 
points of origin for the fifteen clans within Yamphu society. Although formally exogamous, intermarriage 
between members of the same clan is not uncommon (Armbrecht Forbes 1995a: 50-51, 65). According to 
Constructing the Field 	  
- 44 - 
my interlocutors, marriages between Yamphu and members of other Rai subgroups have been practiced 
for a long time. Recently, intermarriage between Yamphu and members of other Non-Hindu groups has 
also become more common. After marriage, the bride has to leave her family and moves in with the groom 
and until recently women were restricted from inheriting land. Therefore, the Yamphu can be described as 
a patrilineal, virilocal society like all the ethnic/caste groups that live with them. Ideally, the youngest son 
should take over the house of his parents while his brothers would build their own houses and inherit a 
part of their father’s land (ultimogenitur). For reasons connected to the specific land tenure system of the 
Yamphu (see below) these land divisions where rarely reported to the authorities. Instead it was the local 
tax collectors/headmen (jimmawals) who kept track of land ownership; their records, however, were often 
doubted in cases of land disputes. These days, most of the landholdings have become too small to support 
more than one family in the next generation, so divisions are becoming more and more difficult. The 
mentioned introduction of cardamom farming will most probably have a severe effect on these questions 
and the way extended families rearrange ownership. 
Similar to most Non-Hindu groups in the Nepalese Himalaya, the Yamphu have no internal system of 
caste stratification. All of these groups were, however, integrated into the Nepalese caste system in the 19th 
century. In the hierarchy of the Muluki Ain (general code [N]) of 1854 the Yamphu (as Rai) are grouped 
into the category of “enslavable Alcohol-Drinkers” (Höfer 1979: 141) and despite the abandonment of 
these categories and the official end of slavery and caste discrimination during the 20th century, Rai and 
members of other Non-Hindu groups still face considerable marginalisation in Nepalese society that 
remains dominated by the caste groups that were on top of the caste hierarchy when it was fixated in the 
19th century, i.e. members of the Bahun-Chhetri castes and a certain subset of Newar castes. 
The inclusion of all indigenous groups into the Hindu caste system is one important peculiarity of Nepal 
and one of the most visible events in a longstanding process of Hinduization that all of these groups have 
been exposed to ever since Prithvi Narayan Shah’s troops defeated their ancestors in the late 18th century 
during his military expansion that led to the creation of the Kingdom of Nepal.11 Nick Allen (1997), 
however, has argued in respect to the Thulung Rai, a group living to the southwest of the Yamphu and 
closely related to them, that the in-migration of Hindus to the hill areas of present-day Eastern Nepal had 
already started before this event. His interlocutors stated that the Bahun were actually welcomed by the 
Rai because they were literate and “knew about din-bār, i.e. the auspicious and inauspicious days for doing 
things” (ibid: 310, emphasis in original). Pointing us to the fact that Bahun cannot sustain their lifestyle 
without the service of occupational castes, he concludes: “If the Thulung welcomed the Brahmans for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In Chapter 5 I will, however, argue that this integration happened particularly late in the upper Arun valley and 
that it took the Nepalese state until 1994 to finally secure its sovereignty over the Yamphu territory. 
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skills they had to offer, presumably they welcomed other castes including the Untouchables for the same 
reason” (ibid). The only clear record of the Thulung fighting new settlers Allen found concerned the 
Chhetri. As they have “no caste-linked speciality except (in principle) fighting” (ibid: 311), this case serves 
as the exception that proves the rule. Beyond that, all historical and mythological evidence points to the 
fact that the economy of the Kiranti groups was based on shifting cultivation and hunting until very 
recently. Probably the population density was extremely low and land was abundant. Therefore, it seems 
highly likely that the locals gave land rights to the newly arriving paddy farmers because they simply did 
not need it for their extensive mode of production. With the continuous increase in population, the 
abandonment of shifting cultivation by the Rai subgroups and their transition to rice cultivation, this has 
changed considerably over the course of the last two centuries. 
Given this history of Hinduization and co-habitation with people of the whole Hindu caste spectrum for 
many generations, it is important to note, however, that to label people who identify themselves as Rai, 
Magar, Sherpa, Tamang and so on as Non-Hindus is a gross oversimplification. Already P. R. Sharma 
(1978: 1) conceptualised ethnicity in Nepal as a “Hindu-tribal continuum” rather than a dichotomised 
system with a clear dividing line. Although formally not followers of Hinduism (in any of its many forms), 
the Yamphu Rai, for instance, have been strongly influenced by Hindu traditions as becomes apparent by 
the frequent depiction of Hindu gods in Yamphu homes or the widespread use of Sanskrit first names. 
Most of the indigenous groups of Eastern Nepal have adopted Hindu customs, beliefs and festivals. The 
most influential innovation brought to the Arun valley by Hindu settlers was however the introduction of 
the plough and the cultivation of rice. Yamphu occasionally call on high-caste Hindu ritual experts for 
astrological advice. Some of them also employ shamans from occupational castes: they drink no alcohol, so 
their services are cheaper than those of their Yamphu colleagues. Additionally, as the northernmost 
subgroup of the Rai, the Yamphu have been influenced by the Buddhist communities further up the valley 
that emigrated from Tibet several generations ago. The most obvious sign for this longstanding contact is 
the fact that every spring, a Buddhist Lama from the village of Hatiya walks down to Hedangna to spend 
the summer there and protect the rice and maize from hailstorms. Despite this history of exposure to two 
of the main metaphysical traditions of the region, the Yamphu’s main spiritual framework remains their 
belief in the importance of the relationship between the living and the dead that has to be constantly 
reproduced. Through these ties between themselves and their ancestors the Yamphu relate to each other, 
their land and the wider world; through it they also conceptualise their group’s history, maintain their 
claim to difference, and uphold their understanding of Yamphu-ness. This of course does not mean that 
every Yamphu is a convicted believer in ancestral entities. But in reaction to the long history of 
Hinduization, recently many young educated Yamphu have gone through a re-evaluation of their group’s 
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mythology. Whereas Ann Armbrecht Forbes (1995: 113, fn 165) reports that middle-aged men often 
laughed when asked “about these stories of Kokcrikpa [the main culture hero in Yamphu mythology], 
dismissing them as tales told to entertain little children,” my interlocutors from the same age group, even 
though they also often could not recount those tales, were far more respectful of their group’s cultural 
heritage. 
The relationship between the living and the ancestors is chronically difficult. Since the time when the 
ancestors decided to become invisible, appalled by the greed of the living, the latter have to maintain good 
relations by pleasing them with rituals during which they feed them rice, meat and jad [Y] (millet beer). If 
the living fail to take care of their ancestors, they will at some point become angry and harm the living 
with illness or bad harvest. Among these ancestral beings, the Yamphu also relate to four more abstract 
entities in different rituals: Nambetuasi [Y] resides in the sun, Thaurumchap [Y] in the open hearth; Waiya 
[Y] lives in the spring water and Yiwa [Y] in the Arun river. Yiwa is called upon before embarking on an 
important journey (the ritual is called Panchewlis [Y] or Yiwa puja). 
This intimate relation to ancestral entities is a common feature among the Rai subgroups of Eastern Nepal 
(Gaenszle 2007; Nicoletti 2006; Hardman 2000). The main tool for communication with them is an 
extensive body of oral text the Yamphu call mundhum [Y]. Through it, ritual experts can contact these 
entities to find the reason for illness and misfortune and possible ways to cure them. The mundhum 
mostly contains of complex chants in highly antiquated language that is incomprehensible for non-
initiated Yamphu speakers. Ritual experts claim that the mundhum is revealed to them in their dreams. So 
far, it has never been put into writing, except for the few pieces that Ann Armbrecht Forbes (1995) has 
recorded and translated. The Yamphu mythology, on the other hand, is called pelem [Y]. This collection 
includes stories about the migratory history of the Yamphu, moral tales and how why the ancestors 
decided to become invisible for the living, but surprisingly lacks a creation myth (Rutgers 1998: 6). One 
important leitmotif that goes through the pelem is the difficult relationship between brothers12 because of 
their disputes about the main scarce resource: land.  
As Ann Armbrecht Forbes’ (1995) ethnography of land disputes among the Yamphu of Hedangna shows, 
these quarrels are indeed strongly connected to the political organisation of the group and the history of its 
integration into the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal. When Prithvi Narayan Shah’s troops tried to occupy the 
valleys of Eastern Nepal (also known as Pallo Kirat), they met strong resistance from the people living 
there, the ancestors of the Limbu and Rai commonly referred to as Kiranti. Unable to defeat them, Shah 
then brokered an agreement granting them a high level of autonomy and assuring, in a royal edict from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Women are only allowed to inherit land since the legal code of 1964 (Gilbert 1993: 240 in Armbrecht Forbes 
1995). 
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1774, that “in case we confiscate your lands, may our ancestral gods destroy our kingdom” (Regmi 1976: 
93). Out of this agreement emerged a very specific land tenure system called kipat [N] that went contrary 
to the logics of land ownership in the rest of the emerging kingship and left the Kiranti groups in 
sovereignty over their land.13 This system was abolished particularly late in Hedangna where it only came 
to an end with the national land survey in 1994. Before this date, land taxes for kipat land were not paid 
directly to the land revenue office, but through special functionaries called jimmawal.14 Armbrecht Forbes 
(1995: 53), however, argues that the jimmawals were much more than simple tax collectors as they “held 
judicial authority over all offences except those which entailed capital punishment or loss of caste” until 
King Mahendra introduced the partyless Panchayat system in 1962. According to Armbrecht Forbes’ 
account, at least since the early 19th century and until 1994, at any given moment several jimmawals were 
active in Hedangna with each Yamphu household being obliged to pay a household tax to one of the 
jimmawals who was responsible to pay land tax for the territory under his control to the tax office. Similar 
to the disputes for land among brothers, these headmen were competing for power and constantly tried to 
bring more households under their control. 
With the introduction of the Panchayat system in the 1960s, the political authority of the jimmawals 
gradually shifted to the position of Pradhan Panch [N] (the leader of the Panchayat, the council of five) 
and with the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991, to the new post of VDC chairperson, a 
position comparable to a mayor. Speaking of these political functionaries, I should mention that at the 
time of my fieldwork in the Arun valley between 2008 and 2011, their seats had been vacant since 2002. 
Because of the decade-long Maoist insurgency and the protracted peace process the last local elections had 
taken place in 1997. Since 2002, when then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba dissolved all local 
bodies, the VDCs have been led by the government-appointed secretaries in coordination with 
functionaries of the political parties and without any democratic legitimisation. Though far from 
dysfunctional, these councils proved far less important for my fieldwork than the thriving scene of NGOs 
in the area. Especially the board members of the Yamphu Kirat Samaj turned out to be among the most 
influential political figures among the Yamphu. 
The YKS was established in 2004, relatively late in comparison with other indigenous activist groups in 
the area (Gaenszle 1997), with the main purpose of 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Mahesh Regmi (1978: 538), however, speculates that other ‘Mongolian’ groups like the Tamang, Sherpa, etc. 
originally also owned land under the kipat system. For an extended discussion of kipat see Chapter 5. 
14 Regmi (1978: 859) defines a jimmawal as a “non-official functionary who collected taxes on khet [irrigated] land in 
the hill region.” 
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preserving, protecting and conserving Yamphu culture, language, and religion as these have 
become nearly extinct because of the special protection or reservation provided in all areas to 
one caste (Brahmin), one religion (Hindu), one language (Khas-Nepali), one culture 
(Hindu). Basically, this organization advocates against any forms of discrimination based on 
ethnicity and advocates for identity based rights of the Yamphu community and other ethnic 
groups (Yamphu Kirat Samaj 2013). 
 
It is not associated with any of the political parties (as many indigenous grassroots organisations in Nepal 
are), but from my conversations with activists and official speeches I was present at, I believe it is safe to 
say that during my fieldwork in 2010 and 2011 the strongest fraction within the society sympathised with 
the UCPN (M). To the YKS activists, the resumption of the Arun-3 project serves as an important topic 
in their communication with the Yamphu public and a powerful example why indigenous mobilisation is 
necessary, both on a politico-economic as well as on an ideological level (see Chapter 7). 
 
 
Kathmandu and elsewhere 
One third of my fieldwork time in Nepal I spent in Kathmandu. Already during my first preliminary field 
trip in the autumn of 2008 I made contact with the now defunct Water and Energy Users Federation of 
Nepal (WAFED). This NGO was both personally as well as content-wise the successor of the Arun 
Concerned Group, the organisation that brought the Arun-3 project in front of the World Bank 
Inspection Panel in 1994. Similarly to my experiences in the upper Arun valley, I found a very supportive 
atmosphere for my research endeavour among the water activists, hydropower experts and scholars I 
contacted in the capital. The circumstances of the encounter with my interlocutors were profoundly 
different, however. As I have outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the close proximity of their 
professional field with mine immediately defined my relationship with them as a form of collaboration. 
Most of them agreed to discuss their memories and opinions on Arun-3 and many also shared their 
personal and professional network with me. The majority of my interlocutors – both the former activists as 
well as their former opponents – were men between the age of 50 and 80 who held influential positions in 
bureaucracy, politics, consultancy and NGOs or had recently retired from such positions. Therefore, our 
encounters often happened in strongly hierarchized office spaces where a completely different set of rules 
and manners applied than during my fieldwork in the upper Arun valley. Still, I was surprised how easily 
accessible most of them were. Generally, I first made contact by e-mail and called their office a few days 
later to ask for a meeting and most of the time, I got an appointment for one of the following days. Many 
of the activists and retired bureaucrats also invited me to their homes. Therefore, many of my interviews 
took place in beautiful gardens behind high walls. 
Elsewhere, I followed the same approach, but contacted the people I wanted to talk to well in advance. 
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Despite this fact, serendipity and my collaborator’s spontaneous phone calls provided for a few fortunate 
encounters I had not planned for during these shorter trips to India, the United States and Germany. 
Twice I showed up unannounced at an office: The first time happened in New Delhi, when after 
unsuccessfully trying to set up a meeting with the head of the international department of the Indian 
SJVN for nearly a week, I decided to visit the company’s office in Saket and see whether I would be 
allowed in. The person I had hoped to encounter was on a business trip abroad, but one of his 
subordinates took time out to discuss the company’s strategy with me. My second uninvited appearance 
was at the Public Information Center of the World Bank in Kathmandu. In this case, I had for a long 
time tried through informal channels and word of mouth to get in touch with recent or former staff 
members of the Bank as many of my interlocutors in Kathmandu had doubted the readiness of the 
organisation to engage officially with me. As it turned out, this perception was informed by their 
experiences with the Bank in the 1990s. As this work will show, in the meantime this institution had gone 
through a remarkable operational change and despite the very careful first reaction to my request for an 
interview, Chapter 4 will show how the collaboration between the Bank and me has evolved since. 
 
This short chapter was an attempt to make transparent how the field site for this thesis materialised. 
While on the one hand my discussion aims at showing the decisions I took to construct this multi-sited 
field in order to trace the story of an invisible dam, it also highlights the contingencies involved in this 
process that were beyond my control and at times left me in a position to follow surprising trajectories 
(Amit 2000; Madden 2010). My field site stretches from the hamlet of Phyaksinda on the Arun right 
below the dam site through the villas in Kathmandu’s upmarket Sanepa neighbourhood to the glass 
facades of Washington’s office buildings. Time and again, I was overwhelmed by the far-reaching 
relations a non-existent dam had established and the passionate narratives its mentioning provoked in my 
interlocutors, many of which had not been involved with it since 1995.
  
 
	   
3 “Those euphoric days of democracy.” 
Nepal’s 1990 people’s movement, the emerging civil society and the Anti-Arun-3 
campaign  
 
 
This chapter focuses on the events that led to the investigation of the Arun-3 project by the World Bank 
Inspection Panel in 1994/95: The coming-into-being and progression of the first transnational civil 
society movement that originated in Nepal. I will argue that the so-called ‘Anti-Arun campaign’ emerged 
out of two decisive historical moments that served as its conditions of possibility: First, the Indian 
embargo against Nepal in 1989/90 that triggered the popular uprising of 1990. This ‘people’s movement’ 
(Jana Andolan [N]) toppled the autocratic Panchayat regime and reinstated multi-party democracy in 
Nepal. Without this opening, the leeway for civil society mobilisation would have been severely restricted. 
On the other hand, the embargo had decisive consequences for Arun-3 as well, as I will show. It coincided 
with the finalisation of the project whose economic viability, from its inception, had been contingent on a 
power purchase agreement with India that was practically impossible to come by at that specific moment.  
The controversies surrounding the Indian plans of massive hydropower development along the Narmada 
River were a second important condition for the transition of the Anti-Arun-campaign from a national 
debate to a global event. On the one hand, the mobilisation and networking of the Narmada Bachao 
Andolan had shown NGOs around the global South that it was possible for a ‘local’ organisation to 
successfully transnationalize a ‘local’ struggle. On the other hand the very success of the NBA’s 
mobilisation led to the first independent review of a World Bank project. This mechanism proved to be 
the forerunner of the World Bank Inspection Panel where the Arun-3 campaign should culminate after 
five years of national and transnational contestation. After this historical embedding of the movement I 
will focus on the progress of the campaign, the way the national English speaking media covered the 
debate, the internal tensions and the activists’ failure to convince the affected people in the Arun valley 
who they claimed to represent to engage in the movement. 
 
 
The semi-blockade 
To many, the force of the popular uprising that swept away the Panchayat system and changed Nepal in 
the spring of 1990 came as a surprise. Despite the difficulties that King Birendra and his autocratic regime 
had encountered during the 1980s, hardly anybody believed in the possibility of a democratic mass 
movement in Nepal. But when the Indian government decided to impose a trade embargo on the 
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neighbour in 1989, the situation changed. First the general public – trained in anti-Indian resentments by 
the regime – put the blame for the resulting hardship on India alone. But the continuous failure to reach 
an agreement even after the more sympathetic V.P. Singh succeeded Rajiv Gandhi as prime minster of 
India in November 1989 made people more and more discontent with their own government and anger 
slowly built up. 
Officially, the bone of contention was the renewal of two treaties on trade and transit between the two 
countries that expired in March 1989. While the Indian government wanted to incorporate both issues 
into a single agreement, the Nepalese negotiators argued that transit was a fundamental right of 
landlocked countries while trade was a bilateral matter subject to periodic change. As both sides stood firm 
and there was no rapprochement until the expiration of the old treaties on 23 March 1989, India closed 
thirteen of its fifteen border crossings with Nepal, leaving only the two major transit points at Jogbani and 
Raxaul open  
 
to permit essential goods such as medicines, baby foods, and cement to reach the Nepali 
people against whom India said it held no animus. Under international law a landlocked 
country has a right to only one transit route to the sea [...]. This also allowed New Delhi to 
deny that it was blockading Nepal (Garver 1991: 959).  
 
Still, India was building up considerable pressure. When a separate agreement under which the Indian Oil 
Corporation was delivering petroleum products to Nepal expired on 31 March, the country was cut off 
from its fuel supplies. Especially the ensuing shortage of kerosene changed public opinion and made 
people start to turn against the Panchayat government. King Birendra turned to the Chinese and “by April 
1989 an agreement for Chinese supply of fuel and food had been signed, and Chinese tanker and other 
trucks began to deliver supplies to Kathmandu by early May” (ibid: 964). Apart from that Chinese support 
for Nepal remained rather limited. John Garver (ibid: 965-965) ascribes this fact mainly to two reasons: 
Firstly, the Chinese upheaval of 1989 was in full swing at that time, occupying a big part of the authorities 
and put the country in a weak position internationally. These circumstances might also explain why China 
did not bring up the issue at the United Nations. Secondly, the logistical constraints induced by the bad 
condition of the transport system between Tibet and Nepal convinced the Chinese leadership that it 
would be next to impossible to seize the opportunity and step into the breach that India’s move had 
opened up. In 1989, the Arniko Highway from Kathmandu to the Tibetan border in Kodari and further 
on to Lhasa was the only motorable connection between the two countries and the road was in no shape to 
permit the sustenance of a landlocked country suddenly cut off from all its supply chains. 
Already at that time, many commentators felt that the economic disagreements were nothing but a pretext 
for India and the real issue was the fact that King Birendra had bought Chinese arms that started to arrive 
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in Kathmandu in June 1988, among them sixteen antiaircraft guns. Especially this procurement upset the 
Indians, as they had declined to sell these arms to the Nepalese already several times since 1972, because 
India believed that Nepal did not need antiaircraft guns. “New Delhi had got wind of Kathmandu’s 
intentions and in December 1987 had warned Nepal of the consequences of purchasing antiaircraft guns 
from China” (Garver 2001: 152). This arms deal was part of a broader strategy of King Birendra to 
decrease Nepalese dependency on its southern neighbour and followed the anti-Indian bias that was, 
besides it strong developmentalist ideology, formative of the Panchayat regime. The Indian side grew even 
more concerned over a “secret agreement between Nepal and China providing for the exchange of 
intelligence between the two governments signed sometime in 1988” (Garver 1991: 963). That said there 
is no evidence to verify the hypothesis that the Indian government used the embargo to topple the 
autocratic rule of the King and facilitate a democratic change in Nepal. David Gellner (1997: 169) instead 
argues that the immediate Indian influence was in fact much less important during the people’s movement 
of 1990 than it had been during the first democratic experiment in the 1950s and, one could add, as it 
would again be in the events that led to the end of the civil war, the abdication of King Gyanendra and the 
proclamation of Republic between 2005 and 2009. John Whelpton (2005: 115) even indicates that India 
was offering support to the King in March 1990 when his regime was already with its back against the 
wall in an effort to exploit the situation for the renewal of a security treaty from 1950. 
Of course, there were other important factors for the people’s movement as well. Firstly, the dramatic 
changes in Eastern Europe constituted a critical precondition for the coming into being of the movement 
as they encouraged hope among pro-democracy activists. Another decisive shift occurred at the conference 
of the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) (CPN [ML]) in August 1989 “at which the party 
formally abandoned Maoism and accepted alliance with Congress to struggle for a parliamentary system as 
a short-term goal” (ibid: 113). During the late 1980s the CPN (ML) was the major force among the 
multiplicity of communist parties and groups in Nepal. In January, six smaller communist parties joined 
them to form the United Left Front (ULF) and together with the Congress Party they prepared for a 
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. The alliance decided to start the protest on 18 February 
1990 (Falgun 7, 2046 in the Nepali calendar Bikram Samvat), the anniversary of the establishment of the 
first coalition government after the end of the Rana regime in 1951.15 The Communist Party of Nepal 
(Masal) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Mashal), the two splinter groups in which the majority of the 
first central committee members of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN [M]) were socialised, 
decided not take part in the ULF. Together with other factions, they however set up the United National 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This day has been celebrated as Democracy Day since that year. 
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People’s Movement. So, even without a common strategy, the two major communist fractions carried out 
protests together. 
Adding to these political changes on international and national level was a general decline in the 
legitimacy of the regime in the public opinion. The contradictions between the Panchayat state’s rhetoric 
of national solidarity and steady development, on the one hand, and the endemic reality of corruption, 
clientelism and economic stagnation on the other hand, had been steadily increasing during the 1980s. 
“Although development had occurred, it was too uneven and was believed to have happened despite the 
regime, not because of it.” (Gellner 2010: 13). Especially the urban middle classes suffered under the 
impacts of rising food prices, steep inflation and an economic policy that still preserved the structures of 
the 1960s, despite the inevitable structural adjustment program dictated by the World Bank during the 
1980s (Whelpton 2005: 127-128). Although the Panchayat governments and King Birendra did achieve 
some success in lessening the dependency from India, the country became more and more dependent on 
foreign aid in these years. 
 
 
Jana Andolan: The People’s Movement 
The majority of protesters that started the demonstrations on 18 February 1990 were students and 
unemployed youths who supported Congress and the ULF. The police came down hard on them shooting 
four protesters in the southern province of Chitwan (Gaenszle 1991: 239). After the first manifestations, 
thousands of pro-democracy activists and journalists were arrested while most of the known political 
leaders had already been imprisoned or placed under house arrest some days in advance. The government 
and the palace were obviously determined to face this challenge to their power, but there was a substantial 
faction among the panchas, the councillors who ran the whole political system, who favoured a political 
solution of the problem already at the outset of the demonstrations. In an effort to reclaim control, the 
 
regime came up with a three-pronged strategy that at times seemed self-contradictory. First, 
it tried to delegitimize the movement by invoking nationalism in the usual way of India 
bashing. Second, officially HMG tried its best to give the impression of an increasing 
rapproachement [sic!] with Delhi, and at the same time, it was equally careful to seek ways of 
reducing external support for the movement. Third, coercive measures were taken to counter 
the opposition campaign (Hachhethu 1990: 178). 
 
From the beginning, there was strong support from Indian politicians. Chandra Shekhar from the Janata 
Party was already present at the Congress party’s conference in January where the start of the pro-
democracy movement and the very unusual alliance with the ULF was announced (Whelpton 2005: 114). 
V.P. Singh and Rajiv Gandhi both made public statements “condemning the crackdown and describing 
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the repression as state violence” (Garver 1991: 970). Thereupon, the government tried to convince the 
public that the democracy movement was an Indian attempt to destabilize Nepal, or, as Ganesh Raj 
Sharma, a representative of the ancien regime, put it: “This movement is inspired and encouraged by India 
with the aim of creating a chaotic and anarchic situation in Nepal to make it soften its stand” (Samikshya 
Weekly in Hachhethu 1990: 178). On the other hand, they hoped that the Indian involvement would jam 
a wedge between the ULF and Congress as the only topic where most of the communist groups agreed 
with the Panchayat regime was their anti-Indianism. “But contrary to the expectations of the panchas, all 
the left leaders were highly appreciative of the articulated support of Indian leaders” (ibid: 179). 
Furthermore, there was also strong criticism from the United States, Japan and West Germany. 
Responding to this, the regime played the communist card claiming the movement to be controlled by 
leftist extremists. When the US put pressure on the King to solve the problem through expanding 
democratic instruments within the system, King Birendra announced a proposal to reforms during a pro-
Panchayat rally in Pokhara on 16 March. 
At that time, the movement was on the verge of breaking down. But when a student at Mechi campus in 
south eastern Nepal was killed, a second wave of rage broke out in Kathmandu and every day, “the crowds 
of people chanting ‘democracy and human rights’ multiplied within and outside Kathmandu valley” (ibid: 
181). Protesters asked the public to turn out their lights collectively at set times each night. These “light 
outs” starting from 29 March gave a large number of people the possibility to show their support for the 
protest in safety while the dark streets made it easier for a small group of activists to confront the police. 
In those days, Kathmandu had a relatively stable and uninterrupted electricity supply, by the way. These 
days, such a form of protest would simply be impossible due to the long hours of power outage every day. 
The turning point was reached on 31 March when the inhabitants of Patan set up a Public Safety 
Committee containing the police to the main square and blocking all access roads after police had shot six 
people dead in Patan and Kirtipur near Kathmandu. There were also daily marches on the streets with at 
least one member of every household. John Whelpton (2005: 114) points to the important factor of the 
tight kinship and caste affiliations in the Newar towns of the Kathmandu valley where police violence 
against individual protesters was understood as assaults against the whole community. Especially the city 
of Bhaktapur and the town of Kirtipur showed determined opposition against the regime. David Gellner 
(Gellner 1997: 166-167) reminds us of the long histories of counter-conduct against the royal state in 
these two cities. 
In the morning of 6 April, King Birendra made a surprising broadcast to the nation in which he promised 
discussions with the opposition and announced that he would form a constitutional reform commission. 
He dismissed the government and appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chand as new Prime Minister, “who, as 
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it was learned, had agreed to take the job only after three other ex-prime ministers had turned it down” 
(Whelpton 2005: 115). Hachhethu (1990: 182) argues that Birendra had realised the immanent threat to 
the very institution of monarchy if he was to continue with his strategy of confrontation. His open support 
for the Panchayat system had started to turn a growing number of the protesting population against him. 
While the leaders of Congress were in favour of constitutional monarchy and agitated against the palace 
solely to put pressure on the King, the communist groups were predominantly pro-republican, even if they 
had accepted the perpetuation of the monarchy for the time being. With the increasing radicalisation of 
the democracy movement and the growing influence of the communist groups, the King feared that 
Congress might lose its dominance in the movement, thereby jeopardising the monarchy. 
His offer came too late to satisfy the agitated public. Later that day, hundreds of thousands took to the 
streets in all parts of the country and when a group marched towards the royal palace, and the police failed 
to stop the protesters with tear gas, security personnel opened fire on the crowd around the statue of the 
late King Mahendra on Durbar Marg, leaving several people dead (Gellner (1997: 169) estimates the 
death toll to have been between 25 and 50). Subsequently the towns in the Kathmandu valley were placed 
under curfew, but two days later the King finally started direct negotiations with four representatives of 
Congress and the ULF. For a start, they accepted a simple ending of the ban on political parties and when 
they left the palace that evening the state media announced the end of the ‘party-less’ Panchayat 
democracy. Still, it took another week until Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand abandoned the 
hope that he could persuade the political parties simply to join his existing cabinet and was forced to 
resign, again with the help of pressure from the streets. On 19 April, a provisional government under the 
leadership of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai was sworn in. It was a coalition of Congress and the ULF while 
two of the ministers were still directly appointed by King Birendra (Gaenszle 1991: 245). 
 
 
“The first blow to Arun came when the Indians sealed their borders.” 
Apart from triggering a revolution, the Indian embargo had another very important outcome: a decisive 
implication for the construction of Arun-3. The World Bank’s Staff Appraisal Report for the Arun-3 
access road based on findings from February and May 1988 implies that the project was planned to be 
developed in two stages. A year earlier, the Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA) and the 
Canadian International Development Agency had assisted the government in conducting a least cost 
generation expansion plan (Mahat 2005: 1). 
 
As a result of this study […] HMG has proposed a two stage (201 MW each) development 
of the Arun III hydroelectric scheme as the next generation project in line with the estimated 
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growth of the electricity demand of Nepal’s interconnected power system. The first stage 
(1992-96), estimated to cost US$490 million, would involve construction of a dam, a tunnel, 
a powerhouse and a switchyard. In the second stage (by year 2003), the tunnel and generating 
capacity would be duplicated (Worldbank 1989: 1). 
 
As is implied by the “electricity demands of Nepal’s interconnected power system,” India as a likely buyer 
of electricity was an important factor from the inception of the project. The Bank estimated that the 
output of Arun-3 would “fulfill Nepal’s total power demands to 2010 at least cost” (ibid: i), so in 1989, the 
project was assumed to be clearly oversized for Nepal. From the initial planning stage, the international 
donors and the government had envisaged a power purchase agreement with India to re-finance a part of 
the project. That in mind, the Bank document further states: “The implementation of the second stage 
could be accelerated if agreement is reached on bulk export sales (100 MW or more) to India” (ibid: 1). 
But due to the growing tensions throughout 1988 that led to the semi-blockade, all bilateral talks came to 
a standstill and so there was no chance to negotiate a power purchase agreement. As Binod, a retired 
natural scientist who was part of the team who brought the Makalu-Barun National Park into existence 
recounts:  
 
I can’t exactly remember the date, but the first blow came from the embargo. And that 
embargo made it compulsory to revise all the projects, to make revisions of all the economics 
of the thing [...]. The project was in a good pipeline but that destroyed everything (Interview 
5). 
 
Therefore, the Indian semi-blockade of Nepal in 1990 was decisive for the history of Arun-3 as it served 
as a prerequisite for the opposition to the project in two critical ways: Firstly, the hardships put on the 
population through the shortage in fuel and other commodities were building up on an ever-growing 
dissatisfaction with the autocratic regime and sparked off the people’s movement. Though surely not the 
main cause for the popular uprising, the embargo was an important trigger to forge a broad alliance across 
divergent fractions of society that was necessary to bring down the Panchayat system – a counter-
hegemonic bloc to borrow Antonio Gramsci’s term that was strong enough to overcome the ancien régime. 
Subsequently, only the end of the Panchayat system and the establishment of multi-party democracy 
opened leeway for the emergence of a civil society, although Krishna Hachhethu (2006: 6) reminds us of 
the predecessors of Nepalese civil society that were instrumental for the first revolution in Kathmandu in 
1951 and the strong activity of civic organisations during the 1950. But after the abrupt end of 
democratisation, social movement mobilisation had to be predominantly carried out in the underground. 
With the Organizations and Associations (Control) Act of 1962, the government sought to ensure that no 
associations were set up without its approval. Though primarily introduced to impede the establishment of 
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political parties, it resulted as well in the dissolution of all peasant unions, students’ associations and the 
like (Heaton Shrestha 2010: 196). With the ban on parties and organisations lifted, Nepal saw a dramatic 
rise in the number of NGOs: from a mere 250 in 1989 to an estimated 30,000 in 2001 (ibid: 181, 210, en 
2). Even more important, however, was the newly gained possibility to contradict the government 
publicly. 
Secondly, the Indian embargo was the main cause for the decrease of the planned capacity of Arun-3 from 
402 MW to only 201 MW as it coincided with the final preparations for the construction of the power 
plant. The initial plan of the World Bank and the other foreign donors to negotiate a power purchase 
agreement with the Indian government was rendered obsolete in the face of the strained relations between 
the two neighbours. This downsizing strongly influenced the economic viability of the whole project as it 
nearly doubled the price of each unit of electricity to be generated. The comparatively high price per 
kilowatt-hour later proved to be one of the main arguments in the campaign against the project. 
 
 
The Emergence of Critique 
Only two months after the resignation of the last Panchayat prime minister, the first article criticising 
Arun-3 was published. It appeared on 13 June 1990 in the Friday supplementary of the government-
owned English daily The Rising Nepal. Under the heading “Arun III Impasse: Is there an escape from this 
blind alley?” its author Dipak Gyawali delivered a withering assessment of the project and the institutions 
involved, especially the NEA. He claimed that “Nepal’s power development program…placed all the 
development eggs in the Arun-3 basket,” (Gyawali 2003 [1990]: 148) and even that “the entire process of 
power planning and development has been hijacked by Arun-3” (ibid: 149). His main argument was that 
only through a number of tricks, Arun-3 had been produced as the cheapest hydropower project in Nepal. 
In his opinion, there were a number of projects that could be constructed with less money in shorter time, 
especially a sequence of middle-sized power plants in Central Western Nepal around the later-built Kali 
Gandaki ‘A’ scheme. There, most of the roads and transmission lines already existed, quite the contrary to 
the situation at the Arun-3 dam site: a place “at the end of a 200 km road…to be built from Dhankuta 
towards Mt. Everest” (ibid: 150). 
The underlying reason for the NEA’s choice to pursue this project, Gyawali argued, was the neo-feudal 
character of Nepal’s development strategy that simply replaced the exploitation of peasants in classical 
feudalism with the exploitation of “productive industrialists,” painting the picture of a parasitic 
bureaucracy that is feeding off the entrepreneurs. And especially when it comes to the power sector, 
Gyawali reasoned, this was all the more true. His op-ed culminated in a fierce attack on the NEA, arguing 
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for the disbandment of the organisation that is “only a government department with a misleading 
commercial name” (ibid: 151) and a radical liberalisation of the power sector: he called for the 
establishment of several independent trans-border river valley development authorities that should be in 
direct competition over customers in Nepal, India and maybe even Bangladesh. 
These days, Gyawali works as an independent consultant and analyst, and remains a controversial 
commentator and public intellectual. When I asked about how he became involved in the Arun-3 
controversy, he explained 
 
When I started this whole thing […] I was in the ministry of water resources as an engineer 
[...] I resigned from the government [in] 1987, but by then, there was enough criticism 
within the ministry that Arun is not properly done […] I was already critical then, but I had 
not really...worked, I mean publicly you couldn’t do it, because of the Panchayat days, but still 
there was some leeway […] In March 1989, I was outside the government, Panchayat was 
still strong and this was just before the Indian blockade of Nepal. Nepal Television had just 
come on […] It was the only TV channel and this anchor person…Bijay Kumar, his program 
was very popular, he was like […] this Jon Stewart now [...] So, he asked to interview me. 
[…] I said: We are on an expansive mode and we are on the wrong mode. [In] Bhutan power 
plants are being built at 500 to 800 Dollars a kilowatt, why are we building Khulekhani at 
2000? And Marsyangdi is going to be even more expensive. [...] We don’t need to be building 
power plants like that, so I was giving some numbers. That caused the sensation. […] So 
then I think the government was planning action against me, against him, he had to suspend 
his program, that poor guy...But then, immediately that week India imposed the blockade 
[…] The net result was that they had other things to worry about then somebody like me. 
[…] But then, you know, things went fast. 1989 March, 1990 March, [in] April we had 
democracy, Panchayat was gone. […] So after 1990 April, in July 1990 I think I wrote the 
first major piece, […] that is how the first public write-up started coming. People started to 
get involved with that, lots of people read that, they said: we should do something about 
it…Those euphoric days of democracy, everybody was organising all kinds of things 
(Interview A). 
 
Despite the euphoria, it took more than two years until the campaign against the dam gained traction. But 
in the meantime, something else was happening in India that proved to be have a huge impact on 
hydropower construction around the globe – and even more so on the conditions in Nepal: the movement 
to save the Narmada. 
 
 
Saving the Narmada 
The Narmada is the longest river in western and central India, flowing through the states of Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat. Proposals to develop a gigantic hydropower project in the Narmada 
valley and use the stored water to irrigate the drought prone areas of western Gujarat and southern 
Rajasthan predate the independence of India – already in 1946 the Central Waterways, Irrigation and 
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Navigation Commission presented first plans for such an endeavour (Khagram 2004: 67). Although initial 
studies were conducted in the following years, it took more than three decades until the final planning of 
the largest river basin scheme ever proposed in India began. This delay was primarily due to the inability 
of the three riparian states and Rajasthan that was supposed to receive water through an enormous canal 
(Fisher 1997a: 12-13) to agree upon the distribution of the water and a number of institutional dynamics 
within the Indian federal structure (Khagram 2004: 66-76). In 1968, the federal government agreed to the 
government of Gujarat’s plea for the establishment of a specific arbitral court to settle the inter-state 
conflict.  
The decisions of the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal of 1979 (NWDT 1979) specified many technical, 
financial and institutional parameters of the project, but neither did it sufficiently tackle questions of 
benefit and costs, resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) or environmental impacts, nor did it consider the 
opinions of central actors like the affected people or foreign donors, mainly the World Bank and the 
government of Japan. Following the Tribunal’s final order, the construction of more than 3,000 dams 
along the Narmada and its tributaries was approved, including 165 big dams (Khagram 2004: 65). 
The focal point of the ensuing resistance movement was the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP), the largest 
structure to be built along the Narmada and the dam closest to the mouth of the river. Although the 
construction of the dam had already started in 1961 under Jawaharlal Nehru, it only gathered momentum 
after 1985 when the World Bank agreed to co-fund the project. Since its inception, the proposed height 
of the dam had caused fierce controversies between the involved states and was one of the main reasons 
leading to the establishment of the Tribunal. The government of Gujarat (with support from Rajasthan) 
argued for a dam with a Full Reservoir Level (FRL) of 530 feet to harness as much water as possible for 
the generation of electricity, irrigation and to supply drinking water to over 40 million people in Gujarat 
(Baviskar 1995: 200). But while the dam site was situated at Navagam in Gujarat, the bigger part of the 
proposed reservoir was in the states of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Therefore, these two states 
objected this plan and the government of Madhya Pradesh insisted on a much smaller dam with a FRL of 
only 210 feet (Khagram 2004: 81). In 1979, the Tribunal followed the argumentation of the Gujarati 
government backed by the Central Government in Delhi, declared that national interest should be 
considered higher than state’s interests (ibid: 78) and fixed the FRL of the dam at 455 feet (NWDT 1979: 
3). At that level, the reservoir was estimated to submerge 37,000 hectares of land and 245 villages with a 
population of 152,000 people, according to government estimates (Morse and Berger 1992: 62) whereas 
activists expected more than one million people to get displaced by the SPP as a whole (Ram 1993: 1 in 
Baviskar 1995: 200). The villages in Gujarat and Maharashtra were almost exclusively inhabited by 
marginalised hill adivasi groups, but across the border in Madhya Pradesh, the Narmada runs through the 
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fertile and densely populated Nirmar plains, where the majority of affected people were Hindu farmers of 
the Patidar caste. And it was in Nirmar where the first resistance against the SSP emerged in 1978 when 
Arjun Singh founded the Nirmar Bachao Andolan (Save Nirmar Movement), although it became apparent 
soon enough that the driving force behind this move was to win the next elections, after which the protest 
stopped (Baviskar 1995: 202).  
The continuous struggle against the damming of the Narmada started in March 1984 when a march to 
the construction headquarters at Kevadia Colony was organised. Around that time, Medha Patkar, a social 
scientist from the Tata Institute for Social Studies in Bombay, went on her first trip to the SSP 
submergence zone villages of Maharashtra and found out that there was no government-funded 
mechanism to inform people about the project and the affected population had to rely on informal 
conversations with revenue officers and other bureaucrats (ibid: 201). Subsequently, the Narmada Bachao 
Andolan was formed. When the World Bank entered into credit and loan agreements for $450 million in 
May 1985, the first villagers in Gujarat were already accepting rehabilitation although no clear provisions 
for R&R had been laid out (Patkar and Kothari 1997: 160-161). So, a transnational alliance of indigenous 
rights’ advocacy groups, among them Oxfam and Survival International, started to put pressure on the 
federal and State governments as well as the World Bank to reform the R&R aspect of the SSP, especially 
pointing to the lack of any provisions for the compensation of people without proper land titles. Only 
later, the environmental impact of the invasion was picked up as another central topic (Khagram 2004: 89-
91). 
The following years were marked by fierce confrontation on local, state, national and transnational levels, 
involving a number of Supreme Court decisions and finally leading to the first independent review of a 
World Bank project in 1991/92. In the conclusions to their very critical report, Bradford Morse and 
Thomas Berger (1992: 356) acknowledge, “that in the national interest, people can be required to resettle” 
and maintain not to “insist upon an unattainable standard in environmental impact assessment and 
mitigation” (ibid: 357). Still, they argue that the high standards both in R&R as well as in environmental 
mitigation were established by India itself. They reject opinions implying that “human and environmental 
costs are to be heavily discounted” in megaprojects like the SSP as “unacceptable” (ibid). The report closes 
by stating that the Bank “must ensure that in projects it decides to support the principles giving priority to 
resettlement and environmental protection are faithfully observed. This is the only basis for truly 
sustainable development” (ibid: 358).  
Remarkably, Morse and Berger’s assessment is very much in line with that of many of the reports by 
NGOs and other civil society actors, as Khagram (2004: 127) rightly observes. As a result to the ever-
increasing pressure on the Bank, its staff drew up a series of rigid benchmarks that would have to be 
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satisfied within six months. When it became apparent that this deadline could not be met and to prevent 
the Bank from an official stoppage of funding, the government of India pulled the emergency break in 
March 1993. 
 
The Indian Executive Director to the World Bank formally announced that it would 
voluntarily forego the remaining $170 million of the $450 million credit and loans […and…] 
would also not seek the approximately $500 million in additional support from the World 
Bank for the other Narmada Project that was under negotiation (ibid: 130). 
 
With the end of the World Bank involvement, the conflict around the SSP was far from resolved and 
immediately after it a wave of repression was unleashed against the villagers and activists to show state 
authorities’ determination to move ahead with the project (ibid: 131). But the campaign showed people 
around the world that pressure on the Bank could be increased to the point where its reputation was so 
severely jeopardised that the continuation of funding for a project could become too costly to one of the 
most powerful development actors in the world.  
 
 
Empty Chairs 
The Narmada controversy was closely followed in Nepal, especially by the Arun Concerned Group 
whereas the Alliance for Energy was stronger connected to the opposition against the Tehri project, as 
Sushil told me (Interview 1). And while the Indian activists waited for the Bank’s response, the first civil 
society network opposing Arun-3 was established in Kathmandu. As mentioned, Gyawali’s first attack on 
the project and the institutions executing it had already appeared in summer 1990, but it took more than 
two year until further steps towards an organised campaign were taken. The first attempt to discuss the 
controversial dam publicly was a hearing organised by the Nepal Forum of Environmental Journalists and 
ten other organisations at Hotel Kathmandu in February 1993. The journalists had invited a number of 
officials, but only the representatives of the NEA arrived while “the chairs set aside for officials of the 
National Planning Commission, the Ministry of Water Resources, and the Ministry of Finance remained 
empty” (Pandey 1995). “Two ministers, Laxaman Ghimere [sic!] (water resources) and Mahesh Acharya 
(Finance), who had agreed to be present, backed out because of other ‘important work’ late Thursday 
night, according to the organisers” (Bhattarai 1993). 
A brochure published by the organisers lists 147 participants in the hearing (ECCA 1993: Annex 2). The 
audience wanted to discuss questions of hydropower policy, why hydropower development was so much 
more expensive in Nepal than in Bhutan, India or China or “why all rural Nepal must bear the burden of 
providing electricity to urban dwellers” (Pandey 1995). In answer to my question why he thinks the 
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government officials did not show up, Anil, one of the former activists, speculates: 
 
They should have come, but they didn’t come, because of their arrogance. The arrogance was: 
We know everything, who are these people? We have already decided everything about the 
Arun-3 project so what do they want? Who are the environmentalists or media or...these 
people who cast a doubt on something we have already done? And look, this is not something 
we have done alone. This is also done mainly by the World Bank. Who can question what 
the World Bank does or did, right? So, it’s all default, it’s all a waste of time […] that’s one 
reason. And the second reason could be, that – maybe – they also knew that there were 
problems and maybe they thought, the more you engage with these kinds of people, the more 
problems will come out in the future. So, they thought it’s better to keep away from such 
engagement […] But it didn’t go that way. […] And in those days, although these political 
parties and leaders also came from a long dictatorship and the democratic movement, you 
know, we were together in these democratic struggles at the frontline, but as soon as they 
came to power they started constructing themselves as...the ruling class and the people as the 
subjects they can rule. So not only in this particular hearing, but throughout the Arun-3 
campaign...from 1993 to 1995, they were never open for us, for the people to meet, to talk, to 
dialogue – they didn’t want to. 
 
As these last sentences already insinuate, the public hearing was not organised in vain and in retrospect the 
image of the empty chairs served as a very powerful symbol for the officials’ refusal to engage with the 
public. A group of young professionals interested in hydropower and development met for the first time at 
that occasion and the empty seats on the podium proved the need for organised action. For this purpose, 
some of the participants of the public hearing came together a month later and formed the Alliance for 
Energy (AfE), a network comprising predominantly of young engineers. Apart from very committed 
lobbying work in the background, their main output were not more than eight slim white papers and 
newsletters in the following two years that criticised the Arun-3 project mainly on economic and technical 
reasons, very much in the line of Gyawali’s arguments from the 1990 article. After the refusal of the 
government, the Alliance contacted the donors and was invited for a meeting with representatives of the 
World Bank, the German KfW and the Asian Development Bank. In 1994, they were also invited to the 
US Senate and the British House of Lords (Interview 1). 
A few months later, on 15 December 1993, a second organisation was formed: The Arun Concerned 
Group (ACG), a coalition of human rights organisations under the leadership of the International Institute 
for Human Rights, Environment, and Development (INHURED), one of the first independent NGOs in 
the country, already established in 1987 before the democratic movement. From the beginning, the ACG 
included people from the lower Arun valley and, unlike the AfE, was keen to add human and indigenous 
rights issues to the campaign that was so far restricted on economic concerns and the right to economic 
self-determination. Thereby, the ACG’s plan was to link it to the emerging global discourses and activists’ 
networks concerned with these issues. Some days before the ACG was officially established, the activists 
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wrote a letter to the NEA as well as the Ministries of Finance and Water Resources and the Arun-3 
Project Office asking for a copy of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) report. When the 
government provided some information on the EIA, the activists drew up another letter on 22 December 
and demanded the full disclosure of all documents related to the project, including the government’s 
agreements with the foreign donors and the World Bank. Without stating its reasons, the government 
refused to comply with these requests. 
 
 
The Supreme Court decision 
Confronted with this reply, Gopal Siwakoti ‘Chintan’ (on behalf of INHURED) and Rajesh Gautam filed 
a case with the Supreme Court on 16 January 1994 alleging that their right to information granted by the 
1990 Constitution had been violated. In their application, they claimed that the Nepalese citizens had not 
been adequately informed about the project. In particular, they complained about a lack of information on 
the terms and conditionalities of the World Bank loan, the involvement of international contractors and 
the far-reaching implications on the national economy and the environment in the Arun valley 
maintaining that the dispute was an issue of public concern (Siwakoti 2004). 
Siwakoti became involved in the emerging movement right after his return from Washington DC where 
he had completed a Master’s degree in human rights and environmental law. He remembers the start of 
his engagement as follows: 
 
When I returned to Nepal in 1993, I simply wanted to know more about Arun-3 and 
basically to study more and make whatever positive contribution I could make. So, getting 
involved […] was basically out of my own academic curiosity. The problems started when we 
were denied basic information about the project by the NEA. We simply asked for copies of 
the Environmental Impact Assessments in the beginning and they said: We cannot give them 
to you. So, as we had a very good provision in the 1990 Constitution regarding the right to 
information, regarding any government undertakings, we approached the Supreme Court and 
asked for the release of project documents and information. The Supreme Court agreed, so 
we had an access to the Arun-3 project and documentation. So, that was the beginning of my 
involvement (Interview B). 
 
As Siwakoti mentioned, Article 16 of the 1990 Constitution provided that “every citizen shall have the 
right to demand and receive information on any matter of public importance.” Still Siwakoti’s and 
Gautam’s demand set a new precedent as there had been no laws governing access to information enacted 
yet. They grounded their case on Article 88(2)16 of the Constitution in a two-fold way: Firstly, they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Article 88(2) provided:  
“The Supreme Court shall, for the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by this Constitution, for the 
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argued, the Supreme Court was the only body to enforce any legal right “for which no other remedy has 
been provided,” in respect to their neglected right to information. Secondly, based on the provision that 
the Supreme Court should have extraordinary power to settle disputes of public interest or concern, they 
demanded that it should decide  
 
whether the average investment cost of the hydroelectricity project, the conduct of the 
project, the propriety of the loans to be taken from foreign countries, the rate of interest, the 
burdens of loan, and the technical aspect of the project are beneficial to the Nepal people and 
the country (Siwakoti 2004: 335). 
 
On 8 May 1994, the Supreme Court judges Keshav Prasad Upadhyaya and Hara Govinda Singh Pradhan 
delivered their decision. Against the arguments of the defendants that “there was no right of action under 
the Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction set out in Article 88(2) of the 1990 Constitution and that the 
applicants had no standing to bring the proceedings” (ibid: 331-332), they followed the activists’ first 
argument and ordered the authorities “that all the documents related to Arun III should immediately be 
made available to the petitioners” (ibid: 337). Concerning their second claim, however, the judges 
maintained that the court could only “provide judicial solution for […] disputes related to public interest 
[…] if they contained questions which require the interpretation of laws,” argued further that the 
“demands of the petitioners are general and not clear” and ruled that “Article 88(2) of the Constitution 
cannot be attracted to such public issues of disputes related to the economic and political sector” (ibid: 
336). Still, to many in Nepal this was a landmark decision and more than what the activists had hopped 
for. Apart from that, the Supreme Court ruling gave the Arun-3 campaign another boost in public 
visibility, not only in the Kathmandu valley – by May 1994, the controversy was on everybody’s lips and 
whereas the national dailies had been very reluctant to report on the project before that, with the case 
before the Supreme Court they finally took up the topic. 
 
 
The media coverage 
When Gyawali’s article on the ‘Arun III Impasse’ appeared in The Rising Nepal in June 1990, the country 
was far away from a free press – which makes the bluntness of his attack all the more surprising. Although 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
enforcement of any other legal right for which no other remedy has been provided or for which the remedy even 
though provided appears to be inadequate or ineffective, or for the settlement of any constitutional or legal question 
involved in any dispute of public interest or concern, have the extraordinary power to issue necessary and appropriate 
orders to enforce such rights or settle the dispute. For these purposes, the Supreme Court may, with a view to 
imparting full justice and providing the appropriate remedy, issue appropriate orders and writs including the writs of 
habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, Prohibition and quo warranto.” 
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the 1980s had seen an explosion in licenses for regional newspapers, they remained tightly monitored by 
the Panchayat regime. This was even more true on the national level. Despite a couple of other national 
dailies, by far the most important newspaper was the state-owned Gorkhapatra – with The Rising Nepal as 
its English language version. This situation of quasi-monopoly changed in 1993 when a second pair of 
newspaper twins was launched: Kantipur (in Nepali) and The Kathmandu Post (in English). This initiative 
to establish a new media outlet with a national scope and a decidedly independent editorial office was one 
of the direct outcomes of the Jana Andolan of 1990. To prove this point, both papers’ first issue appeared 
on Falgun 7 (18 February), the day the protests had started in 1990. 
Looking through the relatively continuous catalogue of back issues of the two English language 
publications at the National Library in Kathmandu the difference could hardly be more pronounced. 
Whereas The Kathmandu Post (TKP) started its coverage of the topic with January 1994 reporting 
extensively on the writ petition by the ACG to the Supreme Court and published updates on the 
proceedings every couple of days, The Rising Nepal (TRN) remained absolutely silent about the issue. 
This was again the case in late 1994 and early 1995 with the World Bank Inspection Panel investigation 
underway (see Chapter 4). Looking through all available issues between Gyawali’s article and the pull-out 
of the World Bank, I could not find a single reference to the controversy or even the dam as such in TRN. 
And even on 5 August 1995 when news of the cancellation reached Nepal, the two paper reacted in very 
different ways: TKP’s front-page headline of that day read: “Govt regrets World Bank’s no to Arun III,” 
followed by a second article titled “Activists rejoice Arun III demise.” TRN, however, opened with “PM 
stresses common feeling for progress.” Below this article there was a two paragraph teaser under the 
heading “World Bank not to fund Arun III” that was continued on page 8. This is how the government-
owned newspaper reported on the cancellation of the most important development project in the history 
of the country. Two days later, the dam made its first headline ever and in the following weeks there was 
broad coverage of the issue. These articles mostly reported on asseverations by the government and the 
foreign donors that their commitment towards development in the Arun valley would not be changed by 
the cancellation. They also gave ample accounts of the attacks directed at the activists for their actions that 
are depicted as undermining the country’s national interest. 
A closer look at the coverage in TKP throughout 1994 and 1995 shows three main themes, apart from the 
factual updates on the progress of the project: officials claiming that the activists have teamed up with 
foreign NGOs to harm Nepal, that every month of delay would cost the national economy millions of 
Nepalese rupees (NPR) and the activists rejecting these accusations. Instead, they claimed that they were 
neither against Arun-3 as such nor against development altogether, but that it was the government that 
was behaving irresponsibly by insisting on a project not suitable for the national economy at this point in 
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time. Beyond these news reports on the progression of the project and the campaign against it, the 
coverage in TKP revealed another intriguing detail about the Arun-3 controversy. Starting in spring 1994, 
an extended debate about the project was unfolding on the paper’s opinion pages. While the editorials 
refrained from taking a clear stance on it, a remarkably open exchange of arguments between opponents 
and advocates of the project evolved. How delicate this debate must have been for the newly established 
media house became clear while I examined all available issues of the paper at Kathmandu’s National 
Library from its launch date in February 1993 until December 1995: the editors paid scrupulous attention 
not to privilege one side. Therefore, advocates and opponents take strict turns in their appearances. 
Surprisingly, however, the main figures of ACG and AfE did not participate in this controversy. 
 
 
The debate on The Kathmandu Post’s opinion pages 
After a few short pieces, the first editorial appeared on 15 February 1994. It refrained from arguing on the 
viability of the project in view of the Supreme Court investigation underway. Still, it claims that there are 
some unaddressed questions: 
 
What will happen if the donors choose, just as in the case of the Narmada Dam in India, to 
withdraw their support half way? Has an agreement been reached with China binding it not 
to build, even at a distant future, any projects in the upper reaches of the Arun that may affect 
the flow of the water? [...] Moreover, the experience of Narmada and Tehri dams of India tell 
us that the task of resettling the people of the project area is more difficult than previously 
thought. Therefore, there is no reason why the opposing views should be resented (The 
Kathmandu Post 1994a). 
 
Two days later, Hari Bansh Jha urges „all the Nepalese to join hands together in their fight against poverty 
by supporting the cause of Arun III” (Jha 1994). In line with the official argumentation, he maintains that 
any further delay „could compel us to live in the dark as in primitive days. Besides, it will also cost the 
nation between Rs. 30 and 35 crores per month.” His main focus, however, is on the international 
connections of the activists, or as he phrases it, „the elements behind the Anti-Arun group.” Quoting the 
weekly People’s Review, he reveals them to be the United Nation’s Mission to Nepal as well as unspecified 
Canadian and American consultants before asking: „If this is true, is it not the direct interference in the 
internal affairs of Nepal by the foreign elements? Who are these foreign bodies to decide what is needed 
for us?” Additionally, he accuses the activists of not presenting alternatives to Arun-3 as “the outdated 
concept of opting for small hydro-power [...] cannot work.” However, the example of the establishment of 
pro-Arun groups like the Arun Support Committee (see below) shows according to Jha the growing 
democratic consciousness of the people. The members of the Committee, he continues, mostly „belong to 
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the area where the Arun project is likely to be constructed.” The author thereby clearly intends to contrast 
these ‘local’ people in favour of the dam with the allegedly foreign controlled anti-Arun activists who 
sabotage the project in order to weaken the country. 
Exactly one month later, on 17 March 1994, the paper opens with a strong expression of support for the 
latter group by a prominent foreigner: Toni Hagen. During a press conference, the Swiss geologist who 
first mapped Nepal, accused the donors of blackmailing Nepal with respect to Arun-3: “‘Two years ago 
during a meeting with Nepali engineers in Germany, the German government told them either take it or 
leave it’ said Hagen. ‘This is blackmailing’” (The Kathmandu Post 1994b). Additionally, Hagen repeated 
the main arguments of the AfE: the fear of structural adjustment that would crowd out investment in 
health and education and that it would be unwise to put all eggs in one basket and to lose the opportunity 
for capacity building smaller project would encompass: “‘When the 60 MW Khimti hydro-electric project 
plant [sic!] could be built by Nepali engineers why go for big projects which involve foreigners’ said 
Hagen.” Ten days later, a reply to Hagen’s comments appeared through a reader’s letter. Its author argues 
that a project like Arun-3 should have been build long ago and likens the critics to people who “appear to 
be hawking others’ apples while their own fall on the ground to rot” (M. 1994). He asks polemically: 
“Does Dr. Hagen prescribe the people of this part of the earth the dirty coat and torn shoes forever?” 
before suggesting that it is “time now to try and beat the causative barriers of economic stagnation with 
international participation.” 
After the Supreme Court decision in May, there was one more pro-opinion in May and a contra-position 
in June before the first part of the debate was over. It resurfaced with full power in January 1995 after the 
first preliminary report from the Inspection Panel (The Inspection Panel 1994). This second round of the 
discussion was characterised by a much higher frequency and also for the first time staff writers of the Post 
clearly took up positions. There were fourteen opinion pieces between 5 January and 3 March 1995, half 
of them by the three main columnists of the paper. One of them, S N Sharma, started the discussion with 
a comparison between Arun-3 and Kali Gandaki ‘A,’ the project favoured by the AfE that was later built 
with the Japanese and ADB money previously earmarked for Arun-3. In line with NEA and World Bank, 
Sharma argued that “firm energy cost of Arun is half the cost of KGA and this is the most important 
factor for selection of any hydropower project” (Sharma 1995) and that Arun-3 would come online much 
faster. He closed with reminding his readers that one billion Nepalese rupees had already been spent on 
Arun-3 and therefore its non-implementation would be a “wastage of time and money which a poor 
country like Nepal cannot afford.” 
The following week, Barbara Adams for the first time engaged in the debate. At the time she was the only 
foreign staff writer of the Post and contributed a weekly column. Contrary to Sharma who blamed the 
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recently installed CPN (UML) government for the slow-down of the project that had made good progress 
while Congress was ruling, Adams (1995a) stated that  
 
the young, bright, nationalist, people-oriented UML Government needs all the help and 
support it can muster to breathe reason and sanity into the current debate. We must 
encourage it to stand firmly against the onslaught of the old-guard, donor-enslaved vested 
interests who have been loudly and mindlessly espousing the cause of Arun III. 
 
The main representative of this old guard in her opinion was the former Vice Chairman of the National 
Planning Commission Ram Sharan Mahat17 from Nepali Congress whom she unmistakably accused of 
corruption by “commission agents and other vested interests who had been buzzing around Arun III like 
hungry bees” (ibid). Coming to the World Bank, Adams claimed that “in Bank offices world-wide Arun 
III is referred to as ‘the son of Narmada’” and closed with the prognosis that in the best of cases, ten years 
from then, “Arun will be able to provide electricity to one tenth of our impoverished people, who will 
certainly be unable to afford it.” The attacked Mahat was quoted in an article appearing two weeks later 
on a talk programme bringing together supporters and critics in Biratnagar, the main town of eastern 
Nepal. The fact that the AfE refused to send a representative provoked Mahat to saying:  
 
They find it more convenient and comfortable to travel to Bonn, London, Washington and 
Tokyo to criticise Arun than spend a few days in remote villages to help the communities out 
there get electricity through the installation of small turbines [...]. Who would not like to talk 
about the virtues of ‘small is beautiful’, specially when it involved jet travels, and dinners at 
luxury hotels? Who bothers to share the life of drudgery with villagers out there in the hills 
(Ardayeti 1995)? 
 
After three more comments on the environmental, technical and ideological impacts of the project by 
scholars, Barbara Adams returned with an article that compares foreign aid with drug addiction. Most 
intriguing was, however, the way she turned her opponents’ accusation of anti-nationalism around: 
 
It is ironic that my good friend and colleague, MR. Josse - whose newspaper’s logo is ‘Let 
Nepal be Nepal’ - should advocate letting Nepal be the beaten and bruised lackey of the 
World Bank, and other extra-national vested donor interests. One would think that he, and 
other pro-Arun ‘nationalists,’ would see that the best way to ‘let Nepal be Nepal,’ is to 
encourage its development in a purely ‘Nepali way’ (Adams 1995b). 
 
Finally, the heavily attacked Ram Sharan Mahat joined the conversation with a two-part opinion piece 
published on 24 and 25 February. In it he tried to rebut his depiction as a staunch advocate of big dams 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 After the resignation of the CPN (UML) government in autumn 1995, Mahat became Finance Minister. 
“Those euphoric days of democracy” 	  
- 70 - 
with a “donor driven mentality” that is not interested in local capacity building in the hydropower sector 
and development in general. Instead, Mahat claimed that the agenda of the National Planning 
Commission under his leadership had considerably shifted towards small and medium sized projects. He 
argued against the insufficiency of a one dimensional approach and therefore called for a simultaneous 
development of Arun-3 and Kali Gandaki ‘A,’ despite the World Bank’s opposition to this plan “because 
they think Nepal’s macro economic position cannot afford both projects and managing it was difficult” 
(Mahat 1995a). After repeating the known arguments in favour of Arun-3 he denied Adam’s Narmada 
comparison:  
 
While Narmada is a huge reservoir project displacing a population of about 67000, largely 
indigenous tribals, and submerging approximately 11000 ha of forest land, Arun is a run-of-
the river project which does not affect more than 40 families, of which only 19 are seriously 
affected. The other affected families numbering 958, will be so due to road construction. The 
project provides an attractive compensation package including substitute land, cash and 
employment for at least one member of the seriously affected families (Mahat 1995b). 
 
To conclude, Mahat discussed the complexity of the negotiations “with seven powerful donors with 
different rules” (ibid) and stated that the present package is the best possible under the prevailing 
circumstances. After Mahat’s defence, the opinion pages stayed mostly clear of Arun-3 until the final 
cancellation of the project in August 1995 when the topic reappeared for another month and seven more 
op-ed articles came out, all of them bemoaning the cancellation 
This debate was the first extended controversy in the first independent English-speaking daily in the 
country. Again, it shows that at the centre of the argument were opposing understandings of ‘the national 
interest.’ While the advocates of the project claimed that the project was technically and economically 
sound and any delay would harm the country unnecessarily, the opponents were convinced that the project 
as such was a threat to national development. By the time of the cancellation, however, the Anti-Arun 
camp was far from unified, as I will show in the next section.  
 
 
“I haven’t talked to him since 1994” 
Let me go back in time for a year, though, and continue the narration where I left it after the decision of 
the Supreme Court. In light of it, the World Bank obviously realised that trouble was in the offing and 
invited representatives of both AfE and ACG to a meeting in Washington, DC that took place on 28 
June 1994 (ACG 1995: 30). But before the conflict became fully internationalised with the ACG’s 
complaint before the World Bank Inspection Panel in October 1994 (see Chapter 4), Nepalese internal 
politics provided for another decisive turning point in the Anti-Arun-3 campaign: the resignation of the 
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Nepali Congress government under Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala in July. The ensuing mid-term 
elections were held in November and although Congress could again secure the majority of votes, the 
CPN (UML) emerged as the largest party in parliament with a margin of only five seats (Whelpton 1995: 
192). The party formed a minority government and Man Mohan Adhikari was appointed as the first 
communist Prime Minister of the country. 
But despite the CPN (UML)’s critical stance towards the project, the Anti-Arun movement could not 
benefit directly from the new circumstances. On the contrary, the sudden change of government led to a 
split in the campaign and posed a serious threat to the whole mobilisation. As Sushil, one former activist 
of the AfE, brings to mind, there was a rather clear-cut affiliation of his group to the Congress Party and 
a strong connection between the ACG and the CPN (UML): 
 
Now, what happened at that point, because 1994, before the World Bank pulled out, there 
was the UML government […] Alliance for Energy had all kinds of people, but it was more 
liberal democratic, so people more close to the Nepali Congress kind of thinking. Arun 
Concerned Group was basically UML funded...all these guys were mostly UML, let’s not 
forget that. So, there were strong differences, in fact, Arun Concerned Group was set up 
because the Alliance for Energy had been set up and the Communists, typical Communist 
behaviour, they can’t allow anything outside of themselves. So they formed that group. And 
their strong argument was: We come from that area, from Sankhuwasabha, so we are the 
local indigenous people...So that was a strong point, now we were not interested in the kind 
of indigenous campaign and all that these guys got into, which I think was slightly fraudulent 
because there was no indigenous people submerged over there, you know, in Arun-3 […] So, 
this was a UML group, now one thing we knew that would happen was once the UML 
government came to power, Alliance for Energy was continuing its campaign and [within] 
Arun Concerned Group there was a split (Interview 7). 
 
Whether Sushil and his allies had really anticipated this fissure within the ACG is of course impossible to 
verify now, but the split indeed occurred in late 1994: the ACG broke apart into a pragmatic wing close to 
the CPN (UML) that was confident in a resolution of the contentious issues with a more sympathetic 
government and a radical wing that did not believe in accommodation. Anil, one of the former members 
of the ACG recounts his memories of the events leading to the split: 
 
After Man Mohan Adhikari had become Prime Minister there were some people […] who 
said: now as UML is – our party, at least some of them – is in government we will stop 
campaigning. […] So, you can say that some people who were...associated with Arun 
Concerned Group had some, you know, vested political interest, that they had the idea that 
they would use Arun-3 as an instrument to criticise the Nepali Congress government, so as to 
popularise the UML opposition party, right?...But that was not the intention of...the rest of 
us...who were in the driving seat of the Arun-3 campaign. [...] Until the UML formed the 
minority government all of us were together in the Arun Concerned Group and we had 
already filed a case before the Inspection Panel of the World Bank [...] As soon as the UML 
government was there, the same friends […] came to me and said: Now, you know...let’s stop 
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it. Because we have now UML, you know, our party in government, things should be 
different. Arun-3 should come. And...they came to me to ask me to withdraw...this 
complaint from the Inspection Panel. And then I said [laughing] No...That’s not...that’s not 
fair, that’s not possible and that’s not how...and why have you started this campaign? So it 
became a big conflict, so one faction of the people were core-UML followers and activists, 
they decided to highjack the Arun Concerned Group [...] So they started all of a sudden, 
without any collective decision among the members of Arun Concerned Group, they set up a 
second secretariat of Arun Concerned Group, which we didn’t know. So for a few months 
you could see that there were two parallel Arun Concerned Groups. One was led by us, we 
were continuing our campaign, and one was led by them who were saying that in fact Arun-3 
is not a bad project but that is was the government that was the problem […] So, there was 
this split. And since then, we have not been together in any campaign with these people 
(Interview 8). 
 
Speaking with former members of the pragmatic wing of the ACG, they deny that they simply wanted to 
stop the campaign because of the newly established CPN (UML) government. Rather, they ascribe the 
split to a certain radicalism among the other fraction that only became apparent in the course of the 
movement. One of them, Prakash, explained their actions as follows: 
 
We definitely had differences. The way they were engaged was very different. […] We were 
more concerned about the local issues that I mentioned, but they had some other interests as 
well...it is difficult to explain…They were going against all hydropower projects and 
sometimes they had a kind of attitude that preached against everything. Ok, that kind of 
identity came out over a period of time...I’m not sure whether they knew that...Even, I was 
not against Arun-3, but if you ask the people, still today they will tell you: he was against the 
project (Interview 9). 
 
On a sunny afternoon in December 2010, I was taking a walk with Anil on Putalisadak, one of the 
crowded shopping streets in the centre of Kathmandu. We were talking about the division of the ACG 
and how it happened. Our conversion took a turn and we were discussing the recent stir about a proposed 
new water law when some minutes later it was time to part. Coming back to our previous topic, I asked 
him if he could provide me with the phone number of another former activist, whose name cropped up in 
a lot of the old documents. He looked at me startled and said: “Well, he was one of the others. I haven’t 
talked to him since 1994” (Interview 10). This quote was only one very articulate example for the 
persisting political divisions, the mistrust and hostility among those who for a short period joined forces 
during the Arun-3 campaign in the 1990s and went on to very different positions and careers later on. 
Both AfE and ACG came apart soon after the cancellation of the project, but the latter found its successor 
in WAFED that also hosted the ACG’s archive. Only recently this NGO disorganised after internal 
conflicts (Interview 1). 
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Civil Society in Nepal 
A look at the recent literature on civil society in Nepal shows that the influence of party politics on NGOs 
is a reoccurring topic and not restricted to the Arun campaign. One of the reasons for this strong 
connection and often-unclear division between party structures and civil society lies in the communists’ 
strategy of mobilisation during the 1980s. In 1985, the CPN (ML) formed a number of open forums to 
attract people, who were willing to fight for democracy. Besides that, Congress as well as CPN (ML) 
organised occupational groups that had clear ideological affiliations. This made them quite distinct from 
the civil society organisations of the 1930s and 1940s that were established well before the formation of 
the two big parties in 1947/1949 (Hachhethu 2006: 7-8). Prem Uprety notes that these groups included 
poets that were struggling against the Rana oligarchy and “wrote for the need for reforms in society; but in 
a very subtle way” (Uprety 1992: 19) as the Rana Prime Ministers came down hard on any threat to their 
power. In 1941, three leading members of the Nepal Praja Parishad ([N] Nepal People’s Council), the first 
political party of the country, were executed after they had distributed leaflets calling for an uprising in 
Kathmandu (Whelpton 2005: 67). With the advent of democracy after an armed uprising predominantly 
organised by Nepali Congress supporters that had forced the Rana regime out of power ten years later, 
most of the educated elite was absorbed into state institutions or the political parties, again leaving very 
little space for civil society action. As this democratic experiment was ended by a royal coup in 1960, an 
independent evolution of civil society became downright impossible. 
With the mushrooming of NGOs after the re-establishment of democracy in the 1990s, the dependence 
of NGOs on parties re-emerged, although foreign donors nowadays outbalance the parties by far as 
patrons (Tamang 2003). Chandra Bhatta (2007: 50) bemoans a commercialisation and monetisation of 
civil society in Nepal in the 1990s, leading to a “patron client culture with subtle corruption pervading the 
entire society.” He also purports that the “western neoliberal” practice of civil society “discounted organic 
concepts of civicness developed in Vedic period which emphasis [sic!] on voluntarism, mutual assistance 
and to some extent helps to construct the civic citizenship building” without specifying his historical 
sources for this claim. In his opinion, this form of cultural imperialism “destroyed traditional forms of civil 
society organisations and resulted in the growth of self interested elite civil society organisations” (ibid). 
As I have shown in my discussion of the debate in The Kathmandu Post, this dichotomisation of allegedly 
foreign-funded NGOs and vaguely defined conceptions of ‘traditional’ civil society featured prominently 
in the controversy between the dam’s advocates and its critics. These opposing perceptions of what it 
means to be local and who is entitled to represent whom were also at the centre of the relationship 
between the Anti-Arun campaigners and the affected communities in the Arun valley. 
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“Since I was a local we were not beaten up.” 
As already mentioned, a main dividing line between the campaigns of the AfE and the ACG was that the 
former criticised the project for economic and technical reasons, while the latter emphasised human and 
indigenous rights issues and claimed to represent local people’s concerns. Sushil, a former member of the 
AfE, called this position “slightly fraudulent because there were no indigenous people submerged over 
there” (Interview 7). Prakash, member of the ‘pragmatic’ wing of the ACG describes the dividing lines as 
follows: 
 
Alliance for Energy was basically looking at the technical part. Arun Concerned Group, our 
group, we had different interests. My interest, as I am coming from the Arun valley, was to 
look at the people’s compensation, the sustainability and cost-efficiency of the project. As a 
concerned citizen I was looking at those three effects [...] I don’t remember the exact date, 
but I was talking to people in my village, you know the place…People were told that it was a 
big project. It would be a centre of the world, ok? This is a big development. So when I was 
looking at the project documents I was really surprised to see that there was a plan to bring in 
helicopters from Singapore to carry sand and gravel and cement...and people from Arun 
valley had to work as construction workers in India in those days (Interview 9). 
 
Fisher (1997b: 454) reminds us that “[a]mid their wide range of translocal connections, all NGO practices 
remain discursively constructed through reference to the ‘local.’ Yet while a notion of the local remains 
centrally important to the legitimacy of NGOs, it is frustratingly illusive.” In her take on the Arun-3 
controversy, Ann Armbrecht Forbes (1999a: 321) rightly argues that being local is always a question of 
perspective and that “the mobilization of identity claims is more about politics than it is about geography.” 
Therefore, she suggests “that the search for the real local by both scholars and activists is an incomplete 
and misguided search” (ibid: 320). 
Behind the different approaches of the two NGOs were divergent claims to representation and locality: 
While the ACG claimed to represent the affected population in the Arun valley, the AfE maintained that 
every citizen of Nepal was affected, as everybody in the country would have to pay the debts connected to 
the project. According to Manish, one of the former AfE activists, his group was fully aware of the largely 
positive sentiment towards the dam in the Arun valley from the beginning. Other than the ACG, he and 
his former colleagues maintain, the Alliance never tried to represent the affected people on the 
international level: 
 
The people in the Arun valley wanted the project. They were interested in the road and the 
jobs that it could bring. There is no denying that and that is completely understandable 
because the whole country was going to take a loan, the whole country’s hydro future was at 
stake, but the people in the Arun valley and all the way down to Biratnagar were expected to 
benefit from it. To them it was an investment in their region. So it was very clear that the 
Anti-Arun people were not popular in the Arun valley. From their perspective a billion 
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dollars was invested in that river valley and some of it will trickle down to the contractors, the 
truck owners, the landowners. All sorts of people would have benefited from it, so I was not 
surprised that local people...especially local vocal people for sure were for that. Us being in 
Kathmandu said: But is anybody asking the people in Jumla? Wouldn’t it make a lot of sense 
to build 50 projects all over the country (Interview 11)? 
 
Differently to this approach, some of the ACG activists had been brought up in the area and were keen to 
organise protest in the region as well. However, they soon had to realise how highly charged the topic was. 
Many of the former activists maintain that people in the Arun valley were poorly informed about the 
project, not told about the possible downsides and that questions of compensation and resettlement were 
not properly addressed. When I asked people in Num and Hedangna about their memories about the 
cancellation (see Chapter 6), I was surprised to find not a single person that mentioned either of the two 
NGOs. It was only later that I found out that none of the activists from the two groups ever came to the 
dam site to speak to those directly affected. Apart from a group of international activists who trekked all 
the way up to Phyaksinda in early 1995 (Paskal 2000), the mobilisation in the Arun valley was restricted to 
Khandbari and the surrounding villages - and it soon stopped due to the intimidating environment. 
Recounting their activities in the valley, Prakash acknowledges: 
 
It is easier to reach there now […] We were also not able to raise the environmental struggle 
[…] More debates have taken place in Khandbari, there more people were interested to bring 
in Arun-3, because they thought that if a road comes along with it, they will benefit 
(Interview 9). 
 
Armbrecht Forbes (1999a: 332), on the other hand, reminds us that the “activists in Kathmandu 
recognized that it would take far too long and require too many resources to educate villagers in the Arun 
valley about the long-term impacts of this type of project.” Another former activist argued that it was too 
unsafe for them to travel to the Arun valley in those days:  
 
Local people were highly manipulated, people got a lot of money, corruption basically, the 
political parties were in favour of the project. When our activists went there, they always had 
confrontations […], gangs were organised to intimidate them (Interview 6). 
 
Before these tensions erupted, the ACG did try to form a local group and mobilise people in the area – 
mostly in and around Khandbari. One of the first actions the organisation undertook right after its 
formation in December 1993 was to send a group of eight members to the Arun valley to attend a public 
hearing on compensation and check the terrain. The situation seemed favourable to find allies in the area, 
as there was a lot of public interest and little information about the project. After the hearing, a group of 
upper caste men from Khandbari were interested in joining the ACG. 
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Within a couple of months, however, the totally different perceptions concerning the project became 
apparent and the local group broke away from the ACG. They reorganised themselves and established 
their own group with a completely different agenda: the Arun Support Committee. Rohit was one of 
them and his memories show some of the problems that people living in the valley had with the 
transnational character of the campaign and the unclear affiliations of the urban activists:  
 
Once the committee was formed we published a red book about Arun-3 [Arun Concerned 
Group 1994b]. Where did the money come from to publish all those books? […] After this, 
friends went to the World Bank, some to America. Who funded them to go to America? […] 
It was a topic of interest to outsiders more than to the local people. People from Kathmandu, 
New York, India talked about it a lot. Still now when I think about Arun-3, I wonder who 
has vested interests in it. […] Arun Concerned Group was in total opposition to the project. 
I was telling them that it needs to be corrected by finding the deficits of Arun-3. […] My 
friends [in ACG] had an opposite view to mine. After that I left Arun Concerned Group. 
Then some local educated people created an organisation called Arun Support Committee 
(Interview 2). 
 
But things got even more heated when one of the leading figures of the ACG visited Khandbari after the 
building freeze in 1995. People blamed him for the pull-out of the World Bank and a group of young men 
assaulted him as Prakash reminded me: 
 
We were also physically attacked, our office was attacked, XY was beaten up [laughing]. 
Once, if I had not been there with the group in the Arun valley…the same problem...Since I 
was a local, that’s why we were not beaten up there, otherwise...once XY went there alone 
and, you know, there they attacked him (Interview 9). 
 
These accounts show the problematic relationship between the urban activists and the affected people in 
the Arun valley, an issue that can be observed in many similar movements. Baviskar (1995: 226) discusses 
the undemocratic structure of decision-making within the NBA, “that is at odds with its claims to being a 
jan andolan,” because it was run by a group of “outside” activists. But whereas in her case the directly 
affected people accepted the leadership of outsiders who came to their villages to organise resistance, in 
the Arun valley that closing of ranks did not happen, despite the fact that some of the activists from 
Kathmandu actually came originally from the Arun area. The main difference to the situation along the 
Narmada was that in the Arun valley not a single house would have been submerged. Furthermore, all my 
interlocutors, both in the valley and in Kathmandu, pointed to the strong interest of local elites in the 
project and their tremendous influence on public opinion in the area. 
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The international expedition 
As it seems, the urban activists of the ACG were not able to transmit their opposition to the affected 
people in the Arun valley. Unlike their allies in the AfE, they had built their campaign on the claim that 
they represented the interests of local people against the government and foreign donors. While they 
found two peasants who claimed they had been adversely affected by the road construction and had lost 
their land without proper compensation to file a case with the World Bank Inspection Panel, these two 
only accepted to be drawn into the claim on the condition of anonymity (see Chapter 4). This shows how 
much of a minority the local voices against the project were. It also lends credence to the memory of my 
interlocutors about how difficult it was for them to mobilise people in the valley. But the example of an 
international group of activists shows that it was not impossible to actually travel up the Arun valley and 
engage the affected communities in discussions about the benefits and detriments of the planned 
intervention.  
Anna Paskal’s (2000) account of this journey is remarkable for its candidness in showing the activists’ 
intentions to raise awareness and engage the people of the Arun valley in a transnational opposition 
movement against large hydropower dams. The group comprised of Canadian and US citizens, among 
them activists, a journalist, a student, representatives of the Cree Nation of James Bay in Quebec who had 
experienced the effects of a huge hydropower project as well as the two filmmakers Ali Kazimi and the late 
Magnus Isacsson. They brought along a film projector and two documentaries, one on the James Bay 
project, the other one on Narmada, to show people the devastating effects of hydropower development 
and facilitate discussions on Arun-3. And they were also accompanied by two surprise guests, Medha 
Patkar, the leader of the NBA, and Gopal Siwakoti from the ACG, who had both decided at the last 
moment to join the group for the first few days. 
Paskal shows how the different agendas of the group members become apparent upon arrival in 
Tumlingtar. Patkar, Siwakoti and the filmmakers decided to show the films that evening and invited the 
whole village, while the Canadian fraction had planned the first screening for Khandbari. They were keen 
to maintain an appearance of neutrality in order to first engage in discussions about people’s conception of 
development before the planned screening a couple of days later. About three hundred people gathered to 
see the films and while the technicians struggled with setting up the projector, the crowd was getting 
impatient and tension building up. Patkar addressed the audience by apologising for the delay: 
 
‘We will see the film soon. Shall we sing a song?’ Before anyone can respond, Medha leads 
the Nepali villagers in a Hindi resistance song. Most know no Hindi […]. Only the educated 
Nepalis can fully understand. I wonder if Medha sees the irony (ibid: 79).  
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In the end the screening was called off because of the opposition of the Canadian fraction and the crowd 
left disappointedly. In Khandbari, after Patkar’s departure, an estimated crowd of 2,000 people watched 
the films. The comments afterwards showed a remarkable diversity of opinions, ranging from a man, who 
screamed: “Foreigners should not meddle in our affairs” to somebody else who announced: “I have walked 
a full day to see this film. You have said what was in my heart” (ibid: 96-97). But the debate the foreigners 
had hoped for did not take place. 
The most remarkable comment Paskal recounts in connection to this screening is her discussion with the 
translator afterwards. The author was surprised that there was not more opposition from people, who were 
in favour of the project, as the film showed how the Cree stopped the second phase of the dam. Here, the 
translator admitted: “‘I didn’t exactly say the dam was stopped. I knew that would cause too much trouble, 
so I changed the words a bit and said that the dam was built, but it was built how the Cree wanted it to be 
built’” (ibid: 97). This incident shows how despite the activists’ intention to engage with the villagers in 
Khandbari, their intervention was flawed not only by the language barrier but also the desire of their 
translator not to cause a conflict. Even the unresolved question of whether they wanted to explicitly 
mobilise opposition against the project or hope to raise awareness of the negative side-effects through a 
presumably ‘neutral’ information of the public that should lead to a discussion on development was not the 
root cause of their failure. What stands behind it, I think, was the rather naïve idea to show people, who 
had for the most never in their lives seen a movie (let alone a movie about Canada) a documentary and 
assume that this would prompt them to openly speak their mind in a situation that was highly charged due 
to the dam project, at a moment when so much was at stake for them. Added to this was the suspicion 
that these foreigners might carry a hidden agenda (see Chapter 6). 
 
 
The promise of being taken care of 
This fundamental failure to build relations of trust, both by the activists of the ACG and the international 
group, can be understood with reference to Partha Chatterjee’s distinction between civil society and 
political society. He argues that the space of civil society in postcolonial India today – as in the 
postcolonial world in general – is “inhabited by a relatively small section of the people” (Chatterjee 2004: 
38) enjoying citizenship rights and participation, whereas the majority of the people are managed through 
techniques of the welfare-state as populations. To be sure, formally “all of society is civil society,” but most 
of the inhabitants of India “are only tenuously [...] rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the 
constitution.” On the other hand, they are not “outside the reach of the state or excluded from the domain 
of politics. As populations within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, they have to be both looked after 
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and controlled by various governmental agencies” (ibid). 
For Chatterjee, the idea of a civil society as the precondition of a modern capitalist nation state is at the 
centre of Western sociological theory of the nineteenth century and deeply entangled with discussions on 
freedom and equality as well as liberty and community that underpin the concept of citizenship:  
 
To have modern free political communities, one must first have people who were citizens, not 
subjects. […] For many, this understanding provided the ethical core of a project of 
modernization of the non-Western world: to transform erstwhile subjects, unfamiliar with 
the possibilities of equality and freedom, into modern citizens (ibid: 33). 
 
In the twentieth century, he claims, the rise of mass democracy and the invention of the welfare state in 
the Western world led to a distinction between citizens and populations. By taking recourse to Foucault’s 
idea of a governmentalisation of the state he argues that “[t]his regime secures legitimacy not by the 
participation of citizens in matters of the state but by claiming to provide for the well-being of the 
population” (ibid: 34). In the global South, however, these technologies of governmentality often pre-date 
the nation state and citizenship. In line with the understanding of Marx and Hegel of civil society as 
bourgeois society Chatterjee identifies civil society in the postcolony as a middle class phenomenon while 
the majority of the population is excluded from this sphere. As members of political society they are only 
mobilised in electoral campaigns. When it comes to their interactions with the state, Chatterjee (2002: 
177) claims that “many of the mobilisations in political society which make demands on the state are 
founded on a violation of the law.” Still, they demand governmental welfare as a matter of collective right. 
Chatterjee’s distinction and his characterisation of political society can help to explain why the affected 
communities were not embracing the proposal to join the activists’ politics of contention, and instead 
preferred to follow the local elites in their gold-rush mood. Paradoxically, to them the dam project served 
as a powerful promise to an inclusion into political society whereas the offer by the outside activists – both 
from Kathmandu and from abroad – must have seemed highly suspicious. With the end of the Panchayat 
system that had promised development without democracy and had failed to deliver it to the majority of 
rural communities, the emergence of multi-party democracy and the involvement of powerful agencies like 
the World Bank gave rise to hope that the state would stand by its promise, develop the Arun valley and 
start to take care of its inhabitants. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to contextualise the emergence of the Anti-Arun-3 campaign, the first 
transnational civil society mobilisation with regard to Nepal. I have argued that a variety of concurrent 
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events were responsible for the rise of the movement: the Nepalese popular uprising for democracy, the 
rise of a global civil society and the emergence of a small, yet committed group of Nepalese professionals 
educated abroad who had brought home a new understanding of doing politics. While in the beginning 
their main aim was to improve the project, the refusal of the political elites to discuss their concerns 
hardened their stance. I then discussed the case before the Nepalese Supreme Court concerning the dam 
that set an important precedence for the right to information in the young democracy before turning to 
the totally different ways the two English dailies dealt with the controversy. Then I focused on the 
tensions emerging ‘within’ the movement – first between the AfE criticising the project on technical and 
economic grounds and the ACG building their campaign on human and indigenous rights’ issues. Beyond 
that distinction, those two groups were clearly divided in their party affiliations, as most of the Nepalese 
civil society was in the 1990s and – to a certain extent – remains until today. This turned out to be a 
problem when the communist UML won the parliamentary elections in 1994 as it led to a split in the 
ACG shortly after they had filed their request for investigation at the World Bank Inspection Panel, the 
topic of the following chapter. 
The other big difficulty the movement faced was the relationship with the affected people in the Arun 
valley, who were strongly in favour of the project and despite several attempts by domestic and foreign 
activists could not be convinced otherwise. While the AfE did not engage in any mobilisation in the area, 
the ACG tried so and faced threats and physical attacks. Here, I also analysed the account of a group of 
international activists who walked all the way to the dam site to also fail in engaging the people they met 
into an equitable conversation using Chatterjee’s distinction between civil society and political society. I 
argue that the main explanations for the failure to organise local resistance against the project lies 
paradoxically in the dam project’s promise to include the affected people into political society.
	   
	   
	   
4 The amnesiac bank 
The claim before the Inspection Panel and the withdrawal of the World 
Bank from the project in 1995 
 
 
An unexpected invitation 
On 27 December 2010 I received a message from a World Bank staff member at the Kathmandu office. It 
read: 
Dear Mr. Rest,  
Are you still in Kathmandu? It’s regarding the Arun III; I’ve had a chance to talk to my 
colleagues about your interest in the abandon [sic!] project and it seemed there are many 
stories floating around. At the meantime we have sourced out some important letters and 
memos from the World Bank archive. So, if you are still interested, I could mail you. Let me 
also enquire if you plan to visit Kathmandu any time, the reason here is my World Bank 
colleagues and the CD [Country Director] herself is interested to learn about your Arun III 
knowledge; perhaps a brown bag session.   
I could elaborate on this.  
Warm season’s greetings.  
Jyoti (2010) 
 
This e-mail came as a big surprise to me. I had tried to make informal contact with World Bank staffers 
in Kathmandu on several occasions during my research, but whenever I mentioned that I was working on 
the Arun-3 project they had politely but firmly declined to comment on the topic. I had pestered my 
interlocutors in Kathmandu if they could put me in contact with retired staff members, but all to no avail. 
As the informal channels proved to be unsuccessful, in November 2010 I finally decided to try it through 
the front door and paid a visit to the World Bank’s Public Information Office. It is located in a side wing 
of Hotel Yak & Yeti, one of the most exclusive hotels in the country. There, I met the person that would 
six weeks later send me the e-mail I quoted above. But to begin with, when I told her about my interest 
she responded the same way as everybody from the Bank whom I had approached in the months before: 
“Although I have only started to work for the Bank six months ago, I already learned that the Arun-3 case 
is a very sensitive topic. People are very reluctant to talk about it and I doubt that they are willing to meet 
you. But I can ask around and will get back to you if I am wrong” (Interview 12). 
Happy as I was to receive this message, it took me two weeks until I could reply: When Jyoti sent the e-
mail I was in the upper Arun valley and therefore offline. When I finally made my way back to the World 
Bank office during my last week of fieldwork, she asked me into her office and had another surprise in 
store for me. They had gone through their archive, she told me, but were unable to locate “the letter from 
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our [i.e. Nepalese] government to the World Bank.” Now she wanted to know if I had it. What she was 
referring to was the letter that then-CPN (UML) general secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal had written to 
the World Bank, dated 18 October 1994 (actually six weeks before his party would come into power). I 
myself had heard a lot about this letter but had been unable to locate it, too; so I had to negate her request. 
Months later I realised that it was hidden in plain sight in one of the reports by the Inspection Panel 
(Nepal 1994). As already mentioned in her e-mail, she told me that a number of staff members were 
curious to learn more about my research and the history of the Arun-3 project and she suggested a 
meeting on my return to Kathmandu. “In fact the senior staff, they were all involved in the project in one 
way or another, they all want to know what really happened” (Interview 13). Could it be true, I thought to 
myself, that the World Bank staff is asking me to brief them on their own project? But it got even more 
unsettling. 
Our conversation circled back to the letter and she gave me a very intriguing insight into the workings of 
the Bank’s local office’s archive: “I heard that old files will be cleared out upstairs in the main office and 
somebody found the Arun-3 file, so I’ll ask that person to look at that file for me. If I’ll get hold of it I’ll 
bring it to my office.” Was it possible that the World Bank in Kathmandu had not only forgotten what 
had happened to the scheme that was their flagship project for nearly a decade, but also that somebody in 
that office would stumble upon the archival material about it by mere accident? 
After a cup of tea she introduced me to Krishna, one of her colleagues. Together they led me into a bare 
conference room. I was asked to sit down on one side of a huge conference table while they took seats at 
the far side of the table, about ten meters away from me. At times, it was hard to understand them 
speaking over the humming of the air conditioning. After a brief summary of my research project, Krishna 
went on to present the obliviousness of his institution in a slightly more elegant framing than Jyoti and 
referred to it as “weak institutional memory.” According to him, there was absolutely nothing in the 
Bank’s archive in Kathmandu on the cancellation of the project, so he as well suggested a collaboration 
between the Bank and me to find out what had happened in the 1990s. When I asked them whether their 
interest was somehow connected to a recently announced new energy strategy of the Bank’s South Asia 
division and rumours about imminent new hydropower credits in Nepal, they did not contradict. 
I left the meeting in a state of utter disbelief and was unsure what to make of what I had just heard. After 
walking down the driveway of Hotel Yak & Yeti I found myself on Durbar Marg, the boulevard leading 
towards the former Royal palace – and the only boulevard Kathmandu has to offer, for that matter. On my 
walk back to the old town I contemplated on what had just happened and why I was so surprised about it. 
It was not the fact that the Bank proved to be an organisation prone to failure, mistakes and bad archival 
practices. My previous fieldwork and the literature engaged with the practical workings of the Bank had 
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given enough hints to indicate that it was not the all-powerful, all-knowing organisation it is sometimes 
depicted as in NGO accounts. What really caught my curiosity was the candour Jyoti and Krishna showed 
in confessing their organisation’s shortcomings and, even more so, the way they sincerely seemed 
interested in learning lessons from their office’s biggest fiasco – their ‘will to improve’ to borrow Tania Li’s 
(2009) term. 
 
 
Greening neoliberalism 
Could it be, then, I asked myself, that it was true what Anil claimed, one of the main Anti-Arun-3 
campaigners: that the World Bank as an organisation had indeed learned from the Arun-3 fiasco and the 
severe attacks from a global civil society movement that categorically demanded the Bank to “reform or 
die” (Goldman 2005: 9)? To be sure, on the surface a lot of changes followed the Narmada debacle and 
the cancellation of Arun-3: for over a decade, the Bank abstained from financing new hydropower 
schemes in South Asia. It took until 2007 before the Bank re-engaged in the hot issue and decided to 
award a US$400 million loan for the construction of the 412 MW Rampur project in India’s Himachal 
Pradesh. The borrower of the loan is a certain SJVN – the same company that is also supposed to 
construct Arun-3 (The World Bank 2014a). The estimated date of commissioning for Rampur is 
September 2013 (SJVN 2013). In Nepal, the Bank is still working its way back in: currently, a US$42 
million loan is under preparation for the construction of the 37.6 MW Kabeli-A project (Butwal Power 
Company 2010-2011; The World Bank 2014b). 
On a broader level, these controversies were instrumental for the Bank to team up with the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and establish the World Commission on Dams in 1998. The 
commission’s report (World Commission on Dams 2000) became an important directive for a new 
practice of dam construction in the global South: socially and environmentally more feasible, transparent 
and comprehensive, and with a commitment towards benefit- and risk-sharing. But more importantly 
(and very much connected to these new conceptual devices for good practice), it is one of the most telling 
examples of the paradigmatic shift that was occurring in the Bank at that time: the massive integration of 
environmental and social scientific expertise into the Bank’s knowledge production. 
From the very beginning, this ‘greening of the Bank’ was a reaction to the growing environmental 
movements in the Bank’s most important donor countries and the emerging network of global civil society 
organisations. Although the Bank had taken first steps towards developing its own environmental 
expertise already in the 1970s with the appointment of the first environmental adviser by President Robert 
McNamara, Robert Wade (1997) shows how marginal the position of environmentalists remained within 
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the Bank until the 1980s. This only changed with the emergence of a vocal and globally connected 
environmental movement. According to Wade’s account, the first time this new actors came into the 
picture was in the course of the Brazilian Polonoroeste project that was a plan to connect north western 
Amazonia with the country’s central region through a 1,500 km highway (Wade 2011). It was followed by 
the Wapenhans Report (Clark 2003) and, of course, the first independent review of a Bank-funded 
project: The Morse Report on the Narmada scheme (Morse & Berger 1992; see also Chapter 3), both in 
1992. 
This chapter will trace this paradigmatic shift through the prism of the cancellation of Arun-3. To do 
that, I will on the one hand draw on the memories of former World Bank staff members, the activists 
involved in the request for inspection and one former employee of the Inspection Panel I met in 
Washington DC, Kathmandu and Europe. On the other hand, I will engage extensively with the 
multiplicity of reports produced by a number of institutions, most importantly the Bank’s IDA and the 
Inspection Panel. I will argue that Arun-3 was a decisive project in the greening of the Bank. Looking at 
the evolution of the documents written on this dam, I believe we can trace the emergence of the Bank’s 
most recent development regime that Michael Goldman aptly calls “green neoliberalism.” This new 
framework came into being after the Bank had to cope with the extended opposition by a well-organised 
transnational campaign from a network of NGOs that on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Bretton Woods institutions in 1994 categorically exclaimed: ‘50 years is enough!’ (Chatterjee 1994; 
Danaher 1994). 
But contrary to the argument of many activists who see this move as mere window-dressing and accuse the 
Bank of green washing, Goldman shows how the Bank has managed to integrate the critique by 
expanding “its neoliberal economic agenda to include new social and environmental dimensions” 
(Goldman 2005: 7). At this point, he argues, the Bank indeed was in a severe crisis and was losing its 
attractiveness as a supplier of capital for governments in the global South. His critical reassessment of the 
history of the institution shows that (except for a difficult period right after its establishment), it never had 
any problems to raise capital but was always much more concerned with finding willing borrowers. So, 
with the sudden rise of civil society organisations lobbying for a new set of ethical practices and their 
growing influence on public opinion as well legislative bodies around the globe, the Bank had to react. 
In Goldman’s understanding, this move was a fundamental prerequisite for the establishment of a new set 
of knowledge/power practices. He reminds us of Antonio Gramsci’s old insight that one of the defining 
features for a situation of hegemony “of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups” is 
revealed when the dominant bloc is able to “also pos[e] the questions around which the struggle rages” 
(Gramsci in Forgacs 2000: 205). With the fact that today very few opinions about development can be 
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expressed in opposition to either sustainability or neoliberalism, Goldman suggests that such a moment of 
hegemony may have arrived. But one important thing seems to be missing from his account of how the 
greening of the Bank came into being: The big number of people within the Bank who felt that there were 
serious flaws in the way the Bank was doing its work. From all the conversation I had with former Bank 
staff members, I believe it becomes apparent that as much as the cancellation of Arun-3 was part of a 
struggle between the Bank and a civil society movement, it was also imbedded in a struggle for a change in 
conduct within the Bank itself. This might be one of the reasons why the new modus operandi of green 
neoliberalism took shape so quickly in the late 1990s. 
 
 
“What is not counted doesn’t count:” The example of Natural Capital Accounting  
The Bank’s new development regime proved to be highly productive in the global South in a number of 
ways. Now a government willing to borrow money is not only obliged to structural adjustment, 
privatisation and market liberalisation, but also to produce and implement a National Environmental 
Action Plan. Goldman (2005: 7) argues that with this move, the Bank has succeeded to “intervene into 
more geographical territories and lifeworlds and in ways that its earlier work never permitted.” It 
substantially extended the Bank’s agenda to now also include “the restructuring and capitalisation of 
nature-society relations that exist as uncommodified or underutilised by capital markets” (ibid).  
For the time being, the culmination of this total commodification of nature is Natural Capital Accounting 
(NCA). This relatively new mechanism aims at calculating the entirety of natural resources and flows in a 
given ecosystem. In a blog post titled “An Accounting System Worthy of Earth Day,” World Bank Vice 
President of Sustainable Development Rachel Kyte praises the boost NCA experienced after more than 60 
countries joined this new accounting mechanism at the 2012 Rio+20 conference: “With each statement 
from the floor, it was clear that natural capital accounting is no longer an academic concept. It is alive and 
well and being utilised across the world in developing, middle, and high-income countries” (Kyte 2013). 
Judging from Kyte’s examples, NCA emerges as the new jack of all trades device in global sustainability: 
measures against climate change and environmental protection are no longer antithetical to economic 
growth, but join hands in the utopian idea of 21st century green neoliberal capitalism: a level playing field 
of willing buyers and sellers who will no longer waste water or destroy the rain forest, because they will 
each have their daily quotas in water, CO2 and other resources/pollutants – or will only be able to consume 
those commodities (or more than their allowance) if they are able to pay for them. This has been one of 
the common arguments in water privatisation schemes: that the end of state-subsidised supply with water 
will lead to more efficient usage. Recent examples from the global South (e.g. Goldman 2007) show 
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instead that consumer prices often rise extremely while investments in infrastructure are neglected by the 
private companies. 
 
France wants to manage greenhouse gas emissions while still growing its economy. India 
wants to know more about the valuation of its natural capital stocks. This is where natural 
capital accounting comes in – a country can improve its understanding of its natural assets 
and how they contribute to growth. As the minister for development from France said: ‘What 
is not counted doesn’t count. We want to change this situation’ (Kyte 2013). 
 
This last sentence, of course, aims at the heart of the issue: it’s so difficult to count nature, even more 
difficult than to count a national economy. But through NCA, nature finally becomes quantifiable and can 
thereby be commodified, as we can already witness in the global trade with CO2 certificates. Furthermore, 
this integration of evermore things formerly unaccounted for by economists into the framework of 
macroeconomic statistics increases the truth claim of this hegemonic model of understanding the world. 
Kyte’s post is headed by a short introductory video clip. It shows testimonials by high-level bureaucrats 
from all over the world enthusiastically embracing the new initiative. Kyte herself is quoted with saying: 
“It’s essential to the way in which we think about the fight against climate [sic!], the fight to end poverty, 
or the MDG-SDG framework post 2015.” At the end, Barry Gardiner, Chair of the Natural Capital 
Initiative of GLOBE,18 sums up the argument:  
 
This is the basis for accounting for the real wealth of your country and turning one form of 
capital […] into something even more valuable. It’s not just about some statisticians who 
have come up with a new way of describing things. It’s about the children in your country 
who would have had no hope if we’d simply go on trashing the natural wealth that comprises 
half the GDP that gives their lives meaning (ibid). 
 
After a dramatic break and with a severe look straight in the camera, he tells us: “It’s over to you.” 
Apart from my surprise to learn that it is GDP that gives children’s lives meaning, this quote shows how 
important it seems to convince the audience that this is not just a new way of counting but a 
fundamentally different approach to nature. Read through Goldman’s lens of green neoliberalism, I 
believe Gardiner is right. This, though, does not mean that the shift to this new developmental regime has 
fundamentally altered the business model of the World Bank. On the contrary, Goldman’s argument 
shows how the integration of environmentalism and sustainability has in fact saved the Bank’s neoliberal 
agenda. This chapter will show how the investigation of Arun-3 by the newly established World Bank 
Inspection Panel in 1995 is particularly remarkable for its refusal to engage with the critique brought 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 GLOBE is an acronym for Global Legislators’ Organization, a network of parliamentarians from 70 countries 
promoting sustainable development. 
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forward by the activists on the economic assessments produced by the Bank. Instead, it used the secondary 
alleged violations in respect to environmental and social issues as its main focus. By this, I argue, the Panel 
defined the path for its own range of authority and paved the way for green neoliberalism. 
 
 
“Technically sound and economically feasible:” The invention of Arun-3 
Jyoti’s and Krishna’s apparent lack of information on one of the most prominent cancellations in Bank 
history stands in stark contrast to the overabundance of reports on Arun-3 and the Bank’s withdrawal. 
During my fieldwork I came across a vast number of reports adding up to several thousands of pages that 
were produced between 1985 and 1996. The German KfW described the scheme as the “best studied 
development project ever undertaken by the German government” (cited in Goldman 2005: 305, fn. 4). 
These documents were issued by a multiplicity of institutions (governmental, parastatal as well as private 
companies) and engage with a host of different forms of expert knowledge. The early reports mainly focus 
on economy, hydrology, geology, and seismology. But over the years an impressive corpus of works on the 
environmental and social impacts of the dam was produced as well. Among them at least two 
Environmental Impact Assessments (NEA 1993; JV Arun III 1992) and a thirteen-volume report titled 
“Environmental Management and Sustainable Development in the Arun Basin” commissioned by the 
King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation (KMTNC 1991). 
But how did the World Bank become involved in Arun-3? And how, in a country full of promising, 
undeveloped sites for hydropower production, a dam site as far afield as Arun-3 came to be seen as the 
most promising, least expensive option? The history of the project starts in 1983, when the Ministry of 
Water Resources (MoWR) with support from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
conducted a baseline study to locate favourable spots for hydropower schemes in the Kosi river system. 
This survey (MoWR and JICA 1985) identified fifty-two potential projects. The Japanese engineers 
selected thirteen for further study (among them three of the six potential sites along the Arun). Two 
schemes were considered as top priority: the Sun Kosi Multipurpose Project and the Arun No. 3: “These 
two schemes are technically sound and economically feasible” (ibid: S-16). While the former was 
earmarked for export, they determined the latter as “the most attractive scheme not only in the Kosi Basin 
but throughout the country” (ibid: S-14). According to their calculations it was “the most economical 
scheme in terms of energy cost among the 52 hydropower schemes studied in the Basin […] due to the 
low kWh development cost” of 2.64 US cent/kWh (including access road, transmission and substation) 
(ibid: S-12-13). The final report identifies only one major problem with dam construction in the upper 
Arun valley: the total lack of roads in the area. Still, it maintains that “[t]his Arun No. 3 hydropower 
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scheme can generate very inexpensive energy in spite of the long access road and can contribute to regional 
development providing electricity for industry in the eastern area” (ibid: 179). 
The project lay-out identified in the master plan study, though, has little to do with the scheme that came 
out of the feasibility study two years later: in the former, the engineers had suggested to build a simple run 
of the river project with a 23 meters weir, a 7.1 kilometres diversion tunnel to the powerhouse, a gross 
head of 194 meters and 240 MW of installed capacity. With projected construction costs of 307 million 
US-Dollars the annual output was estimated to reach 1,965 GWh. In the revamped project design that 
came out of the feasibility study, again conducted under the aegis of JICA, all of these numbers had 
increase except for one; the estimated price per unit. And while the initial planning intended the plant to 
be the first in a cascade series of six simple run of the river schemes along the Arun, the feasibility study is 
completely silent about the other dam sites that were proposed in the master plan. The new project was 
introduced as follows: 
 
The Arun 3 project mainly includes a concrete dam of 65 m in height, two headrace tunnels 
of 11.4 km in each length, underground type powerhouse, transmission lines of 386 km in 
total length, etc. and its development scale is 201 MW (3 units, 67 MW each) as the 1st 
stage development scheme and additional 201 MW (3 units, 67 MW each) as the 2nd, 
totalling 402 MW. The total energy production is estimated at 1,721.6 GWh and 2,960.3 
GWh after completion of the 1st and 2nd stage development schemes, respectively (HMG et 
al. 1987a: C-2). 
 
The costs for this project design were estimated at 518.5 million US-Dollars, while the price per kWh was 
reckoned even lower as in the mast plan study, at 2.4 US Cents. This enhanced version was planned as a 
pondage run of the river scheme with a reservoir lake flooding approximately 50 hectares, creating 4 km of 
backwater (ibid: 12-10, 12-11). 
The World Bank arrived on the scene already one year after the feasibility study; the first Bank document 
mentioning the Arun-3 project is a power sector review from 1988. This document estimates the project 
costs at 813 million US-Dollars and optimistically states: “Environmental aspects do not appear to be a 
major item on the Arun 3 project. […] Few people live near the river […] and aquatic ecology is not 
anticipated to be a major issue. In addition, no wildlife was observed during the visit” (The World Bank 
1988: 114). 
 
 
The Arrival of the Bank 
A different account of how the Bank became interested comes from the people who were working there at 
the time. In November 2012, I was invited for lunch in Washington, DC. My host – I will call him 
The amnesiac Bank 	  
- 91 - 
Antony – was one of the engineers involved in the Arun-3 project for the Bank in the 1980s and 90s. 
When I asked him how his involvement in the project began, he replied: 
 
My boss sent me out to Nepal and said: since you know about water resources and 
management and hydropower why don’t you go to Nepal and have a look and see what their 
needs are in terms of electricity supply and distribution? So…what we did was, based on 
conversations with people working in the electricity sector it was felt that there was a need for 
additional power supply. […] We put in place a program to identify what was the least cost 
expansion plan. That work was written up in a World Bank report […] that made a 
recommendation that the next project that should be developed was Arun-3 (Interview 14). 
 
It was supposed to be the third hydro scheme with Bank funding in the country. The first, the 60 MW 
Khulekhani-I project near Kathmandu had been finalised in 1983. When Antony arrived in Nepal in 
1987, the NEA had already started constructing the 69 MW Marsyangdi project with loans and grants 
from the World Bank, the German KfW as well as from the Saudi and the Kuwait funds. In the 
beginning, things went pretty fast and straightforward with Arun-3, as Antony remembers. The Staff 
Appraisal Report (SAR) for the access road was already submitted on 12 May 1989, but progress slowed 
down considerably in the following year when it became apparent that the Indian government was not 
willing to sign a power purchase agreement that would grant fixed prices for the electricity exported. And, 
as the previous chapter has shown, democracy ‘broke out’ in Nepal impetuously, leading to a radically 
altered political environment. Most importantly, however, bid prices for the road were about twice as high 
as the Bank had estimated them to be. This happened because of two reasons: firstly, the Indian semi-
embargo that led to a huge inflation in prices and secondly IDA’s cost estimate that proved to be 
unrealistic, as the Bank conceded in retrospect: “Against an appraisal estimate of US$ 33.2 million, the bid 
which was about US$ 90 million was found by HMG, IDA and HMG’s consultant to be the most 
realistic price” (The World Bank 1996: 8). When Antony recollects the years leading up to the cancelation 
of the project, he cannot hide a strong feeling of disappointment. The first thing he told me after we met 
was: 
 
If you ask me if I changed my opinion on what should have been done then my short answer 
is: no. I think it was a big mistake for Nepal. […] If the government was behind it, if they 
were really behind it, they should have put more effort into it […]. And part of the reason 
[why] that happened was that the government back in Nepal, no matter what party, […] they 
were not focused on these things. They were…trying to deal with that new democracy […], 
but if the government wanted the project they should have done quite a bit more than they 
did (Interview 14). 
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The critics within 
Even within the Bank, however, the project was far from uncontroversial from its inception. Unlike 
Antony other staff members did not think the project should be financed. Nine months before my 
conversation with Antony in Washington DC, I travelled to Munich to meet up with John, another 
retired Bank staffer. As soon as we had sat down and started to talk about his memories, it became 
apparent that his opinion was diametrically different from Antony’s: 
 
From approximately 87 until 90 I was [working for the Bank] and during that time I 
recommended to stop the project […] I don’t remember when the Bank finally dropped the 
project, but this project was as well the reason for the Bank to stop the funding for 
international dams […]. The whole thing was an economic decision because at that time only 
India came into question as buyer of the electricity. The demand in Nepal itself was relatively 
low […] and I myself while preparing the project worked in a way as a… shuttle on several 
occasions between Kathmandu and Delhi and negotiated with the electricity ministers and 
tried to urge the Indians for a contract with fixed prices at rates that were also acceptable for 
Nepal. The Indians do have a long tradition of suppressing countries in the periphery that are 
dependent on them like for example Nepal especially. […] They were not sufficiently 
interested in the electricity from Arun-3 to take a serious step and offer reasonably 
sustainable tariffs. They always said: We will buy for daily prices. But a country like Nepal 
can’t rely on such an arrangement. Just for the World Bank to fund such a project, there must 
be structures in place for the money to come in to service the debts. This was the first aspect, 
where I really tried to convince the Indians but did not succeed. The other aspect, the one 
that was decisive in the end, were the environmental aspects (Interview 15).19 
 
This comment is remarkable for a number of reasons: Besides showing the existence of internal opposition 
right from the beginning, it again illustrates the decisive influence the Indian non-interest in the dam had. 
But what I find most intriguing is the contradictory stance as to what was the main reason for the 
cancellation: Whereas John starts by affirming that his reason for disapproving of the project was its 
economics, he concludes with stating that in fact it was cancelled because of environmental aspects. 
Despite John’s reservations, the Bank continued to prepare the project. As supporters as well as opponents 
both agree, this was due to a strong interest from senior management to move forward with the dam. 
Already one year after the Bank had started working on it, the SAR for the access road was submitted to 
the Board of Directors. But whereas the two Japanese studies had produced Arun-3 as the most 
economical scheme in the country with very clear and favourable – if not easily verifiable – numbers for 
the cost per produced unit, both the access road SAR as well as the SAR for the hydro project five years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 It seems important to note that this was not the first occasion when the Bank had a tough time negotiating 
regional issues related to water with India. Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997: 1191) mention the frustration among top 
officials at the end of the 1970s over “their failure to find a formula to induce the governments of Bangladesh, Nepal, 
and India – more particularly India – to let the Bank be an analytical and/or negotiating handmaiden to the solution 
of South Asia’s ‘Eastern Waters’ problem.” 
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later totally abstain from presenting an estimate on the actual cost of generated power. Since the Least 
Cost Generation Expansion Plan prepared by the Canadian CIWEC and NEA (1987) had reconfirmed 
in 1987 that Arun-3 was the cheapest option, it seems there was no further need to undergird this axiom. 
Instead, the 1989 SAR presents a new and highly adventurous line of argumentation for the economic 
feasibility of the project. 
First, the report established that the average energy price of “NRs 1.39/kWh is only 42% of the estimated 
average long-run marginal costs of NRs 3.27/kWh” (The World Bank 1989: 4), whereas the export tariff 
was estimated as low as NRs 1.00/kWh. Despite the fact that the Bank had already appointed its 
consultants to recommend a steep rise in tariffs that happened in the following decade, leaving Nepal’s 
electricity consumers with one of the highest prices in the world (Banskota 2012: 94), these low tariffs 
were destroying the economists’ figures: [t]he internal rate of return (IRR) was estimated to be about 
5.6%. This is less than the estimated opportunity cost of capital of 10% and indicates that tariffs are 
currently less than long run marginal costs” (The World Bank 1989: 24). 
To come to terms with the uncomfortable message of their own calculations, the Bank’s economists 
decided to simply ignore them and instead make a bold move that would save the day: Not the real 
electricity tariff was an indicative measure of the rate of return, they argued, but rather the estimated 
consumers’ willingness to pay for electricity. Without further ado or explanation of their methodology, 
they fixed this rate at NRs 3.94/kWh and suddenly the IRR climbed up to a reassuring 13.9%. After 
performing this magical twist, they remind the reader that their new figure is still a lower bound measure 
because their model would neither account for how the “improved reliability and quality of electricity 
supply” would influence consumers’ willingness to pay positively, nor for the “benefits resulting from the 
utilization of the access road by non-power related traffic” (ibid). 
 
 
“Plausible assumptions for the future.” The 1994 Staff Appraisal Report 
This creative way of economic prognosis was one of the main points why a group of engineers, economists 
and hydrologists started to mobilise against the project in Nepal and the trigger for Dipak Gyawali’s (2003 
[1990]) op-ed in The Rising Nepal (see Chapter 3). But the critique did not lead the Bank’s economists to 
call their own calculations into question. On the contrary, the 1994 SAR for the hydropower project 
perpetuated this idiosyncratic way of economic prognosis and came up with even more adventurous 
figures, e.g. an economic IRR of 15.4% for the base-case scenario (The World Bank 1994b: 58). It seems 
important to note, though, that the acrobatics on consumers’ willingness to pay is nowhere to be found in 
the 1994 SAR. Another thing that is missing is any mentioning of the dramatic drop of the Nepalese 
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rupee that had basically lost half its value in US-Dollars since the 1989 SAR for the access road. Whereas 
the road SAR defined one US$ as the equivalent of 24.4 NRs. (for 1 May 1988), the SAR for the dam 
stated the ratio as 1 to 49.48 (in June 1994). Given the fact that the Nepalese rupee had been pegged to 
the Indian rupee for decades and the main source of refinancing was still believed to come from bulk 
electricity sales to India (although, according to John’s account, there had been no active negotiations 
between the governments since 1990) this seems odd – to say the least. Throughout the report one still 
finds the assumption that “exports of surplus hydro to India will be sold at 2.22 cents/kWh” (ibid: 250). 
The report does however acknowledge the controversial nature of the project and states: 
 
Because of its lumpiness, both the Government and the donors agree that project 
development and implementation requires a special risk management strategy. After investing 
more than seven years in developing this project -- controversial because of its size as 
compared to Nepal’s modest economic resources and institutional capacity - - IDA’s decision 
to proceed with the processing of a first stage 201 MW hydro project took explicit account of 
the risks involved (ibid: 10). 
 
Given the controversy surrounding the project since 1990, it seems surprising that the Bank staff identifies 
the same risks as the critics: crowding out of high-priority investments in other sectors, delays in project 
implementation and unsatisfactory implementation of the environmental management plan (ibid). 
The SAR stated the project’s principal objectives as: 
 
(a) increase the power capacity of the Nepal interconnected system at least cost; (b) 
strengthen the capabilities of government institutions and NEA to prepare, design and 
supervise the construction of environmentally sustainable hydroelectric power projects; (c) 
support the environmentally sustainable development of the Arun Valley and assure adequate 
compensation to, and rehabilitation of, the population adversely affected; (d) enhance 
resource mobilization and the operational autonomy and accountability of NEA; and (e) 
support the optimal development of Nepal’s power sector including progress toward 
establishing an appropriate regulatory framework and an active role for the private 
sector”(ibid: 22). 
 
The section on economic analysis started with the reassuring prediction that “the project is projected to 
generate the equivalent of more than US$100 million annually in revenues, which is about ten times the 
project’s annual debt service costs to foreign creditors” (ibid: 54), even without a power purchase 
agreement with India. Especially this section engaged with the opposition against the project and 
explicably mentioned a “Plan B” as proposed by the critics. This would have meant to construct several 
smaller hydropower projects in the range of 30 to 80 MW and the postponement of Arun-3 until 2008. 
Based on a revised least cost analysis, though, the report concluded that this alternative scenario would be 
slightly more expensive. But apart from that the report puts forward a number of reasons why Plan A was 
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the favourable alternative: first, the lacking feasibility studies for some of the proposed alternative schemes; 
second, the experience that it would take three years on average in Nepal to arrange for the financing of a 
new project; third, the risks connected to a larger number of projects to be developed in parallel; fourth, 
higher environmental risks as well as two more points that round out the circular argument:  
 
[T]he completion of Arun 3 would put Nepal in an attractive position for subsequent power 
development in the Arun valley, should arrangements be worked out for major exports to the 
North Indian market. Finally, Government commitment to Plan A is notably strong, an 
ingredient which World Bank experience shows to be critical in successful project 
implementation (ibid: 233). 
 
As mentioned, the SAR acknowledged the controversial nature of the project on several occasions and 
emphasized the extraordinary energy the Bank put into assessing the project and safeguarding the 
participation of affected people and opposition, both internally and internationally: 
 
Public consultation/communication has been an integral part of the preparation of the Arun 
project for which unprecedented effort has been made by HMG in collaboration with IDA 
and KfW. A two pronged approach was followed. The first part relates to the 
consultation/communication process within Nepal, and particularly in the Arun Valley, while 
the second part relates to consultation/communication outside of Nepal (ibid: 155). 
 
To sum up, the SAR made a much less exaggerated case for the dam than the previous documents and 
showed the Bank’s commitment to engage with the opposition against it. A number of environmental and 
social safeguarding mechanisms were presented; the Regional Access Plan, the Land Acquisition, 
Compensation and Rehabilitation Plan, the Environmental Assessment, or the Environmental Action 
Plan, to name but a few; the annexes gave relatively concise summaries of them. While still being mostly a 
document by and for engineers and economists, a comparison with the SAR for the Marsyangdi 
hydropower project (The World Bank 1984) concerning the sections on social and environmental impacts 
shows that the Bank had come a long way from its previous project assessments. Still, the economic 
analysis was based on two shaky premises: first, a yearly increase in domestic electricity tariffs of 9% for the 
next decade and second, the sale of surplus energy to India for a projected price of 2.22 US-cents/kWh. 
And while there was reason to believe in this price level (The World Bank 1994: 184-185), nobody could 
predict whether India would actually buy. 
 
 
“Obviously, if you use these kinds of values, then any project becomes feasible and justified.” 
Despite these adjustments, a growing number of employees within the Bank joined the ranks of the 
critics. In a move that arouse a lot of attention from the transnational coalition against the dam, Martin 
The amnesiac Bank 	  
- 96 - 
Karcher resigned in protest over the Board of Directors decision to continue negotiating the credits after 
twenty-six years at the Bank. In his last post he had been Division Chief for Population and Human 
Resources in the Country Department 1 of the South Asia Region. He left the Bank over Arun-3 in June 
1994 “because he felt the project was economically unsound and unnecessarily put Nepal at financial risk” 
(Udall 1998: 412). In September 1994, the Environmental Defense Fund released a long interview Karcher 
had given to explain the reasons behind his drastic step more thoroughly. 
What was missing from his reasoning was any reference to the environmental concerns raised. Similar to 
the early criticism brought up by the AfE, he confined his reservations to three social and economic issues: 
the danger of crowding out social investments, doubts that the project would contribute to poverty 
alleviation and most importantly, as already indicated, the validity of the economic prognosis that 
undergirded the whole endeavour. First, because of the huge project costs (at that time estimated around 
$760 million), Karcher saw a big danger of crowding out important investments in social programs and 
human resource development (Karcher and Environmental Defense Fund 1994: 159-160). His second 
major point was connected to poverty alleviation, the Bank’s overriding objective of its country assistance 
strategy for Nepal (World Bank 1994b: 8). He expressed his doubts on how the Arun project would fit 
into this strategy and that its “benefits will readily trickle down to the poor, the overwhelming majority of 
whom live in the rural areas that will not be served by the project” (Karcher and Environmental Defense 
Fund 1994: 158-159).  
His main point was, however, his “serious reservations about the economic analysis” (ibid: 158). Apart 
from the fact that this part of the project documentation became available only in January 1994, Karcher 
stated that “there was no indication that Nepal could produce power at a cost and sell it at a price which 
would yield an attractive return to Nepal” (ibid.) and that the government should have entered into 
negotiations with India beforehand. Furthermore, he called into question the methodology of the Least 
Cost Generation Expansion Plan. Conclusively, he asked: “Why is electricity consumption, a significant 
proportion of which goes to the better-off urban dwellers, more important than the needs of the poor, 
especially for an institution like the Bank which is primarily concerned about poverty alleviation” (ibid: 
157)? 
What I find most remarkable in this account is that it features the most outspoken attack of the economic 
prognosis for the project that I have come across from within the Bank. Karcher debunked the economists’ 
claim that they could reasonably predict the Nepalese consumers’ willingness to pay and hinted at the fact 
that there had already been vocal internal opposition against this kind of analysis. Apparently, a major 
revision happened between January 1994 and the publication of the final SAR in August, which Karcher 
claims he had not seen – the tariffs mentioned in the final report prescribed for the next ten years amount 
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to an accumulated increase of 224% (or about 9% p.a. in nominal terms) (The World Bank 1989: 53). 
Talking about the earlier version he stated:  
 
When I looked at the the [sic!] imputed economic value of a kilowatt hour in Nepal, I found 
that on average this was about 7 1/2 times what consumers were paying and I was wondering 
how is it possible that you can assume that the average Nepali consumer would be willing to 
pay something like $0.53 per kilowatt hour when we in Washington pay something like 7 or 
8 cents? Obviously, if you use these kinds of values, then any project becomes feasible and 
justified (Karcher and Environmental Defense Fund 1994: 155). 
 
While Karcher’s move was the most drastic step taken by anybody in the higher ranks of the Bank to 
protest against Arun-3, he was not the first to publicly resign from his institution. In fact, for a couple of 
years a growing number of long-serving Bank staffers had become deeply concerned about the practices of 
their employer; many felt that despite all good intentions they had often failed to bring development to 
those whom they felt accountable to. In 1992, for example, Peter Eigen had left the Bank and founded 
Transparency International, by now probably the most renowned transnational anti-corruption NGO.20 
The most important new institution that emerged out of the ‘struggle for accountability’ in international 
institutions (Fox and Brown 1998), however, was the World Bank Inspection Panel. It was established by 
the Board of Directors in 1993 as an independent review board and was the first of its kind in an 
international institution. In a publication dedicated to its first four years in action, Alvaro Umaña, one of 
the three founding members of the Panel, introduces it as an “innovative tool to ensure accountability in 
Bank operations and to address harm at the grass-roots level. It is an instrument of last resort for local 
people who feel that they have been or could potentially be harmed by World Bank-funded projects” 
(Umaña 1998: ix). 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 When I asked John whether he had had any suspicions on corruption in Arun-3, he categorically denied it. But he 
immediately remembered how TI came into being: 
“The sensibility concerning corruption only emerged in the early 1990s. Until then, the word corruption was a taboo 
in the World Bank. Peter Eigen left at that time, I think it was 1992 […], he was the director of the World Bank 
office in Nairobi and during a conference of World Bank representatives in Africa he spoke with his colleagues and 
said: ‘The World Bank finally has to do something against corruption,’ because a lot of money from World Bank 
loans in Africa ended up in the wrong channels, too. It was a three-day meeting in Harare and on the third day the 
World Bank president came around for a couple of hours and Peter Eigen, on behalf of his colleagues, proposed to 
the president, that was Barber Conable at that time, that the World Bank would have to deal with the topic of 
corruption now, isn’t it? Conable’s answer really became history. He said: ‘Peter, you can do anything against 
corruption that you want, but not inside this institution.’ After that Peter Eigen quit and founded his association TI” 
(Interview 15). 
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“That letter from the government:” Madhav Kumar Nepal writes to Lewis Preston 
On 24 October 1994, the Inspection Panel received the first request for inspection in its history. In it, the 
ACG claimed on behalf of two anonymous claimants from the lower Arun valley that the World Bank 
had not complied with its own regulations when preparing the project. A week before that, another letter 
had arrived in Washington, DC, which proved to be equally important for the further developments. It 
was that very letter to Bank President Lewis Preston that Jyoti, the World Bank staff member I 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter, was unable to locate in the Kathmandu’s office archive. There, 
Madhav Kumar Nepal (1994) expressed his party’s “serious reservations about the way the Project has 
been designed and proposed.” At that time, Nepal was General Secretary of the CPN (UML) and the 
country was one month ahead of general elections that became necessary after the Congress-led 
government had collapsed. In this politically unclear situation, Nepal argued, the decision to pursue a 
project of such scope should not be taken. Furthermore, he claimed that the then-caretaker government 
did not “have the right to undertake any negotiations or reach into agreements that may have long-term 
consequences in the interest of Nepal” (ibid). While assuring Preston about his party’s willingness “to 
attract foreign investment in developing our water resources,” he as well stressed that, should his party 
form the next government, it would conduct a new evaluation of the cost-benefit as well as problems 
relating to environment and settlement issues “prior to any final decision” (ibid). Ram Sharan Mahat 
(2005: 5), while debunking all of Nepal’s arguments, emphasised how critical the timing of this letter 
was.21 Two weeks later, Nepal’s party did indeed win the elections and soon afterwards Man Mohan 
Adhikari became the first communist Prime Minister of Nepal. But the CPN (UML) failed to secure a 
parliamentary majority and in lack of a coalition partner had to form a minority government. In light of 
the repetitive reference to the high importance the Bank put into the government’s commitment to the 
project as one of the main arguments why to move forward with the loan negotiations, Mahat’s argument 
seems to be plausible. It is also backed by Antony’s memories when he claimed that it was mainly the 
government’s lack of efforts that proved decisive for the cancellation.  
Nepal’s letter is an important point of reference in Nepalese domestic politics, too. With it, he set a 
precedent for a very specific form of hydro-power politics that shapes the national discourse to this day. 
This is not to say that water related issues had not been part of power bargaining before 1994, as Dwarika 
Dhungel (2009) shows. Nepal’s letter, however, set the stage for a new strategic usage of hydropower 
projects in politics that has come to be a guiding principle since the end of the civil war and the 
subsequent re-emergence of a number of dam projects that have never been completed. While Nepal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 To this day, the former member of the National Planning Commission who later became Minister of Foreign 
Affairs is a staunch advocate of the dam. 
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(1994) holds out the “great possibility of building national consensus among the major political parties in 
Nepal, at least, in exploiting water resources,” it is exactly this consensus building that has never been 
achieved. Although all political forces in the country in principal agree that hydropower is the only way to 
solve the local energy crisis, to attract considerable foreign direct investment and create revenue from 
electricity exports to India, none of the major projects that were contracted out to foreign investors since 
the end of the Maoist insurgency, has come to the stage of a detailed project agreement, let alone actual 
construction. This is because since the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections, the three major parties 
(Maoists, Congress, UML) have constantly been shifting their position on these projects according to 
whether they were in government or opposition. While the parties in power have been keen on closing the 
deals, those in opposition have been as committed in not letting this happen. Take for example the 
position of the Maoists. During their Pushpa Kamal Dahal-led government (2008-2009) they were 
strongly pushing negotiations with foreign investors, not least to convince the international community of 
their commitment to liberal democracy and the free market. But in September 2010, while in opposition, 
the party’s Department of Water Resources and Energy issued a press release that demanded an 
immediate stop to all foreign-funded projects (UCPN [M] 2010). When they got back into power in 
August 2011, they again switched positions. 
How infamous the letter by Nepal has become may be illustrated by another story: When I asked people 
in the villages of the upper Arun valley about the reason for the cancellation of the dam, nobody was 
talking about the ACG or the Inspection Panel, but on several occasions people put the blame on the 
CPN (UML). They mentioned the letter and identified Madhav Kumar Nepal as the real perpetrator 
(although some ascribed it to Man Mohan Adhikari, the Prime Minister of the UML minority cabinet).22 
 
 
“The shotgun approach:” the Request for Inspection 
As mentioned, a week after Nepal’s letter, another document from Kathmandu arrived at 1818 H Street, 
NW, Washington, DC. A request for inspection of the controversial project addressed at the Inspection 
Panel, written by Gopal Siwakoti and Ganesh Ghimire for the ACG. This document was a frontal attack 
on the Bank, firing at the project from every possible angle. For this reason, one of my interlocutors who 
was involved with the Panel in these years aptly referred to the attitude taken in the request as “the 
shotgun approach.23“ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 It is important to note, though, that all of them were educated elder men with ties to Congress.  
23 “There was a series of decision points about how inspections will be carried out before that first case before the 
Inspection Panel. It was very challenging because the person who drafted the request to the Panel, Gopal Siwakoti 
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On ten pages, Siwakoti and Ghimire elaborated their claim that the Bank had violated several of its main 
directives during the preparation of Arun-3.24 They started with a charge on insufficient care concerning 
the economic evaluation and reminded the Bank on its commitment to energy efficiency and conservation 
in the developing world:  
 
For the project to be acceptable on economic grounds, ‘the expected present value of the 
project’s net benefits must be higher than or equal to the expected net present value of 
mutually exclusive project alternative’. By not undertaking the relevant studies of the 
alternatives such as those listed in Plan B, the World Bank has not fulfilled this very basic 
criteria for acceptability of the project. […] The Least Cost generation and Expansion plan 
(LCGEP) of 1987 and 1990 failed to take into account that the same amount of power 
generated from Arun III could also be generated from a series of smaller alternatives in the 1 
MW to 100 MW range (Arun Concerned Group 1994a: 2). 
 
After that, they alleged violations of the Bank’s policies on disclosure of information, environmental 
assessment, involuntary resettlement, and indigenous peoples. 
Then, they stated their rights/interests, as: 
 
A. Effective participation in policy-making and decision-making processes; B. Timely access 
to information; C. Balanced development; D. Adequate analysis of alternatives; E. Adequate 
compensation and rehabilitation; F. Fair access to electricity supply at affordable prices; G. 
Freedom from debt; H. Freedom from inappropriate lending conditionalities; I. Right to 
development; J. Maintenance of adequate living standards; and K. Healthy environment and 
sustainable development (ibid). 
 
Despite the letterhead from the ACG, technically the request was put forward by two directly affected 
persons from the Arun valley who preferred to stay anonymous. Although the Resolution establishing the 
Inspection Panel does not restrict claims to people who are directly affected and explicitly allows for 
requests by a “representative in the exceptional cases where the party submitting the request contends that 
appropriate representation is not locally available and the Executive Directors so agree” (IBRB and IDA 
1993: § 12), Siwakoti and his colleagues felt their case to be stronger this way. In April 2011, I had a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[...] wrote a request to the panel that was very broad. For some reason he decided that he would just put everything 
in there, what I call shotgun approach, sort of a throw everything at and see what it is” (Interview 16). 
24 “2. Relevant Policies and Procedures of the World Bank which have been violated 
2.A.  Economic Evaluation of Investment Operations – OP 10.04 
2.B  Policies on World Bank Role in the Electric Power Sector and Energy Efficiency and Conservation in the 
Developing World […] 
2.C The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information. March 1994 – BP 17.50 […] 
2.D Environmental Assessment – OP 4.01 […] 
2.E  Involuntary Resettlement: Land Acquisition, Compensation and Rehabilitation – OP 4.30 […] 
2.F  Indigenous Peoples – OP 4.20 […] 
2.G  Wildlands Policy: […] OP 4.04 and […] OP 10.00” (Arun Concerned Group 1994a: 1-2). 
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conversation with Edmund, only a couple of blocks away from the Bank’s headquarter in downtown 
Washington, DC. He had been working for the Inspection Panel from its establishment and was deeply 
involved in the Arun-3 case. Retrospectively, he said: 
 
Gopal [Siwakoti] could have gone a different route, there is provision in the Inspection Panel 
resolution where if in fact the atmosphere is too intimidating for people to file their 
complaint they can delegate that to an NGO. […] Somebody must have told him that that 
would be a harder test to meet, when it went to test the eligibility of the request. Since then, 
of course, it has been used in the Inspection Panel; it has been used in the Chinese case 
(Interview 16). 
 
A couple of months beforehand, I had asked Gopal how they had found the two claimants. He replied: 
 
I personally have never met them...because I am not from the Arun valley and they didn’t 
come to Kathmandu. They were arranged by our friends who were in the Arun Concerned 
Group in the Arun valley, so for their safety and security their names were kept 
anonymous...but they were the people who were displaced. [...] They were not happy with 
the compensation that was provided to them (Interview B). 
 
Looking back at the case at hand, Edmund identified two main attacks on the request from within the 
Bank. And as it was the first case to be investigated, the decisions taken at that time proved to be very 
important to determine the way the Panel has come to understand its mandate: 
 
There were people who were very sceptical about it – well, is there really anybody in the Arun 
valley? – and the government in Nepal was happy to assert that everybody in the Arun valley 
was happy with the project and wanted it and therefore Gopal was inventing these two 
people. So, even the request, when it came in, was attacked behind the scenes in two ways. 
One was that there weren’t any eligible requesters and secondly that ... it was much too broad 
and would cover everything and things that were not intended for the Inspection Panel 
mechanism to review (Interview 16). 
 
Concerning the first issue, the Panel did the obvious and sent out a mission to the Arun valley. This 
verified on passing that the two claimants had good reasons to request anonymity:25 
 
We went up to the Arun valley and set down and talked with the two people who had signed 
[...] and indeed we found that they were living in an intimidating environment, because most 
of the people around them in the community were completely...they did see great economic 
windfall from the project and the government was promising them everything...If these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 By now, the names of the two claimants, as well as their addresses, can be found in the original request for 
information that is available from the World Bank archives online without blackening. This is the downside of the 
Bank’s high level of transparency. 
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people [...] had not kept their identity hidden they would have been probably attacked by 
their neighbours for disrupting the project (ibid.).26 
 
The second point was the much more important issue and proved to establish a path dependency the 
Panel has not left ever since. As mentioned, the main claim in the request aimed directly at the heart of 
the Bank: It claimed that it had violated its Operational Policy (OP) 10.04 on economic evaluation of 
investment operations. This had been the main point of criticism from AfE and ACG all along and after 
studying the Inspection Panel resolution the activists were convinced that it provided for an investigation 
directed at the economic expertise of the Bank. But the Panel decided otherwise, for strategic reasons, as 
Edmund concedes: 
 
On the second [point] it is not so much an issue having to do with this particular claim but 
the fact that this was the first case before the Inspection Panel and it is clear from the record 
of the Board of Directors of the World Bank that they intended for the Panel to be focused 
on the safeguard policies, which as you know are involuntary resettlement, environmental 
assessment...what I call the cultural institutions...indigenous peoples [...] The other policies 
that Gopal [Siwakoti] alluded to, [...] from economic rate of return to national planning, 
[there] was probably a majority on the Board who didn’t think that that was a good idea. 
Now, as a matter of legal principle, we on the Inspection Panel and in fact the general 
counsel of the Bank, Ibrahim Shihata, who wrote the original resolution to establish the 
Panel, did believe that all policies should be covered by the Inspection Panel...but that, our 
judgment on the Inspection Panel was, as the first case we didn’t want to get into a fight with 
the Board over the question of policies, if in fact we had an adequate handle to deal with this 
particular request for an investigation. And we thought that the safeguard policies actually 
did provide that and that the other issues would be very hard for us as an investigating panel 
[...] just starting to be able to get a definitive handle on them. So we had explicit policies in 
those three areas: indigenous peoples, environment and resettlement, and we were able to use 
those I think to raise a series of fundamental issues about the project (ibid.).27 
 
Edmund and his colleagues knew that the Board would never authorise an investigation connected to OP 
10.04 and given the circumstances they decided against such a bold move in order not to weaken their 
cause for evaluating the other allegations. Beyond that they felt that they did not “have clear evidence and 
in part because the data from the Government in Nepal was never concrete and turned out to be wrong.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Edmund did not engage at length with my objection that it must have been very difficult for two white men to 
meet the two anonymous requesters without the whole village getting wind of the event and answered matter-of-
factly: “We went outside the town itself and met the two guys and talked with them and got a sense of what their 
concerns were and they seemed to have real concerns” (Interview 16). 
27 Concerning the alleged violation of the claimants right to information, the Panel decided that “[w]ith respect to 
the alleged noncompliance with the applicable disclosure policy, the Panel thought full compliance would be difficult 
given that the policy evolved rapidly during the last phases of project preparation. Thus, the Panel concluded that an 
investigation was unwarranted in this respect” (IBRD 2003: 53). 
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Therefore, the Panel restricted its investigation into “alleged non-compliance by IDA with Operational 
Directives (‘ODs’) 4.01 on environmental assessment, 4.20 on indigenous peoples, and 4.30 on 
involuntary resettlement” (The Inspection Panel 1995: 1).  
 
 
The Investigation 
The Panel started its work on the request in late 1994 and decided to divide the mission into two phases 
in order to react to the request in a timelier manner. According to the Resolution establishing the Panel, 
the Bank’s management had twenty-one days to respond to a request for inspection. The South Asia office 
did that on 21 November, engaging with the claim point-by-point over fifteen pages. The response denied 
all allegations and concluded not very surprisingly:  
 
We believe […] that the Bank has followed its operational policies and procedures with 
respect to the design and appraisal of the proposed project. Of critical importance for quality 
at entry, we have assessed the various technical, economic, financial, environmental, and 
sociological risks carefully, devoting considerable attention to alternative scenarios (The 
World Bank 1994a: 18). 
 
In order to determine whether an investigation should take place, the Panel reviewed the request, the 
response and further material, mostly consisting of newspaper articles and correspondence between various 
NGOs opposing the project and donor agencies. Furthermore, two of the Panel members went to Nepal 
and visited the dam site. On 16 December the Panel came out with its report on the request to inspection, 
including first recommendations to the project management. In a memorandum to the executive directors 
of the Bank, the Panel noted “that apparent violations of policy do exist that require further investigation” 
(The World Bank 1996: 628). On 2 February 1995, the executive directors authorized the Panel to conduct 
a full investigation. Simultaneously, they prescribed another internal evaluation of the project by Bank 
staff; the so-called April mission.29 Let me quote Edmund again: 
 
That was when they [the Board of Directors] sent out really their first-grade people. […] 
[…] Their conclusion was: we can’t promise that the government of Nepal can pull this off, 
[…] which of course is always the big question. You can write a great plan of action and come 
up with work in almost any other country, but in Nepal…that was when the government fell 
and so then the [Bank’s] President had his excuse to say: well, we’ve got to wait until they 
have a stable government to decide whether we can go ahead with this (Interview 16). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 I was unable to retrieve the original document. 
29 Unfortunately I was unable to interview people who were directly involved in this mission. Their report is dated 23 
May 1995. 
The amnesiac Bank 	  
- 104 - 
The Investigation Report 
Judging from all these circumstances, in spring 1995 the realisation of the dam was already dangling on a 
string. And while both the Panel’s and the Bank’s internal investigations were underway, the people 
involved saw increasing political tensions in Kathmandu, with Congress declaring on 3 April that it was 
preparing to bring down the CPN (UML) minority government (Poudyal 1996: 211).30 After nine 
months of investigation and a second field trip to Nepal, the Panel submitted its final report on 21 June 
1995. Many of the recommendations included in this report point to a host of problems in project design, 
unclear responsibilities and doubtful timeframes. Still, in the conclusion of the executive summary the 
Panel noted, “that IDA is moving towards and intends to comply in substance with the requirements of 
the three operational directives” (The Inspection Panel 1995: 5). And whereas the investigation report was 
in line with the April Mission’s findings in most points that concern the Panel’s mandate to investigate 
violations of the mentioned Bank regulations, it started with a detailed discussion of the prehistory of the 
project. Contrary to the previous documents produced by the Bank, this ‘alternative’ project history 
emphasised the problems in negotiating the environmental and social issues with the government of Nepal 
in connection with the access road credit. Especially the decision to change the route and the neglect of 
the affected families along the hill route served as clear example of how badly managed the early stages of 
the project had been. The report further explained how staff interviews brought to light that after the 
renegotiation of the project in 1992 that led to the unification of both road credit and hydropower credit 
into one single credit agreement, “the Credit 2029-NEP was essentially forgotten.” (ibid: 16); and with it 
the reluctance of the borrower to address the contentious issues. 
Concerning the environmental impact assessment (OD 4.01), the report stated that the Bank did not fully 
comply with the comprehensive methodology of the relevant policy, “instead it followed a piece-meal 
approach” (ibid: 23). The Panel noted several inadequacies, „including (a) the Bank’s inclination to 
proceed with the appraisal and negotiation portions of the project before completing the environmental 
assessment of the valley route and (b) inadequate efforts to promote the use of local labor” (IBRD and 
IDA 2003: 55). Furthermore, the Panel was concerned about forest conservation and the risk of glacial 
lake outburst floods.31 Concerning the road alignment the report abstained from making any judgment on 
which of the two alignments was preferable, but found “that the choice of the valley route will require 
provision for appropriate funding of contingencies to cover maintenance in the event of road wash-outs 
from river flooding due to monsoon rains” (The Inspection Panel 1995: 33). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The government finally collapsed on 7 September. 
31 Another Bank mission to further study glacial lake outburst floods was scheduled for late June 1995 (The 
Inspection Panel 1995: 33). 
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With regards to the allegations on violations of OD 4.30 in connection with involuntary resettlements the 
Panel found that “IDA failed to observe in substance the policy requirements for supervision of 
resettlement components and consequently failed to enforce covenants in the Credit Agreement” (ibid: 
34), furthermore stating that “the land of those who filed the Request for Inspection had been acquired 
but not physically possessed […]. Approximately 1,400 families are in a similar situation,” as well as that 
“provision for access to jobs/training is not adequately addressed” (ibid, emphasis in original). The Panel 
also stressed that “much more emphasis must be placed on monitoring and evaluation of both the land 
acquisition process and implementation” (ibid: 34-35). Studies by the Bank’s Operations Evaluation 
Department as well as regional reviews of the Bank’s experience with resettlement would “point out that 
monitoring by IDA has been chronically inadequate despite consistent findings that oversight must be 
exercised constantly during implementation and beyond” (ibid: 35). 
Thirdly, on the question of indigenous peoples (OD 4.20), “the Inspectors found that people who qualify 
as ‘indigenous’ under IDA’s policy are scattered throughout the valley and live in conditions similar to 
those of non-indigenous people” (ibid: 4). Therefore, they concurred with the April mission’s proposal to 
consider everybody as indigenous and extend the three actions required by OD 4.20 to all residents of the 
Arun valley: 
 
These actions are (i) informed participation through public consultations, (ii) security over 
land tenure, and (iii) an action program with socially and culturally appropriate components” 
(ibid). As to why this approach should be taken, the Panel explains that although “some 
ethnic groups are clearly more prepared to deal with the changes […] than others. Concern 
was expressed particularly about the Rai communities that live north of Tumlingtar […] 
Nevertheless, it cannot be generalized that all Rai people will need special assistance. Nor can 
it be ruled out that non-Rai people will suffer particular disadvantages. […] Virtually the 
entire population of the three districts touched by this project already live in a highly 
vulnerable status: for example, it is estimated that only one in ten farming families can 
support themselves from the land (ibid: 31-32). 
 
Finally, the report engaged with the Regional Action Plan wherein a number of actions required by OD 
4.01 and 4.20 were to be included:  
 
This is an innovative approach to an environmental action plan which has the potential to 
become either a model for future work or, if badly implemented, a serious weakness of the 
entire Arun-III project. […] Described in the Staff Appraisal Report of August 1994 as 
being ‘integral’ to the project, the RAP has nevertheless yet to be completed (ibid: 35).  
 
The Panel further found “inadequate capacity for sustained coordination” (ibid: 36) of the big number of 
different donors and programs included in the RAP and called for yet another “redesigned and expanded 
RAP prior to Board presentation” (ibid). Here, it shortly touched on the subject of remembrance when it 
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postulated: “Since it is the first time such a regional action program has been designed, those involved in 
designing the original RAP need to continue their work to ensure that an institutional memory is 
established” (ibid) before concluding with the following point: 
 
“Given the complexity, scale and scope of proposed developmental interventions in relation to 
the existing institutional capacity in Nepal, the Panel is doubtful that the project’s mitigatory 
environmental and social measures can be implemented within the time frame proposed by 
IDA” (ibid). 
 
 
The cancellation: “The whole thing was settled within 24 hours.” 
Obviously, the findings of the Panel did not strengthen the position of the dam supporters in the Bank, 
the NEA and the government. But there was another decisive factor that added to all these circumstances: 
James Wolfensohn was appointed as the new director of the Bank on 1 July 1995. Furthermore, the 
German KfW had become more and more impatient over the last months and there were signs that they 
were planning their exit. Wolfensohn apparently demanded one more independent review of the project, 
this time under the leadership of Maurice Strong who had served as the secretary general of the UN 
Stockholm Conference in 1972 (IBRD and IDA 2003: 57). As it turned out, this was the last report on 
the issue for a long time: On 2 August 1995, five weeks after he had taken office, Wolfensohn withdrew 
his support for the dam. An office memorandum to the executive directors states that the  
 
separate report considered the potential for significantly higher cost overruns, an uncertainty 
regarding cofinancing at the present stage, as well as implementation and management 
aspects of the project relative to its size and risks. The review also assessed alternative means 
for assisting Nepal in meeting its power needs (ibid).  
 
As several of my interlocutors have confirmed, the decision was communicated to the Prime Minister 
Man Mohan Adhikari and the Bank’s Kathmandu office by phone. 
In the archives of the German NGO Urgewald near Münster I came across a very intriguing document. 
Dated October 1995 by hand, it gives minutes of meetings with a number of important people at the 
Bank in the aftermath of the cancellation and states at the beginning: “These thoughts are pieced together 
from what various people said to us over the course of the week - mostly not attributable.” While clearly 
compiled by one of the main activists, the identity of the author remains unclear. Concerning the 
cancellation it states: 
The decision was at least in part precipitated by a financing gap with the German 
government (one of the major funders) showing increasing concern. 
The decision was finally made in Wolfensohn’s office. […] He apparently spoke to Joe Wood 
(Vice President South Asia) and passed the paperwork to Maurice Strong […]. Strong 
recommended against the project and Wolfensohn took the decision and went to the EDs 
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[Executive Directors]. […] EDs say they were taken by surprise and the whole thing was 
settled within 24 hours. Wolfensohn then rang the Nepali PM and told him the outcome. 
The grounds for the decision were supposedly more to do with developmental issues and the 
potential damage to the Bank than with the environmental concerns. There did also appear 
to be a financing gap and it seems most likely that the Germans pulled back from the project; 
the Japanese claim to have been as surprised as anyone else by the cancellation. 
Many of the EDs were clearly unhappy with the decision. There appear to have been three 
reasons for this: 
• the rapidity and executive nature of the decision; 
• some of the borrowing countries are concerned that a project could be cancelled after this 
level of preparation and perceive undue influence on the part of the US NGO community; 
• some of the lending countries are worried about the precedent this sets in terms of Bank 
lending for large infrastructural projects. (It was implied that the UK might have been one of 
these.) 
A certain amount of flak was flung at the US who were perceived to have been fronting for 
the environmental NGOs. The US, however, say they were as surprised as anyone when the 
decision came down (Anonymous 1995: 1). 
 
For Wolfensohn, it was the perfect opportunity to show the Anti-Bank activists in Washington, DC and 
around the world that the Bank was listening to the opposition and willing to change on an insignificant 
credit to a peripheral country concerning a badly engineered project. Or, as one of the former German 
activists ironically summarised the events: “A World Bank President who plays the cello and cancels a 
controversial project in an unimportant country – isn’t that sweet” (Interview 17)? 
So, five years after Gyawali’s first open attack on Arun-3 based on the project’s bad economics and bad 
implementation, the Bank essentially agreed with him in their internal communication and in 
conversations with the activists. Without transmission of the controversy into a social and environmental 
issue, however, it remains doubtful whether the Bank had ever reconsidered its finance commitment. 
Retrospectively, one of the former activists of the AfE contemplated on this remarkable shift that 
happened once the controversy had been brought before the Panel: 
 
From my perspective this was very much a developmental discourse, not so much an 
environmental discourse [...] By the time we took this debate up to the World Bank and 
international NGOs picked it up, it got transformed into an environmental discourse [...] It 
got picked up by people like International Rivers Network, the whole movement that was 
anti-World Bank at that time, the ‘50 years is enough’ campaign. A lot of different people 
picked it up and I think they were not that interested in the whole developmental discourse 
because the conclusion there was different from what they were used to see. Their conclusion 
was: There are all these environmental impacts therefore dams are bad. Actually, if you took 
our argument to the logical conclusion it would be: no, Nepal will be building dams, but they 
should be built in step with the capacity within Nepal in a way that Nepalese can build up the 
institutions alongside those dams, so that these [...] are done at a lower cost, that people’s 
energy prices are low (Interview 11). 
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Apart from the serious animosity the activists were exposed to after the cancellation, this surprising 
transmission was the second reason why to many of them their success felt like a pyrrhic victory after the 
first enthusiasm evaporated. Added to this was the slowly emerging realisation that it would take at least a 
decade to renegotiate the credit agreements with the Bank, in spite of its contrary assertions. 
 
 
“None of the objectives of the project was achieved:32“ The aftermath 
Edmund’s recollections from inside the Inspection Panel are very much in line with the anonymous 
minutes in that he stresses the kind of “shockwave” that the President’s decision sent out across the whole 
Bank and beyond: 
 
At that time the future of the project was settled in Washington, it wasn’t settled in 
Kathmandu and it was very much a top-down decision by the President, he found the whole 
thing an embarrassment and didn’t want to have that go forward at the beginning of his term 
as president…the South Asian division of the Bank here was headed by a Vice-President 
named Joe Wood…they were extremely upset because they were really counting on having 
infrastructure like hydroelectric dams drive their strategies in a whole series of countries. And 
to have this one fall, they were concerned of undermining their development approaches with 
a whole series of governments where they were pushing hydro projects…and…it 
was…actually in that time in a way they were right, which is that over the next three or four 
years there was a tremendous dispute at the senior levels of the Bank over the future of 
hydroelectric power (Interview 16). 
 
Once the Bank withdrew its support, it only took the other donors a few weeks to follow suit. But judging 
from the chaotic circumstances of the project cancellation it seems surprising that a fair amount of the 
money earmarked for Arun-3 did still end up in the Nepalese hydropower sector. The German money was 
used to fund the Middle Marsyangdi dam, one of the projects favoured by the Anti-Arun-activists. The 
ADB provided a 160 million US-Dollars loan for the construction of the Kali Gandaki ‘A’ scheme, as did 
the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. The World Bank remained true to its affirmation that the 
negotiated credit would be spent in smaller hydropower schemes through a program called Nepal Power 
Development Project. It took until 2003 for this project to be approved by the Board. With 133.4 million 
Dollars it was more or less equivalent to the projected Arun-3 loan (although in the end only 75.6 million 
actually came from the Bank) (Sovacool et al. 2011), but the bigger part of this money is still unaccounted 
for (Interview 1). 
The only document from management side that ever dealt directly with the Arun cancellation was the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The World Bank 1996: ii, emphasis in original. 
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credit cancellation agreement for the access road from 1996. Although the road credit had been fused into 
the “Arun III Package” in 1994 an official cancellation was necessary, as the Board of Directors had 
already approved the road credit in 1989. First of all, again, on the first page, this report shows 
impressively the deterioration of the value the Nepalese rupee over the project period – whereas 1 US-
Dollar was the equivalent of 15.6 NRs. in 1984, it was 47.9 NRs. ten years later. The main unresolved 
question mentioned in this document – unsurprisingly – was again connected to unclear land titles and the 
access road: it concerned “the return of the unused land along the hill alignment to its original owners” 
(The World Bank 1996: ii). As late as 18 June 1996 IDA requested in a letter to the government to be 
informed about the measures taken in this matter.  
This report determined four basic lessons for future projects: Firstly, to “avoid self-imposed pressure to 
accelerate project processing” and secondly, not to “ignore the dynamics of political and economic 
environment” and especially focus on the changes occurring during the project’s lead time, both in the 
country but also within the own organisation. Then it criticised the decision to finance the access road as a 
separate project that should also work as a rural access project. This led to incomplete decisions regarding 
the alignment route. Finally, the report stressed that  
 
IDA should insist on compliance with its policies and operational directives […] even in the 
case of a Project […that…] never began. […] IDA failed to observe […] its own policy 
requirements for appraisal (the project was submitted to the Board without an adequate plan 
to deal with the indirect effects on the people) (ibid: iii-iv). 
 
With this official credit cancellation agreement the unpleasant affair of Arun-3 was finally closed for the 
World Bank. 
 
 
“The World Bank regrets to inform you that it is unable to fulfill your request.” 
I started this chapter with my revealing visit to the Bank’s office in Kathmandu and the missing files from 
their archive. One year later, during my conversation with Edmund I wanted to know if there was any 
chance to retrieve the lost documentation of the credit negotiations between the World Bank and the 
government of Nepal. He was surprised to hear that I had not been able to get hold of them, but 
concluded that they were probably not available because they had never been finalised and therefore not 
archived. Another eighteen months came and went until I launched my so far last attempt to find them. 
The Inspection Panel report mentions both an IDA Draft Development Credit Agreement (Arun III) 
8/25/94 and an IDA Draft Project Agreement (Arun III) 8/25/94. When I asked the Panel for these 
documents, one of their staff answered that they could only disclose information the Panel produces and 
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advised me to get in touch with the Bank’s access to information department. A few weeks after doing 
that, I received a message from them stating that “the World Bank has searched its records and databases 
but has not identified in its possession the [documents] that you have requested” (The World Bank 
2013a). 
The e-mail did not indicate whether this was in any way unexpected. To make sure that was not inventing 
a conspiracy where there was none I replied by asking: “Are such draft agreements normally archived or is 
it common procedure to destroy them at some point” (Rest 2013)? The answer left no room for doubt: 
“Records such are[!] the draft agreements are typically included in the project files for the project to which 
they relate and are not routinely destroyed by the Bank. However, after an exhaustive search, we were 
unable to locate these particular draft agreements in our holdings” (The World Bank 2013b). Judging 
from all of this, it seems safe to assume that somebody from within the Bank had been instrumental in 
erasing traces of what had happened. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Eleven years after the invention of Arun-3 through the publication of the JICA-funded Kosi master plan 
study, no construction had taken place: no road, no dam; not a single transmission pole had been erected. 
Tellingly, the only things that were there in the upper Arun valley, apart from a couple of buildings that 
soon fell into disrepair, were three head-high holes: The tunnels at the dam site, the powerhouse site and 
somewhere in between that stemmed from the exploratory drillings in 1989/90 (see Chapter 6). But of 
course the non-existing dam did have a lot of very graspable effects in the area, in Nepal as a country, in 
the transnational civil society arena as well as in the field of infrastructure development in the global 
South.  
At the World Bank level, this cancelled dam proved to be highly productive in a number of ways. As I 
have tried to show throughout this chapter the project evolved in parallel with the Bank’s attempts to 
integrate environmental and social scientific expertise into its practice of knowledge production. The 
surveys and re-surveys conducted between 1991 and 1995 had a formative impact on the way the Bank’s 
environmental and social assessments have been carried out ever since and how this specific know-how has 
become integrated into the Bank’s modus operandi to establish its current developmental regime of green 
neoliberalism (for a discussion of how the Bank’s knowledge production evolved after the Arun-3 fiasco 
see Michael Goldman’s [2005: 151-180] chapter on the Nam Theun 2 dam in Laos). 
It was the first project to be evaluated through the newly established Inspection Panel and to date it is one 
of only two that were stopped after the investigation. The other cancelled scheme was the China Western 
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Poverty Reduction Project in 1999/2000 – which was only the second full investigation the Board of 
Directors authorised, despite a couple of requests for inspection in the meantime of which the Panel 
recommended five for investigations (Clark and Treakle 2003). The Arun-3 cancellation can be 
considered a turning point in this respect, but it also altered the relationships between Bank, transnational 
civil society networks, as well as governments of both the global North and South. As the anonymous 
minutes from the activists show, many people in and around the Bank were concerned about the 
precedent this decision would have on the future of hydropower development – what they called “the 
combined force of the Narmada and Arun effects” (Goldman 2005: 153).  
And they were right, as Edmund conceded. Wolfensohn wanted a clean slate, all hydropower credits were 
put on the back burner and a new arrangement emerged that fundamentally changed the way the Bank 
conducted business: the first full collaboration with an NGO through the establishment of the World 
Commission on Dams in collaboration with IUCN. By now, many other international institutions have 
followed the World Bank and introduced similar mechanisms. 
For the Inspection Panel, finally, the investigation of Arun-3 established a path dependency in how and 
what to investigate. Although its constitutive resolution was explicitly written to allow claims concerning 
all Bank policies, the Panel has ever since served as a review board solely focused on social and 
environmental measures. The Board of Director’s refusal to engage in a discussion of alternatives, let alone 
a reflection of the Bank’s foundations of knowledge production, has remained intact. And it is exactly here 
that we can see the validity of Goldman’s claim that the Bank has managed to emerge stronger than ever 
from one of its biggest crises. The mobilisation against the Bank that culminated in the ‘50 years is 
enough’ campaign wanted to put an end to the Bretton-Woods Institutions. The pressure exerted on the 
Bank was instrumental for it to change its development regime. But instead of collapsing, it was able to 
integrate not only a multiplicity of new forms of environmental and social scientific know-how into its 
operations, but much more importantly to co-opt NGOs to become part of the Bank’s knowledge 
production: “Simply put, the Bank has transformed an antidevelopment environmentalist agenda into one 
that works in its favour in many of its borrowing countries” (Goldman 2005: 154). 
	   
	   
5 “They provide us with a road but sweep us away from here:” 
Waiting for the Kosi-Lhasa-Rajmarg 
 
I: If the road is built, will it bring advantages or disadvantages for you? 
Richin: Nothing will happen to me. What can happen? 
 
 
Arriving for a funeral 
In her seminal contribution to Writing Culture, Mary Louise Pratt (1986: 27-28) focuses on “the vexed but 
important relationship between narrative and impersonal description in ethnographic writing”. For this 
purpose, she engages at length with anthropologists’ accounts of their arrival in the field. The arrival trope 
in classical ethnographies, she argues with recourse to Malinowski, Firth, Evans-Pritchard and Maybury-
Lewis, displays a clear continuity with travel writing, often rooted in the specific motives used in the 
literature about the geographical region in question: “[…] Evans-Pritchard joins a century-long line of 
African travellers who lose their supplies and cannot control their bearers” (ibid: 39). In Pratt’s 
interpretation, the self-imagination anthropologists transport through personal stories interlaced in their 
ethnographies tend to reproduce the common Western images of the lonesome adventurer, the castaway 
or that of the colonial conqueror and the utopia of first contact. Often, these accounts include the idyllic 
depiction of a native village at dawn as seen from a ship or a viewpoint followed by the formal welcome of 
the anthropologist and the ritual exchange of presents. Arguably, nowadays most anthropologists would 
refrain from explicitly using this trope and already Pratt points to critical variations on the theme, but 
recounting the arrival at our field sites (or, more and more often, the realisation that we have just found 
one) remains an important topos in ethnographic writing. 
My arrival in Hedangna was far from these classical cases, but reminiscent of Majorie Shostak’s (1981: 7-
8, 23) account that Pratt cites as an example for a new way of self-reflexive writing in anthropology. After 
fantasising about an ideal arrival in a !Kung village at sunrise, Shostak describes the way she actually 
arrived in her field site in the middle of the night, without someone to welcome her. The !Kung men 
travelling with her suggest that she should make camp in the abandoned hut where Richard Lee and 
Nancy Howell had stayed during their fieldwork several years beforehand, thereby rendering any 
imagination about her being the first white woman on site as illusionary. 
In my case it was at dusk, I came from the valley and was tired after a long day of sitting on the platform 
of a four by four and then walking uphill. Except for a pack of mixed snacks I had no supplies with me. 
On top of that, I was neither alone nor the leader of an expedition, but was accompanying Chun Bahadur 
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Yamphu Rai who had grown up in Hedangna. At that time he was working for an Austrian NGO and his 
former supervisor happened to be a friend of mine. This is how I had made contact and after some days 
spent together in Khandbari, the headquarter of Nepal’s Sankhuwasabha district, Chun Bahadur had 
generously walked with me to Hedangna to introduce me to his parents and friends. But all of this has 
nothing to do with why I mention my arrival at Hedangna. I recount this scene because it coincided with 
a tragedy; the accidental death of a 15-year-old youth who probably would still be alive if there had been a 
road connection to the next hospital. 
It was already dark when we reached the house of Chun Bahadur’s parents as we were caught by surprise 
by a sudden shower of rain – it was Mid-November and the monsoon had already ended – just when we 
entered the village and sought shelter on the porch of the nearest house. Once we had arrived at Chun 
Bahadur’s family, his mother shooed us inside the house and started to serve dinner immediately. It was 
during my second serving of rice that Chun Bahadur’s brother Dipen Bahadur brought the bad news: At a 
pick-nick organised by some of the village’s teenagers, one of the boys had gone to fetch water, slipped 
and had fallen off a cliff. The boy was alive, but severely injured. As one of the two trained paramedics in 
the village, he had been called to the emergency, but could do nothing except disinfecting and staunching 
the bleedings – “All we have in our health post is plaster and paracetamol” (Interview C). He ate hastily 
and left again. When I got up the next morning, I learned that the boy had not made it through the night. 
We had a quick breakfast and left for his parents’ house where a big part of the villagers had already 
gathered for the funeral procession. 
This procession was my first walk through the main section of Hedangna, the village where I was based 
for all my spells of fieldwork in the upper Arun valley between 2008 and 2011. Hedangna is a settlement 
of approximately 280 households spread across on an east-facing ridge in Pathibhara VDC at an elevation 
of around 1300 meters. The inhabitants of the village identify themselves predominantly as Yamphu Rai 
with smaller numbers of people belonging to other jat living there as well. Whereas a small cluster of 
houses (called gadi [N]) is approximately forty-five minutes walk uphill from the dam site of the Arun-3 
project, the main village (mulgaon [N]) is situated another twenty minutes further up the ridge and extends 
for fifteen more walking minutes both to the north and the south.33 
Hedangna is a relatively densely populated settlement and stonewalls and fences demarcate the boundaries 
between households. The house of the deceased teenager was situated on the northern fringe of the village 
and the funeral procession to the upper cremation spot at the southern end of the settlement transected 
the whole village. Most of the rice harvest had been completed on the terraces above the settlement and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Distances in rural Nepal are generally measured in walking time. 
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the straw was piled up to impressive heaps on the barren fields to dry. Children were playing around them. 
Nearby, a group of men were slaughtering a water buffalo for the funeral meal. 
The funeral happened on 22 November 2008, eight months after the memorandum of understanding on 
the resumption of the Arun-3 hydropower project had been signed between the government of Nepal and 
SJVN. At that time, around half of the way between Hedangna and the nearest hospital in Khandbari was 
covered by a motorable road.34 That, though, did not mean that using a car for this half of the journey 
would cut down travel time considerably; either way it would take a fit person the whole day to get from 
one place to the other. This is mainly due to the bad condition of the newly constructed road that for the 
most part is a very simple single-lane dirt road without gravel topping or drainage system. Therefore, it is 
only negotiable with tractors and four-wheel-drive vehicles. In combination with the high amount of 
rainfall during monsoon, these heavy vehicles lead to deep ruts, often filled with water and mud that 
increase travel time considerably. Beyond that, the old footpath is following a much more straightforward 
course, cutting through the road’s serpentines. All that said a road all the way up to Hedangna, even in 
this poor condition, still would have enhanced the chances of survival for the teenager considerably, mostly 
because carrying a severely wounded person on a stretcher through the night is a completely different 
matter from walking or driving. My association, however, was much more naïve: I had grown up at a 
similar altitude, in a similar topography, at a similar distance from the next hospital in the Austrian Alps. 
There, it takes the ambulance fifteen minutes to cover the distance. 
During several trips to the Arun valley since then, I have seen the road approach Num, the central market 
town of the upper Arun valley, directly above the proposed dam site. In early 2011 it was only a few 
kilometres short of it and Num bazaar as well as Hedangna on the opposite side of the valley were full of 
rumours about the width and the exact route as well as with speculations about what would change once it 
finally materialised. This chapter will follow the road up to the Arun valley, where people have been 
waiting for its “arrival35“ for more than twenty years. As I hope I have made clear in the last chapter, the 
road was both the main reason why people were so enthusiastic about the Arun-3 dam and one of the 
main reasons why this project never took off. First, I will discuss the significance of roads in the 
anthropological literature, give a short historic account of roads in Nepal and recount the deferred story of 
this specific road. I will argue for an understanding of roads as one decisive technology of how modern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Considering the recent past, this was already a huge development as Khandbari, the headquarter of 
Sankhuwasabha district was only connected to the national road network in early 1999 (Armbrecht Forbes 1999a: 
337). 
35 The word my interlocutors most commonly used in connection to the construction of a road was āunu [N] (to 
come, to reach, to arrive, but also to progress to). I will return to this point later. 
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nation states aim to extend their control over territories and populations, but at the same time focus on the 
instability and fragility of these attempts. For this purpose I will make use of Penny Harvey’s call for a 
topological approach to roads that is less concerned with the metric qualities of places but instead focuses 
on the ways in which they are connected and the relations that hold them together, as Edward Leach 
(1961: 7) has already proposed fifty years ago. I will then discuss the ambivalent feelings people living in 
the two mentioned villages have towards the road and the uncertain outcomes its arrival will bring. The 
history of the upper Arun valley, the mythology of the Yamphu Rai and the practice of two ritual experts 
will illustrate a pervasive feeling of being “left in the middle” at the centre of one major corridor between 
South and Central Asia. The historic and current experience of this specific position is a common topic 
among many people in the Nepalese hills. I will argue that this is the main reason why so many of my 
interlocutors are keen for the road to be finally constructed, but simultaneously express deep concerns 
about its ramifications on themselves and their communities. 
 
 
Situating roads 
“Can asphalt be a political territory?” asks Paul Virilio (2006 [1977]: 30) rhetorically, before positioning 
the road at the very centre of his discussion of “Speed and Politics.” The defining features of the modern 
state, he argues, are mobility and acceleration, the ever-increasing speed of transportation and 
communication. In the totalising fashion of early poststructuralism he proclaims: “there was no ‘industrial 
revolution,’ but only a ‘dromocratic36 revolution;’ there is no democracy, only dromocracy; there is no 
strategy, only dromology” (ibid: 69). Despite the usefulness of this intensification and the high importance 
many theorisations of modernity attribute to questions of speed and the concomitant emergence of new 
conceptions of temporality (e. g. Knauft 2002; Harvey 1989; Koselleck 1985), Virilio’s point is a strong 
oversimplification. Modernity surely is a lot of things, but definitely not only acceleration. 
Dimitris Dalakoglou and Penny Harvey (2012) review the anthropological literature on the topic in their 
introduction to a recent special issue on ethnographic approaches to roads. According to them, the 
occupation with roads starts with Max Gluckman’s (1958) classical essay on the opening of a road bridge 
in Zululand in 1938. His brilliant analysis draws a powerful picture of race, class and gender relations in 
the Union of South Africa. In retrospect it serves as a highly intriguing harbinger of recent 
anthropological interest in the ambiguity of these spaces of connection and separation where diverse 
groups of people interchange and interact. Contrary to Marc Augé’s (1995: 85-87) well-known statement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 From the Greek dromos (race course) and cratos (power). 
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“that motion and spatial mobility were generally seen as antithetical to classical anthropology,” Dalakoglou 
and Harvey (2012: 4) maintain that anthropologists were in fact not indifferent to mobility as, for 
example, the important contributions on nomadism and migrant communities since the 1960s show. 
Rather, they argue, anthropologists before the late 1970s were reluctant to engage in research that would 
have jeopardised the neat classification of clearly delimitable cultures that represented one of the central 
paradigms of the discipline at that time. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1992: 7) have dealt with this 
problem at length and termed it as “this assumed isomorphism of space, place, and culture.” 
In the meantime, things have changed considerably; Dalakoglou and Harvey (2012: 2) rightly point to the 
fact that “mobility has come to define the contemporary human condition as never before, [yet] never 
before have so many people felt so deeply the consequences of their exclusion from a condition where 
mobility is embraced as a correlate of freedom.” This is reflected by a large number of recent contributions 
on mobility and some of the concepts developed to cope with this shift of attention – terms like flows 
(Appadurai 1996), networks (Castells 2000) or liquidity (Bauman 2000) – have gained unprecedented 
currency in every-day language. The last few years have seen an ever-increasing interest in roads in 
anthropology (e.g. Harvey 2012; Bürge 2011; Knox and Harvey 2011; Campbell 2010; Dalakoglou 2010; 
Wilson 2004; Masquelier 2002, 1992; Stewart and Strathern 1999) and there is a well-established 
literature on the subject in the social sciences and humanities in general (e.g. Merriman 2012; Cresswell 
and Merriman 2011; Moran 2010; Featherstone et al. 2005; Wollen and Kerr 2002; Miller 2001). Most of 
the literature on mobility is, however, concerned with who and what travels or stays put and the effects of 
the increased movement of people and things. What is commonly neglected in discussions of flows,  
-scapes or networks is the materiality of infrastructure. A recent contribution addressing this lacuna is 
Harvey’s (2010) discussion of concrete where she argues that the homogenising promise of concrete stands 
in contradiction to the heterogeneous matters it connects, both in the material and social domains. 
Arguably, the construction of roads has been at the heart of the idea of development since the inception of 
the first modernisation programs. And despite all the changes that the postcolonial development paradigm 
has gone through, building roads continues to occupy one of the top ranks on the development agenda – 
for Western donors, governments in the global South as well as many of their citizens. Frank Ellis (1998: 
27) notes, “[i]n participatory exercises improved road access is one of the most frequently desirable items 
on village wishlists. Improved rural roads reduce the costs of all types of spatial transaction, including 
labour, output, input and consumer markets.” On the other hand, as Adeline Masquelier (2002: 829) 
reminds us on the example of Niger, in many parts of the global South “roads are the embodiment of 
colonial experience.” Or take postcolonial Peru, where “[r]oad building was associated with brutal 
attempts to re-instate colonial systems of forced labour” (Wilson 2004: 523). These contradictory 
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reactions to the potentialities of the motorable road show the ambivalences inscribed in this core 
technology of modernity. The construction of roads serves as a central tool of increasing control over 
territories and the rule over populations in modern projects of state-making but at the same time, these 
same roads give people enhanced opportunities for movement as well as access to new markets and 
commodities. The following sections will elaborate this point on the example of Nepal and the road up the 
Arun. 
 
 
Roads in Nepal: A short history of state making 
Looking at the history of roads in Nepal, their importance for the creation of a modern nation-state 
becomes very graspable and the reason why they arrived so late in this country – only during the 1950s – is 
directly linked to the late arrival of modern forms of rule. More importantly, this history shows that roads 
in Nepal have never been a simple matter of internal mobility of people and commodities, but were part of 
transnational connections and disconnections between South and Central Asia from their very inception. 
Beginning with the first road projects right after the independence of India and the Chinese occupation of 
Tibet, they have been inextricably connected to the relationship between these two uneasy neighbours and 
the attempts of Nepalese politicians to maintain or renegotiate the ties with them. This becomes even 
more apparent when we look at the names of the roads and the politics of nomenclature inscribed in them. 
Nepal is the only country in the region that was never occupied by colonial powers. After early attempts by 
the British Empire, the East India Company decided in the early nineteenth century that a colonisation of 
the mountainous Kingdom of Nepal would not provide enough profit in trade to justify the effort (Stiller 
1973: 28). This is one of the main reasons why road construction started particularly late in Nepal, as the 
“ruling class regarded improvements in transport facilities as a threat to their remaining authority. Offers 
of British help to link Kathmandu with India by road were refused” (Blaikie et al. 1977: 27). Blaikie, 
Cameron and Seldon point to the similarity with other states like Ethiopia or Iran that were not colonised 
and remained nominally independent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although the tiny 
class of feudal landlords who were ruling Nepal could have taken advantage of an institutionalised system 
of bonded labour to have roads constructed, that very system made transportation for them so cheap that 
they had no interest in changing anything about it. And because the British colonial administration in 
India allowed them to move their troops over Indian territory, not even for military purposes roads seemed 
necessary. With the independence of India, however, things changed considerably. In 1950, the success of 
the revolutionary upheaval against the Rana regime was directly connected to the lack of roads in the 
country: The government in Delhi simply refused the Rana troops to transit through its territory. King 
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Tribhuvan returned to the throne and a constitutional monarchy was declared. The easy success of this 
revolution was one of the main reasons to convince subsequent governments of the importance of a road 
network as an instrument to maintain rule, a precondition for modern sovereignty and a reduction of the 
dependency on India. 
When it comes to Nepal’s northern border, however, until the very recent commencement of a number of 
new road projects to connect the country with Tibet, “Nepal’s status as a cul-de-sac for the subcontinental 
road system has only been breached by one road since the 1960” (Campbell 2010: 268). Before the 
invention of the combustion engine and blacktopped roads, Kathmandu had been the main hub for 
commodities and information between Northern India and Central Asia, but when the first road reached 
the valley from the south in 1956, the city had moved to a position of considerable periphery. This road 
was built and financed by the government of India and named Tribhuvan Highway after the recently 
deceased King who had died in Zurich the previous year. In 1960, the Chinese government came up with 
a plan to extend the Indian road to the Tibetan border and ultimately to Lhasa. The Chinese offer 
provoked great unease in New Delhi, but the newly inaugurated King Mahendra signed an agreement 
with the Chinese government in the following year. Ever since this strategic move towards China, both 
the usage of the China card to threaten India as well as an anti-Indian rhetoric addressed at the domestic 
population has been a defining feature of Nepalese politics. 
The so-called Arniko Highway (respectively Friendship Highway, as it is called on the Tibetan side) was 
opened in 1967 and fifty-five years later it still is the only motorable road crossing the Himalayas. 
Chinese-Indian animosities continued to erupt in connection to infrastructure development in Nepal; 
most pronouncedly in the 1980s, during the construction of the Mahendra Highway (named after 
Tribhuvan’s son) covering the entire country from west to east over a distance of 1040 kilometres. The 
route runs through Nepal’s low-lying Terai region, often in very close proximity to the Indian border and 
when New Delhi found out that Beijing had offered to construct big parts of this road, it rushed to build 
the road by itself. Apart from China and India with their obvious interests in Nepal, a number of other 
foreign countries and international organisations have constructed roads. Among them are the United 
Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank. Recently, the dependency on foreign donors in road construction has become slightly 
less extreme, but due to the comparably high costs in the Nepalese topography and weather conditions, 
roads remain one of the central areas of development assistance. Currently, the ADB is the most 
important donor in this respect (Asian Development Bank 2012). 
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The Kosi-Lhasa-Highway 
As I have mentioned above, soon the Arniko Highway will cease its uniqueness and a number of new 
connections between Nepal and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region will become available. According to 
Ben Campbell (2010), work on the Rasuwa road in Central Nepal is close to completion. Two more 
connections are developed in the far-western region of Humla (Giri 2011) and through Mustang, the 
Upper Kali Gandaki valley north of Pokhara. Another road will lead up the Tamur valley in the country’s 
far east. The fifth new route is the planned road through the Arun valley. While the Department of Roads 
refers to this scheme as North-South (Koshi) Road Project, most of the people I talked to call it Kosi-Lhasa-
Rajmarg ([N] Kosi-Lhasa-Highway). This new connection will be a relatively easy gap closure: the Arun-
3 dam site is only thirty-three kilometres south of the Chinese road head at the border. Plans for an 
international road connection through the Arun valley predate the reincarnation of the controversial 
hydropower project (The Nepali Times 2004) and seem to have been mainly pushed by the Chinese side 
and local opinion leaders in the Arun valley while the government did not prioritise the endeavour before 
2008. 
 
 
Ill. 6: A boy guarding rice and beer near the road head at Kuwapani, 10 October 2010. 
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In 2009, the Department of Roads announced a contract for a detailed survey of the northernmost 22.5 
kilometres of the marked-out route (Government of Nepal et al. 2009). To find out more about how the 
recent acceleration of a road construction that had been deferred for more than a decade came to be, I 
visited Purna Prasad Rai at his house in Uwa, a village about one walking hour north of Hedangna. The 
trained primary school teacher joined the Maoist movement in the late 1990s and at the time we met (and 
until its dissolution in May 2012), he was representing the constituency of the Upper Arun valley in the 
Constituent Assembly in Kathmandu. Purna Prasad explained that he had put in a lot of effort to 
accelerate the road project and attributed his success to his good relations with the top-rank of the Maoist 
party. He was convinced that the track would be open within four years, i.e. in late 2014: 
 
I am proud to say that I have contributed 75 per cent of my effort to the public highway. If 
not, it would have not been successful. Many people tried […] but they weren’t successful 
because there were a lot of institutions involved and people from a certain rank were not able 
to reach there. I think it was my luck that at that time I had good relations with the finance 
minister [Baburam Bhattarai] and with Prachanda [Pushpa Kamal Dahal]. The Kosi 
Highway is a road that does not provide facilities only for the local people but for the country 
as a whole. […] This road is not just for the trade between Nepal and China but favourable 
for business all over South Asia (Interview D). 
 
To me, Purna Prasad’s emphasis on the instrumental role he played in finally making the road a reality 
showed again how important this project was for his constituency and how much his political career would 
depend on the question whether this road would finally arrive. As in most of rural Nepal, this emphasis on 
infrastructure development was an issue beyond party politics, as the other Constituent Assembly member 
from the area, representing the Nepali Congress, was lobbying for the construction of an airstrip in 
Tashigaon at that time. His main argument was that this would boost tourist arrivals to the Makalu-
Barun National Park (see Chapter 6). Initially, it was planned that the entire road works for the Arun-3 
access road should have been completed in January 1993 (The World Bank 1989: 36). The next section 
will give a short account over the road’s prehistory and its entanglement with the failed hydropower dam. 
 
 
A history of deferral 
When the government of Nepal announced that it would construct the Arun-3 hydropower project and 
first exploratory works at the dam site started in 1987, local elites all over the area became aware of the 
huge economic opportunities that would come along with a project like this. In anticipation of the arrival 
of foreign engineers and consultants, new hotels were constructed as far afield as Biratnagar, the major city 
of eastern Nepal right at the Indian border. But the main reason for excitement, and the main target for 
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investment, was the access road to the dam site. When the World Bank revealed the plan to construct a 
192 kilometre long, gravel-surfaced all-weather road, local landowners rushed to buy as much land as 
possible along the marked-out route. As one of the former Anti-Arun-3 activists in Kathmandu 
remembered: “In these days, one haat [N]37 of land was often sold for several lakh [N]38 of rupees” 
(Interview 7). The road was planned as an extension of the Dhankuta-Basantapur road that had been 
constructed by the Swiss Development Corporation and the British Overseas Development Agency in the 
early 1980s. The route “selected as being the most economical in terms of construction and maintenance, 
consistent with sound environmental planning, is in mountainous terrain and follows the ridges wherever 
possible” (The World Bank 1989: 13). Apart from linking the construction site to the national road 
network this alignment was supposed to serve a second purpose: To connect the main settlements on the 
eastern side of the Arun valley and their estimated population of 500 000 to the industrial and agricultural 
centres of the lowlands. This second point was the main reason why the Bank preferred this so-called hill 
route over the route proposed by JICA “which planned for the road to follow the river alignment to the 
powerhouse and dam site” (The Inspection Panel 1995: 5). The main advantage of this so-called valley 
route was that it was shorter, therefore cheaper and would, presumably, take less time to construct.  
The World Bank Staff Appraisal Report summarises the main objectives of the road to be threefold, 
adding a perplexingly tautological argument to the two mentioned above: To strengthen the government’s 
“capabilities to administer rehabilitation of families affected” (The World Bank 1989: 12). Given the fact 
that the dam itself was not supposed to submerge a single house, the Bank here obviously tried to convince 
itself that one of the advantages of the road was its ability to support those people its own construction 
would displace. The estimated total cost for the road amounted for 40 million US-Dollars of which 82% 
were to be covered through an IDA credit. 
Three months before this report appeared, in February 1989, the Department of Roads had floated a 
tender for the road. And soon the trouble started. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Indian blockade of 
Nepal in 1989/90 drove up inflation, but as the Bank later conceded, the first cost estimates had been far 
too low in any case. In light of these new developments, the government wanted to deploy the Royal 
Nepalese Army to construct the road under the supervision of the Department of Roads to save time and 
money. The Bank plainly refused. This small detail shows the naivety of the government and their total 
lack of understanding for the Bank’s business model that was at that time pursuing a fiercely liberal agenda 
centred on awarding contracts to private (preferably Western) companies. When later that year the Bank 
announced a new bid, the cost estimate had nearly tripled. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Literally one hand; an ell, approximately 18 inches. 
38 1 lakh equals 100 000. 
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Ill. 7: Both road alignments with the hill route dashed (His Majesty’s Government et al. 1987b: 27). 
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In what seems to have been a frantic attempt to retain control over the project after the government had 
realised that with the Bank on board, the rules of the game were different from bilateral loan agreements, 
it decided to integrate the access road and the power plant under one single credit and to entrust the NEA 
with the overall supervision of the entire project. The arguments were that through this move there would 
be a higher level of co-ordination, flexibility and saving in construction schedule as well as lesser risk of 
time-overrun and environmental hazard (Pun 2010: 6). This was done in spite of the fact that the Board 
of Directors of the Bank had already approved the credit for the road on 30 May 1989 (The Inspection 
Panel 1995: 14). With this sudden change in the project structure the Department of Roads was 
completely out of the project and the NEA was supposed to construct a road, which it had never done 
before. As the main argument for the separate road credit – the hope for its faster construction – was no 
longer valid, the Bank did not object to this change of plans. 
But even then road construction did not commence. On the contrary, and in contradistinction to the 
assessment of the Bank’s report, in May 1992 the NEA decided to change the route of the road back to 
the old alignment proposed by the Japanese feasibility study in 1989. Instead of opening up the 
settlements on the eastern ridges of the Arun valley, the access road should now follow the river to shorten 
the route from 192 km to 117 km and thereby bring down the project costs. Rajib, a retired NEA 
engineer remembers:  
 
The hill route was 192 km, longer, because generally, you know, when you look at Nepalese 
villages they like...they don’t like to stay down in the valley. So, initially it was planned to 
connect the villages and so forth. That is why I said that it would have really opened up [the 
valley]...But then, because India refused to buy that 200 MW and they had to bring it down 
to 200 MW and they had to reduce the cost, it got delayed, […] and then…by more than 60 
km they reduced the road in order to reduce the cost of the project (Interview 18). 
 
With news of the changed route spreading rapidly, speculators rushed to buy new land along the valley 
route and a second speculative bubble emerged. Many of the actors involved belonged to the wealthy 
landowning elite of the eastern Terai region and rumours about their identity were a constant topic of 
speculation throughout my fieldwork. Especially the alleged participation of political leaders of both 
Nepali Congress and the CPN (UML) was often mentioned – not only when talking with people in the 
Arun valley. In August 2011, I met a former World Bank staff member in Zurich who told me: “I heard 
that Jhala Nath Khanal bought a lot of land along the route” (Interview 19). Khanal hails from nearby 
Ilam district, has been in the top ranks of the UML for decades and served as Prime Minister in 2011. But 
the most serious consequences of this sudden change of route were felt by the communities along the hill 
route, a fact that had already come to light with the publication of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
for the valley route in 1992 (JV Arun III 1992). Already two years before that, Joint Venture Arun III 
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Consulting Services had sent a social scientist to the villages along the hill route to investigate what had 
happened with the land compensation landowners had received there, only to find out that most of the 
affected people had already spent the money without being able to restore their prior standard of living. 
Most of the households had used the money to repay debts or for occasions like marriages and funerals. 
But even those who managed to save the compensation money and wanted to buy land were mostly unable 
to do so because of the extreme inflation in land prices after the compensation money had flooded the 
villages along the route. The investigation report by the Inspection Panel very clearly expounds this point:  
 
The impact on former property owners was catastrophic in a number of ways: (1) they had 
lost title to their land to the government; (2) the cash compensation they had received for 
title had been largely spent in non-productive purposes; (3) if the government were to 
attempt to follow the letter of the law, by offering the land to original owners at the price 
they were paid, they would not have the cash to regain the land, and it would be auctioned to 
others; and (4) the road would not go through their communities, thereby depriving them of 
immediate alternative income opportunities. On top of this, the attention of IDA shifted 
entirely to the valley route, leaving them forgotten in an outlying area (The Inspection Panel 
1995: 17) 
 
Again, actual road works on the new alignment did not start. An article in The Kathmandu Post from 7 
January 1994 states that “[t]he first phase of the multi-million dollar project, construction of a 117-
kilometre access road, is scheduled to begin this month” (Upadhyay 1994). By that time, the costs had 
further increased: “Construction of each kilometre of the road is estimated to cost around 50 million 
rupees, an ACG booklet says, which is going to make it by far the most costly in the country” (ibid). 
Eighteen months later, in summer 1995, the World Bank announced that it would not proceed with 
negotiating the credit agreements for the whole Arun-3 hydropower scheme. This happened after a six-
months investigation of the whole project through the newly established World Bank Inspection Panel, as 
I have elaborated in Chapter 4. After the other donors had cancelled their support for the project as well 
and people in the Arun valley were outraged, the ADB announced that it would still finance the Regional 
Action Program that had been sketched out during the loan negotiations. Most of this money was still 
used for road construction, as in the end both the valley and the hill route were constructed, though much 
slower than planned. By 2011, both routes were functional during most of the year and the hill route had 
recently been black topped. They conflate in Khandbari. As mentioned the route further up the valley is a 
very recently constructed single-track dirt road that is so far only negotiable by off-road vehicles. In 2013 
the bulldozers arrived at the dam site in Phyaksinda (Magar-Yamphu Rai 2013). 
 
 
 
“They provide us with a road but sweep us away from here”	  
- 126 - 
Towards a topology of roads 
Contrary to the rhetoric of reports by organisations like the World Bank that understand roads as 
relatively straightforward means to accelerate the flow of people, commodities and information from place 
A to place B, the historical contextualisation of road construction in Nepal and the prehistory of the 
Arun-3 access road show clearly the eminently political character of any new road and the importance of 
roads in state-making projects. On the example of post-revolutionary France, James Scott (1998: 73) 
argues that roads were one of the essential modern technologies that made provinces “far more accessible, 
far more legible, to central authorities then even the absolutist kings had imagined.” But, as Penny Harvey 
(2012) claims, such ‘topographical’ understandings of roads as stabilising modern state-making projects 
run the risk of reducing them, again, to the rather straightforward “idea of roads systems as imposed grids 
which integrate state-space through the connective force of a network” (ibid: 79). 
Against attempts to reduce roads in this sense, Harvey points to the complex plurality of infrastructural 
spaces and therefore suggests to use a topological approach instead that might offer “a language for 
articulating the instabilities and fluctuations of state territory in explicit contradistinction to the 
topographical or metric idioms deployed to conjure more static notions of state-space” (ibid: 77). While 
topographical thinking is rooted in singular and absolute depictions of space and distances, centres and 
peripheries, a topological approach, by contrast, is much more concerned “with how spaces are organized, 
with the connectivity properties that arise from certain arrangements of elements, and with their 
transformations […] without implying that they arise from some inner necessity or coherence” (Collier 
2009: 80). It draws  
 
attention to the spatial figures where insides and outsides are continuous, where borders of 
inclusion and exclusion do not coincide with the edges of a demarcated territory and where it 
is the mutable quality of relations that determines distance and proximity, rather than a 
singular and absolute measure (Harvey 2012: 78). 
 
But while topology challenges the stable categories of topographical conceptions of space, it does not 
replace them, as John Allen (2011: 284) demurs:  
 
Topological understandings merely bring us into line with many of the shifting geographies 
of power practised routinely by overstretched NGOs and civil society campaigners, dispersed 
government authorities and sprawling corporations, as well as overlapping supranational 
institutions and biopolitical agencies. 
 
When it comes to roads, Harvey adds for consideration, their qualities as ‘practical spaces’ that are built 
with an explicit intention to stabilise and fix uncertain terrains, makes them problematic objects for 
topological analysis. Because they connect otherwise disparate people and places, they often are 
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understood as “overcoming rather then manifesting difference” (Harvey 2012: 79). Her discussion of four 
cases in Peru shows, however, how controversial and unsettling roads can be. In the case of the road up 
the Arun valley, this is the case as well. As I am dealing with a road that still remains to be constructed for 
the most part and has only recently materialised in its southern section, the rest of this chapter will 
attempt a topology of the ambivalent spaces this road is supposed to connect and the ambivalent feelings 
towards the changes that will come along with it expressed by the people who live along its route. 
 
 
Unstable sovereignty: Kipat 
First, I want to show how unstable and complicated the question of territory and sovereignty is in the area 
the road is about to penetrate. Since its integration into the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal, the royal state in 
Kathmandu has had a hard time claiming sovereignty over the upper Arun valley. Different from other 
regions of the country and until very recently, the indigenous Rai communities of the area experienced a 
relatively high level of autonomy form the central state. This was most prominently expressed by the 
special land tenure system of kipat that was in effect until 1994. Soon after his ascendance to the throne of 
the chiefdom of Gorkha halfway between Kathmandu and Pokhara in 1743, Prithvi Narayan Shah started 
the military expansion that would result in the creation of the Kingdom of Nepal under the Shah dynasty. 
After defeating the small kingdoms in the Kathmandu valley in the 1760s, his troops headed further east 
and met strong resistance by the Kiranti, the ancestors of the Rai and Limbu groups of present-day 
eastern Nepal. As the Gorkhali were unable to defeat them, Shah struck a deal: “As long as the Kiranti 
paid tribute to the king, they would be allowed to be kings in their own lands. […] These rights were 
embodied in the land tenure system of kipat and sealed in a royal decree” (Armbrecht Forbes 1999b: 117). 
The central particularity of kipat is that it was a communal, customary and ethnicized form of land tenure. 
Rights to it were exclusively reserved to members (kipatiya [N]) of the community who could claim direct 
decent from those who had originally cleared the land, but there was no individual right to a specific plot 
of land and rights were frequently redistributed. Due to these characteristics, at least in theory, “Kipat land 
generally could not be sold outside the community” (Regmi 1976: 89, emphasis in original).39 
The category of kipat always stood in stark contrast to all the other forms of landownership in Nepal. By 
contradicting the feudal logic that all land in the kingdom was ultimately in the possession of the king, 
kipat questioned the sovereignty of the rulers. Apparently unsure as to how to come to terms with this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 On the other hand, Mahesh Regmi (1978: 110) claims that „[d]uring the early nineteenth century, kipat lands 
appear to have been freely sold and mortgaged.” Looking at the recent conditions in Hedangna, even fifteen years 
after the end of the kipat system most of the kipat land is still held by kipatiya, i.e. the Yamphu Rai families claiming 
decent from the first settlers of the area (Yamphu Rai 2011). 
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immanent threat to its sovereignty, the feudal state kept on shifting between two conflicting strategies in 
dealing with kipat. On the one hand, it decided to simply ignore it, as kipat was never mentioned in any of 
the governmental land or revenue settlements, thereby rendering it invisible from an official point of view. 
On the other, through undocumented practices, “legislation has reduced considerably the area held under 
kipat” (Caplan 1970: 4) over the last two centuries and at times the government tried to withdraw these 
rights altogether (ibid: 56-60) – at least in the upper Arun valley without success. One main reason for 
this failure might have been its fragile claim over the region. According to Christoph von Fürer-
Haimendorf (1975: 114) the whole area north of Hedangna used to belong to the rulers of Sikkim. 
Against the autonomy of the Yamphu Rai’s claim to their territory, the Nepalese state finally won this 
struggle after more than 200 years in the course of the cadastral survey of 1994. Since this event kipat is 
officially abolished and all kipat land was transformed into raikar, i.e. land that is taxed according to its 
actual size. It now is personally owned and can be freely bought and sold. This, however, does not mean 
that kipat has lost its importance as a means of belonging. 
Compared with the Limbu areas further east, the abolishment of kipat seems to have happened 
particularly late in Sankhuwasabha district. Ian Fitzpatrick (2011: 39) for example reports the abolishment 
of kipat rights among the Limbu of Mamanghke in Taplejung district in 1985. This particularity is also 
apparent when looking at the land revenue data for the 1980s. While in 1986/87 in the two districts to the 
south of Sankhuwasabha (Dhankuta and Bhojpur) land revenues amounting to 335 000 respectively 427 
000 NPR were collected, the number for Sankhuwasabha was a meagre 11 000 NPR (Department of 
Land Revenue, HMG in Shrestha 1989: 61). The cadastral survey of 1994 proved to be a watershed for 
the relations between the people of the upper Arun valley and the state and Ann Armbrecht Forbes 
(1999b: 116) has argued that only with this step the state succeeded in integrating the area into its 
territory after two hundred years of struggle. The survey also changed the relations between households by 
establishing for the first time an official cadastre whereas claims to land were chronically unstable and had 
to be constantly reinforced by a multiplicity of performative practices beforehand (see Chapter 6). 
For the road, the cadastral survey had another surprising outcome that reproduced the uncertainty of land 
titles despite the new system of land registration. Already in 1992, the government had bought the land 
along the marked-out route and people had been compensated for the land lost. But during the cadastral 
survey two years later, this land was not surveyed separately. I am not sure why this happened, but some of 
my interlocutors indicated that this was a result of miscommunication between different government 
agencies. A year later, when the dam project was cancelled and the construction of the road suddenly 
seemed highly unlikely, people were able to get land titles for these plots as if the government had never 
bought them. Therefore, they could be sold to others. Twenty years of selling and reselling has led to a 
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situation were many people did not know that the road would consume the land they had bought and that 
someone in the line of previous owners had received compensation for this. 
 
 
“Whose land is it?” 
The place where these problems seemed most urgent was Num. This village is situated on the western-
looking ridge above the dam site on the opposite side of the valley from Hedangna and therefore the last 
settlement before reaching the Arun-3 dam site from the south. With around 250 households, Num is 
approximately as large as Hedangna, but more diverse when it comes to people’s jat affiliation. The 
majority of inhabitants are, however, Yamphu Rai, too. It accommodates the main bazaar of the upper 
Arun valley and the road was supposed to run right through it. A couple of guesthouses and restaurants 
cater for travellers there and it is an important transhipment point for the mule caravans that carry 
cardamom down the valley. In one of these guesthouses I met Badri and Boras. When I asked the two 
young men about the problems with the road and unclear land titles, they explained the circumstances as 
follows: 
 
Badri: The citizens are paying [land] tax for the road [route]. 
I: Where are you paying the tax? 
Badri: We are paying it in the Land Revenue Office. They haven’t separated the road. Otherwise, 
we would not be paying tax for the road.  
Boras: What happened was that in 2050 [1993/94], a survey was taken from your house until 
the road. In your name, the surveyor gave you an ownership slip. Then in the next year, you 
sold it to someone else. Registration was passed successfully. Then in the next year, that 
person sold it to someone else. In such a case, whose land can we say it is? Is it Arun-3’s 
property or a person’s property (Interview 20)? 
 
This clearly added another layer of uncertainty to the already complicated relation between the people and 
the delayed road. Some of my interlocutors alluded with bitter irony to the fact that after two decades it 
turned out that some people were compensated for a road that was never built on their land (as they were 
able to sell their expropriated land once again) while others would lose their land to the road without 
being compensated (those who were so unlucky to buy these very plots of land). With the abolishment of 
the kipat system, the amount of land that could be freely bought and sold had increased manifold in the 
upper Arun valley. This is not to say that there has not been a land market in the area before that, but 
especially the Yamphu as kipatiya were participating in a very limited manner in it.  
Another important uncertainty was connected to the width of the road. Especially in early 2011 when the 
road construction crew with their excavation machine and their trucks were rapidly approaching Num 
bazaar, the market was full of rumours about how wide the road would be – some said seven meters, 
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others fifteen and a third group claimed that the road would be – at least in its final dimension – thirty 
meters wide. Tula Ram, who runs a small guesthouse that I used for most of my stays in the village, told 
me: 
 
The road will follow the main trail to the market. This is very good for us, as our house is 
right next to it. But we still don’t know how wide the road will be – if it is 15 meters, I will 
lose me whole veranda. I already measured it; it would practically reach the wall of our house. 
This is not possible. Other neighbours say the same thing. If they will construct a 15-metre 
road you can be sure that we will obstruct all the works (Interview 21). 
 
As mentioned, the announcement of the Kosi-Lhasa-Rajmarg is only one of a handful of new roads that 
will soon connect Nepal to Tibet. The apparent interest of China to accelerate these projects is arguably 
only part of a larger shift in Chinese foreign policy towards its southern neighbour – and as Martin Saxer 
(no date) argues might be indicative of a newly emerging regional strategy aimed at its western borders. 
Until recently, China has by and large accepted the strong economic and cultural entanglement of Nepal 
with India as limiting a more active role and has always kept its interventions in Nepal’s interior affairs to 
a minimum – very contrary to the role of Indian diplomacy. But as mentioned before, since its annexation 
of Tibet in 1950, it launched a number of calculated provocations of India (most prominently the arms 
deal of 1989 that I have elaborated on in Chapter 3). However, China has always been careful to retreat 
soon thereafter. Especially its backing of the monarchy during the Maoist insurgency showed a keen 
interest in maintaining the status quo and Nepal as a more or less stable buffer state in this highly sensitive 
border area. But as Rajeev Chaturvedy and David Malone (2012) stress, China’s interest in Nepal was 
always very distinct from India’s as it was focused on one single issue: the activities of Tibetan refugees. 
For decades China has unwillingly accepted the so-called Gentleman’s Agreement between Nepal and the 
UNHCR that provides the safe passage of Tibetan refugees to India. In 2010, this changed and Nepal’s 
police forces and border guards are increasingly returning Tibetans that managed to slip through the ever 
more closely observed border (ibid: 307, Lee 2011). But also on the cultural front, China’s outreach 
towards Nepal has increased considerably. When I returned to Kathmandu after several months of 
fieldwork in the Arun valley in early 2011, everybody was talking about the new FM radio station that had 
started broadcasting in Nepali by China Radio International (Koirala 2010). Many people I talked to 
about the issue were impressed by the high journalistic standard of the news desk and the Nepali language 
skills of the Chinese radio hosts. 
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“We are still trying to find the proper way for the road” 
Whenever I asked people in the Upper Arun valley about their opinion on the road, they would 
unanimously stress the necessity for the road to be finally constructed and its importance for the local 
economy. “I think the road is the backbone of development” (Interview 22) as Hel Bahadur put it, a high 
school teacher from Hedangna who is now living in the district headquarter Khandbari. But this does not 
mean that people feel exclusively positive about the road. On the contrary, their expectations about the 
immanent future of their villages and the valley they live in are characterised by a deep ambivalence 
towards the promises and perils of increased connections and faster travelling. And while my interviews 
show that young people are in general more enthusiastic about the potentialities of the road than their 
parents, most of them are very much aware of the “side-effects of development” as well. Take for example 
my conversation with Umesh in front of the higher secondary school in Hedangna where he teaches. 
When I asked him what will change with the road he replied: 
 
It will bring changes that no one here has seen. […] We tried to bring a road that will go 
around the mountain so it will have minimum damage in our village. There was already a 
survey conducted before. We took that old map and met with the surveyors. They told us 
that the old map was done by the old government and cannot be used this time. The current 
map will take away local people’s houses and farms. Later, we understood that the main road 
would bring a lot of dust and robbers into the village. So they decided to construct the main 
road below the village. […] It’s good that the road is coming, but we are still trying to find 
the proper way for the road (Interview 23). 
 
Adeline Masquelier (2002) highlights the deeply ambivalent feelings of villagers in Niger towards roads as 
sites of danger and potentialities. By focusing on stories people tell about what happens on the road she 
comes to understand them as part of a complex economy of violence, power and blood. She especially 
draws our attention to the widespread stories of road accidents being caused by evil spirits that often 
materialise either as beautiful blond women or as “black trucks” that take up the whole road and approach 
cars to kill their passengers through a head-on collision. These entities once resided in the trees that were 
cut down during road construction in colonial times and now restlessly roam the paved highway. On the 
other hand, Masquelier argues, the road represents a powerful pathway to magical wealth for those who 
know how to use it. “Hence, every year many illiterate young men struggle to obtain the coveted driver’s 
license that will enable them to achieve the mobility so widely associated with modernity” (ibid: 836). 
I did not come across stories of evil spirits roaming the Arun-3 access road. But soon after my return to 
Kathmandu, I visited the temples of Pashupatinath with a friend. When it was time to return to the city 
centre, we decided to walk towards Ring Road to catch a microbus. After we had reached the broad 
thoroughfare and crossed the bridge over the Bagmati River, suddenly Judith told me that she had to show 
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me something. We crossed the street, climbed down the bank and she led me to a giant tree overgrowing 
a shrine right next to a bridge girder. Then she told me that when the Chinese were building this stretch 
of Kathmandu’s Ring Road, the shrine of the deity of Pigamai (or Vajresvari) lay directly on the marked-
out route. The plan of moving it was met by fierce opposition from the Newar community of the area, the 
former town of Deopatan, and, as it seems, Pigamai herself. In the end it was decided to extend the 
Bagmati Bridge and to house the shrine in a tunnel beneath the bridge. Axel Michaels (1993: 158) quotes 
the memories of a local inhabitant:  
 
A few years ago, when they were building this road, they wanted to relocate Pigamai [...] to 
the south. Everyone here was against that. But no one listened to us especially not the 
construction workers. One of them rammed the large tree at the site of Pigamai with a 
caterpillar. At the same moment, two snakes came out of the tree and bared their fangs. Well, 
three days later the poor man was dead. He died in terrible pain. There was also an 
earthquake in China at the time when the man touched the tree. So a difficult situation had 
arisen. It was only possible to resolve it because King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah and Mao 
Tse-Tung got together and conferred with each other. They decided that the goddess should 
remain there and that the Ring Road should pass on over her. 
 
This comment shows how far-reaching the implications can be when a road construction runs into trouble 
on the local level and how people imagine the two heads of state coming together to negotiate the 
opposing interests of the road and the goddess. Michaels (2008: 204) is quick to sort this story into the 
category of myth, because apparently this meeting never happened. By contrast, I believe the simple fact 
that Pigamai did not move and it was the road that had to make way for the deity is a very apt example of 
non-human agency. According to one of Masquelier’s (2002: 838) interlocutors, these things happen in 
Niger as well:  
 
Even the whites who have cars, they know where there are spirits. Sometimes, they bring a 
bulldozer to take away a tree but they don’t succeed. If they kill the tree, the bulldozer’s driver 
is going to die. And if they bring another driver, he, too, will die. This is why whites now 
avoid trees, and make the road curve instead of cutting a tree. 
 
Both these cases are variations on a basic theme that can be found in many places around the globe: that 
violence against nature (and especially violence against trees) will inevitably lead nature to commit acts of 
retribution against the human perpetrators. What makes the Kathmandu case even more intriguing is the 
fact that Michaels contrasts the persistence of Pigamai with the flexibility of a second goddess, 
Managalagauri. Her shrine was moved during the same road construction in 1976 without any opposition 
or casualties. Whereas the latter is a benevolent Hindu deity and a form of Parbati, the consort of Shiva, 
Pigamai is a tantric goddess that demands sacrifices of blood and alcohol. According to Michaels (1993: 
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158), these entities “are wild and independent, menace single individuals and the town, demand human 
sacrifice and threaten to unleash disease, epidemics and failed crops if they are not regularly appeased with 
offerings at their seats.” If they are satisfied, however, they protect the village and especially the harvest. 
Their shrines are usually situated outside the town limits where they protect the community from harm. 
Therefore, Pigamai’s furious resistance to her relocation seems to be connected to the importance of her 
liminal position on the border. Another possible explanation that comes to mind is, again, a very simple 
one: maybe it was all about the tree? Had Pigamai’s shrine been moved this would unavoidably have 
meant the end of the tree overgrowing it. Managalaguri’s, on the other hand, was treeless. 
Similar to the way the Newar community of Deopatan appeases entities like Pigamai with sacrifices of 
blood and alcohol, the Yamphu Rai of the upper Arun valley have to keep their ancestors content, too – 
they have to “feed” them, as my interlocutors would call it, with rice, millet beer and meat (mostly 
chicken, as this is the favourite meat of the Yamphu). Journeys to distant places are central to the 
performances required to maintain the delicate relationship between ancestors and living Yamphu, to 
restore these relations if they are jeopardised, as well as in the treatment of victims of witchcraft. This kind 
of travelling, however, is very different from using a road, as the following section will show. 
 
 
Down to Varanasi, up to Lhasa – Travelling by naming 
When I returned to Hedangna in autumn 2010, I found my friend Peresti in a very bad shape. The young 
woman I had come to know as an affable and hands-on person was not herself at all. She hardly spoke or 
ate and had been lying in bed most of the day for the past two weeks, as her in-laws told me. When she 
got up, she would sit on the porch staring emptily into space with expressionless eyes. Obviously, her lawa 
[Y], her individual essence, had been detached from her body. The first thing to do in such circumstances 
is to call a yadengba [Y] to find out if somehow the ancestors had been offended and caused the illness. 
The Yadengba arrived in the afternoon to perform the proper rituals in front of the mangsuk [Y],40 a two-
story bamboo shrine that is located on the eastern wall of every Yamphu house in Hedangna and is the 
seat of the linage ancestors. He started his chanting on the porch, searching for the mangsuk, travelling to 
their particular place and calling them to come to attend the feast. Then he moved to the first floor, 
opened the mangsuk and offered rice and millet beer to the ancestors. After some more chanting, a 
chicken was brought and slaughtered in front of the shrine to offer some drops of blood to the mangsuk. 
The Yamphu say that the ancestors are like very old people and like very young children at the same time: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Mangsuk is both the name of the shrine and the name of the lineage ancestors. 
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they are very powerful but simultaneously very moody. So it is very easy to offend them and it often 
happens without ill intentions. As most of the living do not see them, they can easily trample on them 
when they roam around the house, for example. Moreover, Yamphu myths explain the reason why the 
ancestors decided at some point in history to become invisible for the living and live separate lives from 
them by their disappointment over the ignorance and greed of the living. To prevent the small every-day 
insults from estranging the ancestors to a point where they would start to harm the living, the mangsuk 
puja is performed on a regular basis to maintain good relations with the linage ancestors that protect the 
house, the people living there and the rice stored therein. 
The following day, however, it became apparent that nothing had changed and Peresti still was in her 
apathetic state. So it was obvious that it had not been the ancestors who had caused her illness, but had 
probably fallen victim to an act of witchcraft. In such cases, only a shaman (mangma [f]/mangpa [m] [Y]) 
can help. The Mangma arrived in the afternoon. Unlike yadengbas she works at night, and while the 
former’s puja at the mangsuk is directed towards the east, it took the two assistants of the Mangma most 
of the afternoon to prepare the western wall of the house’s main room for her work. When they were 
done, the whole wall was covered with a curtain of different plants. Soon neighbours, relatives and friends 
started arriving to attend the performance.41 
Another stark contrast to the mangsuk puja was the public character of the shamanistic treatment. After 
sunset, when the assistants started beating the rhythm on a drum and a brass plate, the room was already 
full of people and there was hardly a place left to sit. Slowly, the Mangma started chanting herself into 
trance, the room was full of smoke and murmur, children lay down to sleep, old women were rolling 
cigarettes and chatting vociferously while Peresti, the person undergoing treatment, was lying in her bed 
on the first floor, seemingly detached from the action. It took the Mangma until 4 am until she had 
determined the cause of Peresti’s illness. She declared that her food had been cursed. A chicken was 
slaughtered and the house purified. After that, she isolated the curse and put it inside a calabash. Together 
with Peresti’s family she left the compound and buried the calabash about fifty meters south of their house 
on one of the main village pathways close to a central junction. Thereafter, she announced that all the 
household members were safe from harm for the time being but that an unspecified relative living outside 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 It is important to note, though, that there is no strict separation between yadengba and magma. A person can 
actually be both, although my Yamphu interlocutors would point to the fact that until now only men have achieved 
this double position. So far, no woman has been chosen as yadengma, a fact that might soon change, as some 
speculated. But women can become shamans and one does not have to be Yamphu either. I even heard the story of a 
Chhetri woman who had been initiated as mangma in the Yamphu tradition. Armbrecht Forbes (1995: 110) 
recounts that during her fieldwork in Hedangna in the early 1990s, there were several tailors and blacksmiths that 
were also shamans. As they did not drink alcohol they were cheaper than Yamphu shamans and therefore called on 
by poorer families, but considered less powerful. 
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Hedangna might die in the following months. The next day, Peresti seemed already much better and 
colour was returning to her face. Two days later, she strapped her son on her back and headed out to the 
paddy terraces to weed. 
 
 
Ill. 8: The mangma travelling, 20 October 2010. 
 
 
Left in the middle 
The reason I engage with these two rituals is that both yadengbas as well as mangmas in their work, 
through their recitation of the mundhum, travel through the landscape of the Arun valley, and they do 
this quite literally. As Martin Gaenszle (1999: 136-137) observes  
 
[s]uch ritual journeys are also known among various other Tibeto-Burman speaking groups in 
the Himalayas […], and one might go as far as saying that they are one of the most unique 
characteristics of the hill region’s ‘tribal’ religions. What is of special interest in the 
Himalayan cases is that these journeys are not only mythic journeys (as in other parts of the 
world) but journeys through the real landscape and thus combine cosmological notions with 
the known geography. 
 
Both yadengbas and mangmas are initiated in the mundhum, a corpus of ritual texts that is used to 
communicate with the ancestors and non-human entities. It uses a highly antiquated form of Yamphu 
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that is said to have remained unchanged for generations and is for the most part unintelligible to 
laypersons (for a detailed discussion of Rai ritual language see Allen 1972). But it is not secret knowledge 
in the strict sense of the term, as many of the elder men of Hedangna know certain parts of the 
mundhum. But only those who were given these words in their dreams – i.e. yadengbas and mangmas – 
are allowed to chant them; and these spells only unfold their power when they are chanted. Ann 
Armbrecht Forbes (1995: 85) explains that the translation of the chants of the mundhum as such made 
little sense. They “are often simply lists of objects that have a place in this world: flower names, place 
names.” But they become powerful because through their exact recitation they allow the ritual experts to 
travel to the locations of different non-human actors and engage with them. As Gaenszle (1999) 
elaborates on the example of the Mewahang Rai, a group that lives in close proximity to the Yamphu Rai, 
these mythic journeys are always arranged on a vertical level, they first lead away from the middle ground 
of every-day life in the hills of Eastern Nepal either down to the plains or up to the mountains where the 
entities they are searching for reside, before they in a second step return to the middle. 
Armbrecht Forbes (1995: 111-114) describes the ritual journey of a Yamphu mangpa she calls Kelekpa 
who is looking for lost lawa in a way very similar to my example. Starting from the household’s clan tsawa, 
the specific spring that is the mythical place of origin of each clan, he travels south to Kasi (i.e. Varanasi) 
where he enters the underworld and continues his downward journey through eleven vertical levels to the 
centre of the world. There, on a clear lake, sits Manguhang. He is the one that gives yadengbas and 
mangmas their dreams and to him they travel to ask his advice. 
Kasi, the place in the south, is directly connected to the history of the Yamphu as a distinct group of 
people. Interestingly, as Rutgers (1998: 6) remarks, they lack a creation myth. But their legends tell that 
their ancestors used to live in the south, as tell the migration myths of many other Rai groups, for example 
those of the Mewahang Rai (Gaenszle 2000: 49–50). The Yamphu say they used to live in Kasi before one 
of their forefathers moved north through the Arun valley to Lhasa and further to Kharta. There he 
married a Tibetan woman and they had two sons. These two moved back south along the Arun and finally 
settled near the springs of Hedangna and Seduwa (Rutgers 1998: 409-414, for a different account see 
Armbrecht Forbes 1995: 67-69 or Chapter 6). This mythic background explicitly shows the Yamphu Rai’s 
awareness of their position at the centre of one of the most direct routes between India and Tibet and 
demonstrates that the perceived remoteness of the area is a very recent phenomenon that is directly 
connected to the invention of the combustion engine, the motorable road and, even more so, the Chinese 
occupation of Tibet and the subsequent closure of the border. With the announcement of the Kosi-Lhasa-
Rajmarg, this position will undergo another decisive shift and the ambivalence expressed in all my 
conversations with people living in the area anticipates these approaching transitions. 
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This understanding of being “in the middle” is, however, not specific to the Yamphu Rai, but a common 
theme among many of the non-Hindu hill groups of Nepal. Ben Campbell discusses this issue with 
respect to the Tamang of Central Nepal and in his account, this specific position of economic and political 
marginality becomes obvious in a verse his interlocutors recite during a pilgrimage: “Neither born in 
Kathmandu, nor in Kyirong42/Born in the middle ground, weak, unclothed, and hungry” (Campbell 1997: 
215). This is the position the Yamphu Rai find themselves in as well and both groups through generations 
of marginalisation by the Nepalese state have come to understand this ‘centrality’ not as an opportunity, 
but a severe limitation to the economical well being of their communities. 
 
 
“Nothing will happen to me. What can happen?” 
Ganesh runs a shop in the Gadi, the lower part of Hedangna. The main trail up the Arun valley to the 
Chinese border runs through this small bazaar that also houses a police station and bank office. His views 
are illustrative of the ambivalent feeling towards the road many people in Hedangna and Num share: 
 
It is our hope and thinking that the road will come quickly. The road may provide enjoyment 
for those who are earning a living; it may be adverse for those who are doing nothing. Just 
because we have the availability of a road does not mean it will provide us all the facilities. 
Robbers and criminals might come here as well. It may have a monetary benefit to those 
farmers who want to sell their vegetables in another village […] With the availability of a 
road, vegetables can be sent to Kathmandu and Kathmandu’s goods can be made available to 
the local people here (Interview 24). 
 
Our conversation took place in late October 2010, when at the same time the local women’s group held a 
meeting on a porch nearby. After they had completed their agenda they agreed to talk with Chun Bahadur 
and me about the Arun-3 project and the road. Immediately, a lively discussion commenced, with twenty-
eight women commenting on our questions simultaneously in Nepali and Yamphu. There, the vast 
differences in perceptions and expectations among them became apparent. When I asked which changes 
would occur once the road would reach Hedangna, three different answers were provided on the spot: 
 
A: If there is movement of vehicles then there are many facilities. We can move goods from 
here to there and brings goods to the village. 
B: I rather walk. 
C: They provide us with a road but sweep us away from here (Interview 25). 
 
This last comment touched upon the big insecurity about questions of land compensation and what would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Kyirong (Gyirong) is a region in southern Tibet. 
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happen to those families who will lose most or all of their land due to the road construction. Whereas 
there are clear provisions for land compensation, people were often not aware of them or, given their 
relatives’ experiences with the state in Num, highly suspicious about the state’s willingness or capacity to 
provide them with proper compensation, whether monetary or land for land compensation, a model the 
women clearly favoured. 
In January 2011, I was on my way from Khandbari back to the upper Arun valley and decided to walk all 
the way to Hedangna. My plan was to talk with the people along the part of the road that had already 
been constructed and ask about the changes that actually had occurred. Chun Bahadur was on leave from 
his current job and incidentally in Khandbari as well. When I told him about my plan, he decided to 
accompany me. Our first conversations we had in Pangma, just one hour above the district headquarter, 
where Charlotte Hardman (2000) had done the fieldwork for her brilliant ethnography on the self among 
the Lohorung Rai. Three women aged twenty to fifty told us that the road was very beneficial for the 
people in the village. Now they were able to sell vegetables and fruits much easier and many families had 
intensified their cultivation of mandarins and oranges due to the increased connectivity. When I asked 
them about the downsides of the road they could only name one: the dust. But further up the ridge we 
heard different opinions. Beyond Chiplegaon, we met Bishnu who was less thrilled. When I asked him, 
what changes the road had brought, he answered:  
 
Bishnu: What changes can it bring? They told us that Arun-3 would come. We are collecting 
toll for the road. Apart from collecting money, I don’t see any other benefit. […] 
I: So, this road has brought no other changes? 
Bishnu: I don’t know. Well, it has made travelling easier. 
I: There are no other changes? 
Bishnu: No. The most important thing is that we do not have water here. We have a small 
river where we get water but that is also drying up. […] 
I: When this road was built, did it take your land? 
Bishnu: Not mine but my wife’s elder brother’s land had to be taken. They had given him the 
land compensation […]. 
Chun Bahadur: When did your wife’s elder brother receive the money? 
Bishnu: I think it was after the survey of the road. Everyone has received money here. Some 
spent it fast, others paid off their loan. The land was sold cheaply (Interview 26).  
 
Later on, in Botebas, we met another peasant couple just next to the road and the following conversation 
ensued: 
 
I: What benefit has the road given to you? 
Indra: I don’t see any benefit; we earn from our farm and eat. 
CB: The road has brought no changes, no benefit? 
Chameli: No benefit. The cars go up to the village and it’s difficult for us to catch them. […] 
They hardly stop at our place and the road has taken away our land. 
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I: They took your land? 
Indra: Yes, the land over there and the land above. We haven’t received any benefits. 
CB: They have taken your land without land compensation? 
Indra: We took the money years ago. We received land compensation for one piece of land, 
but we haven’t received anything for two more spots [that we lost] (Interview 27). 
 
When we reached the crest at Chainkutti, we decided to leave the road and therefore the direct route 
towards Num and Hedangna. Instead, we walked down to the powerhouse site at Ghorepani in Diding 
VDC and from their followed the course of the Arun up to Hedangna via Seduwa. After passing a group 
of people working on the planned road to the powerhouse on the way down to the river, we met Richin as 
he was sitting on a bench next to his house. Chun Bahadur asked him if he had received land 
compensation and he replied: 
 
Richin: I have already spent it. 
I: Do you think the road will come? 
Richin: Sometimes it feels like the road will be made; sometimes it feels like it will not. It has 
just been a topic of constant arguments. I heard it will arrive by December, where is it? It has 
been so long. 
I: If the road comes, will it bring advantages or disadvantages for you? 
Richin: Nothing will happen to me. What can happen (Interview 28)? 
 
Adopting the practice of my interlocutors, I used the word aunu when I spoke about the completion of the 
road. Āunu most literally means ‘to come, to reach, to arrive’ hence my persistent reference to the road’s 
‘arrival’ throughout the chapter. Yet the verb is also used in a number of other meanings, one of them to 
express notions of progress. It has therefore a close connection to development and the concept of bikas 
that I will discuss in the next chapter. 
 
 
After the funeral 
As I have indicated at the outset of this chapter, the first walk I ever took in Hedangna was a funeral 
procession. In the morning after the teenage boy had passed away, the mourners met at the house of his 
family and from there the funeral procession left for the upper of the two cremation grounds of the village, 
as was decided by the pelengi, a group of elder laymen after verifying the position of the star shukra [N] 
(i.e. Venus). It is important to note, though, that the Yamphu Rai burry their dead in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, as do most other Rai groups.43 Only if a person dies due to falling from a height, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 There are several small groups of thatched stone graves on unproductive, steep patches of land on the outskirts of 
Hedangna. 
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corpse will be cremated. The pelengi scattered rice and coins on the way of the procession and were busy 
building the funeral pyre when I arrived at the spot. While the family of the boy and the men of the 
village were squatting around the pyre, the village’s women occupied a small terrace some fifty meters 
away. Then the body was put on the pyre; a coin was placed on the boy’s forehead and a chunk of ghee in 
his mouth. This was lit by one of the pelengi before the corpse was covered with some more layers of 
wood. Then three male members of the boy’s family lit the whole pyre. 
 
 
Ill. 9: Lighting the funeral pyre, 22 November 2008. 
 
When the pyre was ablaze, most of the mourners left for the funeral meal while Chun Bahadur and I 
retreated to a small pond about two hundred metres from the cremation spot. There, he introduced me to 
his friend Ichchha, a high school teacher. When I asked him about his opinion on the Arun-3 project and 
the road, I was surprised that he drew no connection between the death of the boy and the lack of a road 
(Interview 29). As it was my first day in Hedangna, I was reluctant to press on the subject, but it became 
apparent in the following days that none of my interlocutors made this link: while one of the most 
important arguments for the road was the easier access to health care, the tragedy that had just happened 
in front of the whole village seemed totally disconnected from this question. Of course, I have no idea 
whether the boy could have been saved through immediate transport to the hospital. The thing that struck 
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me was the lack of a connection between the demand for a road and the misfortunes that happen due to 
its lack. 
 
 
Conclusion 
These comments again show how deeply ambivalent people in the upper Arun valley feel about the 
proposed road. They bemoan the fact that it has been delayed for twenty years and hope for a boost to the 
local economy once it will finally be constructed. These high hopes articulate their strong belief in the 
promise of development. Yet, at the same time, people often point to the fact that the road will lead to 
more social polarisation. As Ganesh expressed it: “This might cause enjoyment to some people and agony 
to others” (Interview 24). According to him, those already well-off will benefit a lot from the increased 
connectivity while less affluent households along the route will most probably have to cope with the 
twofold burden of losing land (they may or may not have been compensated for twenty years ago) and 
changing economic circumstances. With trucks plying the new road it will be much more difficult for 
them to obtain day labour as porters. Others doubt the transformative power of the road altogether – and 
interestingly enough not only those still unconnected but also some of those I met right next to it. As I 
have argued throughout this chapter, people living in the villages around the dam site adopt an ambivalent 
position towards the road. Very much in line with Masquelier’s work on Niger, I believe that the proposed 
Kosi-Lhasa-Highway “in its multiple and contradictory manifestations aptly condenses the mysteries and 
paradoxes of this postcolonial epoch” for the Yamphu Rai who, “despite their manifold connections to 
industrial metropoli, have yet to benefit from the development they were once promised” (Masquelier 
2002: 834). Furthermore, the journeys of their ritual experts are proof of the long history of connectivity 
between the Gangetic Plains and Tibet through the Arun valley, but at the same time express the Yamphu 
Rai’s feeling of deep marginality about their position ‘in the middle.’ With the construction of a road link 
between India and China through their villages, this position will undergo severe changes in the coming 
years. Once completed, the road will definitely enable the state to faster and more direct interventions in 
an area where its claims to sovereignty have been chronically fragile. Yet Harvey’s call for a topological 
approach to roads as complicated spaces that to some extent evade the intention of relating spaces through 
fixed connections has a lot to offer in the case of the emerging Kosi-Lhasa-Rajmarg as well.
	   
	   
6 A stolen statue and a missing hose 
Narratives on the cancellation of the Arun-3 and the futility of development 
in the upper Arun Valley 
 
 
Something from below 
We met her on our way down from Bakle. Chun Bahadur had been keen to introduce me to his relatives 
in this hamlet about an hour above Hedangna who took care of his family’s livestock in the alpine pastures 
during summer. Unfortunately, she never told us her name. I would assume she was in her late forties, a 
tall and beautiful woman with proud eyes, a loud voice and a throaty laugh. Chun Bahadur and I had sat 
down on a small rock next to the foot path connecting Bakle with Hedangna to fix ourselves a portion of 
surti (chewing tobacco [N]), when we heard the voices of a woman and a man approaching us talking 
animatedly. They greeted casually and told us they were on their way to cut fodder for their livestock. I 
asked them to sit down for a couple of minutes and talk about the dam project, the road, and development 
in general. He declined by stating that he was not interested in these topics, had no time anyway and 
continued further uphill. Still, he stayed within earshot, disappeared into the bushes and started to cut 
branches. She, however, said she had a couple of minutes and sat down with us, shouting after him to wait 
just a little bit. Every once in a while he would call on her, pressing to continue further uphill. I asked her 
whether she had heard about Arun-3. She affirmed and told us: “They say that the benefit from Arun-3 is 
that something will come out from below, in Phyaksinda [the dam site]. They also mentioned that this 
area and that area would be dammed.” 
 
I: The river will be dammed, so what will be the result? 
She: They will generate electricity. No, that’s not it. They will block this area and export the 
water to another country. This is what I have heard. Is it true? 
Chun Bahadur: No, this is not true. What else have you heard? 
She: I have heard that they will block the water flow of the river. Where will Arun-3 lead the 
river? I heard that it would go to some [foreign] country. We are not educated; we don’t have 
enough brainpower so we don’t focus that much on the information (Interview 30). 
 
This conversation is paradigmatic for many encounters I had with people in the hamlets around the dam 
site. Not only for the evident lack of information about the project, but also for putting the blame about 
this on themselves: as if someone had told her the whole thing but she had just been too ignorant to 
understand. At times I had the impression that the closer to Phyaksinda I got, the lower the level of 
information about the project was. Before I arrived in the upper Arun valley, I had assumed that because 
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of the long history of deferral and insecurity about the project, affected people would at least be aware of 
its basic technical features – the opposite was true. The villages were full of rumours about the history and 
the future of Arun-3. Inevitably, these narratives were engaged in discussions of the potentialities and 
futilities of bikas [N] – the Nepali word for development and progress. 
This chapter will discuss how people in the upper Arun valley have been coping with twenty-five years of 
uncertainty about Arun-3. It will present a plurality of voices and positions on what the invisible dam 
means to the people who have been living with/out it for all these years. Often, these positions shifted 
even during one conversation, showing again – as in the case of the road – how ambivalent these meanings 
can be: in many cases our dialogues circled around a desire for development and the simultaneous claim of 
the futility of this desire. My interlocutors conceptualise the resulting non-development as backwardness 
and in a parallel move blame both themselves and mysterious outsiders, who come to the Arun to extract 
local resources, for it. Throughout the chapter, I will relate their narratives to a number of mythological 
tropes, from the establishment of the first Yamphu Rai settlement in Hedangna, through the tales of the 
Yeti that for decades attracted numerous Western expeditions to the upper Arun valley, to the mythology 
of national development introduced to the area by the Nepalese state in the last fifth of the 20th century. 
My main argument will be that any imagination of development is dependent on a simultaneous 
imagination of backwardness without which it cannot function, in the same way as modernity “as a 
structure requires an other, an alter, a native―indeed, an alter-native” (Trouillot 2002: 224). Development 
and backwardness are therefore constantly reproducing each other. This, I will try to show, stands also 
behind the paradoxical situation that whereas I as a frequent visitor to the upper Arun valley from 2008 to 
2011 had the feeling of rapid rural transition and a downright economic boom in the area, many of my 
interlocutors would state categorically throughout my stays: yaha bikas chhaina [N] – there is no 
development here. Through a discussion of the recent rise in cardamom production, I will show how 
severely the local economy has changed and a process of social polarization is increasing previous 
inequalities between households. 
 
 
“Nothing will be provided to us.” 
To open these ambivalent narratives on development, let me return to the woman we met in the forest. 
After we had established that the main purpose for damming the river was to produce electricity, I asked 
her whether she thought that the electricity generated would benefit the local people. She answered:  
 
I don’t know. […] They say bridges will be made, cars will be brought. I don’t know how 
much of that is true…They also say it will be taken abroad…They mentioned electricity will 
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be generated, roads will be built. What I have heard that in those days they have taken out a 
gold statue. […] 
I: What of gold? 
She: A statue of gold. Actually, I heard that the statue is made half of gold and half of 
diamonds. Even before, the Arun-3 people lied to the locals saying that they will generate 
electricity. But once they dug out the items, why would they generate electricity? They left 
the village in a mess without completing their project…I doubt that they will provide us with 
electricity. Now that everything has been closed, nothing will be provided to us. They have 
found resources, why would they generate electricity (Interview 30)? 
 
At this point I had already met several people telling me very similar stories to explain why a group of 
foreign engineers had come to their villages in 1989 and started drilling holes in the mountain on three 
locations. They told me that they were only pretending to do test excavations for a tunnelling system 
connected to a hydropower dam. In fact they had come with the intention to steal precious things that 
were hidden underground. Once I had heard that a golden calf was found, another source claimed it was a 
golden rooster, on a third occasion somebody mentioned precious stones. From the first time I had 
learned about this theory, I found it to be a very intriguing way of making sense of why the dam never 
materialised. And I found it even more exciting in light of the reinvention of the project as an export-
oriented scheme in which most of the electricity generated would in fact be “taken abroad.” I was 
extremely curious how it had come into being, but when I asked a couple of friends my age, nobody could 
help me any further. They had all heard the story before but tried to convince me that this was just the 
opinion of a small minority of uneducated old people who would believe (literally) such cock-and-bull 
stories. 
Some weeks later I was at Num bazar, the main market in the upper Arun valley. There, I met Shyam 
who told me that he had been working on the drilling machines during the text excavations. When I asked 
him about the story of the stolen treasures, he confirmed that he had heard about it as well. But he did not 
believe it was true – “and if there was any [treasures], they probably hid it and took it away.” Another men 
his age, while overhearing our conversation, was less sure and stated: “We cannot say whether there were 
any or not. We have not seen it so we are not exactly sure if there were any” (Interview 31). What they 
knew for a fact, though, was that the foreigners took a lot of stones away by helicopter. Shyam’s younger 
cousin, a teacher, on the other hand was laughing about the theory and argued: “It is said that there is no 
gold on the summit of Mount Makalu. Why would there be gold here” (ibid)? 
Akhil, an Indian engineer employed by SJVN, the company that is behind the re-invention of the dam, 
reacted similarly. When I brought up the theory during a conversation with him at the project office in 
Khandbari as an example of local mistrust towards outsiders promising development that never 
materialises, my counterpart replied matter-of-factly: “We have inspected the area and we have not found 
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anything” (Interview 32) He, however, did not let on whether he had heard about the rumours 
beforehand. Edmund, my dialogue partner from the Inspection Panel, on the other hand, made more 
sense of the story: 
 
When the World Bank decided not to approve the financing for the project, of course that 
[the land along the road alignments] was worthless again. And you can see how people come 
up with explanations like you are describing. It seems so illogical to them what happens to 
them. These foreigners coming in and then kind of manipulating them into, you know, 
making and losing money, buying land, losing land and all this. They’re all waiting for a 
windfall and they really believe, you know, that…they believe in things like the lottery, they 
believe in golden calves [laughing], precious jewels and whatever it is and…they had enough 
bad experiences over the years to be paranoid about outsiders - which I fully understand…it’s 
a great story, though (Interview 16). 
 
This narrative of stolen treasures stands in stark contrast to numerous ethnographic accounts from 
Melanesia on so-called cargo cults where mysterious foreigners actually bring mystical wealth – the cargo 
– instead of taking it away as in my example. Ton Otto explains those movements as emanation of the 
social changes initiated by colonialism. The sudden influx of Western valuables in societies that were 
based on gift exchange, personal prestige and a strong sense of gerontocracy led to considerable tensions, 
as it was mostly young men who could acquire the cargo by working on trading ships or plantations. On 
the other hand, he argues, the fact that white people exchanged commodities with Melanesians but denied 
to enter into social relations and share their knowledge of how they gained their wealth, “offended 
Melanesian notions of morality” (Otto 2009: 91). Therefore, a common theme in many of these 
movements was the conviction that once this knowledge had been found, the ancestors would bring 
unlimited prosperity. Against that idea of a wealthy future stands my interlocutors’ perception of a wealth 
that was always already there, but now no longer is. What both accounts share, however, is a strong 
sentiment of denied co-operation, powerlessness and exploitation. Otto’s citation (ibid) of a Papuan: 
“White people do not help the black man. They found the way, but hide it from us” resembles the 
disappointed comments about those foreigners who never accomplished what they had promised I heard 
countless times. 
 
 
“Something that is hidden” 
By mere accident, I brought up this narrative during a meeting at the office of The Mountain Institute 
(TMI) in Kathmandu. This NGO was instrumental in the establishment of the Makalu-Barun National 
Park and Conservation Area in the Mid-1990s. After a long conversation with two staff members about 
the National Park and its entanglement with the hydropower project, we ended up talking about my 
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experiences during fieldwork. Both of them had been working in the Arun valley for decades and when I 
told them about the stolen treasures, on of them, Lhakpa, immediately connected my story with a similar 
incident that is said to have happened at the confluence of the Barun and the Arun rivers where the 
annual Barun mela (fair [N]) is held: “There is a story that foreigners have found gold and diamonds. It’s 
been said that some people saw foreigners taking the gold. Now these people are very old. I don’t know 
the full story, I have only heard of it. But there are eyewitnesses” (Interview 33). 
I asked him whether he knew anything about folk stories on golden calves or anything similar and he 
affirmed:  
 
In our language we call it ‘ter’ […] If there is something that is hidden it is said that it will 
bring luck and the farm will flourish. So, as that has been stolen and has been taken abroad it 
is said that people have become poor. If we still had it people would say we would be in a 
better condition. I know people who have seen it being taken away. […] It is also said that 
the foreigners took stuff from the Barun River. […] At night those items would shine (ibid). 
 
At this point, his colleague Paul jumped in and asked Lhakpa whether he was taking about “Guru 
Rimpoche’s things44“ when he used the term ter [T]. As Karma confirmed, Paul offered an explanation of 
the concept for someone like me unversed in Buddhist theology:  
 
Guru Rimpoche/Padmasambhava […] has chosen a number of valleys throughout the 
Himalaya - beyüls - where he has hidden the teaching so that in the age of samsara when all 
the world is evil and full of sickness and suffering, there will be places where he can go to 
restore the dharma and bring it back and […] within the beyüls there are the places where 
these treasures are hidden. And the treasures are called ter. […] Their whole area is 
considered to be a sacred valley and there were ters hidden there and the foreigners came and 
took some of the ters and since that time that’s caused the area to be subject to problems like 
too much rain and poverty (ibid). 
 
Among the Yamphu, I never heard anybody refer to a concept like ter. But for them, the fertility of the 
soil and the amount of rice they can harvest is inseparably connected with the idea of charawa [Y], “the 
essence of grain.45“ This essence is emanating from two glacial lakes at Popti La, a pass at the Tibetan 
border. When they came down from Tibet, Minaba and Sepa, the two mythological brothers who first 
settled Hedangna and Seduwa, threw a wooden bowl and a walking stick into these lakes and pledged that 
they would settle down where the two items would reappear. This, the Yamphu say, is how they chose 
their current territory and to this day, they are convinced that the charawa of their rice is directly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 At this point, our conversation was constantly switching back and forth between Nepali and English. 
45 The equivalent for charawa in Nepali is shaha (Holmberg 1989). 
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connected to the water level of the two glacial lakes. Should they ever dry out, there would be no charawa 
left. The rice harvest would be finished very quickly and the wellbeing of the whole village would be at 
stake.46 Ann Armbrecht Forbes (1995: 71, fn 105) reports a story from Uling that gives a different 
explanation for the hardships of contemporary life from Paul’s account and already point us to the 
ambivalence in the question of who is to blame for it that will run through this chapter: in this account, it 
was not foreigners who stole the hidden treasures in the ground but the Yamphu themselves who 
diminished the charawa: In the old days there was so much rice that people could not even cut it all. 
When they asked the snake (nag [N]) what to do about it, it told them to go to the centre of their fields 
and blow a whistle. After that their charawa was lost and since that time they have to ask Matlung Thuba 
[Y], their most powerful ancestor, for it. 
These conceptions of treasures underground, their far-reaching relationships and their importance to the 
well being of the people living from this land might be one explanation why people suspect foreigners of 
knowing about them as well and use their power and technology to extract them. On the other hand, this 
way of framing the story might tell more about me and a certain “obsession with coherence47“ than about 
the narrative itself. As Lhakpa’s account shows it seems likely that another incident of mineral extraction 
had indeed happened further up the valley several decades beforehand. And as my further conversation 
with him and Paul would reveal, this was only one in a long succession of such encounters. 
 
 
Searching for the Yeti 
During this discussion I realised that the reason for the organisation’s long-standing connection to the 
upper Arun valley was a rather unexpected one: it was directly connected to the search for the yeti.48 As 
any cursory look at the literature concerning the so-called ‘abominable snowman’ shows (e.g. Messner 
2000, Panday 1994, Bord 1984), in the 1950s, the upper Arun valley was selected as the most promising 
area for this endeavour. For the next thirty years, it remained one of the centres of one of the most 
intriguing entanglements between Western science and Eastern mythology. Paul told me that Daniel 
Taylor-Ide, the founder of The Mountain Institute, had been obsessed with finding this mythic creature 
and as “everybody said that if there were a Yeti it would be in Arun, because that’s the only kind of proper 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Kathryn March (1977) reports a similar connection between a Sherpa village’s livelihood and a glacial lake. 
47 I owe this formulation to Nikola Bagic. 
48 Only later I found this quote: “The Mountain Institute (TMI) has deep roots in the Himalaya. It grew from an 
expedition in search of the yeti into a project for conservation of 2,330 square miles in north eastern Nepal” (The 
Mountain Institute 2011: 3). 
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habitat...and Eric Shipton saw those famous bear footprints in the snow […] in the Barun glacier, so in 
the Makalu-Barun area49“ (Interview 33). It took me a while to understand the importance of this 
information for our case at hand. My argument here is that the Rai communities of the upper Arun valley 
got to know white men in a way that was very different from the Sherpa of the Khumbu region further to 
the west: After the successful ascent of Mount Makalu in 1955 (Franco 1957), by far less mountaineers 
trekked up the Arun than the Dudh Kosi towards Mount Everest, Lhotse and Cho Oyo (Ortner 1999). 
Instead, the Arun valley proved to be highly interesting for biologists who were drawn to the area by its 
extremely high biodiversity and their perception of the valley’s remoteness. But they came only second: 
The first foreigners to actually engage with the people in the Rai villages were adventurers and 
cryptozoologists searching for the yeti. So, from the very beginning, this relationship was characterised by 
two peculiarities: The Westerners were actively engaged in finding prove for a mysterious being similar to 
many other creatures in folk belief around the world. But instead of shrugging off the yeti as yet another 
form of ‘primitive superstition,’ these biologists actively participated in the reproduction and 
transformation of this Himalayan myth that led to its incorporation into global pop culture. In other 
words: these encounters showed the Rai that these strange kuire50 (westerners [N]), despite all their 
idiosyncrasies, believed as well in the mythical wealth of the upper Arun valley – even if the Rai 
themselves seemed not to have been particularly interested in the yeti. 
Secondly, these expeditions established the potentially extractive character of any relation between the 
upper Arun valley and foreigners. Through them, the villagers came to know foreigners as people who 
would leave their families for months to roam through the forests, mountain pastures and even the glacial 
moraines of their valley in search of peculiar specimens. While not a single yeti was ever captured, a great 
plenty of samplings was collected and taken away. In combination with the long-standing 
conceptualisation of the forest as an area of spiritual and nutritional abundance, it is not surprising that the 
Rai communities over the years became suspicious about the foreigners’ intentions. 
As early as 1956 the first white explorer, Peter Byrne, arrived in the area to track down the abominable 
snowman. This was only one year after Nepal had officially opened its borders to foreigners. Before that 
very small numbers of mountaineers, diplomats and adventurers had been admitted to enter the country. 
According to Ephrosine Daniggelis’s (1997: 114) interlocutors from Yangden and Gongtala, Byrne was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 In fact, the famous 1951 finding of yeti footprints by Sen Tensing, Michael Ward and Eric Shipton happened 
beneath the Menlung La, a pass connecting Rolwaling with Khumbu, about 50 km west of the Barun glacier 
(Shipton 1952: 54). In a recent paper Michael Ward (1997: 32) argues that the footprints probably came from a 
“local inhabitant with cold-tolerant feet and possibly some congenital or acquired abnormality or foot infection.” 
50 The term kuire is mildly pejorative, stems from kuiro (fog, blue haze) and is a reference to the unusual blue and 
grey eyes of many white people. 
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the first white person any villager had ever seen.51 The next year he returned together with Tom Slick, an 
eccentric Texan oil magnate and cryptozoologist,52 and explored the Apsuwa Khola for five weeks, a side 
valley of the Arun halfway between the dam site and the powerhouse site. He was convinced that the 
entity known by local villagers as ban jhakri (forest shaman [N]) was in fact the yeti. As this creature likes 
to eat frogs, Byrne paid villagers two Indian rupees for each frog caught – a small fortune at the time. This 
search for the yeti among the Rai is even more surprising as neither my own fieldwork nor that of others 
(Gaenszle 2007, 2000, Hardman 2000, Rutgers 1998, Daniggelis 1997, Armbrecht 1995, Allen 1976) 
shows any importance of this creature among these groups.53 
Asked as to why he had chosen the Arun valley for his yeti hunt, Byrne answered that it was mostly due to 
“stories of the yeti of eastern Nepal being much larger than those elsewhere in the country” (Coleman 
1989: 61).54 With the Slick-Byrne expedition, the Arun valley was established in the imagination of 
Western biologists as something similar to the Tibetan imagination of the beyül – here as well it was a 
mystical valley full of hidden treasures waiting to be found. Numerous expeditions followed, some 
exclusively focusing on the yeti, others with a broader scope. Probably the most comprehensive and 
ambitious among them was the Arun Valley Wildlife Expedition in 1972-73. Fourteen primary scientists 
and more than forty different assistants were involved in this mission that lasted for fifteen months, 
funded through the Bangkok-based Association for the Conservation of Wildlife. In his account of it, Edward 
Cronin (1979: 84) sums up the attraction of the area as follows: “It is an exotic land typified by such plants 
as the rhododendron or animals like the red panda. Inaccessible by even Asian standards, it contains what 
is probably the least known wildlife in the world.” But, according to his report, this unique ecosystem was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Judging from the map in Franco 1957, the Yamphu Rai of Hedangna must have seen Westerners in 1954, during 
the French Makalu Renaissance Expedition. 
52 According to Loren Coleman (1989: 54-55) it was Tenzing Norgay Sherpa, one of the two first climbers of 
Mount Everest, who brought them into contact. 
53 Nicolas Allen gives this observation a most unexpected twist when he speculates that the origin of the yeti 
narratives among the Sherpa might have actually been their encounter with indigenous groups who “from the point 
of view of the Sherpa of that time, were so primitive and alien to be excluded from the category of the completely 
human” (Allen 1976: 165). To support his suspicion he refers to the remarkably human attributes ascribed to the yeti 
“such as stealing Sherpa cattle and women, being afraid of malaria, and attempting to imitate Sherpa agricultural 
practices” (ibid). As ungrounded as this suspicion may sound, it would mean that it were the ancestors of the Rai 
who inspired the Sherpas’ stories of the yeti. 
54 The underlying argument for this persistent choice of the middle altitudes for the yeti hunt is summarized by 
Cronin (1979: 165): “My experience in the Himalayas suggests to me that a yeti-Gigantopitecus [assuming the yeti 
to be a hominid] would not inhabit the snowlands. It would favor the dense vegetation of the steep valleys in the 
middle-altitude zone. The yeti is encountered in the snows, because, like the mountaineers who discover its tracks, it 
uses the snowy passes as routes from one valley to the next.” 
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in severe danger, as can be seen from this quote: “Thus, the middle-elevation forests constitute a narrow 
belt of superb wildlife, beautiful and rare, wedged between the devastation of the lowlands and the fragility 
of the highlands” (ibid: 101). Again, yeti tracks were found and “their close resemblance to Shipton’s 
prints were unmistakable” (ibid: 167). 
Growing up in India, Daniel Taylor-Ide was fascinated by this “quest” from early on and became himself 
one of the adventurers roaming the Himalayas in search of the mythical snowman and later wrote his own 
book about it (Taylor-Ide 1995). As Paul remembers, it was 
 
[i]n the course of those explorations [that] he realised that this is a very important bio-
diversity site and that there was some threats from poaching and from over-harvesting of 
medicinal plants and things like that. But there was lot of potential, because there is no 
population […]. As the dam was being considered, this very rich area would be impacted, 
people started to make the connection between the dam and the potential impacts on the very 
high biodiversity (Interview 33). 
 
 
The Makalu-Barun National Park 
With this longstanding interest of biologists and conservationists in the area and the hydropower project 
taking shape in the late 1980s, the plan for the creation of a protected area emerged as well. Binod was 
one of the Nepalese biologists involved in these efforts from the outset. In his recollection  
 
we were actually looking into the prospects of conserving the things that might be impacted 
by this dam. But we were looking more from the positive side, in the sense that if we 
conserve the watershed of Arun […] we are looking at the prospects of conserving nature for 
the benefits of the water shed, for the benefit of the dam (Interview 5). 
 
This very utilitarian line of argumentation to undergird the necessity of a protected area is clearly 
identifiable in the conservation project’s management plan as well (Shrestha et al. 1990: 22-23). 
As with the emerging environmental and social safeguarding mechanisms of the World Bank that were 
invented alongside the preparation of Arun-3 (see Chapter 4), the project of the Makalu-Barun 
Conservation Area proved to be a precedence for a new approach to nature conservation: it was an attempt 
to establish a protected area “for the first time in Nepal and much of the world, in collaboration with its 
local residents (pop. 35,000)” (The Mountain Institute 2011: 3). This in fact represented a huge difference 
from previous projects for nature conservation, most notoriously the Chitwan National Park where dozens 
of villages were forcefully displaced since 1964. There, the last resettlement program was carried out 
between 1995 and 2004, as Joanne McLean and Steffen Straede (2003: 511) argue due to “outdated 
management decisions that have not been reappraised for decades.” Narayan Dhakal, Kristen Nelson and 
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David Smith (2011) point out that this program was mainly driven by the villagers themselves. However, 
their key motives to relocate (man-eating tigers and ever-increasing floods) do not seem particularly self-
paced. 
As far as Daniel Taylor-Ide and his allies were concerned, such mistakes should not be made in the case of 
the Makalu-Barun conservation project, instead a new framework of ecological governmentality took 
shape in these years, as Paul pointed out to me: 
 
Putting it back in sort of historical perspective, that was about the time of the Rio 
environmental conference, so the setting up of the GEF, the Global Environment Facility. 
GEF is one of those hybrid organisations that has money from World Bank, UN 
Development Program and UN Environment Programme. So Makalu-Barun was in the very 
first batch of GEF projects. […] Then we formed this task force [that] was a mixture of 
Nepali scientists and foreign scientist and they studied there for two years doing...extensive 
consultation with the local community, extensive biological inventories...and sociological 
inventories55 (Interview 32). 
 
So from the outset, both the participation of Nepalese scientists as well as the local people figured 
prominently on the agenda and as Binod confirmed there was considerable lobbying for the project from 
the ranks of the Royal Nepal Academy as well. The paradigmatic shift that accompanied the 
implementation of this project and the seriousness of the commitment to a totally new understanding of 
engaging local communities may be indicated by a new approach towards park implementation and 
management: TMI demanded that neither the Royal Nepalese Army nor the King Mahendra Trust for 
Nature Conservation (now National Trust for Nature Conservation) would by involved. Thereby, they did 
not accept the previously established terms of reference for both national parks (implemented by the 
Army) and conservation areas (run by the Trust). Instead, the structure was something new: A national 
park with a conservation area as buffer zone that should be run and implemented through the Department 
of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation.56 This demand seems even bolder when we consider that 
the Trust at time was busy conducting a large-scale thirteen-volumes report titled “Environmental 
Management and Sustainable Development in the Arun Basin” as part of the environmental and social 
reviews of Arun-3 (KMTNC 1991). Let me quote Paul again: 
 
Originally, at the very beginning of the national park, it wasn’t conceived as a national park at 
all, it was conceived as completely a conservation area. But...at that time the King Mahendra 
Trust was just beginning to be operational and starting to work on the Annapurna 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 For a detailed discussion of the Global Environment Facility see Young 2002. 
56 The Conservation Area was officially integrated as a buffer zone into the National Park in 1999 (Jha 2003: 41). 
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Conservation Area. And that...at the time...this is legend, I don’t know if it’s true or not […], 
Daniel [Taylor-Ide] had dinner with the King, and […] said: ‘[…] I want your approval to 
create a new conservation area.’ And he [King Birendra] said: ‘That’s a great idea and we’ll 
just let the King Mahendra Trust manage it.’ And so Daniel immediately said: ‘Well, we 
want it to be a national park and conservation area, so therefore we can’t give it to the King 
Mahendra Trust to manage’ (Interview 32). 
 
It may seem surprising, but Taylor-Ide was successful with all these demands. Paul, in line with several 
other interlocutors in Kathmandu, confirmed that the decisive reason for this was his intimate 
acquaintance with King Birendra: they knew each other from Harvard. 
 
 
The National Park now: Participation in action? 
In 1992, the national park was formally established, with the buffer zone extending to the east until the 
Arun, incorporating Hedangna as well as the western bank of the proposed Arun-3 dam site. Nearly 
twenty years later, my fieldwork suggests that the park today plays no important role in the everyday lives 
of the peasants of Hedangna – except for the oft-heard complaint that hunting has become nearly 
impossible these days. Given the numerous accounts of the negative effects of conservation projects on 
indigenous communities all over the world, one could assume that this was actually a huge success. The 
Mountain Institute (2011) points to impressive achievements in community building, forest resource 
protection and farming methods for which I lack any basis of comparison. To be sure, the park has created 
a number of jobs for local people as rangers and administrative staff. 
But the fact that the misgivings about decreased access to pastures and forest resources (Armbrecht Forbes 
1995: 309-310) have been mitigated by an approach that for the most part stays true to its proclaimed 
attempt to consider local development and nature conservation as equally important for a successful 
community based national park, should not obscure the fact that one main positive effect did not 
materialise for the people of Hedangna: income generated through eco-tourism. To my knowledge there 
is not a single tourist bed in Pathibhara VDC. Since the second French Makalu expedition (leading to the 
first successful ascent) in 1955 practically all mountaineers and trekkers heading up to the base camp at the 
head of the Barun valley take the route via Seduwa and Tashigaon. And due to the compared remoteness 
of the Makalu-Barun area compared to other trekking destinations in Nepal, even these villages do not 
attract a lot of tourists. Of those who do come, the majority is taking part in expedition-styled group treks 
complete with porters, tents and kitchen staff organised by trekking agencies in Kathmandu where most of 
the profits of these treks remain. Only a very small number of individual trekkers find their way up to the 
Barun valley. Therefore there are only a handful of lodges in Num, Seduwa and Tashigaon. But as 
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evidence from other trekking areas in the country shows, it is predominantly individual trekking tourists 
that have a significant economic effect on village communities as a whole. Even in Seduwa, many people 
are unhappy with the state of tourism, as became apparent in a recent discussion with Ben Campbell 
(2013). He told me that several years ago he had a conversation with the VDC chairman who was 
complaining about tourists flying into the Barun valley by helicopter thereby belying the promises of a 
steady income through trekking. 
To find out more about the conditions in the Barun valley and to finally get more than a glimpse of 
Makalu, I decided to trek up to the Base camp in October 2010 together with three friends. The idea was 
to do a lodge trek, without carrying food or tents and even with the help of local friends in Khandbari, it 
took us a day to confirm that this was actually possible. During our trek it turned out that members of two 
extended Sherpa families ran all lodges in the Barun valley from Tashigaon. These impressions are very 
much in line with the findings Jai Mehta and Stephen Kellert (1998) present while discussing the 
participatory approach of the Makalu-Barun project. Their main conclusion is that the majority of their 
respondents were generally positive about the national park and the educational and training activities that 
were at the centre of TMI’s efforts in the region. What people considered as much more important 
components of local development, the parks however had so far not delivered: a boost to local economy 
through significant growth in tourist arrivals and better infrastructure. 
 
 
Development and its Discontents  
This is still the case: The overwhelming majority of the people I talked to in the upper Arun valley see the 
main task of development in improving infrastructure: “development’s main pillars are electricity and 
transportation” (Interview 34) as Raj put it, a teacher from Uwa. After that most of my interlocutors 
mention the word suvidha [N] that can be translated as facilities or convenience:  
 
If development is in place, there will be a road here that will bring facilities to the local 
people. If electricity is made available to us, we will be able to live in the light, watch TV, and 
use the computer. Whatever it is, if development occurs it will be good (Interview 35) 
 
as Parbati stated. When we met, the young woman had recently opened a tailor shop. 
Not surprisingly, I did not meet a single person in the Arun valley who was against development and 
many of the people I interviewed insisted that development is something they desperately long for. On the 
other hand, very few of them believed in a straightforward path toward obtaining these conveniences and 
to many the Arun-3 project was not likely to lead to a better or easier life for them. Take for example 
Parbati. As most of the young people I met she thinks that the hydropower dam should be constructed for 
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the sake of national development, but personally she does not expect an electrification of her village: 
 
The project is about generating electricity, but we don’t know when we will receive it. It has 
been mentioned that the electricity will be directly sent to India. If it goes to India, then we 
will have darkness below the electricity production site (ibid). 
 
Adding to that, many people express the fear that better connectivity will lead to an erosion of local 
culture through the growing Indian influence and another form of theft: an increase in organized crime. In 
Parbati’s words: 
 
There are people who are afraid that robbers will come after the development of a road in this 
area. If the Arun-3 is implemented then there will be 16,000 to 17,000 people working in 
this area, so there are high chances of being robbers among them […] What I have heard is 
that we need to learn Hindi. […] Our local people don’t even know how to speak Nepali, 
how can they know Hindi? If we forcefully learn their language, then our traditional language 
and culture will start to disappear (ibid). 
 
This opinion is widespread despite the fact that seasonal work migration to India has been an integral part 
of the local economy for generations. Therefore, inhabitants of the upper Arun valley seem to know much 
more about the adjacent North Indian states (West Bengal, Bihar and Assam) than about Kathmandu. 
Their reservations concerning the re-invention of the dam project under Indian aegis is different from the 
nationalist anti-Indian prejudice I often encountered when I discussed these issues with water activists and 
hydropower experts in the capital (see Chapter 6), but again a manifestation of the strong belief that 
outsiders – be they Europeans, Nepalese elites, or an Indian company – are not to be trusted as they 
always in the end take advantage of the credulity of the local population without delivering a graspable 
benefit for their livelihoods. 
Another reoccurring concern connected to the influx of a large number of construction workers from 
outside was the safety of women, the threat of the onset of sex work in the villages around the workers’ 
camps and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. Some of the elder men I talked to about their 
memories of the test drillings in 1989/90 remembered that about a dozen girls “were taken away” by 
Nepalese construction workers (Interview 36). Generally, men were much more anxious about these issues 
whereas especially younger women seemed to understand this emerging change as a possibility for 
different ways of doing gender. Finally, many people were worried about the river and whether there 
would be any water left after the dam had been constructed and the water would be diverted. This was less 
connected to ecological concerns, but due to the high spiritual importance of the Arun for the Yamphu 
and members of other Rai subgroups. People often referred to it as the precondition for all life and told 
me that Yiwa lives in the Arun, a powerful ancestral entity that is often called upon for a puja when 
embarking on a journey. 
A stolen statue and a missing hose 
- 156 - 
The Desire for development 
Despite these misgivings, many people I met around the dam site still believe in the possibility of 
development through the hydro project. Take for example my conversation with Angrita and Norbu, a few 
hours before the meeting with the nameless woman in the forest. They live in Bakle, a hamlet of about 
fifteen houses one hour above Hedangna. Most of the families are Sherpa and keep considerably more 
livestock than the Yamphu, as the altitude of their village is too high for the cultivation of rice. It was late 
October, so most of the maize and millet was already harvested, leaving the fields barren, unlike the lush 
paddy terraces of Num on the other side of the valley. When I asked the middle-aged couple about their 
opinion on the dam, Norbu answered: 
 
For the sake of development we desire the Arun-3 project. The most important thing is the 
desire. Our desire is that when Arun-3 comes, transportation will also be made available and 
this will develop our village. If Arun-3 is developed quickly, in the future, with 
transportation, a market will be available for people to buy and sell their goods. We will also 
obtain employment. […] There have been many discussions that many people’s land will be 
drowned, but I don’t think that will happen. The lower areas will drown a little. So, we are 
very eager for the project to start. What needs to be done after Arun-3 is that electricity 
should be provided to us. These are my desires (Interview 37). 
 
In the course of our conversation, I asked them what electricity was in their understanding. Unlike Parbati 
who, in the above-quoted conversation, immediately jumped from light to watching TV and computers, 
for Angrita the main benefit of electricity was still its most obvious: “Light,” she answered matter-of-
factly, “electricity means light.” Norbu further elaborated:  
 
There is a big difference between light and darkness. At night we have to either light a candle 
or a lighter to go out, with electricity it would be easier to go out at night, and at least we 
would not bump into anything while going to the toilet. With electricity we will receive many 
benefits and the house will be bright when we return home (ibid). 
 
On the pediment of their house I had spotted a small solar panel. With the influx of affordable and 
portable Chinese panels and a successful government program subsidising rural households for installing 
solar-powered battery systems, these panels are now widespread among middle and higher income families 
in the area. In consideration of Norbu’s last statement, I was curious to know whether they still thought 
they would need grid electricity now that they had their own supply to fuel a light bulb or two in the 
evening. “Yes, we do,” Angrita answered. “From my understanding, solar doesn’t last a long time. If you 
charge a mobile, the battery will go down quickly. We will not be able to use the light if the mobile is 
charged. Also, if there is no sunshine for seven days, we will not receive light for seven days” (ibid). I will 
return to the topic of electrification as a process of connection-making later. 
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What I found surprising about this interview was Angrita’s and Norbu’s steadfast belief in the possibility 
of development and their acknowledgment of the progress that had been achieved in the previous years. 
More often when I discussed issues of development with people living around the dam site, they expressed 
a deep disappointment concerning the promises of development and a strong believe in the futility of any 
attempt to actually achieve it. Especially with the hopes for a road connection, electrification and wage 
labour connected to the announced hydropower project that were shattered by the sudden and mysterious 
cancellation of the project in 1995, many of their comments resonated the situation James Ferguson 
(1999) describes in his work on the decline of the Zambian copperbelt. The important difference is that 
his example shows a region in decline, a place that once was rapidly “catching up” with the developed 
countries and now no longer was while the desire for a modern life persists as the hope is belied. After 
decolonisation, the country had one of the fastest emerging economies in Africa with a pace of industrial 
growth whose social consequences reminded the missionary Sandilands in its “suddenness and ruthlessness 
and irresistibility” (Sandilands 1948: ix in Ferguson 1999: 2) of the German blitzkrieg. Nowhere was this 
more the case than in the mining cities on the copperbelt that provided the country with a steady income 
in foreign exchange. Up until the mid-1970s, it was considered a middle-income country, but the gradual 
decline of the world market prices for copper combined with the ensuing increase in foreign debt that 
brought along devastating structural adjustment measures led to an equally sudden de-industrialisation 
and counter-urbanisation. This, Ferguson argues, has resulted not only in a decline of the material 
comfort for the mineworkers and their families and a dramatic rise of malnutrition and child mortality, 
but beyond that in a loss of “a certain ethos of hopefulness, self-respect, and optimism” (ibid: 12). With 
the dream of modernity shattered, for Ferguson’s interlocutors “history seems to be running in reverse” 
(ibid: 255): “This is modernization through the looking glass, where modernity is the object of nostalgic 
reverie, and ‘backwardness’ the anticipated (or dreaded) future” (ibid: 13). Therefore, many Zambians 
experienced recent history “as a process that has pushed them out of the place in the world that they once 
occupied” (ibid: 236). 
 
 
“There have been no changes here” 
In my example, people feel that they never even got along the path towards such a place. Often, they 
would state categorically: “there is no development here” – and there has never been any. This was also the 
first reflexive answer I got when I asked the women at the women’s group meeting in the Gadi I 
mentioned in Chapter 5 what they thought development was, but immediately somebody contradicted 
and the following brainstorming emerged: 
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Woman 1: There has been no development here. 
Woman 2: We can’t say that there has been no development. It has been better than before. 
I: What is development from your point of view? 
Woman 3: It is dissemination of information. It is knowing things that we did not know. 
That may be it, isn’t it? 
Woman 4: A [cellular radio] tower will be developed here; we will be able to talk [on the 
phone]. These are the development and its happiness, and we can’t say it is sad. 
Woman 5: Compared to before, the valley has developed. 
Woman 6: Prior we would go to the forest to look for wood, now we are working in our 
farmland. That is also development. 
Woman 7: Prior we had to eat black dhindho [N, a porridge made out of millet or corn], now 
we are able to eat white rice. That is also development (Interview 25). 
 
Right away, I was startled by the clarity of the image swathed in this last statement. Not only the 
transition from black to white that was reminiscent of Norbu’s comment on the difference between 
darkness and electric light and beyond that its evocation of modernist teleology, but also the promise of 
social and economic upward mobility inscribed in it. Eating rice on a daily basis is considered a sign of 
economic prosperity in rural Nepal whereas poor people – especially those living at higher altitudes – have 
to rely on dhindho.57 
When I asked the woman I mentioned at the outset of the chapter about this issue, she made it very clear 
what her stance was. After she had told us the story about the statue that was stolen by the foreigners our 
discussion turned to the alleged resumption of Arun-3 when she suddenly stood up and announced: “I’m 
in a rush, I will go as well” (Interview 30). I begged her to stay just a few minutes longer and asked: “In 
your view, what is the meaning of development?” 
She answered: “Development means for example, if roads are constructed, then cars will come here. But in 
Hedangna there has been no development so far. If someone tries to develop this place another one will 
start pulling their leg.” 
Here, Chun Bahadur intervened and inquired: “What do you mean by that?” 
 
She: The other person will not allow development to happen. 
I: Do you have an example? 
She: Well, they would not let it happen and will hamper anything that has been done. Do 
you see any development in Hedangna so far? There have been no changes here. If they bring 
drinking water here, then someone else will cut the pipeline. No benefit has been provided to 
us (ibid). 
 
With this explanation she was gone, following her companion who had eventually left us behind. I asked 
Chun Bahadur about the cut pipeline and he told me a story he said had happened a couple of years ago. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Moreover, the less millet you eat the more beer you can brew from it. 
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Up in Bakle, he had shown me the spring that is supplying the drinking water for Hedangna. About 
fifteen years ago, he estimates, the spring was collected and a PVC pipe installed to divert it downhill. 
Now, most of the households in Hedangna have their own hose connected to the main pipeline, providing 
them with save drinking water right on their porches. The pipeline is installed in the ground along the 
direct, steep footpath we had used in the morning, but at times peeks out of the soil. One day, he told me, 
a man was walking down that path after a long day in his fields and because he was very thirsty, he cut the 
pipe with his knife to have a drink and left it this way. A short while later, another man came along the 
way and was delighted to see that the pipe had run dry. He was in use of a hose, so he dug out several 
meters, cut the pipeline again and left with that piece.  
To many of my interlocutors stories like this prove the local people’s backwardness and their inability to 
development. So, whereas the story of the stolen treasures shows the powerlessness of people towards 
mysterious outsiders, this narrative shows the flip side of why development was unable to arrive in the 
upper Arun valley: people were just too ignorant to think about the community instead of their own 
immediate needs. Therefore, whenever I discussed these matters with teachers or the activists of the 
Yamphu Kirat Samaj, they would emphasise the importance to cultivate a new sense of community and 
collaboration they felt was missing in their villages. But it is important to understand that in rural Nepal as 
in many other places in the global South there is a long and entangled history of development and 
backwardness – the teleological longing for development constantly reproduces the pervasive feeling of 
backwardness (Karp 2002). 
 
 
“Some foreign country should get Nepal and develop it” 
The notion of development holds a very peculiar space in Nepalese society. As Stacy Pigg (1992) has 
convincingly argued, the idea of the post-1960 nation-state of Nepal is inseparable from the concept of 
bikas – development. As in many other languages, development is an old concept that has taken on a 
distinctly new meaning with the emergence of the developmentalist state (for discussions of the Swahili 
term maendelo see Karp 2002 or Smith 2008). Bikas was already used in Sanskrit [vikāsita] meaning 
development or expansion. Today it is also a common male first name all over South Asia. Bikas operates 
as a strong marker of difference that separates city from village, elites from poor people and the developed 
countries from Nepal, thereby producing a multi-fold social map that essentializes the countryside as a 
place bound in tradition and ignorance. 
Pigg shows how that topos is reproduced in schoolbooks and local discourse, a technique of power that is 
clearly at work in the Arun Valley as well. Many people define their everyday lives as a situation of lack, 
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asking me: “Why are you coming here? We have no road, no electricity, no running water,” and often very 
outspokenly frame the current situation of Nepal in clearly evolutionist terms, stating that “we are 500 
years behind Europe” or even “we are in the Stone Age” (Interview 38) reminiscent of what Akhil Gupta 
has termed ‘the post-colonial condition’ for rural Northern India. He identifies this attitude as “a pervasive 
feeling of being underdeveloped, of being behind the West, articulated with other identities of caste, class, 
region, gender, and sexuality” (Gupta 1998: ix) that is „constitutive of ‘local’ lives and ‘local’ systems of 
meaning” (ibid: 6). There are even people bemoaning the fact that Nepal was never colonised – one 
teenager from Hedangna told me that “some foreign country should get Nepal and develop it. Not India, 
we don’t like the Indians, but maybe the UK” (Interview 39), reminding me of Joan Robinson’s (Edwards 
1999: 12) remark that the only thing worse than being exploited by capitalism is not being exploited by it. 
 
 
Two Brothers 
But there is more to the story of the stolen hose than its close entanglement with the nationalist 
production of development and backwardness. Another layer is added when we consider the central 
position of theft, cunning and deceit in Yamphu history and mythology. As soon as the two brothers 
Minaba and Sepa decide to settle the ridges that are present-day Hedangna and Seduwa, the competition 
for the best arable land starts and a pattern emerges that runs through all the stories I heard about them: 
Whereas Sepa is sincere, diligent and plays by the rules, Minaba is smart, cunning and always in search for 
his own advantage. I heard several versions of this story during my fieldwork, but let me here quote Ann 
Armbrecht Forbes’ (1995: 238-239) account: 
 
There was plenty of land, but there were two of them, and each went off through the jungle 
to claim his land. Sepa is said to have used a durable hard wood to stake the borders of his 
claim. Though strong, this wood looks freshly cut for some time after it has been felled. 
Minaba, on the other hand, is said to have used wood which isn’t nearly so durable but which 
dries quickly, turning black and old even if it was only cut yesterday. He put his stakes next to 
those pounded in by Sepa. 
After marking their boundaries, the brothers met up at the Uling Pokhari (lake) at the top of 
the ridge. They sat down to eat a snack. Minaba had brought along pounded rice; Sepa had 
roasted corn flour. Sepa put a handful of dry flour into his mouth. Just then Minaba asked, 
‘Where is the land you have selected?’ Unable to speak, his mouth stuffed with flour, Sepa 
waved his hand across the land and grunted. Minaba was unable to understand his brother’s 
gesture or his grunt. As he was eating only pounded rice, Minaba was able to speak clearly. ‘I 
want this land,’ he said, and pointed to the gentle slope on the eastern side of the ridge, to the 
land of what is now Hedangna. Sepa protested that he had already claimed that land, and 
that he had put up posts to mark the borders. ‘So have I,’ Minaba asserted. They went off to 
look at the evidence. On arriving at the posts, placed side by side, one old and dry, the other 
new and white, Minaba said, ‘See, my posts are older, they were placed here before yours. 
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This land is mine.’ Though the Sepa brother had placed his posts first, there was no way he 
could dispute Minaba’s claim, and so he set off to settle in the west where the land is steeper, 
drier, and rockier. 
 
Hedangna is known all over the upper Arun valley for two things: its extraordinarily fertile paddy land and 
the ferocious disputes its inhabitants used to have over it. Just north of the village, on a gentle slope facing 
east, the biggest continuous stretch of rice terraces in the region is situated. Until the cadastral survey in 
1994, all of this land was kipat, meaning it officially belonged to the community of kipat holders, i.e. the 
decedents of the first settlers of the area (Sepa and Minaba) who started cultivating the land and building 
the terraces generations ago – the Yamphu. Contrary to all other forms of land title in Nepal, individual 
claims to kipat lands were never written down – at least not in anything resembling an authoritative land 
register. Instead, the ownership of a particular terrace had to be constantly re-enacted and in the case of 
disputed claims, normally the party won the dispute that was able to present the more persuasive case for 
their entitlement. Armbrecht Forbes (ibid: 239) mentions several strategies that have been employed in 
recent disputes: “stones and ridges are renamed, documents created and alliances forged with land, money, 
and marriage, all in the effort to spin the most compelling tale and to convince others to support your 
version.” 
As is indicated in the story of Minaba and Sepa, these disputes occurred mostly between brothers and 
cousins. Traditionally, kipat land was divided between a group of brothers after the death of their father 
and each one had to guard his land as the apple of his eye against encroachment by his closest kin. Only 
half-jokingly, Chun Bahadur once told me that when he was a boy all his male adult relatives slept with 
their thumbs in their fists and their fists in their armpits so that no one could steal their fingerprint and 
forge land documents. After the cadastral survey of 1994 the kipat system was abolished and all the land 
previously held through this system was integrated into the national land register and is now privately 
held. With official land titles and the legalistic security that accompanies them, the continuous 
reproduction of claims over land through performative practices has receded and a fundamentally altered 
form of ownership has emerged. 
 
 
Cardamom – Change that does occur 
However, there is another factor that substantially diminished the importance of paddy land: the 
introduction of cardamom cultivation to the area about twenty years ago. This highly lucrative perennial 
spice plant finds perfect conditions in the middle altitudes of the Arun valley around the proposed dam 
site: a long, extremely wet monsoon, mild winters and lots of forest cover. A small group of innovative 
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peasants brought it to the Arun valley from the Limbu areas further east and it took only one decade until 
most of the households with access to suitable land had started to cultivate it. Now, for the first time, 
peasants can produce a cash crop locally they can sell to an international market and earn more money 
with it than with work migration abroad through manpower agencies. After saffron and vanilla, 
cardamom is the third most expensive spice in the world. Added to that is the fact that cardamom is an 
“extremely high-value, high return, low-volume and non-perishable crop – the last two being of great 
advantage in remote parts of Nepal where transportation is limited” (Fitzpatrick 2011: 145). 
Due to this sudden change in local economy, the Yamphu villages have experienced an unprecedented 
economic boom. This is further accentuated by an incredible rise in prices in the last years due to dramatic 
crop failure in the more established cardamom areas further east where a pest has been destroying an ever-
increasing part of the harvest every year. Whereas Ian Fitzpatrick (2011: 146) reports prices of 200 to 300 
Nepalese rupees per kilo for Taplejung district, during the harvest of 2011, prices in Khandbari were 
approaching 1,000 NPR. Only twenty years ago, this was completely different. Several of my friends from 
Hedangna in their thirties confirmed that when they were children, the rice harvest in most of the families 
would only last for six to eight months, so their fathers had to leave the village in winter to earn money to 
get their families through the year. Most of the men one generation older told me stories about their work 
migration to India, often involving picking tea in Darjeeling and working in construction in Bihar and 
Assam. 
As cardamom can only grow under the shade of thick forest cover, a total shift in the valuation of land has 
taken place: now the access to forested land decides over a household’s prosperity. Land suitable for 
cardamom production in the Yamphu villages falls broadly under three categories: community forest, 
privately held forest and abandoned dry terraces (bāri [N]). As the first category is under the authority of 
the Makalu-Barun National Park and cardamom cultivation generally prohibited, there is hardly any 
production there, according to my interlocutors. While encroachment on these forests for firewood, 
timber and non-timber forest products is very common and national park enforcement of regulations in 
the area has been unsystematic since its inception (Armbrecht Forbes 1995: 318-319), the fact that 
seedlings have to be bought and cherished leaves anybody daring to set up their illegalised plantation in 
community forest with a high financial risk. 
Therefore, the overwhelming majority of plantations are set up in the other two categories. Although 
cardamom has led to a considerable economic boom in the whole region, this sudden wealth is distributed 
highly unevenly in the Yamphu villages as in the adjacent communities. Unsurprisingly, it is the more 
affluent households who have better access to both private forest and abandoned dry terraces. Given the 
centrality of kipat until 1994 and the history of the Yamphu as first settlers of the area, all the privately 
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held forest land above the villages is in fact kipat land that had been cleared for rotational planting of 
millet and corn several generations ago. Apparently, households with enough permanent (i.e. terraced) 
fields to sustain themselves later stopped clearing these plots every couple of years and let the forest 
regrow. Thereby, they also secured a private supply of forest products very close to their homes whereas 
poorer families who had to rely on these plots for food production had to take on much longer walks to 
retrieve firewood, medicinal plants and timber. 
 
 
Ill. 10: During a break in the cardamom plantation, 27 October 2010. 
 
Something very similar happened in the 1980s and 1990s with the higher altitude dry terraces that again 
had been used to grow millet and corn. With the growing availability of money through increased work 
migration, the richer households equipped with more land stopped this cultivation pattern. In the case of 
Ala and Uling a particularly big stretch of dry terraces above the village was abandoned. People told me 
that it became too arduous to continue tilling these terraces more than an hour uphill from the villages for 
the small harvest that could be made. It took the forest only a few years to reclaim them. By now, an area 
of several hectares has been turned into a more or less continuous cardamom plantation. These ‘terrace 
plantations’ offer very favourable harvesting conditions compared to cardamom planted in forest that had 
not been previously terraced, as I can tell from own experience. 
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The time for harvesting starts soon after the end of the rainy season, before the rice harvest. In late 
October and early November Ala, Uling and (though to a lesser extent) Hedangna suddenly seem deserted 
with the bigger part of the adult population moving to the plantations – or as people say: ‘in the 
cardamom’ (alainchimaa [N]) where the harvested seed capsules are directly smoked over open fire on 
large, roofed racks. During harvest time, one household member is at the plantation at all times, guarding 
the fire as well as the harvested and the unharvested produce. Friends and relatives visit each other at their 
temporary shelters and the forest is full of laughter, singing and whistling. 
As mentioned, this new cash crop has for the first time enabled peasants to earn money without physically 
leaving their villages and many young men have to reconsider their plans for work migration to the Gulf 
countries or Malaysia because now staying at home seems to be the more profitable alternative. On the 
other hand, the mushrooming of cardamom plantations in the Arun valley has led to new forms of 
regional work migration. By now, many of the households with large cardamom plantations in the area, 
especially in the village of Hatiya two days north of Hedangna, grow much more than they could harvest 
themselves and therefore rely heavily on day labourers. Most of them are men from the poorer Rai villages 
in the side valleys that so far have not taken up the new crop themselves. 
To sum up, the introduction of cardamom in the upper Arun valley has been the most important 
intervention for socio-economic change in decades: the unprecedented influx of money, the establishment 
of regional work migration patterns and the emerging transition of peasants engaged in subsistence 
farming into cardamom farmers producing for export. This hints at the biggest change that is already 
graspable in narratives on local middlemen who have accumulated fabulous fortunes in only a few years 
and less fortunate others who lost years of savings in one bad cardamom deal: a vastly increased social 
stratification and economic polarisation between those who have the resources to participate in this boom 
and those who do not. With Ian Fitzpatrick (2011) we can understand this change in the mode of 
production of a set of already better off households as a process of rural class formation. 
Ann Armbrecht Forbes’ (1995) ethnography of land disputes among the Yamphu shows a remarkably 
high level of economic homogeneity within the group. While the kipat system required men to constantly 
reproduce their claims over land performatively and often involved cunning practices that turned brothers 
into enemies, it on the other hand also constituted a system of fine checks and balances that made it 
difficult for richer families to institutionalise their hegemonic position through watertight land titles over 
generations. This is not to say that inherited inequality was not a topic in Yamphu history (and of course 
one has immediately to add marginalised non-kipatiya, i.e. dalit households), but the combined effect of 
the establishment of an individualised, non-performative system of land ownership and the introduction 
of a highly lucrative cash crop has led to a completely new way of doing agriculture, business and society. 
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This process, however, is only in the making and hints to a future development similar to what Ian 
Fitzpartrick (2011) describes for a Limbu village in Taplejung district further east where cardamom was 
already introduced in the 1960s. His ethnography shows how specific families were able to become so 
wealthy that they could afford to buy land in the lowlands and establish a kind of “satellite village” there 
while others have not benefitted considerably from this new source of income. 
 
 
The question of modern life 
As already discussed, even with these changed economic circumstances, many of my interlocutors still 
hold on to the opinion that development is not happening in the upper Arun valley. This also became 
apparent when the conversation turned to the question of what qualities a modern life would characterise. 
In Num, I asked Mandira about her opinion on this issue, while she and her sisters were preparing to 
attend a night market in a hamlet nearby. As many other people, the young tailor answered this question 
categorically with: “I don’t know anything about modern life” (Interview 40). From those who had an idea 
what that could mean I got a whole lot of intriguing glimpses: Mandira’s younger sister answered with 
“enough clothes and food – and education” (ibid). Others mentioned better health care, 
telecommunication and sanitation, a road, cars and mobility in general, changing agricultural techniques 
and new crops, most importantly cardamom, new ways of dressing and hair styling, less fighting and 
drinking and a lot of suvidha – facilities like television, cinema and computers. One teacher from 
Hedangna brought up gender equality while his colleague stated: “modern life is a relative concept, it 
always depends on the national context. Often it means an excessive investment in shopping” (Interview 
41). Ajib, another teacher I met in Khandbari, had a similar understanding: “In modern life, everybody 
wants luxury, people want to live a standard life, they want quick earnings, no matter whether they are 
legal or illegal. People want to migrate to the city; everybody wants every sort of comfort – a hi-fi life” 
(Interview 42). A lot of my male interlocutors talked about business opportunities, like Durga who said 
that a modern life would mean that it would become easier to get a cheaper price, buy wholesale and sell 
agricultural products to the market (Interview 43). 
When I asked people whether they felt that they themselves were leading a modern life, a lot of different 
opinions were expressed as well – but except for Mandira’s sister nobody answered in the affirmative. Her 
confident “Yes, sewing is modern life” was, however, followed by a fit of laughter in which the three 
women around her joined in. After some instances she contradicted: “No, actually it is not” (Interview 40). 
Hem Kumar was of the same opinion but more specific in defining his life as non-modern through a list 
of things he lacked: “We have no computers, no phone, no road, no electricity, no vehicle, no hospital, no 
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police. This is a traditional life. In modern life all these things are available locally” (Interview 44). 
Bilsimaia, again, answered: “We are hard working, going to the forest, carrying firewood, growing jams - 
what do I know about these things” (Interview 45)? Others were less categorical in their self-assessment 
and acknowledged that things had been changing. Take for example Ram Bahadur who said: “Now my 
life is much more modern than when I was young. Then I only used to wear shorts, now I have trousers” 
(Interview 46). Sher Bahadur replied: “a little bit, because my children are going to school, unlike me. And 
the clothing and food have changed, too” (Interview 47). 
To many of my better-educated dialogue partners, the question was not solely related to the access to 
modern infrastructure and amenities, but even more strongly connected to individual processes of 
changing to a different kind of subjectivity. When I asked Rudip, the teacher who identified bikas as a 
relational concept whether he would lead a modern life, his answer emphasised how difficult and arduous 
this process can be and showed a certain inescapability from this work: 
 
I don’t think so, but we have to change with the time. But it’s very hard to move with the 
time. If I go to Kathmandu or Biratnagar, if I don’t change, I will lose a lot of opportunities. 
But I don’t think I have to take drugs and so on. But with my clothing and working style I 
have to be up-to-date in my personality (Interview 41). 
 
 
Sahlins’s Develop-man 
What to make of all these different, often contradicting accounts? A helpful proposition to understand 
these intertwined conditions and how they change the way the people I talked to perceive themselves is 
put forward by Marshall Sahlins. His work on the develop-man (2000, 2005) aims to provide us with a 
way to conceptualise indigenous ways of coming to terms with capitalism and catches the double-
sidedness of development as both the accumulation of newly introduced consumer items and the re-
formation of individuals into a different kind of persons: 
 
‘Develop-man’ is the neo-Melanesian term for ‘development,’ but it would not be wrong to 
re-pidginise it back to English as ‘the development of man’, since the project to which it 
refers is the use of foreign wealth in the expansion of feasting, politicking, subsidising kinship 
and other activities that make up the local conception of a human existence (Sahlins 2000: 
48). 
 
His material from the Pacific shows that kings and chiefs very soon developed clear and selective tastes for 
the specific Western things they wanted and how they could use them to strengthen their claims to power: 
“not just any old beads and baubles, such as European folklore then and now supposed were ‘good enough 
to please the savage’” (Sahlins 2005: 28). On the contrary, the European traders had to comply with the 
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demands of their trading partners and the items desired by them – like Hudson Bay blankets in Northwest 
America or sperm whale teeth in Fiji – were sought after for their abilities to reproduce indigenous 
societies, often as powerful tokens in already established gift economies. From a Non-Western point of 
view, then, Sahlins argues that develop-man is “the enrichment of their own ideas of what mankind is all 
about” (ibid: 24). He contrasts this active engagement of Pacific elites in the colonial trade regime that 
span the whole ocean and provided e.g. Hawaiian nobilities with the finest Chinese silk and English 
broadcloths with later emerging notions of modernist development when this selective approach to 
Western things changed to an eclectic one. More importantly, however, he identifies the decisive role 
humiliation plays in this shift from develop-man to development: “To modernize, the people must first 
learn to hate what they already have, what they have always considered their well-being” (ibid: 38). 
Development thereby becomes something other. 
In the case of the upper Arun valley, a very similar process is behind the way people perceive their lack of 
development. Although by now the discourse on bikas is on everybody’s lips, there is reason to suggest 
that this is a rather recent phenomenon. When I was discussing the issue with Klaus Seeland who 
conducted fieldwork in the area in 1978/79, he remembered that in those days nobody was invoking the 
concept (Seeland 2011). Hence, his accounts of local economy (Seeland 1980a, 1980b) represent early 
example of a post-development approach: Because all items of everyday use could be produced from the 
overabundance of locally available bamboo species, he argues, there was simply no use for the introduction 
of modern consumer goods made out of plastic that would replace sustainable, locally produced objects 
and spoil the pristine landscape. To be sure, the narratives of high levels of food insecurity and the long 
history of labour migration to compensate for insufficient rice harvest I collected during my fieldwork 
render this account of self-sufficiency highly unrealistic. But the lack of a local discourse on bikas backs 
Stacy Pigg’s argument that state interventions played a decisive role in implementing the imaginary of 
backwardness in places like the upper Arun valley. Many of my interlocutors were convinced that they 
could measure the underdevelopment of their villages in temporal terms, defining the distance to the West 
somewhere between 100 and 500 years. This strong imaginary of backwardness leads people to 
categorically deny the development of their villages although my discussion of cardamom farming shows 
that it is actually happening with increasing speed. 
 
 
Conclusion 
From the perspective of what bikas has promised and failed to deliver, however, this feeling seems 
completely understandable: the ease of life and increased connectivity. The previous chapter focused on 
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the most important intervention in this respect, the promise of a road – and the denial of this promise 
with the cancellation of the dam. But a connection is more than a mere convenience: it is also a proof of 
inclusion into the networks of a modern nation state, a promise of participation in the mechanisms of this 
state, even if this is for the most part confined to being managed as a population and not connected to a 
participation in civil society, as I have argued in Chapter 3. This seems especially relevant when we 
consider the long history of marginalisation that indigenous communities in rural Nepal have experienced. 
As became evident in the conversation with Angrita and Norbu I mentioned earlier, despite the 
introduction of affordable solar panels, the couple still insists on the connection of their household to the 
national electricity grid. Their main reason is the pragmatic argument that their system is too weak to 
provide them with light and charge their mobile phone simultaneously. But people in rural Nepal are fully 
aware of the long hours of load shedding in the national grid and the example of Khandbari shows that a 
connection to it can actually decrease the power supply in a given community: until 2011, the town’s 
households experienced practically uninterrupted electricity services, provided by an isolated micro-hydro 
power plant. Now, with the newly established connection to the grid, people experience the long hours of 
rolling blackouts like all other consumers. Ironically, this new connection actively leads to an evacuation of 
electricity and leaves them with less power than in their previous – unconnected – state. 
This is only one more example of the contradictory narratives on development and backwardness I 
encountered in the villages of the upper Arun valley. While many of my interlocutors were deeply 
disappointed about the progress of their living standard and seemed convinced that development will 
never arrive in their villages, I had a completely different perception. Every time I returned, economic 
development seemed to have accelerated: cardamom production had increased, more families had changed 
their thatched roofs to corrugated iron or installed solar panels and even a boarding school had opened in 
Hedangna that taught in English. 
The other paradox about the ways people tell stories on development is connected to the question of who 
is to blame for its non-arrival. Whether it was outsiders trying to appropriate the natural and spiritual 
resources of the region or its inhabitants themselves, was often changing in a matter of minutes. This is 
why I kept on referring time and again to the conversation with the woman Chun Bahadur and I met in 
the forest. While it started with her claim that these cunning foreigners found something precious in the 
ground they took away with them, leaving “the village in a mess,” she then impetuously switched to the 
story of the two peasants – like the two brothers Sepa and Minaba one simple-minded, the other cunning 
– and their combined efforts to disconnect the village’s water supply (Interview 30). 
By focusing on these two narratives, this chapter is an attempt to discuss the ways people in the villages 
around the dam site have come to terms with the uncertainty concerning the dam non/construction and 
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the apparent impossibility of development. At the outset, I argued that the story of the stolen statue could 
be explained through the widespread notions of a spiritual substance that is residing in the ground and 
maintaining the fertility of the land and therefore the survival of the people who live off it. To understand 
how the foreign engineers who did exploratory drillings for the hydropower project in 1989 became 
accused of stealing this substance, I referred to the specific way the communities in the area came to know 
white men: the first had arrived in the mid-1950s in search of the yeti and were soon followed by more 
conventional biologists who trekked up the Arun for its famed biodiversity. Their interest in the natural 
treasures of the area confirmed local people’s understanding of the hidden wealth and the foreigners’ 
practice of collecting specimens to be taken abroad established their extractive concupiscence early on. 
These encounters, combined with the invention of Arun-3, were instrumental in the establishment of the 
Makalu-Barun National Park, the first large-scale development intervention in the area. As in countless 
other examples (and despite its participatory approach that was indeed on the forefront of a more inclusive 
implantation process, not only in Nepal) communities felt the national park as an intrusion into their 
rights over forests and pastures while the promise of a growing number of trekking tourists visiting their 
villages turned out to become true only for a tiny fraction – and even there the numbers are much lower 
than expected. 
Through a discussion of what constitutes a modern life and the recent economic boom, finally, I arrived at 
Sahlins’s understanding of development as a process of humiliation. I argued with Stacy Pigg that in 
Nepal the two seemingly opposing imaginations of development and backwardness constantly reproduce 
each other and that it is mainly the government who taught its own rural citizens that they were backward 
– in order to develop them. This, I believe, is the reason why people despite the tremendous economic 
boom thanks to cardamom so often insist that there is no development in the area.
	   
	   
7 The next attempt 
The reincarnation of the Arun-3 hydropower project 
 
 
When I was led into his office, Akhil greeted me with exquisite politeness, as his two predecessors had 
done on my previous visits to Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited’s Arun-3 Hydropower Project Office. 
Despite my unannounced appearance, he immediately put aside what he was working on and asked me 
whether I would like some tea. The office was situated on the first floor of an inconspicuous building in 
the bazaar of Khandbari, the main town of Nepal’s Sankhuwasabha district. It was a sedate afternoon in 
January 2011 and millet was spread out to dry in the sun on a bamboo matt in front of the house. 
Downstairs, in the Public Information Centre, I had run into Sanjay, an Indian engineer approximately 
my age I knew from an encounter in the jungle above Ghorepani some weeks before. At this small strip of 
land next to the river in Diding VDC the powerhouse for the hydropower plant is supposed to be 
constructed. At the office, we started talking about his impressions from the trip up the valley and he told 
me that the biggest problem for his interaction with the people around the powerhouse construction site 
had been their lack of information. When I asked him if SJVN was going to change that once the Indian 
company would obtain an official agreement to construct the power plant from the government of Nepal, 
he said: “Actually I’m not the right person to comment on that. I will ask you to meet our head of 
office…I will take you to him” (Interview 48). 
Leaving Akhil’s office one hour later, my initial question was still unanswered. As with most other topics 
we discussed, his reply was very similar to the one his subordinate had given: “I am a civil engineer, I am 
not the right person to talk to about that” (Interview 49). But even without giving clear answers, he was 
eager to discuss all my questions while we had several cups of tea and what felt like two pounds of 
mandarins. In the previous months, I had closely interacted with water activists and hydropower experts in 
Kathmandu as well as the activists from the Yamphu Kirat Samaj (YKS), an NGO representing the 
interests of the Yamphu Rai. During these conversations, a number of critical points about the recent 
reinvention of the dam had been raised. Confronted with these, Akhil went at great length to convince me 
of the mutual benefit of the current situation for both countries and the affected population. He referred 
to SJVN’s corporate social responsibility policies and their outstanding track record concerning social and 
environmental measures in connection to the construction of the Nathpa Jhakri project in Himachal 
Pradesh. This dam is currently the hydropower scheme with the largest installed capacity in India. On 
several occasions, he stressed his company’s commitment to developing hydropower resources not only in 
The next attempt 
- 172 - 
India but all over the Himalaya. As a state-owned corporation, he argued, they were not exclusively 
focused on making profit. Instead, SJVN and its involvement in Arun-3 was also part of the Indian 
foreign aid strategy that would be aimed at developing South Asia as a whole. Akhil’s depiction of India as 
a benevolent neighbour was diametrically opposed to the picture Bipin had drawn, for instance. He was 
one of the hydropower experts I had met in Kathmandu and he described SJVN’s activities as a clearly 
neocolonial attempt to appropriate Nepalese water resources for electricity production while Nepalese 
citizens had to cope with long hours of daily outage. 
This chapter will focus on the recent reinvention of Arun-3 by the Indian SJVN. It juxtaposes the 
narratives of the company’s engineers, Kathmandu-based water activists and the indigenous activists who 
grew up in the villages around the dam site. To conclude, I will briefly discuss the recent re-emergence of 
Western NGOs in the Arun-3 arena. Looking at these four groups of actors I will argue that while the 
position of the engineers and the Western activists is entirely antithetical, both operate with a similar 
imaginary of the indigenous other: a subject that has to be taken care of, or to use Chatterjee’s term again, 
somebody who has to be included into political society. Drawing on discussions I had with staff from 
SJVN I will show the close proximity of their accounts about their work with the official narrative of 
Indian foreign aid that is consistently downplaying its strategic interests. The engineers reframe their 
company’s acquisition of water resources abroad as a form of contribution to their neighbour’s 
development. I will attempt to show, however, that the reincarnated Arun-3 points towards trends on a 
global scale: With the growing energy demand, the emergence of a multi-polar world order and the rise of 
regional powers like India or Brazil, a new foreign aid paradigm is taking shape. 
The water activists, on the other hand, despite their clear reservations against the recent project design, see 
very little room for a mobilisation among the urban middle-classes in the current ‘energy crisis’ that results 
in up to fourteen hours of rolling blackouts every day during winter. Reminiscent of their previous 
problems with the people in the upper Arun valley (see Chapter 3), they still abstain from forging alliances 
with organisations like the YKS and restrict their actions to the Supreme Court and the parliamentary 
system. Their opposition is informed by fifty years of water-related treaties between Nepal and India that 
are predominantly in favour of the latter. To make sense of this history, they claim that the political class 
in Nepal is too closely entangled with their Indian counterparts and the ‘national interest’ is sacrificed by 
the elites in order to maintain the benefits they receive from Indian sources. 
The indigenous activists from the Yamphu Kirat Samaj, finally, are fighting a struggle of recognition on 
multiple levels. In principal, they are cautiously positive about the dam, but the experience that neither 
SJVN nor the government seems to acknowledge their demand to be included in a dialogue about the 
project gives rise to serious concerns about the trustworthiness of the state and the company. Moreover, in 
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the context of the imminent, yet still absolutely diffuse federal reform the dam project has become a site 
for territorial claims over the upper Arun valley – not only towards the state but in opposition to other 
indigenous groups as well.  
 
 
Donors emerging and re-emerging 
When I asked Akhil how he estimated the people’s opinion about the reincarnation of the project in the 
villages around the dam site, he told me: “As far as we are concerned, the people we have talked to are in 
favour of Arun-3” (Interview 46). When I demurred that I had experienced a lot of mistrust and concerns 
about it as well, he reduced that to the long and controversial history of the dam: “At the time when we 
start the physical work, this mistrust will go away. Because they have not been able to see anything on the 
ground, that is why they are misunderstanding our commitment” (ibid). Throughout our conversation, he 
was consistently arguing for an understanding of SJVN’s involvement in the project as a win-win situation: 
While India was receiving the bulk of the generated energy at the outset, after only 30 years, Nepal would 
gain control over the whole output of the plant, free of cost. By that time, SJVN would have refinanced 
the dam and its transfer into public ownership would be an Indian contribution to development in Nepal. 
And while India has been a long-standing donor of foreign aid to Nepal, recent changes to the global 
system of development assistance have also had its repercussions on this relationship. 
In November 2012, the British Department for International Development (DFID) announced that no 
new financial aid grants will be made to India and that the last programs underway will be completed by 
2015 (DFID India 2012). Its offices in China were already closed in 2011 while both India and China 
have increased their development assistance to other states in the global South manifold in recent years. 
Two months before DFID’s statement and after nearly one year of political controversy, French President 
François Holland announced that his government would accept an offer by the Qatari government to 
invest 50 million euros to fight unemployment in neglected suburban areas that are predominantly 
inhabited by Muslim immigrants (Vandoorne 2012). These incidents show how profoundly the terms and 
conditions of foreign aid have changed in recent years: former recipients of international development 
cooperation have suddenly turned into donors, and vice versa while a whole set of new actors seem to have 
emerged on the scene. Thus, the post-World-War-II system of foreign aid that for decades has been 
played by the rules of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) is no longer the only game in town. 
As Emma Mawdsley (2012: 4-6) elaborates, a host of labels for these actors have been in use recently: new 
or emerging donors, non-traditional, non-Western and non-DAC donors as well as postcolonial donors. 
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For lack of a better term most commentators agree to subsume these actors under the umbrella term of 
‘emerging donors.’ Thereby, they invoke the labels of emerging markets or emerging economies that have 
come into fashion during the 1990s with the promise of risky but potentially very lucrative investment 
attached to it. A look at the International Monetary Fund’s (2012: 3) list of emerging economies shows 
that indeed almost all of the countries labelled as emerging donors are actually part of it. Generally, 
emerging donors are considered to consist of three subgroups of national economies: the rising global 
powers China, India and Brazil; regional powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia or South Africa; and post-
socialist countries like Poland and Russia. 
But for a number of reasons, the term proves to be problematic. While there is no doubt that the countries 
subsumed under these awkward headings provide an ever increasing part of the global aid – currently 
about 10-12% (Mawdsley 2012: 9) – it leaves us with the assumption that these countries have only 
recently started to engage in foreign aid. Whereas this is true for a small number of them – like the post-
socialist member states of the European Union – countries like India or China have been active as donors 
since the 1950s. While a small number of scholars (e.g. Bräutigam 1998; Dietz and Houtkamp 1995; 
Banerjee 1982) has been working on these donors for decades, Mawdsley (2012: 8-9) points to the fact 
that their recent ‘discovery’ by mainstream development studies, political science and economics is for the 
better part connected to a previous systematic neglect of anything that could have threatened the neat 
dichotomy of donors and recipients during the hey-day of developmentalism. As Vijay Prashad (2008) or 
Pankaj Mishra (2012) show, the projects of the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
were from their inception building on a strong commitment to South-South cooperation as one of its 
foundations. On the other hand, political leaders in the smaller postcolonial states were not blind to the 
strings attached to the benevolence of the big postcolonial states. Take for example Jomo Kenyatta who 
already touched upon this threat during a speech in 1965 when he said: “It is naïve to think that there is 
no danger of imperialism from the East. In world power politics, the East has as much designs upon us as 
the West, and would like us to serve their own interests” (Kenyatta 1968: 276). 
Recently, the shifting landscape of foreign aid has gained considerable attention among anthropologists 
and a big number of research projects are underway at this moment (e.g. Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka 2013; 
Cesarino 2012; Giese and Thiel 2012; Gray 2011). 
 
 
India as emerging donor? 
SJVN is a Public Sector Undertaking and a joint venture of the governments of India and Himachal 
Pradesh. It operates the currently biggest hydropower plant in the country, the Nathpa Jhakri dam in 
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Himachal. With the Arun-3 project, it was the first state-owned enterprise to win a dam contract abroad 
on open competition basis. According to their website, twelve more projects in India and Bhutan are 
under way, while company representatives also mentioned negotiations for contracts as far afield as 
Georgia or Panama. Whereas the implementation of infrastructure development through state-owned 
companies is a characteristic of recent shifts in Indian foreign aid policy, the engagement with 
development in Nepal and South Asia as a whole has a longstanding tradition. India was one of the 
original signatories of the Colombo Plan in 1950, an initiative for regional cooperation. The first grant to 
Nepal was already given in the following year to help build Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan Airport (Mawdsely 
2012: 71). During the 1950s, India’s contributions were only marginally lower than those from the United 
States (Rana 1971: 650).  
This early entry into foreign aid can be explained by three main reasons: Firstly, Indian nationalists, not 
least Jawaharlal Nehru himself, felt a strong commitment to South-South cooperation in the wake of 
decolonisation while at the same time they were also convinced that India would soon catch up with the 
industrialised countries and claim a leading role in the postcolony. Secondly, they wanted to create support 
in the region, given India’s difficult position between West and East Pakistan (present-day Pakistan and 
Bangladesh) after the partition of the British Raj in 1947. A third reason was the attempt to create strong 
buffer states between herself and China (Mawdsley 2012: 72-73). 
Therefore, one could argue, that India is not an emerging donor at all, but became part of the foreign aid 
donor countries almost immediately after its own coming into being. But only recently its own status has 
been changing from a recipient to a donor country. As Subhash Agrawal (2007: 3) reminds us, in the mid-
1980s, India was the World’s largest recipient of foreign aid. Now foreign aid constitutes less than half a 
per cent of the gross domestic product. All that said, it is important to note that the official Indian 
position is to categorically avoid the term donor and to instead insist on the position that its foreign aid 
initiatives are to be understood as international cooperation (Mawdsley 2012: 7). 
The actual amount of development assistance that India provides is difficult to estimate, however. 
Although Andreas Fuchs & Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati (2013) have recently presented an 
econometrical analysis of Indian foreign aid based on data from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) 
for the period 2008-2010, Agrawal (2007: 5) maintains that the official figures hide as much as they 
reveal, mainly for three reasons: not all foreign aid is registered under clear budget headings, often money 
is channelled through other institutions as well – as for example in the case of SJVN’s hydropower 
development in Bhutan – and beyond that, India does not follow any standard definition of official 
development assistance (ODA). That said, the calculations by Fuchs and Vadlamannati based on the 
official numbers still are a useful approximation to get a broad picture: 
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India’s aid budget rose from 13.4 crores Indian rupees (about US$ 40.3 million in constant 
2000 prices) in 1966, to 2,917.4 crores Indian rupees (US$ 362.8 million in constant 2000 
prices) in 2010, which is roughly 0.04% of India’s GDP. This amount, which only captures 
MEA aid, is comparable to Austria’s total ODA (US$ 395.2 million in constant 2000 prices) 
(Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013: 112). 
 
According to them, the overwhelming majority (89.7%) of Indian aid went to its South Asian neighbours 
(with the notable exception of Pakistan), followed by South East Asian countries (5.5%) and 2.2% that 
were allocated to twenty-two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (ibid: 114). Julie Walz and Vijaya 
Ramachandran (2011: 12), on the other hand, maintain that African states receive 15% of the Indian 
foreign aid, based on a 2008 study of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, while Hisahiro 
Kondoh et al. (2010: 33) end up with 4.4% of direct governmental aid to African states for the period 
between 2002 and 2008. They, however, point to the fact that assistance for Africa is predominantly 
provided through loans and lines of credit distributed via the India EXIM Bank (ibid: 31). This ambiguity 
concerning the statistical data available sets India clearly apart from the camp of non-emerging donors. 
The repeated announcement (Economist 2011; Agrawal 2007) of the plan to establish a central foreign 
aid agency similar to the British DFID or the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), however, points towards an approximation of Indian ODA to the aid and accountancy practices 
of the DAC donors. 
 
 
India, the strategic non-donor 
Looking more closely at where exactly India’s development cooperation is aimed, we can see one main 
investment that exceeds all other budgetary items by far: hydropower schemes in Bhutan. Over decades, 
Bhutan has been the top recipient of direct government aid – combining the expenditures from 2002 
through 2008 it received 50.1% of the total aid, followed by Afghanistan (10.4%), Sri Lanka (6.2%) and 
Nepal (5.8%) (Kondoh et al. 2010: 33). And the overwhelming majority of this money has been used to 
build dams that secure India’s energy demand, all of which were constructed through a 60 % grant and 
40% soft loan model. Bhutan currently exports almost 80% of the generated electricity to India and even 
of the remaining 20%, three quarters is consumed by Indian-owned industries in Southern Bhutan right 
next to the border (Gyawali 2010). Unlike Nepal, where the first hydropower plant was already 
constructed in 1911 (Khanal 2012: 21), electricity only arrived in Bhutan in the 1960s (Bisht 2012: 788). 
By now, the Bhutanese model of hydropower development serves as an oft-cited success story to the 
Nepalese public: twice as much installed capacity, over 70% of households with access to electricity (and 
the plan of full electrification by the end of 2013), low prices for local consumers and considerable 
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revenues through the export to India. To many water activists and hydropower experts in Nepal, however, 
this model operates as a dystopian vision for a neocolonial future of Nepal: “The export-oriented path that 
Bhutan has taken cannot be an option for Nepal, unless it forsakes its independent foreign and defence 
policies. From a political-economic perspective, the Bhutanese model is one of neocolonial resource 
extraction” (Gyawali 2010). Beyond these concerns about the country’s sovereignty, Dipak Gyawali points 
to the fact that due to the character of bilateral agreements and the growing domestic demand Bhutan will 
experience some level of scheduled power cuts during dry season until 2016 when the new scheme 
Punatsangchhu-I will come online.  
There is no evidence that Bhutan’s government is trying to reduce its dependence on India. Quite to the 
contrary, with the signing of the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007 and a joint press statement in 
2009, the Indian government confirmed its commitment “to buy 10,000 MW of electricity from Bhutan 
by the year 2020. According to Bhutan’s Tenth Five Year Plan, the hydropower sector is expected to 
contribute 50 per cent of the GDP and 75 per cent of the fiscal revenues by 2020” (Bisht 2012: 788). 
These agreements block any other foreign investors from entering the Bhutanese hydropower sector and 
secure India the control over a potential of 23,760 MW of installed capacity of which only five per cent 
have been harnessed so far (ibid). Hydropower, however, is not the only sector where strategic interests 
guide Indian foreign investments. Agrawal (2007: 7) points to a growing interest for equity oil in Africa 
and describes this topic as the focal point where India’s rivalry with China becomes most evident. The 
recent signing of a memorandum of understanding between the government of Nepal and the Chinese 
Three Gorges Hydropower Corporation on the construction of the 750 MW West Seti hydropower 
project and the fierce political controversies in Nepal triggered by this announcement indicate that a 
similar conflict might start here as well. 
Against these conditions and as I already mentioned, Indian official documents, bureaucrats and political 
actors paint a rather different picture of Indian aid. They are very keen on maintaining that their 
development assistance is all about South-South cooperation and mutual benefit – contrary to the 
intentions of other donors, as they say. In a recent newspaper article, Biswajit Dhar who is the director of 
the Delhi-based Research and Information System for Developing Countries, stated: 
 
Donors’ clubs like the OECD have attached conditionalities to the assistance they offer. 
Some countries are known to use aid to further their commercial interests. Countries like 
India have been opposing these conditions. While the OECD countries have been talking of 
the effectiveness of the aid, India, for example, has stressed on development effectiveness. 
India has also laid stress on using local resources and local expertise like in Afghanistan... 
India can try and help redefine the rules governing rendering assistance (Roche 2012). 
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Whenever I had the opportunity to talk with staff from SJVN about the Arun-3 project, they would as 
well uphold the priority of good relationships with their neighbours over the sole economic viability of the 
projects in question. Often, they maintained that not only SJVN, as a public sector undertaking, has an 
ethical obligation to development in South Asia but also they themselves as civil engineers. One of them 
told me: “When I walk up to the dam site and see the children playing in the dirt, my eyes are filled with 
tears” (Interview 50). In line with leading Nepalese politicians they stress the advantage of the outsourcing 
of the project to SJVN. And when I doubted the purely economic intentions when an Indian state-owned 
company intends to construct a dam thirty kilometres south of the Chinese border in one of the few 
valleys that break through the Himalayan main ridge and thereby facilitate easy transit between India and 
Tibet, they strongly denied any geo-strategic dimension to their activities abroad.  
 
 
Build Own Operate Transfer  
The memorandum of understanding between the government of Nepal and SJVN from March 2008 
states that the Indian company will build the power plant, the access road and the transmission line at 
their own account while the Nepalese government will procure the necessary land and hand it over to the 
company. In return,  
 
SJVN agrees to provide 21.9…percent of monthly generated power and energy from the 
Project…free of costs…GoN [Government of Nepal] agrees to grant the licenses for 
generation and transmission of Electricity to SJVN for the development and operation of the 
Project for a period of thirty years...SJVN shall...handover the ownership of the Project to the 
GoN, free of cost, at the end of such period” (MoWR and SJVN 2008: 3-7). 
 
In the discursive realm of ‘new public management’ this ownership structure is termed as BOOT. 
According to Bengt Hallmans and Christer Stenberg (1999: 110), in such an arrangement 
 
normally an organization acts on behalf of a public entity to provide service to the customers 
for a specified period of time…BOOT type projects combine the design, financing, 
construction and operation into one undertaking as a private sector initiative. They are 
normally organized as a joint venture in the form of a concession company involving 
engineers and architects, contractors or developers…and an operator.” 
 
BOOT is one of the four basic categories of public-private-partnership (PPP) financing models. 
According to Jane Broadbent and Richard Laughlin (2004), the term PPP was developed in the United 
Kingdom and introduced in 1997 following the election of Toni Blair. The Labour government localised 
these arrangements in the context of their ‘Third Way,’ but the basic framework had already been initiated 
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by the Conservative government in 1992 “in response to a shortage of resources for infrastructure 
investment” (ibid: 6). Hans Van Ham and Joop Koppenjan (2001: 598) formally define PPP as 
“cooperation of some sort of durability between public and private actors in which they jointly develop 
products and services and share risks, costs, and resources which are connected with these products.” 
Graeme Hodge and Carsten Greve (2010), on the other hand, claim that the definition of PPP remains 
cloudy and commentaries on the topic tend to be highly polarised. While its advocates see it as a new 
governance tool and hail it as “the main alternative to contracting out and privatization” (Hodge and 
Greve 2007: 545), critics understand it merely as a language game that is only used to avoid exactly these 
contentious terms by replacing them with the more inclusive grammar of partnership (Linder 1999).  
Apart from that, recent research has relativized the claim that cooperation between the public and the 
private sector is something new and specific to late liberal circumstances by reminding us on historical 
examples of partnership. Roger Wettenhall (2003: 92) mentions the fact that “163 out of 197 vessels in 
Drake’s fleet which defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588 were privately owned, serving under contract to 
the Admiralty” while Gautam Pingle (2011) reports a BOOT arrangement for the water supply of Fort 
Saint George in Chennai between the British East India Company and a certain Captain George Baker in 
1771. Speaking of this very company, one might come to the conclusion that a big part of the history of 
early European colonialism can in fact be read as a manifestation of early modern PPP – with authorities 
for the private parties that exceeded those in contemporary contracts by far. 
But such a reading suffers from a severe flaw: it takes a modern understanding of the differences between 
corporations and states, between the private and the public in such a partnership, and imposes it on a 
historical condition without calling these assumptions of sovereignty into question. Against the 
widespread opinion that the British East India Company only became a political entity after its military 
victories in India in the second half of the eighteenth century, Philip Stern (2011) argues instead that the 
Company was a body politic from its inception in 1600. Against typical descriptions of the Company as 
quasi-governmental or state-like, he upholds that the Company’s characteristics were not a “strange 
absurdity” as Adam Smith noted, but typical for its time: “an early modern world filled with a variety of 
corporate bodies politic and hyphenated, hybrid, overlapping, and composite forms of sovereignty” (ibid: 
2). 
Coming back to our case at hand, the BOOT agreement between the government of Nepal and SJVN is 
still awaiting final approval. In 2012, it was declared one of fourteen flagship projects that will be 
negotiated by the newly established Nepal Investment Board, but despite the announcement that a Project 
Development Agreement would be signed by Mid-July 2013, so far the negotiations have not been 
completed (Republica 2013a). Already the signing of the memorandum of understanding (MoWR and 
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SJVN 2008), however, has prompted strong opposition and legal action. Similarly to the situation in the 
1990s, the fiercest critics of Arun-3’s reincarnation are not found in the upper Arun valley, but in 
Kathmandu and abroad. 
 
 
“Damn stupid!” The water activists’ stance 
Despite their ambivalent feelings about the dam, most of the people I talked to around the dam site see it 
as an opportunity for increased connectivity and economic growth, as the two previous chapters showed. 
Even when asked whether they approve of the fact that an Indian company will construct it, only very few 
expressed their objection. One of the first persons I spoke to during my first trip to the Arun valley in 
2008 was Shyam, then-chairperson of the Arun-3 Committee in Num. I was surprised to hear that he 
“heartily welcomes the project” (Interview 48) without forgetting to mention negative effects that will 
come alongside the road and employment opportunities. And when I asked him what he felt about the 
involvement of the Indian SJVN, he did not seem particularly worried about that, but instead stated: “Our 
concern is not so much with the company as with the Nepalese government. We don’t care if the company 
is Indian or American, we need security that the government will compensate our losses” (ibid). 
Talking to hydropower experts, former bureaucrats and water activists in Kathmandu, their answers 
showed a completely different picture. Among them, not a single person was in favour of the current 
arrangement with SJVN. The thrust of their argument was that in light of the current scarcity of 
electricity in Nepal that leads to long daily blackouts, the award of projects like Arun-3 to foreign 
companies amounted to an attack on the ‘national interests’ of the country. Moreover, with a number of 
other potential schemes earmarked for similar agreements, they feared that the current political leadership 
was about to sell out the most promising projects. One of my interlocutors was Bipin who estimated that 
the output of the Arun-3 project would easily be consumed in eastern Nepal alone if developed for the 
domestic market. He summarised his position as follows: 
 
Arun-3 is for export to India, when we have an energy crisis in Nepal. So, neither am I 
against export per se – no, export is not forbidden – but it is damn stupid to be exporting 
power when you have an energy crisis in your country (Interview 52). 
 
In line with other experts, Bipin puts the Arun-3 agreement in a long history of water related treaties 
between the two countries and points to the fact that these treaties tend to be much more beneficial to the 
Indian side than the Nepalese. The main reason for this, Bipin argues, is a specific dependency among the 
higher levels of Nepalese politics and bureaucracy towards India. This accusation was very common in my 
conversations with those working on water issues. Taking the example of the Mahakali treaty (Shrestha 
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and Adhikari 2009) that included plans for the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project he elaborated on this 
point: 
The principal idea of this project was half water/half electricity [an equal share of both 
resources between Nepal and India], but if you ask the people working on it, they will tell you 
that from that water 93 000 hectares will be irrigated in Nepal and more than 1.6 million 
hectares in India. So how is that half? […] What gives me pain is...if India tells me that: Yes, 
[Bipin], your half is 93 000 and my half is 1.6 million I can accept that, because Indians are 
supposed to work for Indian interest, I’m not surprised. But what gives me pain is when 
Nepali people say that Pancheshwar water is half/half and they go on to say that Nepal’s 
share is 93 000 hectares and India’s is 1.6 million hectares (Interview 52). 
 
When I asked him why these treaties often turn out not very favourably for Nepal, he replied: 
 
It is simple […] These are senior people, they don’t have any more time left in the ministry, 
in the government, so they want it to be implemented fast and they can take […] their cut, 
their percentage, their kick-back. And some...may not even be looking for the bribe, but they 
are obligated because they received a favour from India, their daughter may be in Indian 
medical school, […] because of a favour granted by the Indian bureaucracy or the Indian 
government. So they feel obliged to do things in the Indian interest (ibid). 
 
When it comes to the possibility of stopping the Arun-3 agreements, this lose network of activists, 
bureaucrats and consultants, however, stands pretty much out on a limb. While during the 1990s, there 
was a critical mass of people in the media, bureaucracy and interested public who were sympathetic 
towards the Anti-Arun-3 campaign, the long hours of rolling blackouts have taken their toll. Today any 
public mobilisation would be easily delegitimised with the argument that it is a campaign against 
development and for more load shedding. Given the long and conflict-laden history connecting some of 
the water activists in Kathmandu with the local communities in the Arun valley, they are also reluctant to 
start any mobilisation in the project area. “We are happy to help,” one of them told me,  
 
if somebody approaches us and asks us to support a campaign, we are prepared to do that. 
But these days we don’t have the capacities to start campaigning on our own. And we don’t 
have to do that anymore; nowadays local people are well equipped to run their own 
campaigns (Interview 10).  
 
Moreover, the majority of the people I made contact with are in their fifties. They do not feel like doing 
politics the way they did it twenty years ago. Young people interested in activist politics, however, prefer 
to engage in different topics these days. 
Therefore, most of the activities are concentrated on legal action. When I met Bipin in December 2011, 
some of his colleagues had recently lost a cause before the Supreme Court against another controversial 
major dam project in Nepal, West Seti. At that time, WAFED had just field a case against Arun-3, 
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basically on the same grounds as the former appeal: In both cases the activists claimed that the tendering 
of the two projects to foreign companies by the Ministry of Water Resources without consent from the 
parliament had been unconstitutional because of paragraph 156 of the interim constitution. That provision 
states that the ratification of treaties related to “natural resources and the distribution of their uses” require 
a two-thirds majority from parliament:58 
 
In the case of West Seti, our case was stronger, because it’s a reservoir project, which will 
generate an augmented flow during dry season. Arun-3 does not do that, unfortunately. 
Therefore, it is relatively weaker, but still: the principle of sharing, if you look at the 
constitutional provision, the wording is: ‘Agreements and treaties related to natural resources 
and sharing in use of it.’ By exporting electricity, Nepal is going to share electricity generated 
from using the water resource...I still believe, even in the case of Arun-3, the parliament 
ratification is mandatory, but we have lost in the West Seti case, so our case is a lot weaker in 
Arun-3... unfortunately (Interview 52). 
 
Soon afterwards, Bipin was proven right. The Supreme Court followed the argumentation of the ministry 
and the NEA that frames the issue in a totally different logic that is somehow reminiscent of Marcel 
Duchamp’s old dictum: “There is no solution because there is no problem” (Schwarz and Duchamp 2003: 
265). Licensing hydropower projects to foreign companies, the bureaucrats claim, is not related to the 
distribution of natural resources at all. As the water itself is not altered, traded or redistributed, they argue, 
these contracts are only concerned with the cross-border traffic of electrons. But, as electricity is the 
energy that is stored in the movement of these electrons while they themselves are not depleted through 
the consumption of electricity, in the end no natural resources would be shared with a foreign country 
(Interview 52). 
The government, on the other hand, argued with economic constraints that make hydropower 
development without foreign direct investment impossible at the moment. And after the World Bank’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 “§156 provides: 
(1) The ratification of, accession to, acceptance of or approval of treaties or agreements to which the State of Nepal 
or the Government of Nepal is to become a party shall be as determined by the law. 
(2) The laws to be made pursuant to clause (1) shall, inter alia, require that the ratification of, accession to, 
acceptance of or approval of treaty or agreements on the following subjects be done by a two-thirds majority of the 
total number of members of the Legislature-Parliament existing: 
(a) peace and friendship; 
(b) security and strategic alliance; 
(c) the boundaries of Nepal; and 
(d) natural resources and the distribution of their uses.  
Provided that if any treaty or agreement referred in the sub-clauses (a) and (d), is of ordinary nature which does not 
affect the nation extensively, seriously or in the long-term, the ratification of, accession to, acceptance of or approval 
of such treaty or agreement may be done at a meeting of the Legislature-Parliament by a simple majority of the 
members present” (UNDP Nepal 2008: 228). 
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exit from hydropower financing, it became indeed much more difficult for governments in the global 
South to conduct such projects. Above that, they claim that these agreements are actually highly 
favourable for the citizens of Nepal, as they will be “given” hydropower plants free of charge – only with 
the slight delay of thirty years. Otherwise put, they argue that one day the current suffering induced by 
power cuts “will have been resolved” in an undefined, but near future without the need to pay for it. This 
has been the position of all five cabinets since the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 2008, 
regardless of the parties forming the coalition. 
 
 
Ill. 11: A road sign for SJVN’s Arun-3 project next to the airstrip at Tumlingtar, 13 November 2010. 
 
 
Taking as giving 
Confronted with the accusation by the water activists that SJVN’s interest in the Arun-3 project is part of 
a broader Indian strategy of neocolonial resource appropriation, the company’s employees strongly 
opposed and once again stated the altruistic nature of their endeavour. But it was very difficult to discuss 
these issues with them because whenever I tried to problematize the political implications of their plans 
they would either react by declaring themselves as not authorised to talk about these issues, or by simply 
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claiming that these allegations would become obsolete once the engineers would be allowed to proceed 
with their work. In other words, they followed the old strategy of rendering political conflicts in 
development schemes invisible by reducing them to problems that can be solved with the right technology 
(Li 2007, Ferguson 1990). 
Only once I managed to discompose Akhil, the engineer from SJVN, during our conversation – when I 
confronted him with the water activists’ stance that the memorandum of understanding between his 
company and the government was against the national interest of Nepal. He replied: 
 
No, it is not against the national interest! It is very good for Nepal, too. We are giving 21.9 % 
of electricity free of cost to them [...] and indirect employment to the people there, we will do 
R&R [resettlement and rehabilitation] and environmental measures […] We have to do that 
for culture, uplift of living standard of the people. Business will come to the people of this 
area (Interview 52). 
 
Additionally, whenever I was talking with SJVN employees about the hopes of the affected people and the 
activists’ demands of participation and a rights-based approach, they were very keen on describing the 
serious commitment of their company to benefit sharing. When I confronted them with the criticism 
voiced by the YKS’s activists that nobody from the company was talking with the affected people, they 
explained their scant communication with the tardiness of the government of Nepal that had thus far not 
provided them with the necessary legal documents to start their information campaign. “Once we have the 
contract,” one of them told me, “our teams will go to each and every house in the project area and inform 
the people. We will produce video documentation of this, too” (Interview 50). But when I asked Akhil 
this same question, I was surprised by his direct answer that negated such an approach and stated that 
SJVN would outsource this ‘community outreach’ exercise: 
 
We came here only to look for the people, not engage with the locals unnecessarily, because 
we don’t want any complication, because if we talk to them there is some misunderstanding 
between us and them, it will spoil all the good work again (Interview 49). 
 
I further asked him about SJVN’s opinion on the demand that the local people should become 
shareholders of the dam or at least that the company should provide them with free electricity. This as 
well was not very well received by Akhil as he replied: 
 
The expectation of the people is very high. The company will come and give us this, they will 
give us free power from the stock – how can we give them this? It is not possible. Everybody 
wants something from us: ‘give me toilet, give me this, give me that’ (ibid). 
 
When our conversation turned to the question of compensation, Akhil reminded me that the 
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memorandum of understanding clearly states that it was the responsibility of the government to provide 
SJVN with the land they needed free of cost and that therefore the government was responsible for any 
land compensation. Yet, on a visit to SJVN’s office in New Delhi nearly a year beforehand, one of Akhil’s 
colleagues had told me that according to regulations by the government of India, the company was obliged 
to spend five per cent of the amount to be invested for the local population. In the Nathpa Jhakri project 
in Himachal Pradesh, he claimed they had even spent more than that (Interview 53). The company’s 
website (SJVN 2007) shows these efforts in great detail, but I was not able to find any mention of the 
implementation of any form of participation in the ownership of the plant. In discussions with activists in 
the upper Arun valley I understood that their demand for a right to become shareholders is inextricably 
entangled with complex struggles of indigenous identity politics and a territorial claim over the area. I will 
deal with these issues in the following section. 
 
 
“This is not development – this is theft!” The indigenous activists’ position 
Coming to the upper Arun valley, I found a thriving network of activist groups representing the different 
indigenous groups and a high degree of communication between different NGOs, despite highly complex 
processes of dissociation among the Rai subgroups. The most important NGO in the villages surrounding 
the dam site is the Yamphu Kirat Samaj (YKS) that claims to represent the Yamphu Rai politically and 
strives to preserve the language and culture of the group. In January 2010, I was invited to participate in 
the organisation’s general assembly that is held in Hedangna every third year. The first day was dedicated 
to a ceremonial act with speeches, songs, dances and performances that took place on the football field 
below the secondary school. The whole program was in Nepali, except for a few chants and songs that 
were performed in Yamphu. Most of the speeches by Yamphu activists and politicians followed a similar 
pattern. After thanking the organisers for inviting the speaker they stressed the importance of Yamphu 
identity and the necessity to strive for recognition as a distinct caste group by a negligent state. This was 
often mediated through a claim on the sovereignty of the territory and resources of the upper Arun valley. 
At the same time many of them emphasised the absolute necessity to lead this struggle with non-violent 
means. And to many speakers, the Arun-3 project came as a handy example to explain to the general 
audience how the Yamphu and their rights over their natural resources were systematically neglected. One 
of them said the following: 
 
It seems as if the culture and values of this historical place have been neglected by our nation. 
And this is all too obvious for you. I feel it is important that we all protest against this and 
put forward our demands for the national constitution. […] You have been promised a lot 
but have never received your rights. Your natural resources have been given as a deposit to the 
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foreigners. You have only ended up in the calendars that hang on the wall, nothing more. 
This is a nation of 236 janajati59. We as Yamphu need a good place in the economy as well as 
in politics. I would like to say that we have to raise in a right way, through a rights-based 
process, not war. There have been many rumours about what the Yamphu want. But the 
truth is that we Yamphu want our rights and we desire to help in reconstructing this nation 
(Speech 1). 
 
Another speaker and representative of the UCPN (M) was less withdrawn in his statement: 
 
The rights of the janajati have always have been cut down in this Arun-3 project. Nobody is 
actually in touch with us. But who is this who has been cutting off our rights? There has not 
been any satisfactory work regarding this. If your constitution does not mention anything 
about our rights, if it does not help with our issues then we shall raise our voices. We will 
change our political party into an ethnic party! There are hundreds of issues regarding us 
indigenous people. If our issues are not dealt with or mentioned in the constitution, we shall 
rise against it. This is our warning (Speech 2). 
 
Comparing the volume of applause different speakers received from the crowd I had the impression that 
inflammatory speeches with a radical touch like the latter were well received. And judging from the 
commentaries of some friends who were functionaries of the YKS one of the main purposes of the cultural 
program at the general assembly was to politicise and agitate (or “educate” as they would have it) the 
spectators. The speaker’s blatant threat of changing the YKS’s agenda from a political to an ethnic one has 
been brought forward by different indigenous movements since the democratic opening of the 1990s and 
especially since the start of the protracted peace process that followed the end of the civil war.60 
The second day of the general assembly was dominated by the so-called closed meeting (the actual general 
assembly of the YKS as an association). At 7.30 pm, the agenda had finally reached the topic of the 
contested hydropower dam. Among fifty women and men I had been sitting for four hours in a bare 
classroom of the school, by that time barely lit by torchlights and mobile phones. In the chilly January 
evening, I envied the first speaker to enter the podium on the subject of Arun-3 for his thick down jacket. 
He immediately started an inflammatory speech against the project that would disempower the Yamphu, 
deprive them of the natural resources of their ancestral land and displace many families. At length, he 
quoted article 15 of the ILO convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries that proclaims: “The rights of the people concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their 
lands shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 janajati [N] is a relatively new term that is used to subsume all minority groups.  
60 For an extensive discussion of the rise of indigenous movements and their complex relation to the Maoists see 
Hangen 2010 or Lawoti and Hangen 2013. 
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use, management and conservation of these resources” (International Labour Organization 1989: Article 
15). As he rightly reminded us, the following article states that “[w]here the relocation of these peoples is 
considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and 
informed consent” (ibid: Article 16). In his opinion, the procedure of the government and SJVN stands in 
direct opposition to the principle of “free, prior and informed consent” although the government of Nepal 
was party to the convention. Suddenly, he changed into English and shouted into the crowd (at that point, 
the microphone had already run out of battery): “This is not development, this is theft” (Speech 3). 
 
 
Ill. 12: A group of dancers at the YKS’s general assembly, 10 January 2010. 
 
The cadres of the YKS greeted his speech with frenetic applause. In many conversations with 
functionaries of the association before, during and after the general assembly I heard very severe concerns 
about the consequences of the hydro project, the access road connected to it and the entry of modernity 
into the Arun valley. In their opinion the main threat to “the simple folk” was their credulity. They were 
convinced that once the road was built and the construction of the dam had been started, powerful actors 
from outside (labelled as Non-Yamphu, Indians or gangsters at different occasions) would seize the 
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chance to make a profit and lure local people into unfavourable contracts, making them lose house and 
home. Moreover, through the influx of a large number of workers from outside the valley they feared a 
loss of indigenous customs, a change in gender relations, the onset of sex work and a rise in sexually 
transmitted diseases. 
This, though, does not mean that the activists of the YKS are against the project as such. And although 
they often complain about their difficulties to raise awareness about the possible negative consequences 
among their community, both activists and laypersons conceive of the dam in a similar way: they know 
that there is a lot at stake, but understand the project as an ambivalent issue with beneficial potential for 
their communities. The activists know very well how indigenous groups have suffered from the effects of 
dams in Nepal (e.g. Rai 2005) and abroad. Especially the example of the Narmada scheme in India serves 
as a powerful warning to them. Suresh, one of the leaders of the association summarised the YKS’s 
position as follows: 
 
Our concern is that the government should consult us before they take any kind of decision 
that may affect us. […] The second concern is participation. […] Then there is benefit 
sharing. […] The Arun is our resource that is shaped and nurtured by the indigenous people 
of this region. How will the government ensure our rights over the benefits? […] For 
example, there is a memorandum of understanding between the Indian company and Nepal 
government. You can’t find a word there on indigenous people (Interview 4). 
 
As became apparent, two main claims stood behind these concerns: first the demand for recognition as a 
distinct indigenous nationality by the government that is accompanied by a territorial claim over the dam 
site and second the desire for a participatory decision-making process concerning the dam construction. 
The activists wanted to be recognised by the government as well as by SJVN as an equal participant in 
three-party negotiations, but the apparent refusal to do so by both other parties led to a growing level of 
frustration. This experience of disregard was only one in a variety of circumstances where Yamphu Rai 
witnessed continuous marginalisation and felt that the promise of naya Nepal [N], a new, inclusive Nepal 
whose citizens and institutions would seriously attempt to overcome caste discrimination, was constantly 
withheld from them. After a few more speeches and comments on the dam and considering the lack of 
knowledge about the next steps in the project implementation the majority of members shied away from 
releasing a public statement as the more radical wing had demanded. Instead, they decided to initiate the 
work on an action plan that should bring the YKS, the government and SJVN together as stakeholders in 
the process. 
It was through practices of indigenous activism that these categories were established and fixated in an 
attempt to create a community with clear boundaries and allegedly common interests. To the activists, the 
hydropower dam served as a powerful imaginary in this process as it showed their constituency the need 
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for political representation. Coincidentally, it reinforced their territorial claim, not only in distinction to 
the state and bigger indigenous groups that might dominate a yet to be established federal state in north 
eastern Nepal, but also against Non-Yamphu living around the dam site. For the time being, the YKS’s 
attempt to have Yamphu included in the list of indigenous nationalities has failed.  
 
 
“Destruction at Dawn” 
To complete this map of positions on the reincarnation of Arun-3, another long-known group of actors 
has re-entered the stage: Western indigenous rights activists. The British Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) 
has recently published a report on Arun-3 together with the Lawyers’ Association for Human Rights of 
Nepalese Indigenous Peoples (LAHURNIP) (FPP and LAHURNIP 2012). Titled “Destruction at Dawn” 
(a bit idiosyncratically I must concede, as neither of the two terms is mentioned even a single time in the 
continuous text) it recounts the findings of a survey trip to some of the affected communities in the upper 
Arun Valley in March and April 2009. The activists’ findings are by and large in line with my experiences, 
although their narrative focuses almost exclusively on people’s concerns and their lack of information while 
it understates their hopes for increased connectivity and emergent opportunities once the project will be 
undertaken. 
Their conclusion, however, fails to acknowledge the totally altered circumstances around the reincarnated 
Arun-3 project when it states: 
 
The fate of the original Arun III hydropower project provides rich lessons for any company 
planning to resurrect plans for hydro-electricity production in the Arun Valley. The World 
Bank and other funders in the 1990s confronted serious and multi-sector concerns over the 
project, including problems with inadequate assessment of potential social and environmental 
impacts and large-scale public opposition to the project. Plans by SVJN Ltd. to resurrect the 
dam, and indeed expand it, show little regard for the lessons learnt during this earlier attempt 
to dam the valley, and indeed are taking place with little public consultation or outreach at all 
(ibid: 44). 
 
Apart from the fact that Chapter 4 has shown how the social and environmental impacts of this particular 
project were only two of many reasons why the project was cancelled, this report does not at all engage 
with the completely changed atmosphere in the upper Arun valley. Whereas affected people in the 1990s 
were not organised, by now there is a well-established network of NGOs in the area. During Arun-3 first 
incarnation, hardly anybody had completed secondary education whereas now many of the civil society 
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actors have university degrees.61 They command a vastly enhanced understanding of the Nepalese state, 
access to information and networks that affected people in the 1990s could only dream of. But as I could 
not find a single mentioning of any interaction with local NGOs in the report, I wonder whether 
something else has remained the same since the 1990: The depiction of poor, rural, indigenous people as 
victims of development who need help from and representation by activists from Kathmandu and the 
West. Different as this may seem from the attitude of the Indian state and SJVN, here again we are 
confronted with a form of benevolence that is well-intended but prone to othering and victimising the 
receiving group, very similar to what Chandra Mohanty (2003: 17) has termed “the production of the 
‘Third World woman’ as a singular, monolithic subject in some (Western) feminist texts.” 
A recent phone conversation with Catherine, one of the activists further underpinned this impression. In 
her account, the Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) was asked by the Lawyers’ Association (LAHURNIP) 
to help them investigate how international law might be applied in the context of the Interim constitution 
of 2008. This is indeed the main focus of the report and done with great diligence. Therefore, Catherine 
argued, the question of local perceptions to development was not central to their mission as the Arun-3 
project only served as the case study for this endeavour. She acknowledged that they did have neither the 
resources nor the time for a detailed engagement with the people they met around the powerhouse site 
(Interview 54). It remained unclear why the report then engages at great length with the narratives of local 
people without even mentioning the activist groups actively struggling for participation. After reading the 
report a second time, the people depicted in it remain a fragile indigenous population that has to be taken 
care of. 
 
 
Conclusion 
As I have tried to show, the idiom of benevolence is deeply inscribed in the rhetoric of the SJVN 
engineers as well as the official self-representation of the Indian state as development co-operator while its 
geo-strategic and economic interests are persistently downplayed. There is a long history to Indian foreign 
aid that has to be mainly understood in the context of the NAM and India’s security concerns after the 
partition of 1947. But with the growing energy demand, the end of the Cold War and India’s economic 
rise, a new foreign aid paradigm has taken shape. Within this new framework, the character of India’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Whereas my data on ethnic activism is focused on the Yamphu Rai around the dam site, the FPP & LAHURNIP 
mission was centred on the area around the powerhouse that I only visited once. But I know from meetings of the 
Indigenous Rights Forum I attended in Khandbari that the Lohorung, Mewahang and Kulung Rai have their own 
NGOs similar to the YKS. All of them come together in the Forum to exchange information and plan collective 
action. 
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development assistance is becoming increasingly similar to the Western donors’ aid programs of the last 
sixty years: a complex bundle of humanitarian, politico-economic and strategic considerations. The Indian 
engineers stressed especially the first of these intentions while denying that geostrategic interest might 
play a significant role when an Indian state-owned company plans to construct a dam in Nepal in close 
proximity to the Chinese border. Their frequent mentioning of their employer’s commitment to benefit 
sharing shows how the discursive framework of green neoliberalism has by now turned into a hegemonic 
practice of doing hydropower. A serious participation of the affected people through giving them a share 
in the dam seems not very likely, however. 
Especially the Indian engagement in the Bhutanese hydropower sector serves as a powerful warning to 
water activists in Kathmandu who see SJVN’s involvement in the Arun-3 project as the prelude to an 
Indian ‘energy grab.’ They fear that their southern neighbour will attempt to bring the Nepalese water 
resources under her control, thereby increasing the already existing dependency manifold and cement the 
electricity scarcity for the foreseeable future. Their opposition is framed in strongly nationalist terms that 
shed a light on the highly complex relationship between the two countries that reaches back to the mid-
nineteenth century. It is, however, also a further attempt of opposition against the political and 
bureaucratic elite they perceive as corrupt and not acting in the national interest by awarding contracts to 
Indian companies. 
A certain degree of worry about the intentions of SJVN is a recurring topic in conversations with activists 
and the inhabitants of the upper Arun valley as well. But there, the question of who will construct the dam 
takes second place behind the question of how it will be implemented. The majority of affected people is 
in favour of the project and expects to benefit from the opportunities that will emerge with the road, wage 
labour and (maybe) electricity while they also admit that adversary effects will come along with it. The 
functionaries of the YKS – who often serve as local opinion leaders – stress these negative consequences in 
an effort to prepare their communities for the upcoming changes. At the same time, they struggle for 
recognition as equal partners in negotiations with both the government and SJVN and feel proven right in 
their longstanding mistrust towards the Nepalese state for its persistent high-caste bias. Simultaneously, 
the activists are involved in a struggle for the recognition of their difference from the surrounding Rai 
subgroups and show concern about the future of their territorial claim over the area around the dam site in 
the wake of a still undetermined federal reform that will most probably allocate the Arun valley to a 
federal province dominated by the Limbu. 
With the recent appearance of a British indigenous rights NGO, a new internationalisation of the Arun-3 
controversy might be on the horizon. The FPP’s engagement is reminiscent of that of the international 
activists discussed in Chapter 3 in its attempt to appropriate a ‘local’ struggle without a conversation with 
the people on site. Therefore, its efforts run the serious risk of depicting them as passive, indigenous 
others who have to be taken care of by benevolent outsiders. 
	   
	   
8  Epilogue  
 
 
This thesis started with the random find of a short story atop a paper bank in Zurich in March 2011. A 
couple of weeks beforehand, another intriguing piece of literature found my way. It was during coffee with 
a friend that I learned about a poem that was ‘going viral’ in Kathmandu. Its title was ‘bijuli malai dibhors 
deu’ [N] – ‘Electricity, please divorce me.’ In it, the poet Shyam Shrestha ‘Swapnil’ comes up with a very 
telling metaphor for the relationship between humans and electricity and the plight produced by chronic 
power outages. He compares electricity to a faithless spouse who is always somewhere else and has unclear 
relationships – probably affairs – with others. Disappointedly, the author demands the divorce papers and 
mentions his new love affair in closing: the more reliable candle. 
 
I sleep, he wakes up, I wake up, he sleeps […] 
Neither does he come when I’m not here, nor am I here, when he is 
What a hide and seek game between him and me! […] 
I invite him to my shack, 
he is in the […] VIP area 
What is his relationship with the inverter and the generator? 
Only yesterday he met these people in somebody’s house 
While we where waiting, he appeased the thirst of their inverter […] 
While he loves the neighbour, we have to carry more load shedding on our shoulders. 
What a breach of trust! 
Now I live without him […] 
I demand the divorce papers. […] 
Now I’m I love with the candle (Shrestha 2011). 
 
In February 2011, when this poem was being sent around in Kathmandu, its inhabitants had to endure 
fourteen hours of rolling blackouts every day. Due to the country’s high dependency on hydropower and 
the low volume of Himalayan Rivers during the dry winter, January and February are the months were 
electricity is the scarcest. But for the last decade, even during summer the electricity produced in the 
country has not been sufficient for a continuous power supply – in July 2013, e.g. the daily blackout time 
was around five hours. The main reason for this decrease in the security of supply has been a steady annual 
increase in power consumption of over seven per cent while the NEA has been unable to keep up with 
adding new facilities to its system. For 2012, the national energy provider estimates that its supply covered 
around 77% of the total annual energy demand. 17.44% of the supplied electricity was imported from 
India while nearly four per cent of the nationally generated power was exported to the southern 
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neighbour62 (Nepal Electricity Authority 2013: 8). 
To cope with this situation, the NEA has divided its grid into a plethora of subsystems and categorised 
them into seven groups. Each group has its distinct load shedding schedule and in Kathmandu, where 
people rely heavily on electricity, this schedule is arguably the most important thing structuring people’s 
days second only to the movement of the sun. Especially in connection with the chronic water shortage in 
the city that forces people to pump large amounts of water into rooftop tanks whenever it is available, it 
leads to a need of sophisticated forward planning to manage the two scarcities. People do not only have to 
get up in the middle of the night to turn on the water pump, they also have to plan their days and their 
movements around town well in advance and have to consider the different schedules of the locations they 
will pass through. The chronic lack of electricity has severe consequences on businesses as well. As a 
highly egalitarian scheme, only the most vital industries are exempt from the schedule whereas the bulk of 
the economy is treated like private customers. Those who can afford it (or cannot afford it to be without 
electricity) have to rely on battery systems (generally called inverters as you first have to invert alternating 
current into direct current to load a battery) or diesel generators. While the heavy use of the former 
increases the consumption of a given household during supply hours, the latter add considerably to the 
already high levels of air pollution in the valley during winter. 
Thus it is hardly surprising that Shrestha’s poem hit a nerve. In these few lines he manages to express how 
urban members of the Nepalese middle-classes perceive the electricity scarcity and addresses many of the 
issues and rumours connected to the problem of blackouts. He starts with the everyday experience of 
urban Nepalese electricity consumers: the difficulty of being at home when there is power. But already the 
second stanza moves to discuss deep feelings of inequality. Consecutively he suggests that VIPs get a 
special treatment, that the inverters of more affluent people drain the system and that electricity is given to 
the neighbour – i.e. India – while the Nepalese population is suffering. His consequence is a renewed love 
affair with candlelight, a very literal state of dis-connection many city dwellers in Nepal experience that is 
reminiscent of the situation in the Zambian copperbelt James Ferguson (1999) describes. 
All that said and despite the poem’s strong resonance with my own experiences during two winters spent 
in Nepal, the metaphor of the unfaithful spouse seemed strange to me. Not the idea that our relationship 
with electricity was as intimate as a marriage, but the allegation of untrustworthiness towards electricity 
made me scratch my head. It was for the simple reason that I had not experienced any other service in 
Nepal – be it governmental or private – that was as reliable as the load shedding schedule. One could 
practically set the clock according to it. When it did not perform in the predicted way and electricity was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The transborder electricity market between the two countries is characterised by an extensive body of treaties that 
leads to complex traffic patterns. 
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only five minutes late, people around me became furious, but their anger showed on the other hand how 
reliable the schedule in 99% of the cases was. 
To my friends in Kathmandu this objection seemed highly academic. For the most part of the year their 
daily routine is dictated by the schedule, with every change every couple of weeks they have to re-organise 
their days – and there is no end in sight to this situation. Although three major new hydropower plants are 
currently under construction, it is highly unlikely that the long hours of blackout during winter will come 
to an end without the commissioning of a major reservoir scheme63. A number of feasible sites for such a 
storage facility have been under consideration since the 1980s but nowhere construction has actually 
started. There is room to believe the suggestions that Arun-3 became such a highly interesting project for 
so many foreign companies because they saw it only as a first step to get a foot in the door for the 
construction of the fantastic 10,800 MW Karnali Chisapani storage project (Interview 1). 
In these circumstances, a peculiar symbolic politics has unfolded around Arun-3 and its cancelation during 
the last twenty years in a country whose inhabitants have been told for all these years that water is the only 
natural resource that could be exploited to earn foreign exchange. ‘There is no alternative to hydropower 
exports’ has been the mantra of politicians, bureaucrats and foreign development agencies. At the same 
time, the fact that nearly one fifth of the electricity is actually imported from India is assiduously kept 
silent and many electricity consumers truly believe that together with the inefficient Nepalese state and its 
electricity authority India is to blame for their powerless suffering. Not surprisingly, then, an unbuilt dam 
serves as a great metaphor for the way development as imagination and practice fails – both for the 
bureaucrats and engineers who blame the current power shortage on the cancelation as well as for the 
former activists who still insist that the whole plan was flawed from the beginning and Nepal would be far 
worse off had it embarked on the Arun-3 adventure. To the general public and especially the inhabitants 
of the upper Arun valley it has acquired a status similar to the one of Godot in Samuel Beckett’s (1954) 
play: practically everybody has heard about it and there is reason to believe that it will finally appear at 
some point but at the same time nobody knows anything specific about it. Even with the recent 
reincarnation of the project through the Indian SJVN and in the new disguise of Build Own Operate 
Transfer, the elusiveness of the project has not changed. More than five years after the memorandum of 
understanding, there are still no definitive agreements. 
Together with thirteen more so-called National Priority Projects, the dam has been assigned to the 
recently established Investment Board of Nepal. Despite the announcements of SJVN officials that they 
expect to sign a project development agreement before 15 July 2013 (Republica 2013a), a recent article 
suggests that negotiations are still far from completed (Khadka 2013). A second announcement stems 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Currently, the country only has one storage facility, the 60 MW Khulekhani I project. 
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from the World Bank. As expected for some time, the Bank’s Nepal office has now officially declared that 
it is planning to invest in at least one large-scale hydropower project (Republica 2013b). After nearly two 
decades the Bank is back in the game, finally abandoning their position that big dams in the global South 
do more harm to their reputation than acceptable for an institution that is under tight surveillance by 
transnational civil society. Thus, in 2014, the first World Bank co-founded hydropower project in South 
Asia since 1995 will come online, executed by SJVN (World Bank 2014a). Furthermore, the Bank is to 
provide funding for a small hydropower project not far from the Arun-3 dam site (World Bank 2014b). 
So it seems we have come full circle and 2013 feels like a remake of 1993 when Arun-3 appeared to be a 
done deal. 
Not quite. Should the recent negotiations really succeed – and the long list of dams in Nepal that never 
materialised give reason to doubt it – this re-invented Arun-3 plant would be a very different incarnation 
altogether, for four main reasons. First, the execution of the project as a public-private-partnership within 
a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer framework will lead to a completely different ownership structure and to 
very different decision-making patterns. Despite the fact that the old Arun-3 would have indeed left the 
Nepalese state with a vast burden of foreign debt, once constructed the NEA would have had control over 
the scheme. In the present set-up, these characteristics have been reversed. So has the purpose of the 
structure: whereas the first design was supposed to secure the domestic electricity supply (admittedly in 
the World Bank’s very optimistic prophecies) until 2008, the new one will be constructed predominantly 
for export, with only 21.9% of the production staying in the country. To be sure, the government will earn 
royalties with the exported electricity, but it will have to wait for thirty years for the structure to be handed 
over. And given the high level of siltation in hydropower schemes in the Himalaya, it is highly speculative 
how efficient it will then be. 
Thirdly, while the dam and the tunnel have the same measures in both designs, the capacity of the 
turbines installed in the re-invented project has increased from 402 MW to 900 MW. As there is no 
reason to believe that the river suddenly contains twice as much water, it is highly probable that SJVN will 
use the plant predominantly to produce peak current. That means they will switch it on only for the few 
hours in the morning and evening when demand is at its highest and use the high performance of the 
turbines to produce as much electricity in a as little time as possible, changing the plant thereby into a 
hybrid between run-of-the-river and storage scheme. While the Nepalese grid will definitely benefit from 
such a usage to help accommodate peak demand, this management model will do little to help the base 
load problem the NEA is experiencing, even with a fifth of the generated electricity remaining in the 
country. 
Fourthly, the conditions in the upper Arun valley have changed considerably since the early 1990s. As I 
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have argued in Chapter 3, one decisive reason why the majority of the people in the upper Arun valley in 
those days were enthusiastic about the project was that it promised them an inclusion into the 
developmentalist state through the promise of becoming a part of what Partha Chatterjee has termed 
political society. To a certain extent, this hope is still evident in the narratives I presented in Chapters 5 
and 6. Yet by now, through organisations like the Yamphu Kirat Samaj, there is also a strong and vocal 
network of activist groups established in the area who are opposed to the way the dam project will be 
implemented and demand the be recognised as stakeholders in the process. Many of their leaders have 
university degrees and are well versed in the practice of transnational indigenous activism. They have 
attended workshops by organisations like the OHCHR or the ILO and are a part of transnational civil 
society networks. Still, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, both the engineers of SJVN as well as a 
coalition of NGOs based in the United Kingdom and Kathmandu, perceive the affected populations as 
people who have to be taken care of and deny them the possibility of participation in decision-making 
while the state fails to provide spaces for public engagement so far. The indigenous activists, on the other 
side, use the dam project as one important way to legitimise their raison d’être towards the people they 
claim to represent and as a tool to stake territorial claims on the region in the wake of a federal reform 
whose organising principle is still unclear. 
In his nuanced discussion of the Narmada controversy, Sanjeev Khagram (2004) has argued extensively 
that the era of big dams has come to a close. While the second half of the 20th century would be 
remembered as the hey-day of hydropower construction, he claims, the combination of three factors has 
seriously decreased the possibility for further dam construction: the ‘technical’ decrease of available sites to 
be developed, economic factors that made them less profitable and political circumstances connected to 
the rise of transnational civil society that made it much more difficult for governments to impose them on 
their citizens (ibid: 8-11). Especially the last of these factors serves as his main argument why big dams 
will cease their central place in economic development in democratic societies where the state has little 
manoeuvring space to curtail civil society mobilisation. These new conditions, he argues, pressure states 
towards more sustainable forms of development. 
To be sure – and this work is only one example for this trend – the emergence of new forms of doing 
politics on a level that exceeds the nation state through transnational activism, have changed the way 
hydropower schemes are designed and implemented. Yet, as Goldman (2006) has convincingly shown, not 
in the straightforward way presented by Khagram. Using the example of the World Bank, he shows how 
international donor agencies confronted with the critique of their business model by activist networks, 
have learned to integrate new forms of environmental, social scientific and anthropological knowledge to 
establish a new development regime that is even more powerful and pervasive than their previous ones. In 
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many cases, these organisations were successful in co-opting their fiercest critics to help them set up what 
Goldman calls ‘green neoliberalism.’ Through new mechanisms like Natural Capital Accounting an ever-
increasing number of countries are now part of a global movement of different sorts; a movement that is 
aiming at a total commodification of natural resources while at the same time the question of property 
rights over these resources are figuring far less prominently in debates on environmental protection.  
Ten years down the line from Khagram’s contribution, we can see a powerful re-emergence of the large 
dam on a global scale. Not only in the global South, also in the Alps, for instance, capacities are about to 
be increased considerably. And while the controversies around the Turkish Ilisu and the Brazilian Belo 
Monte schemes show the validity of Khagram’s claim that transnational activism has decisively changed 
the rules of the game, the World Bank’s announcement of its come-back to hydropower financing in 
Nepal points to another decisive shift that might threaten the movement towards less destructive dams 
gained through the persistence of transnational activism: The vast increase of money spent on 
infrastructure by investors that are not bound by the new rules of green neoliberalism. This has led to the 
paradoxical situation that many NGOs that campaigned against the World Bank twenty years ago now are 
happy when the Bank is co-funding a project, as this will increase the ability for affected people and those 
who represent them to participate in the process manifold. It is this newly emerging system of foreign aid, 
already in full swing in the Chinese aid programs in Africa that pushes the Bank back in the game as it 
once again threatens its importance for large-scale investments in the global South. 
Retrospectively, the former activists see the central importance of their campaign for this decisive shift in 
the Bank’s mode of practice, but lament that the organisation still has failed to deliver tangible benefit to 
the citizens of Nepal. Anil, for example, said: 
 
The World Bank did learn for some time. The Asian Development Bank continued 
financing large infrastructure projects including dam projects, but not the World Bank, there 
was some kind of moratorium, for some ten fifteen years. So, in that sense we can say that the 
World Bank did learn some lessons, but at the same time it didn’t do anything good for 
Nepal post-Arun-3, in policy formulation, in designing, financing a good project that would 
be built in Nepal from the money that was allocated. So, it learned lessons in the sense that it 
realised its mistakes in Arun-3, but these lessons, it did never implement them in the case of 
Nepal. And now the World Bank people have also started saying that it was a mistake to 
cancel Arun-3 and that it was a mistake to give up large dams (Interview 6). 
 
Given the recent history of large dam construction in the global South, the publications of the World 
Bank as well as my conversations with former and recent staff members, I do not believe that it is a wide-
spread position within the Bank that it was a mistake to give up large dams in the 1990s. Through this 
move, the Bank has not only been able to integrate a whole new set of expertise and establish a new mode 
of knowledge production, it was also successful in parrying the orchestrated attack on its reputation. 
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Today, it remains one of the most important development donor agencies despite the manifold rise of 
development funds provided by para-statal bodies from emerging powers around the globe. How 
important the claim to sustainable development through green hydropower is can be measured when we 
consider the Bank’s President’s recent announcement that his organisation would not fund nuclear power 
plants and instead invest heavily in renewable sources of energy (Agence France Press 2013). 
This thesis is an attempt to conceptualise the Arun-3 hydropower project as an object that has created far-
reaching relations and influenced sets of practices that were instrumental for the ways in which large dams 
in the global South have become impossible in the Mid-1990s, but also how they have made their recent 
comeback. Despite all the changes dam construction has gone through over the past quarter-century, the 
object of the dam still serves as a powerful promise of development to international donor institutions, 
governments and people waiting for electricity around the world. I traced the invention, cancellation and 
reincarnation of this dam from the Mid-1980s until today and have argued that its wound biography can 
be understood as a complex set of force transmissions that happened over the course of its non-existence. I 
understand transmission in the sense of a gearing mechanism that transmits forces inside a machine, yet 
considerably changes this very force while doing so. As we are dealing with transnational development 
projects - a remarkably complex machine - these transmissions have led to outcomes that were only 
partially intended by those who applied force. When in 1993 the activists of the Alliance for Energy 
started campaigning against a dam project they felt was economically unsound and developmentally 
dubious, they had no idea that their opposition would be transmitted into a global struggle against 
environmental degradation and for indigenous rights and absorbed by the ‘50 years is enough’ campaign 
that lobbied for the dissolution of the World Bank. And while the material I presented in Chapter 4 
suggests that the repeated re-evaluation of the project design through Bank staff led to the realisation that 
much of the activists’ criticism was substantiated, it was nevertheless the environmental and social issues 
that were the official justification for the Bank’s pull-out. The Inspection Panel, in the best interest of the 
claimants of the Arun Concerned Group and its own fragile status, transmitted the request for inspection 
from a complaint mainly concerned with economic arguments into an investigation that solely considered 
questions of compensation and the environment. From a World Bank perspective, this was a brilliant 
move as the institution did not have to face the main critique that was aimed at its core: the way its 
economists are shaping the world though their forecasting. Thereby, in a joint endeavour, the Panel and 
the Board of Directors transmitted the Panel’s founding resolution that had entitled it to investigate all 
the Bank’s directives into an actual practice that confined it to the so-called soft issues of environmental 
and social concerns. So far, it has not left this course and the Panel’s track record since the Arun 
investigation leads to serious doubts about its independence from the Board and the interests of influential 
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member states (e.g. Randeria 2003: 54-58). When it comes to the integration of the people affected by the 
dam in the Arun valley, the Kathmandu-based activists were unable to transmit their oppositional force to 
establish a group that would support their agenda in the region. There, the desire for development and the 
wish to be integrated into the workings of a hitherto negligent state were a much stronger argument to 
believe the announcements of the government and the assertions of ‘local’ elites. 
Through the detour of the World Commission on Dams, twenty years of transnational activism and 
global discourses on corporate social responsibility, this new way of doing dams in a green neoliberal 
fashion has reached actors like the Indian SJVN. The recent comeback of large dams is taking place inside 
a new, multi-polar world order with decidedly new forms of property relations where public-private 
partnership financing models are quickly becoming the new norm in transnational infrastructure 
development. While SJVN’s engineers and public announcements are fully aware of these altered 
circumstances and strongly draw on a rhetoric of altruism and benevolence towards their Nepalese 
neighbours, both water activists as well as indigenous activists do not buy this narrative. Instead they 
understand the recent reincarnation of Arun-3 as yet another scheme of powerful outsiders to appropriate 
‘their’ water resources. And while the water activists translate their opposition into legal action, the 
indigenous activists feel side lined both by the state and SJVN and threaten to transmit their resistance 
into obstructing the construction with direct action. 
Through the lens of Arun-3 this dissertation aimed to discuss the way large dam construction in the 
global South has changed in the last thirty years. Following David Mosse’s programmatic call for a ‘new 
ethnography of development’ that is leaving the normative question of whether development works aside 
and instead focuses on how development as a practice is enacted, it attempts to render the development 
machine as an object of anthropological inquiry. Given my conceptualisation of Arun-3 as a complex set 
of force transmission, I believe this picture of a machine is apt. My discussion of Arun-3’s twisted tale and 
the far-reaching relationships it established, however, leaves me to conclude that this machine is many 
things, but not an anti-politics machine. 
	   
	   
	   
 References 
 
 
Abbink, Jon. 2012. Dam controversies: contested governance and developmental discourse on the 
Ethiopian Omo River dam. Social Anthropology 20 (2):125-144. 
Adams, Barbara. 1995a. Arun, son of Narmada. The Kathmandu Post, 12 January, 4. 
Adams, Barbara. 1995b. A dangerous addiction. The Kathmandu Post, 23 February, 4. 
Agence France Press. 2013. World Bank says no money for nuclear power.. 27 November. Online: 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ieI0sSSXRKjbPEqzMWJFLiqIckMw?docId=
09e97e2c-51da-41fb-81bd-98f8379e4480. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Agrawal, Subhash. 2007. Emerging donors in international development assistance: The India case. Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre. 
Allen, John. 2011. Topological twists: Power’s shifting geographies. Dialogues in Human Geography 1 
(3):283-298. 
Allen, Nicholas. 1972. The Vertical Dimension in Thulung Classification. Journal of the Anthropological 
Society of Oxford 3:81–94. 
Allen, Nicholas. 1976. Studies in the myths and oral traditions of the Thulung Rai of east Nepal. DPhil thesis, 
Faculty of Anthropology and Geography, University of Oxford. 
Alliance for Energy. 1993. White Paper No. 2. Kathmandu: Alliance for Energy. 
Amit, Vered. 2000. Constructing the field: ethnographic fieldwork in the contemporary world. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Anders, Gerhard. 2008. The Normativity of Numbers: World Bank and IMF Conditionality. PoLAR: 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 31 (2):187-202. 
Anonymous. 1995. Why was Arun cancelled? Archive of Urgewald, Sassenberg, Germany. October. 
Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization, Public worlds. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Ardayeti, Janum. 1995. The Arun controversy, or is it? The Kathmandu Post, 27 January, 4. 
Armbrecht Forbes, Ann. 1995. The Boundary Keepers: The Poetry and Politics of Land in Northeastern Nepal. 
Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, Cambridge. 
Armbrecht Forbes, Ann. 1999a. The importance of being local: Villagers, NGOs, and the World Bank in 
the Arun valley, Nepal. Identities 6 (2-3):319-344. 
Armbrecht Forbes, Ann. 1999b. Mapping Power: Disputing Claims to Kipat Lands in Northeastern 
Nepal. American Ethnologist 26 (1):114–138. 
References 
- 204 - 
Arun Concerned Group. 1994a. Request for Inspection. Prepared by Siwakoti G. and Ghimire, G. K. 
Kathmandu: Arun Concerned Group. 
Arun Concerned Group. 1994b. Arun-III: an Introduction and Issues of Concern. Kathmandu: Arun 
Concerned Group. 
Arun Concerned Group. 1995. Urgent Call for Action: Arun III. Kathmandu: Arun Concerned Group. 
Asad, Talal. 1973. Anthropology & the colonial encounter. London: Ithaca Press. 
Asian Development Bank. 2012. Strategic Roads Improvement Project. Online: http://www.adb.org/ 
projects/38350-013/details. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Augé, Marc. 1995. Non-places: Introduction to an anthropology of supermodernity. London, New York: 
Verso. 
Bandyopadhyay, Jayanta. 2002. A Critical Look at the Report of the World Commission on Dams in the 
Context of the Debate on Large Dams on the Himalayan Rivers. International Journal of Water 
Resources Development 18 (1):127-145. 
Banerjee, Brojendra N. 1982. India’s Aid to Its Neighbouring Countries. New Delhi: Select Books. 
Banskota, Narottam P. 2012. South Asia Trade and Energy Security: The Role of India. Boca Raton: 
Universal Publishers. 
Barth, Fredrik. 1964. Capital, Investments and the Social Structure of a Pastoral Nomad Group in South 
Persia. In Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies: Studies from Asian, Oceania, the Carribean 
and Middle America, edited by Firth, R. and Yamey, B. London: Routledge 
Bauman, Zygmunt. 2000. Liquid modernity. Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press. 
Baviskar, Amita. 1995. In the Belly of the River: Tribal Conflicts over Development in the Narmada Valley. 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Beckett, Samuel. 1954. Waiting for Godot: a tragicomedy in 2 acts. New York: Grove Press. 
Bennett, Jane. 2001. The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Bhabha, Homi K. 1990. The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination, and the Discourse of 
Colonialism. In Out there: Marginalization and contemporary cultures, edited by Ferguson R. and 
Gever, M. Cambridge: MIT Press, 70-89. 
Bhatta, Chandra D. 2007. Civil Society in Nepal: in search of reality. Contributions to Nepalese Studies 34 
(1):45-57. 
Bhattarai, Binod. 1993. Officials Dodge Arun III Hearing. The Independent, 17 February. 
Biggs, Stephen. 2008. The Lost 1990s? Personal Reflections on a History of Participatory Technology 
Development. Development in Practice 18 (4-5):489-505. 
References 
- 205 - 
Bisht, Medha. 2012. Bhutan–India Power Cooperation: Benefits Beyond Bilateralism. Strategic Analysis 
36 (5):787-803. 
Bissell, Richard E. 1997. Recent Practice of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank. The American 
Journal of International Law 91 (4):741-744. 
Bissell, Richard E. 2003. The Arun III Hydroelectric Project, Nepal. In Demanding Accountability, edited 
by Clark D., Fox, J. and Treakle, K. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing. 
Biswas, Rudra. 2011. Koel-Karo project on revival path. The Telegraph, 12 July. 
Blaikie, Piers M., Cameron, John, and Seddon, David. 1977. Effects of roads in West Central Nepal. 
Norwich: Overseas Development Group University of East Anglia. 
Bosshard, Peter. 2010. The Dam Industry, the World Commission on Dams and the HSAF Process. 
Water Alternatives 3 (2):58-70. 
Bord, Janet. 1984. The evidence for Bigfoot and other man-beasts. New York: Sterling. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, and Wacquant, Loïc J. D., eds. 1992. An invitation to reflexive Sociology. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
Braidotti, Rosi. 2006. Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics. Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press. 
Bräutigam, Deborah. 1998. Chinese aid and African development: exporting Green Revolution. New York: St. 
Martin Press. 
Broadbent, Jane, and Laughlin, Richard. 2004. PPPs: nature, development and unanswered questions. 
Australian Accounting Review 14 (33):4-10. 
Brüschweiler, Willy, ed. 1967. Neues Schweizer Lesebuch. Aarau: Sauerländer. 
Bürge, Michael. 2011. Riding the Narrow Tracks of Moral Life: Commercial Motorbike Riders in 
Makeni, Sierra Leone. Africa Today 58 (2):59–95. 
Butwal Power Company. 2010-2011. Kabeli ‘A’ Hydro Electric Project. Online: http://www.bpc.com.np/ 
index.php?option=com_page&task=details&id=26. Visited 18 January 2014 
Caduff, Carlo. 2012. The Semiotics of Security: Infectious Disease Research and the Biopolitics of 
Informational Bodies in the United States. Cultural Anthropology 27 (2):333-357. 
Campbell, Ben. 1997. The heavy loads of Tamang identity. In Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu 
Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal, edited by Gellner D. N., Pfaff-Czarnecka, 
J. and Whelpton, J. Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association, 205-235. 
Campbell, Ben. 2010. Rhetorical routes for development: A road project in Nepal. Contemporary South 
Asia 18 (3):267–279. 
Campbell, Ben. 2013. Conversation on development and tourism in the upper Arun valley. Edinburgh, 18 
April. 
References 
- 206 - 
Campregher, Christoph. 2010. Shifting perspectives on development: an actor-network study of a dam in 
Costa Rica. Anthropological Quarterly 83 (4):783-804. 
Caplan, Lionel. 1970. Land and social change in east Nepal: A study of Hindu-tribal relations. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Carossa, Hans. 1967 [1923]. Das Stauwehr. In Neues Schweizer Lesebuch, edited by Brüschweiler W. 
Aarau: Sauerländer, 17-23. 
Castells, Manuel. 2000. The rise of the network society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, 
Volume 1. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Caufield, Catherine. 1996. Masters of illusion: The World Bank and the poverty of nations. New York: Henry 
Holt. 
Central Bureau of Statistics. 2012. National Population and Housing Census 2011 (National Report). 
Kathmandu: Government of Nepal; National Planning Commission Secretariat; Central Bureau 
of Statistics. 
Central Bureau of Statistics. 2013. National Population Census 2011: Caste/ethnicity. Thapathali, 
Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Cesarino, Letitia. 2012. Brazilian postcoloniality and south-south cooperation: a view from anthropology. 
Portuguese Cultural Studies 4:85-113. 
Chatterjee, Partha. 2002. On civil and political society in postcolonial democracies. In Civil Society: 
History and Possibilities, edited by Kaviraj S. and Khilnani, S. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 165-178. 
Chatterjee, Partha. 2004. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Chatterjee, Partha. 2011. Lineages of political society: Studies in postcolonial democracy. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Chatterjee, Pratap. 1994. 50 years is enough. London: Friends of the Earth. 
Chatterjee, Pratap. 1996. Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About the World Bank (in South Asia). 
Himal 8: July. 
Chaturvedy, Rajeev Ranjan, and Malone, David. 2012. A Yam between Two Boulders: Nepal’s Foreign 
Policy Caught between India and China. In Nepal in Transition, edited by Einsiedel S. v., 
Malone, D. and Pradhan, S. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 287-312. 
CIWEC, and NEA. 1987. Cost Evaluation of Hydropower Projects for the Generation Expansion Plan. 
Kathmandu: Canadian International Water and Energy Consultants & Nepal Electricity 
Authority. 
References 
- 207 - 
Clark, Dana. 2003. Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel. In Demanding Accountability: Civil-
Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel, edited by Clark D., Fox, J. and Treakle, K. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 1-24. 
Clark, Dana, Fox, Jonathan, and Treakle, Kay. 2003. Demanding Accountability: Civil-Society Claims and 
the World Bank Inspection Panel. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing. 
Clark, Dana, and Treakle, Kay. 2003. The China Western Poverty Reduction Project. In Demanding 
Accountability: Civil-Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel, edited by Clark D., Fox, J. 
and Treakle, K. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 211-246. 
Clifford, James, and Marcus, George E., eds. 1986. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography: Experiments in Contemporary Anthropology. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: 
University of California Press, Ltd. 
Coleman, Loren. 1989. Tom Slick and the Search for the Yeti. Boston: Faber & Faber. 
Coleman, Simon, and von Hellermann, Pauline, eds. 2011. Multi-Sited Ethnography: Problems and 
Possibilities in the Translocation of Research Methods. New York & Abingdon: Routledge. 
Collier, Stephen. J. 2009. Topologies of Power: Foucault’s Analysis of Political Government beyond 
‘Governmentality’. Theory, Culture & Society 26 (6):78-108. 
Comaroff, John L., and Comaroff, Jean. 1999. Introduction. In Civil society and the political imagination in 
Africa: Critical perspectives, edited by Comaroff J. L. and Comaroff, J. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1-43. 
Cresswell, Tim, and Merriman, Peter. 2011. Geographies of mobilities: Practices, spaces, subjects. Farnham & 
Burlington: Ashgate. 
Cronin, Edward W. 1979. The Arun: A Natural History of the World’s Deepest Valley. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company. 
Cummings, Barbara. 2009. Dam the Rivers, damn the People: Development and Resistance in Amazonian 
Brazil. London: Earthscan. 
D’Souza, Dilip. 2002. The Narmada dammed: An inquiry into the politics of development. New Delhi & New 
York: Penguin Books. 
Dalakoglou, Dimitris. 2010. The Road: An ethnography of the Albanian-Greek cross-border motorway. 
American Ethnologist 32 (1):132-149. 
Dalakoglu, Dimitris, and Harvey, Penny. 2012. Roads and Anthropology: Ethnographic Perspectives on 
Space, Time and (Im)Mobility. Mobilities 7 (4):459–465. 
Danaher, Kevin. 1994. 50 years is enough: The Case against the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Boston: South End Press. 
References 
- 208 - 
Daniggelis, Ephronsine. 1997. Hidden wealth: The survival strategy of foraging farmers in the upper Arun 
Valley, Eastern Nepal. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 
Day, Richard J. 2005. Gramsci is dead: Anarchist currents in the newest Social Movements. London: Pluto 
Press. 
Delcore, Henry. 2003. Nongovernmental Organizations and the Work of Memory in Northern Thailand. 
American Ethnologist 30 (1):61-84. 
DFID India. 2012. India is a growing global power and a key partner for the UK. 9 November. Online: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/world/organisations/dfid-india. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Dhakal, Narayan P., Nelson, Kristen C., and Smith, J. L. David. 2011. Resident Well-Being in 
Conservation Resettlement: The Case of Padampur in the Royal Chitwan National Park, Nepal. 
Society and Natural Resources 24 (6):597-615. 
Dhungel, Dwarika N. 2009. Historical Eye View. In The Nepal–India Water Relationship: Challenges, 
edited by Dhungel D. N. and Pun, S. B. Dordrecht: Springer, 11-68. 
Dhungel, Dwarika N., and Pun, Santa B. 2009. The Nepal-India Water Relationship: Challenges, 
Dordrecht: Springer. 
Dietz, Ton, and Houtkamp, John. 1995. Foreign aid to Africa: A geographical analysis. Tijdschrift voor 
economische en sociale geografie 86 (3):278-295. 
Drążkiewicz-Grodzicka, Elżbieta. 2013. From Recipient to Donor: The Case of Polish Developmental 
Cooperation. Human Organization 72 (1):65-75. 
Dunsmore, John R. 1988. Mountain environmental management in the Arun river basin of Nepal. 
ICIMOD Occasional Paper No. 9. Kathmandu: Institute for Integrated Mountain Research. 
Online: http://lib.icimod.org/record/24881/files/Mountain%20environmental%20management% 
20in%20the%20arun%20river%20basin%20of%20nepal.pdf. Visited 18 January 2014. 
ECCA. 1993. Public Hearing of the Arun III Hydro Project. Kathmandu: Environmental Camps for 
Conservation Awareness. 
The Economist. 2011. Official development assistance: Aid 2.0. 13 August. Online: 
http://www.economist.com/node/21525899. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Edelman, Marc, and Haugerud, Angelique, eds. 2005. The Anthropology of Development and Globalization: 
From Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism. Malden & Oxford: Blackwell. 
Edwards, Michael. 1999. Future positive: International Co-Operation in the 21st Century. London & 
Sterling: Earthscan. 
Edwards, Michael. 2009. Civil society. London: Polity. 
 
References 
- 209 - 
Einsiedel, Sebastian von, Malone, David, and Pradhan, Suman, eds. 2012. Nepal in Transition: From 
people’s war to fragile peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ellis, Frank. 1998. Household strategies and rural livelihood diversification. Journal of Development Studies 
35 (1):1–38. 
Escobar, Arturo. 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Falzon, M.A., ed. 2009. Multi-sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary Research. 
Fanham & Burlington: Ashgate. 
Featherstone, Mike, Thrift, N. J., and Urry, John. 2005. Automobilities. London & Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Ferguson, Adam. 1995 [1767]. An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Ferguson, James. 1990. The anti-politics machine: Development, depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in 
Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Ferguson, James. 1999. Expectations of Modernity: Myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian 
copperbelt. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Fisher, William F., ed. 1995. Toward Sustainable Development? Struggling Over India’s Narmada River. 
New York: M. E. Sharpe. 
Fisher, William F. 1997a. Development and Resistance in the Narmada Valley. In Toward sustainable 
development? Struggling over India’s Narmada River, edited by Fisher W. F. New York: M. E. 
Sharpe. 
Fisher, William F. 1997b. Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices. Annual Review 
of Anthropology 26:439-464. 
Fisher, William F. 2010. Civil Society and its Fragments. In Varieties of activist experience: Civil Society in 
South Asia, edited by Gellner D. N. New Delhi & Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Fitzpatrick, Ian Carlos. 2011. Cardamom and class: A Limbu village and its extensions in east Nepal. 
Kathmandu: Vajra Publications. 
Fletcher, Robert. 2001. What are we fighting for? Rethinking resistance in a Pewenche community in 
Chile. The Journal of Peasant Studies 28 (3):37-66. 
Forgacs, David. 2000. The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916-1935. New York: New York University 
Press. 
Fox, Jonathan, and Brown, L. David, eds. 1998. The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, 
and grassroots Movements. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
References 
- 210 - 
FPP, and LAHURNIP. 2012. Destruction at Dawn. Moreton-in-Marsh & Kathmandu: Forest Peoples 
Programme and Lawyers’ Association for Human Rights of Nepalese Indigenous Peoples. 
Franco, Jean. 1957. Makalu: 8470 Mètres [27, 790 Feet]: the Highest Peak Yet Conquered by an Entire Team. 
London: J. Cape. 
Fuchs, Andreas, and Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya. 2013. The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis 
of India’s Aid Motives. World Development 44 (April 2013):110-128. 
Gaenszle, Martin. 1991. Blut im Tausch für Demokratie: Der Kampf um eine neue Verfassung in Nepal 
1990. Internationales Asienforum 22 (3-4):233-258. 
Gaenszle, Martin. 1997. Changing Concepts of Ethnic Identity among the Mewahang Rai. In 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal, 
edited by Gellner D. N., Pfaff-Czarnecka, J. and Whelpton, J. Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers 
Association, 351-373. 
Gaenszle, Martin. 1999. Travelling Up and Travelling Down: The Vertical Dimension in Mewahang Rai 
Ritual Texts. In Himalayan Space: Cultural Horizons and Practices, edited by Bickel B. and 
Gaenszle, M. Zurich: Völkerkundemuseum, 135-163. 
Gaenszle, Martin. 2000. Origins and migrations: Kinship, mythology and ethnic identity among the Mewahang 
Rai of east Nepal. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 
Gaenszle, Martin. 2007. Ancestral voices: oral ritual texts and their social contexts among the Mewahang Rai of 
East Nepal. Berlin: Lit. 
Garver, John. 1991. China-India Rivalry in Nepal: The Clash over Chinese Arms Sales. Asia Survey 31 
(10):956-975. 
Garver, John W. 2001. Protracted contest: Sino-Indian rivalry in the twentieth century. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press. 
Gautam, Upendra, and Karki, Ajoy. 2004. Hydropower Pricing in Nepal: Developing a Perspective. 
Kathmandu: Jalsrot Vikas Sanstha. 
Gellner, David N. 1997. Caste, Communalism, and Communism: Newars and the Nepalese State. In 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal, 
edited by Gellner D. N., Pfaff-Czarnecka, J. and Whelpton, J. Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers 
Association, 151-184. 
Gellner, David N. 2007. Introduction: Transformations of the Nepalese State. In Resistance and the state: 
Nepalese experiences, edited by Gellner D. N. Oxford & New York: Berghahn Books, 1-30. 
Gellner, David N. 2010. Introduction: Making Civil Society in South Asia. In Varieties of activist 
experience: Civil Society in South Asia, edited by Gellner D. N. New Delhi & Thousand Oaks: 
Sage, 1-14. 
References 
- 211 - 
Ghosh, Kaushik. 2006. Between Global Flows and Local Dams: Indigenousness, Locality, and the 
Transnational Sphere in Jharkhand, India. Cultural Anthropology 21 (4):501-534. 
Giese, Karsten, and Thiel, Alena. 2012. The vulnerable other–distorted equity in Chinese–Ghanaian 
employment relations. Ethnic and Racial Studies: 1-20. 
Gluckman, Max. 1958. Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand. Rhodes-Livingstone Paper 28. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Goldman, Michael. 2004 Imperial Science, Imperial Nature: Environmental Knowledge for the World 
(Bank). In Earthly Politics: Local and global in environmental governance, edited by Jasanoff S. and 
Martello, M. L. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Goldman, Michael. 2005. Imperial Nature: The World Bank and Struggles for Social Justice in the Age of 
Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Goldman, Michael. 2007. How “Water for All!” policy became hegemonic: The Power of the World 
Bank and its transnational policy networks. Geoforum 38 (5):786-800. 
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Physical Planning and Works, and Department of Roads. 2009. 
Expression of Interest: Detailed Survey and Design of Basantapur-Khandbari-Kimathanka Road 
Project. Kathmandu. 
Hoare, Quintin, and Nowell Smith, Geoffrey 1971. Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. 
New York: International. 
Gray, Patty A. 2011. Looking ‘The Gift’ in the mouth: Russia as donor. Anthropology Today 27 (2):5-8. 
Gupta, Akhil. 1998. Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India. Durham & 
London: Duke University Press. 
Gupta, Akhil, and Ferguson, James. 1992. Beyond “Culture”: Space, Identity, and the Politics of 
Difference. Cultural Anthropology 7 (1):6–23. 
Guthman, Julie. 1997. Representing Crisis: The Theory of Himalayan Environmental Degradation and 
the Project of Development in Post-Rana Nepal. Development and Change 28:45-69. 
Gutner, Tamar. 2005. Explaining the Gaps between Mandate and Performance: Agency Theory and 
World Bank Environmental Reform. Global Environmental Politics 5 (2):10-37. 
Gyawali, Dipak. 2003 [1990]. Arun-3 Impasse: Is There an Escape from This Blind Alley. In Rivers, 
technology and society: Learning the lessons of water management in Nepal. Kathmandu: Himal 
Books, 148-152. 
Gyawali, Dipak. 2003 [1997]. An Autopsy of Arun-3. In Rivers, technology and society. Learning the lessons 
of water management in Nepal Kathmandu: Himal Books, 66-86. 
 
References 
- 212 - 
Gyawali, Dipak. 2010. The neocolonial path to power. Himal Southasian 22(8). Online: http:// 
www.himalmag.com/The-neocolonial-path-to-power_nw4642.html. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Gyawali, Dipak. 2013. Reflecting on the chasm between water punditry and water politics. Water 
Alternatives 6 (2):177-194. 
Gyawali, Dipak, and Dixit, Ajaya. 2010. Nepal’s Constructive Dialogue on Dams and Development. 
Water Alternatives 3 (2):106-123. 
Haag, E. 2004. Grenzen der Technik: Der Widerstand gegen das Kraftwerkprojekt Urseren. Zurich: Chronos. 
Hachhethu, Krishna. 1990. Mass Movement 1990. Contributions to Nepalese Studies 17 (2):177-201. 
Hachhethu, Krishna. 2006. Civil Society and Political Participation. Online: http://www.democracy-
asia.org/countryteam/krishna/Civil%20Society%20and%20Polotical%20Participation.pdf. Visited 18 
January 2014. 
Hallmans, Bengt, and Stenberg, Christer. 1999. Introduction to BOOT. Desalination 123 (2):109-114. 
Hangen, Susan. 2010. The rise of ethnic politics in Nepal: democracy in the margins. London, New York: 
Routledge. 
Hardman, Charlotte. 2000. Other worlds: Notions of self and emotion among the Lohorung Rai. Oxford: Berg. 
Harper, Richard H. 1998. Inside the IMF: An ethnography of documents, technology and organizational action. 
London, New York: Routledge. 
Harrison, Elizabeth. 2003. The Monolithic Development Machine? . In A Moral Critique of Development: 
In Search of Global Responsibilities, edited by Quarles van Ufford P. and Giri, A. K. London, New 
York: Routledge, 101-117. 
Harvey, David. 1989. The condition of postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Harvey, Penelope. 2010. Cementing relations: the materiality of roads and public spaces in provincial 
Peru. Social Analysis 54 (2):28-46. 
Harvey, Penny. 2012. The Topological Quality of Infrastructural Relation: An Ethnographic Approach. 
Theory, Culture & Society 29 (4-5):76–92. 
Heaton Shrestha, Celayne. 2010. Activists and Development in Nepal. In Varieties of activist experience: 
Civil society in South Asia. New Delhi & Thousand Oaks: Sage, 181-216. 
Hill, Christopher V. 2008. South Asia: An environmental history. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. 
HMG, NEA, and JICA. 1987a. Final Report of Feasibility Study on Arun-3 Hydroelectric Power 
Development Project. Volume I, Main Report. Kathmandu: His Majesty’s Government; Nepal 
Electricity Authority; Japan International Cooperation Agency. 
HMG, NEA, and JICA. 1987b. Final Report of Feasibility Study on Arun-3 Hydroelectric Power 
Development Project; Executive Summary. Kathmandu: His Majesty’s Government; Nepal 
Electricity Authority; Japan International Cooperation Agency. 
References 
- 213 - 
Hodge, Graeme, and Greve, Carsten. 2010. Public‐Private Partnerships: Governance Scheme or 
Language Game? Australian Journal of Public Administration 69 (s1):S8-S22. 
Höfer, András. 1979. Caste and state in Nepal: A study of the Muluki ain of 1854. Innsbruck: 
Universitätsverlag Wagner. 
Holmberg, David H. 1989. Order in paradox: Myth, ritual, and exchange among Nepal’s Tamang. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Holmes, Douglas, and Marcus, G.E. 2008. Collaboration Today and the Re-Imagination of the Classic 
Scene of Fieldwork Encounter. Collaborative Anthropologies 1:81-101. 
Holmes, Douglas, and Marcus, G.E. 2012. Collaborative Imperatives: A Manifesto, of Sorts, for the 
Reimagination of the Classic Scene of Fieldwork Encounter. In Collaborating Collaborators, edited 
by Konrad M. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Hull, Matthew S. 2012. Government of paper: The materiality of bureaucracy in urban Pakistan. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
IBRD, and IDA. 1993. Resolution of the Executive Directors establishing the Inspection Panel. In No 
93-10 for the IBRD and 93-6 for IDA, Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and International Development Agency 
IBRD. 2003. Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel 10 Years on. Washington, DC: The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. 
ICRC. 2013. Missing Persons in Nepal: Updated list - 2013. Kathmandu: International Committee of the 
Red Cross.  
International Monetary Fund. 2012. New Setbacks, Further Policy Action Needed. Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund. Online: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/update/ 
02/pdf/0712.pdf. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Ingersoll, J. 1968. Mekong River Basin Development: Anthropology in a New Setting. Anthropological 
Quarterly 41 (3):147-167. 
International Labour Organization. 1989. Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries. Geneva: International Labour Organization. 
Jha, Hari B. 1994. Arun III: A need of the nation. The Kathmandu Post, 17 February, 4. 
Jha, Shree G. 2003. Linkages between biological and cultural diversity for participatory management: 
Nepal’s experiences with Makalu-Barun National Park and Buffer Zone. Journal of the National 
Science Foundation of Sri Lanka 31 (1-2):41-56. 
Jing, Jun. 1999. Villages Dammed, Villages Repossessed: A Memorial Movement in Northwest China. 
American Ethnologist 26 (2):324-343. 
 
References 
- 214 - 
Johansson, Per-Olov, and Kriström, Bengt, eds. 2011. Modern Cost-Benefit Analysis of Hydropower 
Conflicts. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham 
Jones, Peris S. 2012. Powering up the people? The politics of indigenous rights implementation: 
International Labour Organisation Convention 169 and hydroelectric power in Nepal. The 
International Journal of Human Rights 16 (4):624-647. 
JV Arun III. 1992. Arun III Hydroelectric Project: Environmental and Socioeconomic Impact Study Report, 4 
Volumes. Kathmandu: Joint Venture Arun III Consulting Services. 
Jyoti. 2010. Aw: link. E-mail to the author. 27 December. 
Kaminsky, Arnold P., and Long, Roger D. 2011. India today: An encyclopedia of life in the Republic. Santa 
Barbara: ABC-CLIO. 
Karcher, Michael, and Environmental Defense Fund. 1994. Transcript: Nepal’s Arun Dam, 9 September. 
In The Inspection Panel Report on Request for Inspection Nepal: Proposed Arun III Hydroelectric Project 
and Restructuring of the Arun III Access Road Project (Credit 2029-NEP), by The Inspection Panel. 
Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International 
Development Association, 148-161. 
Karp, Ivan. 2002. Development and Personhood: Tracing the contours of a moral discourse. In Critically 
Modern: Alternatives, Alterities, Anthropologies, edited by Knauft B. M. Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Kaviraj, Sudipta. 2001. In search of civil society. In Civil society: History and possibilities, edited by Kaviraj 
S. and Khilnani, S. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 287-323. 
Keane, J. 1988. Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development of the Distinction Between 
Civil Society and the State, 1750-1859. In Civil society and the state: New European perspectives, 
edited by Keane J. London: Verso, 35-72. 
Kenyatta, Jomo. 1968. Suffering without bitterness: The founding of the Kenya nation. Evanston: East 
African Publishing House. 
Khadka, Baburam. 2013. IB to start fund for study of projects. Karobar, 10 December. Online: 
http://www.karobardaily.com/news/2013/12/ib-to-start-fund-for-study-of-projects. Visited 18 
January 2014. 
Khagram, Sanjeev. 2004. Dams and development: Transnational struggles for water and power. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Khanal, Sanjay N. 2012. Nepal’s Science and Technology in 2030. In Nepal 2030: A Vision for Peaceful and 
Prosperous Nation, edited by Sharma S. R., Upreti, B. R. and Pyakuryal, K. Kathmandu: NCCR 
North-South. 
References 
- 215 - 
Kiely, Ray. 1999. The last refuge of the noble savage? A critical assessment of post-development theory. 
European Journal of Development Research 11 (4):30-55. 
Klingensmith, Daniel. 2007. “One Valley and a Thousand”: Dams, Nationalism, and Development. New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
KMTNC. 1991. Environmental Management and Sustainable Development in the Arun Basin. Kathmandu: 
King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation. 
Knauft, Bruce M., ed. 2002. Critically Modern: Alternatives, Alterities, Anthropologies. Bloomington 
& Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Knox, Hannah, and Harvey, Penny. 2011. Anticipating Harm: Regulation and Irregularity on a Road 
Construction Project in the Peruvian Andes. Theory, Culture & Society 28 (6):142–163. 
Koirala, Kosh R. 2010. China Radio Int’l to reach out to Nepali listeners through FMs. Republica, 28 
October. 
Kondoh, Hisahiro, Kobayashi, Takaaki, Shiga, Hiroaki, and Sato, Jin. 2010. Diversity and 
Transformation of Aid Patterns in Asia’s “Emerging Donors”. JICA -RI Working Paper No. 21. 
Koselleck, Reinhart. 1985. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Kosmatopoulos, Nikolas. 2011. Toward an Anthropology of ‘State Failure’: Lebanon’s Leviathan and 
Peace Expertise. Social Analysis 55 (3):115-142. 
Kumar, Krishan. 1996. Controversy over Tehri Dam and Sardar Sarovar. Delhi: Farm Digest Publications. 
Kyte, Rachel. 2013. An Accounting System Worthy of Earth Day: Natural Capital Accounting. Online: 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/natural-capital-accounting-an-accounting-system-worthy-of-earth-
day. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Latour, Bruno. 2005a. From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik. In Making things public: Atmospheres of democracy, 
edited by Latour B. and Weibel, P. Cambridge & Karlsruhe: MIT Press & ZKM/Center for Art 
and Media in Karlsruhe. 
Latour, Bruno. 2005b. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Clarendon Lectures 
in Management Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lawoti, Mahendra, and Hangen, Susan. 2013. Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Nepal: identities and 
mobilization after 1990, London, New York: Routledge. 
Leach, Edmund R. 1961. Rethinking Anthropology. London: Athlone Press. 
Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie. 2009. Hindu kingship, ethnic revival, and Maoist rebellion in Nepal. New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lee, Peter. 2011. China tests Nepal’s loyalty over Tibet. Asia Times, 2 April. Online: http://www.atimes. 
com/atimes/China/MD02Ad03.html. Visited 18 January 2014. 
References 
- 216 - 
Leins, Stefan. 2011. Pricing the revolution: Financial analysts respond to the Egyptian uprising. 
Anthropology Today 27 (4):11-14. 
Lewis, David, and Kanji, Nazneen. 2009. Non-governmental organizations and development. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Lewis, David, and Mosse, David. 2006. Development brokers and translators: The ethnography of aid and 
agencies. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. 
Lewis, Oscar. 1961. The children of Sánchez: Autobiography of a Mexican family. New York: Random 
House. 
Li, Tania Murray. 2007. The will to improve: Governmentality, development, and the practice of politics: Duke 
University Press. 
Li, Tania Murray. 2009. To make live or let die? Rural dispossession and the protection of surplus 
populations. Antipode 41 (s1):66-93. 
Linder, Stephen H. 1999. Coming to Terms With the Public-Private Partnership: A Grammar of 
Multiple Meanings. The American Behavioural Scientist 43 (1):35-51. 
Locke, John. 1960 [1690]. Two treatises of government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
M., Tirtha N. 1994. On Hagen’s remark on Arun. The Kathmandu Post. 25 March, 4. 
Madden, R. 2010. Being Ethnographic. A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Ethnography. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Magar Yamphu Rai, Reeta. 2013. Namaskar. E-mail to the author, 29 April. 
Mahat, Ram S. 1995a. Debates on small, big and Arun III (I): When facts mix with fiction. The 
Kathmandu Post, 24 February, 4. 
Mahat, Ram S. 1995b. Debates on small, big and Arun III (II): When facts mix with fiction. The 
Kathmandu Post, 25 February, 4. 
Mahat, Ram S. 2005. The Loss of Arun-III. Online: http://nepalstudycenter.unm.edu/MissPdfFiles/ 
The%20Loss%20of%20Arun%20IIIRevised.pdf. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Mallaby, Sebastian. 2004. The world’s banker: A story of failed states, financial crises, and the wealth and 
poverty of nations. New York: Penguin Press. 
March, Kathryn S. 1977. Of people and naks [yak hybrid]; the management and the meaning of high 
altitude herding among contemporary Solu Sherpas. Contributions to Nepalese Studies 4: 83-97. 
Marcus, George E. 1995. Ethnography in/of the world system: the emergence of multi-sited ethnography. 
Annual review of anthropology:95-117. 
Marcus, George E. 1997. The uses of complicity in the changing mise-en-scène of anthropological 
fieldwork. Representations (59):85-108. 
References 
- 217 - 
Marcus, George E. 1998. Ethnography Through Thick and Thin: Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Marcus, George E. 2011. Multi-Sited Ethnography: Five or Six Things I know about it now. In Multi-
Sited Ethnography: Problems and Possibilities in the Translocation of Research Methods, edited by 
Coleman S. and von Hellermann, P. New York & Abingdon: Routledge, 16-34. 
Masquelier, Adeline. 1992. Encounter with a road Siren: machines, bodies and commodities in the 
imagination of a Mawri Healer. Visual Anthropology Review 8 (1):56-69. 
Masquelier, Adeline. 2002. Road Mythographies: Space, Mobility, and the Historical Imagination in 
Postcolonial Niger. American Ethnologist 29 (4):829–856. 
Mawdsley, Emma. 2012. From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development 
Landscape. London: Zed Books. 
McCully, Patrick. 2001. Silenced rivers: The ecology and politics of large dams, G - Reference, Information and 
Interdisciplinary Subjects Series. London: Zed Books. 
McLean, Joanne, and Straede, Steffen. 2003. Conservation, Relocation, and the Paradigms of Park and 
People Management--A Case Study of Padampur Villages and the Royal Chitwan National Park, 
Nepal. Society &Natural Resources 16 (6):509-526. 
Mehta, Jai N., and Kellert, Stephen R. 1998. Local attitudes toward community-based conservation policy 
and programmes in Nepal: a case study in the Makalu-Barun Conservation Area. Environmental 
Conservation 25 (4):320-333. 
Merriman, Peter. 2012. Mobility, space, and culture. London, New York: Routledge. 
Messner, Reinhold. 2000. My quest for the yeti: Confronting the Himalayas’ deepest mystery. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Michaels, Axel. 1993. God versus Cars: On Moveable and Immoveable Gods at the Nepalese Pasupati 
Temple. The National Geographical Journal of India 39:151–159. 
Michaels, Axel. 2008. Siva in Trouble: Festivals and Rituals at the Pasupatinatha Temple of Deopatan. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Miller, Daniel. 2001. Car cultures. Oxford: Berg. 
Mishra, Pankaj. 2012. From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia. London: Macmillan. 
Mitchell, Timothy 2002. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Mitchell, Timothy. 1988. Colonising Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1991. Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses. 
In Third world women and the politics of feminism, edited by Mohanty C. T., Russo, A. and Torres, 
L. M. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 51-80. 
References 
- 218 - 
Mol, Annemarie. 2003. The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Moran, Joe. 2010. On Roads: A Hidden History. London: Profile. 
Morse, Bradford, and Berger, Thomas R. 1992. Sardar Sarovar: The report of the Independent Review. 
Ottawa: Published for the Independent Review by Resource Futures International. 
Mosse, David. 2005. Cultivating development: An ethnography of aid policy and practice. London, Ann 
Arbor: Pluto Press. 
MoWR, and JICA. 1985. Master plan study on the Kosi river basin for water resources development: Main 
report and annexes. Kathmandu: Ministry of Water Resources and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency. 
MoWR, and SJVN. 2008. Memorandum of Understanding between The Government of Nepal, represented by 
Ministry of Water Resources and Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited concerning the Execution of Arun-3 
Hydropower Project in Nepal. Kathmandu: Ministry of Water Resources and Sutlej Jal Vidyut 
Nigam Limited. 
Mudimbe, Valentin Y. 1988. The invention of Africa. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press. 
Murphy, Elizabeth, and Dingwall, Robert. 2001. The Ethics of Ethnography. In Handbook of ethnography, 
edited by Atkinson P., Coffey, A., Delamont, S., Lofland, J. and Lofland, L. London, Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Nelson, Paul. 1997. Deliberation, Leverage or Coercion? The World Bank, NGOs, and Global 
Environmental Politics. Journal of Peace Research 34 (4):467-470. 
Nepal Electricity Authority. 1993. Arun III Hydroelectric Project: Environmental Assessment and 
Management. Kathmandu: Nepal Electricity Authority. 
Nepal Electricity Authority. 2013. A Year in Review - Fiscal Year 2012/13. Kathmandu: Nepal Electricity 
Authority. 
Nepal, Madhav Kumar. 1994. Letter to Lewis Preston, 14 October. In The Inspection Panel Report on 
Request for Inspection Nepal: Proposed Arun III Hydroelectric Project and Restructuring of the Arun III 
Access Road Project (Credit 2029-NEP), by The Inspection Panel. Washington, DC: International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International Development Association, 143-145. 
The Himalayan Times. 2010. Nepal Maoists Reactivate People’s Court. 17 February. Online: 
http://southasiarev.wordpress.com/2010/02/20/nepal-maoists-reactivate-peoples-courts. Visited 18 
January 2014. 
Nicoletti, Martino. 2006. The ancestral forest: Memory, space and ritual among the Kulunge Rai of Eastern 
Nepal. Kathmandu: Vajra Publications. 
References 
- 219 - 
NWDT. 1979. Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal, Final Order and Decision of the Tribunal. Gazette of 
India, 12 December. 
OHCHR. 2012. Nepal Conflict Report 2012. Executive Summary. Kathmandu: United Nations Human 
Rights Office of the High Commissioner. Online: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ 
NP/OHCHR_ExecSumm_Nepal_Conflict_report2012.pdf. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre. 2005. Anthropology and development: Understanding contemporary social 
change. London, New York: Zed Books. 
Ong, Aihwa, and Collier, Stephen J. 2005. Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as 
Anthropological Problems. Malden & Oxford: Blackwell. 
Ortner, Sherry B. 1999. Life and death on Mount Everest. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Otto, Ton. 2009. What Happened to Cargo Cults? Material Religions in Melanesia and the West. Social 
Analysis 53 (1):82-102. 
Paine, Robert. 1982. Dam a river, damn a people? Saami (Lapp) livelihood and the Alta/Kautokeino hydro-
electric project and the Norwegian parliament. Copenhagen: IWGIA. 
Panday, Ramkumar. 1994. Yeti Accounts: Snowman’s mystery & fantasy. Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak 
Bhandar. 
Pandey, Bikash. 1995. Because it is there: Foreign money, foreign advice and Arun III. Himal Southasian 
8(4): 29-35. 
Pandey, Bikash. 1996. Local Benefits from Hydro Development. Studies in Nepali History and Society 1 
(2):313-344. 
Paranjapye, V. 1994. Preliminary Look at Arun III in Light of Tehri Experience. Water Nepal 4 (1):30-
35. 
Paskal, Anna. 2000. The Water Gods: The Inside Story of a World Bank Project in Nepal. Montréal: Véhicule 
Press. 
Patkar, Medha, and Kothari, Smitu. 1997. The Struggle for Participation and Justice: A Historical 
Narrative. In Toward sustainable development? Struggling over India’s Narmada River, edited by 
Fisher, W.J. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 157-178. 
Pfaff-Czarnecka, Joanna. 2007. Challenging Goliath: People, Dams, and the Paradoxes of Transnational 
Critical Movements. In Social Dynamics in Northern South Asia, edited by Ishii H., Gellner, D. N. 
and Nawa, K. New Delhi: Manohar. 
Pigg, Stacy Leigh. 1992. Inventing Social Categories Through Place: Social Representations and 
Development in Nepal. Comparative Studies in Society and History 34 (3):491-513. 
Pingle, Gautam. 2011. 18th century Madras - A study in BOOT. Business Standard, 10 April. 
References 
- 220 - 
Poudyal, Ananta Raj. 1996. Nepal in 1995: The Communist-Rule Experiment. Asian Survey 36 (2):209-
215. 
Prashad, Vijay. 2008. The darker nations: A people’s history of the Third World. New York: New Press. 
Pratt, Mary Louise. 1986. Fieldwork in Common Places. In Writing Culture, edited by Clifford J. and 
Marcus, G. E. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Pun, Santa Bahadur. 2010. The Controversial Arun III Hydroelectric Project: Angst and Factors Behind 
the Scuttle. Sangam Journal:1-31. 
Rabinow, Paul, Marcus, George. E., Faubion, James, and Rees, Tobias. 2008. Designs for an Anthropology 
of the Contemporary. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Rabinow, Paul. 2009. Marking time: On the anthropology of the contemporary: Princeton University Press. 
Rachbauer, Dieter. 2010. Partizipation und Empowerment: Legitimationsrhetorik und Veränderungspotential 
entwicklungspolitischer Schlüsselbegriffe. Vienna: Südwind Verlag. 
Rahnema, Majid, ed. 1997. The post-development reader. London: Zed Books. 
Rai, Kavita. 2005. Dam Development: The dynamics of social inequality in a hydropower project in Nepal. 
Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag. 
Rai, Kavita. 2007. The Dynamics of Social Inequality in the Kali Gandaki ‘A’ Dam Project in Nepal: The 
Politics of Patronage. Hydro Nepal 1 (1):22-28. 
Ram, Rahul N. 1993. Muddy Waters: A Critical Assessment of the Benefits of the Sardar Sarovar Project. New 
Delhi: Kalpavriksh. 
Rana, Pashupati Shumshere J. B. 1971. India and Nepal: The Political Economy of a Relationship. Asian 
Survey:645-660. 
Randeria, Shalini. 2003. Cunning states and unaccountable international institutions: legal plurality, social 
movements and rights of local communities to common property resources. European Journal of 
Sociology 44 (01):27-60. 
Randeria, Shalini. 2007. Civil Society and Legal Pluralism in the Shadow of Caste: Entangled 
Modernities in Post-colonial India. In Hybridising East and West: Tales Beyond Westernisation. 
Empirical Contributions to the Debates on Hybridity, edited by Schirmer D., Saalmann, G. and 
Kessler, C. Berlin: Lit Verlag. 
Regmi, Mahesh C. 1976. Landownership in Nepal. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Regmi, Mahesh C. 1978. Thatched huts and stucco palaces: Peasants and landlords in 19th-century Nepal. 
New Delhi: Vikas Publication House. 
Republica. 2013a. Government, Sutlej Confident Of Inking Key Deal On Arun-III. 27 June. Online: 
http://myrepublica.com/portal/index.php/twb/printable_news.php?action=news_details&news_id=569
35. Visited 18 January 2014. 
References 
- 221 - 
Republica. 2013b. World Bank to invest in 200-500MW hydro project. 30 June. Online: 
http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php/ads/ads/rss.php?action=news_details&news_id=57044. 
Visited 18 January 2014. 
Rest, Matthäus. 2013. Aw: Case Number AI2416: Update on your Access to Information Request. E-mail to 
the World Bank. 12 February. 
Rist, Gilbert. 1997. The history of development: From western origins to global faith. London: Zed Books. 
Roche, Elizabeth. 2012. India goes from aid beneficiary to donor. Mint, 1 July. Online: 
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/BToxm8wd11xe45wSBbkqGO/India-goes-from-aid-beneficiary-to-
donor.html. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Rogers, Edward S., 1971. Les Indiens de la baie James et l’energie hydroelectrique. Recherches 
amerindiennes au Quebec 1 (4/5):44-57. 
Roy, Arundhati. 2001. Power politics. Cambridge: South End Press 
Rupnik, Jacques 1979. Dissent in Poland, 1968-78: the end of Revisionism and the rebirth of the Civil 
Society. In Opposition in Eastern Europe, edited by Tökés R. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 60-112. 
Rutgers, Roland. 1998. Yamphu: Grammar, texts, & lexicon. Leiden: Research School CNWS. 
Sachs, Wolfgang. 1992. The development dictionary: A guide to knowledge as power: London: Zed Books. 
Sahlins, Marshall. 2000. On the anthropology of modernity, or, some triumphs of culture over 
despondency theory. In Culture and sustainable development in the Pacific, edited by Hooper A. 
Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 44-61. 
Sahlins, Marshall. 2005. The economics of develop-man in the Pacific. In The making of local and global 
modernities in Melanesia: Humiliation, transformation and the nature of cultural change, edited by 
Robbins J. and Wardlow, H. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 23-42. 
Said, Edward. 1979. Orientalism. New York: Vintage. 
Saxer, Martin. no date. Neighbouring China. Unpublished Research Proposal. 
Schwarz, Arturo, and Duchamp, Marcel 2003. The Complete Works of Marcel Duchamp. London: Thames 
& Hudson. 
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed, Yale 
agrarian studies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Scudder, Thayer. 2005. The future of large dams: Dealing with social, environmental, institutional, and 
political costs. London & Sterling: Earthscan. 
Seeland, Klaus. 1980a. Ein nicht zu entwickelndes Tal: Traditionelle Bambustechnologie und 
Subsistenzwirtschaft in Ost-Nepal. Diessenhofen: Rüegger. 
References 
- 222 - 
Seeland, Klaus. 1980b. The Use Of Bamboo In A Rai Village In The Upper Arun Valley - An Example 
Of Traditional Technology. Journal of the Nepal Research Centre vol. 4, 175-183. 
Seeland, Klaus. 2013. Conversation on development in the upper Arun valley. Zurich, 5 May. 
Seligman, Adam. 2002. Civil Society as Idea and Ideal. In Alternative conceptions of civil society, edited by 
Chambers S. and Kymlicka, W. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 13-33. 
Sharma, P. R. 1978. Nepal: Hindu-Tribal Interface. Contributions to Nepalese Studies 6 (1):1-14. 
Sharma, S. N. 1995. Comparing Kali Gandaki ‘A’ with Arun III. The Kathmandu Post, 5 January, 4. 
Shipton, Eric Earle. 1952. The Mount Everest Reconnaissance Expedition, 1951. London: Hodder and 
Stoughton. 
Shostak, Marjorie. 1981. Nisa: The life and words of a !Kung woman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Shrestha, Ananda P., and Adhikari, Pushpa. 2009. Mahakali treaty. Kathmandu: Sangam Institute. 
Shrestha, Ratnar Sansar. 2009. Arun-III Project: Nepal’s Electricity Crisis and its Role in Current Load 
Shedding and Potential Role 10 Years Hence. Hydro Nepal (4):30-35. 
Shrestha, Shyam ‘Swapnil’. 2011. bijuli malai dibhors deu. Online: https://www.facebook.com/ 
photo.php?fbid=169842686393923&set=pb.107461499298709.-2207520000.1390218567.&type 
=3&theatre. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Shrestha, Tirtha. 1989. Development ecology of the Arun River Basin in Nepal. Kathmandu: International 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development. 
Shrestha, Tirtha B., Sherpa, Lhakpa N., Banskota, Kamal, and Nepali, Rohit K. 1990. The Makalu-Barun 
National Park and Conservation Area Management Plan. Submitted by the Taskforce for the 
Makalu-Barun Conservation Project. Kathmandu: Department of National Parks and Wildlife 
Conservation & Woodlands Mountain Institute Mount Everest Ecosystem Conservation 
Program. 
Siwakoti, Gopal. 2004. Gopal Siwakoti v. Ministry of Finance. In International environmental law reports, 
Vol 4, edited by Palmer, A., Cairo, R., Bethlehem, D., Crawford, J. and Sands, P. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 330-339. 
SJVN. 2007. SJVN Limited. Online: http://sjvn.nic.in/index.asp. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Sklar, Leonard, and McCully, Patrick. 1994. Damming the Rivers: The World Bank’s Lending for Large 
Dams. In International Rivers Network Working Paper Number 5. Berkeley: International Rivers 
Network. 
Smith, James Howard. 2008. Bewitching development: Witchcraft and the reinvention of development in 
neoliberal Kenya. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Sovacool, Benjamin K., Bambawale, Malavika Jain, Gippner, Olivia, and Dhakal, Saroj. 2011. 
Electrification in the Mountain Kingdom: The implications of the Nepal Power Development 
Project (NPDP). Energy for Sustainable Development 15 (3):254-265. 
References 
- 223 - 
Spilsbury, Louise. 2011. Dams and Hydropower: Development or Destruction? New York: Rosen Central. 
Stern, Philip J. 2011. The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the 
British Empire in India. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stewart, Pamela J., and Strathern, Andrew. 1999. Death on the Move: Landscape and Violence on the 
Highlands Highway, Papua New Guinea. Anthropology and Humanism 24 (1):20-31. 
Stiller, Ludwig F. 1973. The rise of the House of Gorkha: A study in the unification of Nepal, 1768-1816. New 
Delhi: Manjusri Publishing House. 
Tamang, Seira. 2003. Civilising Civil Society: Donors and Democratic Space in Nepal. Himal Southasian 
16 (7):14-24. 
Taylor-Ide, Daniel. 1995. Something Hidden Behind the Ranges: A Himalayan Quest. San Francisco: 
Mercury House. 
Thapa, Deepak, and Sijapati, Bandita. 2003. A kingdom under siege: Nepal’s Maoist insurgency, 1996 to 
2003. Kathmandu: The Printhouse. 
The Inspection Panel. 1994. The Inspection Panel Report on Request for Inspection Nepal: Proposed Arun III 
Hydroelectric Project and Restructuring of the Arun III Access Road Project (Credit 2029-NEP). 
Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International 
Development Association. 
The Inspection Panel. 1995. Proposed Arun III Hydroelectric Project and Credit 2029-NEP. Investigation 
Report. Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International 
Development Association. 
The Kathmandu Post. 1994a. Some questions on Arun III. 15 February, 4. 
The Kathmandu Post. 1994b. Arun III a blackmail, says Hagen. 17 March, 1. 
The Mountain Institute. 2011. Conserving the Sacred Himalayan Landscape. Kathmandu & Washington, 
DC: The Mountain Institute. 
The Nepali Times. 2004. Kosi-Lhasa Highway. 23 November. Online: http://nepalitimes.com/news.php? 
id=1979#.Ut5yaPYwcy7. Visited 18 January 2014. 
The World Bank. 1984. Nepal Marsyangdi Hydroelectric Power Project Staff Appraisal Report. Report No. 
4422a-NEP. South Asia Projects Department Power and Transportation Division. 1 May. 
The World Bank. 1988. Nepal Power Subsector Review. Report No. 6879a-NEP. Industry and Energy 
Operations Division Country Department I Asia Region. 15 January. 
The World Bank. 1989. Staff Appraisal Report Nepal Arun III Access Road Project. Report No. 7461-NEP. 
Infrastructure Operations Division Country Department I Asia Regional Office. 12 May. 
 
References 
- 224 - 
The World Bank. 1994a. Nepal: Arun III, Management Response to Request for Inspection. South Asia 
Region. 21 November. 
The World Bank. 1994b. Staff Appraisal Report Nepal Arun III Hydroelectric Project. Report No. 12643-
NEP. Energy and Infrastructure Division Country Department I South Asia Region. 29 August. 
The World Bank. 1996. Status of Implementation at Credit Cancellation Note (In Lieu Project Completion 
Note): Nepal, Arun Access Road Project (Credit 2029-NEP). Report No. 16037. Energy and 
Infrastructure Division South Asia Region Country Department II. 
The World Bank. 2013a. E-mail to Matthäus Rest. 11 February. 
The World Bank. 2013b. E-mail to Matthäus Rest. 14 February. 
The World Bank. 2014a. Rampur Hydropower Project. Online: http://www.worldbank.org/projects/ 
P095114/rampur-hydropower-project?lang=en&tab=overview. Visited 18 January 2014. 
The World Bank. 2014b. Kabeli–A Hydroelectric Project. Online: http://www.worldbank.org/projects 
/P122406/kabeli-hydroelectric-project?lang=en. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Thompson, Michael. 2002. Don’t let it put you off your dinner: First steps towards ethical policies shaped 
by cultural considerations. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 4 (3):347-
363. 
Tomlinson, Kathryn. 2011. The Anxieties of Engaging in Multi-sited PhD Research: Reflections on 
Researching Indigenous Rights Processes in Venezuela. In Multi-Sited Ethnography, edited by 
Coleman S. and von Hellermann, P. New York & Abingdon: Routledge, 161-173. 
Transparency International. 2008. Global corruption report 2008 corruption in the water sector. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Online: http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/ 
global_corruption_report_2008_corruption_in_the_water_sector. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Trommler, Frank. 2003. Targeting the Reader, Entering History: An New Epitaph for the Inner 
Emigration. In Flight of fantasy: New perspectives on inner emigration in German literature, 1933-
1945, edited by Donahue N. H. and Kirchner, D. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 113-130. 
Trouillot, Michel-Rolf. 2002. The Otherwise Modern: Carribean Lessons from the Savage Slot. In 
Critically Modern: Alternatives, Alterities, Anthropologies, edited by Knauft B. M. Bloomington 
& Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 220-237. 
UCPN (M). 2010. Pres vijnapti. 25 September. United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). 
Udall, Lori. 1998. The World Bank and Public Accountability: Has Anything Changed? In The struggle 
for accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and grassroots movements, edited by Fox J. and Brown, D. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 391-436. 
 
References 
- 225 - 
UNDP. 2011. Decentralized energy access and the millennium development goals: An analysis of the 
development benefits of micro hydropower in rural Nepal. Rugby and New York: Practical Action 
Publishing. 
UNDP Nepal, ed. 2008. The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2067 (2007): As amended by the first, second and 
third amendments with the English and Nepali side-by-side. Kathmandu: Power Communications. 
Umaña, Alvaro. 1998. Preface. In The World Bank Inspection Panel: The First Four Years (1994-1998), 
edited by Umaña, A. Washington, DC: The World Bank, ix-x. 
Upadhyay, Akhilesh. 1994. Arun III details demanded. The Kathmandu Post, 4 January, 1,8. 
Uprety, Prem Raman. 1992. Political awakening in Nepal the search for a new identity. New Delhi: 
Commonwealth Publishers.  
Van Ham, Hans, and Koppenjan, Joop. 2001. Building Public-Private Partnerships: Assessing and 
managing risks in port development. Public Management Review 3 (4):593-616. 
Vandoorne, Saskya. 2012. Controversy over Qatar’s plan to help deprived French suburbs. CNN, 28 
September. Online:	  http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/28/world/europe/france-qatar-disadvantaged-
suburbs-funding. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Virilio, Paul. 2006 [1977]. Speed and politics. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e). 
von Fürer-Haimendorf, Christoph. 1975. Himalayan traders: Life in highland Nepal. London: J. Murray. 
Wade, Robert. 1997. Greening the Bank: The struggle over the environment, 1970-1995. In The World 
Bank: Its First Half Century, edited by Kapur D., Lewis, J. P. and Webb, R. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 611-734. 
Wade, Robert. 2011. Boulevard of broken dreams: the inside story of the World Bank’s Polonoroeste 
Road Project in Brazil’s Amazon. Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment Working Paper No. 55, August 2011. Online: http://www.lse.ac.uk/ 
GranthamInstitute/publications/WorkingPapers/Papers/50-59/WP55_world-bank-road-project-
brazil.pdf. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Walz, Julie, and Ramachandran, Vijaya. 2011. Brave New World: A literature review of emerging donors 
and the changing nature of foreign assistance. Working Paper 273, November 2011, Center for 
Global Development, Washington DC. 
Ward, Michael. 1997. Everest 1951: the footprints attributed to the Yeti—myth and reality. Wilderness & 
Environmental Medicine 8 (1):29-32. 
Westbrook, David A. 2008. Navigators of the contemporary: Why ethnography matters. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
 
References 
- 226 - 
Wettenhall, Roger. 2003. The rhetoric and reality of public-private partnerships. Public Organization 
Review 3 (1):77-107. 
Whelpton, John. 2005. A History of Nepal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wilson, Fiona. 2004. Towards a Political Economy of Roads: Experiences from Peru. Development and 
Change 35 (3):525–546. 
Wollen, Peter, and Kerr, Joe. 2002. Autopia: Cars and culture. London: Reaktion Books. 
World Commission on Dams. 2000. Dams and development: A new framework for decision-making. 
London: Earthscan. 
Yamphu Rai, Chun Bahadur. 2011. Conversation on kipat, 15 January. 
Yamphu Kirat Samaj. 2013. Info. Online: http://www.facebook.com/pages/Yamphu-Kirat-
Society/133876523354150?id=133876523354150&sk=info. Visited 18 January 2014. 
Young, Zoe. 2002. A new green order? The World Bank and the politics of the Global Environment Facility. 
London & Sterling: Pluto Press. 
Ziai, Aram. 2007. Exploring Post-Development: Theory and Practice, Problems and Perspectives. London, 
New York: Routledge. 
	   
 Interviews 
 
Interview 1 with Sushil, 15 June 2013, Oxford, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 2 with Rohit, 3 November 2010, Khandbari, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 3 with Tilman, 26 January 2010, Kathmandu, in English (recorded). 
Interview 4 with Suresh, 8 February 2010, Kathmandu, in English (recorded). 
Interview 5 with Binod, 14 February 2011, Kathmandu, in English (recorded). 
Interview 6 with Anil, 25 November 2010, Kathmandu, in English (recorded). 
Interview 7 with Sushil, 9 December 2010, Kathmandu, in English (recorded). 
Interview 8 with Anil, 19 December 2010, Kathmandu, in English (recorded). 
Interview 9 with Prakash, 4 December 2010, Kathmandu, in English (recorded). 
Interview 10 with Anil, 19 December 2010, Kathmandu, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 11 with Manish, 20 November 2012, Washington, DC, in English (recorded). 
Interview 12 with Jyoti, 29 November 2010, Kathmandu, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 13 with Jyoti and Krishna, 26 January 2011, Kathmandu, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 14 with Antony, 21 November 2012, Washington, DC, in English (recorded). 
Interview 15 with John, 17 February 2012, Munich, in German (recorded). 
Interview 16 with Edmund, 19 April 2011, Washington, DC, in English (recorded). 
Interview 17 with Margret, 10 May 2011, Berlin, in German (recorded). 
Interview 18 with Rajib, 1 December 2010, Kathmandu, in English (recorded). 
Interview 19 with George, 19 August 2011, Zurich, in German (not recorded). 
Interview 20 with Badri and Boras, 20 October 2010, Num, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 21 with Tula Ram, 20 October 2010, Num, in Nepali (not recorded). 
Interview 22 with Hel Bahadur, 27 November 2008, Khandbari, in Nepali (not recorded). 
Interview 23 with Umesh, 1 November 2010, Hedangna, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 24 with Ganesh, 23 October 2010, Hedangna, Nepal, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 25 with a group of women, 23 October 2010, Hedangna, in Nepali and Yamphu (recorded). 
Interview 26 with Bishnu, 9 January 2011, Chiplegaon, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 27 with Indra and Chameli, 9 January 2011, Botebas, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 28 with Richin, 9 January 2011, Diding, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 29 with Ichchha, 22 November 2008, Hedangna, in Nepali (not recorded). 
Interview 30 with an anonymous woman, 31 October 2010, en route between Bakle and Hedangna, in 
  Nepali (recorded). 
Interviews 
- 228 - 
Interview 31 with Shyam, his cousin and an anonymous passer-by, 16 January 2011, Num, in Nepali  
  (recorded). 
Interview 32 with Akhil, 17 January 2011, Khandbari, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 33 with Lhakpa and Paul, 8 February 2011, Kathmandu, in English and Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 34 with Raj, 24 October 2010, Uwa, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 35 with Parbati, 23 October 2010, Hedangna, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 36 with Surya, 10 January 2011, Ghorepani, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 37 with Angrita and Norbu, 31 October 2010, Bakle, in Nepali (recorded). 
Interview 38 with a group of anonymous men on route between Khandbari and Hile, 8 December 2008, 
  in English (not recorded). 
Interview 39 with an anonymous teenager, 19 November 2008, Hedangna, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 40 with Mandira and her sister, 25 November 2008, Num, in Nepali (not recorded). 
Interview 41 with Rudip and his colleague, 12 October 2010, Hedangna, in Nepali and English  
  (not recorded). 
Interview 42 with Ajib, 27 November 2008, Khandbari, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 43 with Durga, 23 November 2008, Ala-Uling, in Nepali (not recorded). 
Interview 44 with Hem Kumar, 21 November 2008, Num, in Nepali (not recorded). 
Interview 45 with Bilsimaia, 21 November 2008, Num, in Nepali (not recorded). 
Interview 46 with Ram Bahadur, 27 November 2008, Khandbari, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 47 with Sher Bahadur, 22 November 2008, Chillingte, in Nepali (not recorded). 
Interview 48 with Sanjay, 17 January 2011, Khandbari, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 49 with Akhil, 17 January 2011, Khandbari, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 50 with Kailash, 21 January 2010, Khandbari, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 51 with Shyam, 20 November 2008, Num, in Nepali (not recorded). 
Interview 52 with Bipin, 6 December 2010, Kathmandu, in English (recorded). 
Interview 53 with Vishnu, 10 February 2010, New Delhi, in English (not recorded). 
Interview 54 with Catherine, 1 June 2013, via phone (not recorded). 
 
  
Interviews 
- 229 - 
Non-anonymised Interviews 
 
Interview A with Dipak Gyawali, 2010, in English (recorded). 
Interview B with Gopal Siwakoti, 2010, in English (recorded). 
Interview C with Dipen Bahadur Rai, 2010, in Nepali (not recorded). 
Interview D with Purna Prasad Rai, 2010, in Nepali (recorded). 
 
 
Speeches 
 
Speech 1, 10 January 2010, Hedangna, in Nepali (recorded). 
Speech 2, 10 January 2010, Hedangna, in Nepali (recorded). 
Speech 3, 11 January 2010, Hedangna, in Nepali and English (recorded). 
 
 
 
	   
	   
Curriculum Vitae  
 
 
Education 
2009 – 2014  
PhD programme in Social Anthropology at the URPP Asia and Europe, University of Zurich. 
 
2002 – 2007  
M. A., Social Anthropology & Organic Agriculture, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, 
University of Vienna and Department of Agriculture, University of Applied Life Sciences Vienna. 
 
 
Professional Employment 
2014 – 2015 
Visiting Scholar to the Nepa School for Humanities and Social Sciences, Kathmandu and the Center for 
India and South Asia, University of California, Los Angeles 
 
2012 – 2013 
Visiting Scholar, Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford 
 
2011  
Instructor, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Zurich 
 
2009 – 2012  
Research Fellow, URPP Asia & Europe, University of Zurich 
 
2009 – present  
Adjunct Lecturer, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Vienna 
 
2007 - 2008  
Graduate Student Instructor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Vienna 
 
2006 – 2007  
Junior Assistant to Gertraud Seiser, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Vienna 
 
2005 – 2006  
Junior Assistant to Professor Andreas Novy, Institute for the Environment and Regional Development at 
the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration 
 
 
Fellowships & Awards 
2014 – 2015 
Early Postdoc.Mobility fellowship, Swiss National Science Foundation 
 
2012 – 2013 
Fellowship for prospective researchers, Swiss National Science Foundation 
 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
- 232 - 
2012 
Travel Grant, Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences 
 
2009 – 2012  
Research Grant, Humer Foundation for Academic Talent and URPP Asia & Europe of the University of 
Zurich 
 
2008  
Research grant, University of Vienna 
 
2008  
Summer grant, Graduate School Asia and Africa in World Reference Systems at the Martin Luther 
University Halle-Wittenberg  
 
2007 
Merit scholarship, University of Vienna 
 
2006 
Research grant, University of Vienna 
 
2006 
CEEPUS grant, Austrian Agency for International Cooperation in Education and Research and Wroclaw 
University of Environmental and Life Sciences 
 
2005  
Research grant, South African Wine Industry Trust (with Professor Werner Zips & colleagues) 
 
2004  
Travel grant, Academy of Fine Arts Vienna 
 
 
Publications 
Refereed Articles 
Dam good business? India and the Arun-3 hydropower project in Nepal. In: Momentum Quarterly, 
forthcoming. 
 
Generating Power. Debates on Development around the Nepalese Arun-3 Hydropower Project, in: 
Contemporary South Asia, 20 (1), 2012, 105–117. 
 
Book Chapters & Editor-reviewed Articles 
„Something we could never have”. Die Südafrikanische Landreform und ihre Auswirkungen am Beispiel des 
Weinbaus im Western Cape (with Stephan Handl and Severin Lenart), in: Zips, Werner (ed.). To BEE or 
not to Be. Black Economic Empowerment in der südafrikanischen Weinindustrie. Vienna: Lit, 2008, 233-
268. 
 
„Man sieht, dass das die Hände von einem Bauern sind.” Bäuerliche Identität und Ethnizität im post-
sozialistischen Polen, in: Austrian Studies in Social Anthropology, 2008 (2). 
http://www.univie.ac.at/alumni.ethnologie/journal/volltxt/Rest.pdf 
 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
- 233 - 
Essays and Commentaries (selected) 
Von einheimischen Geistern und auswärtigen Göttern. Das Arun-3 Wasserkraftprojekt, in: Südasien, 2012 
(4), 49-52. 
 
Erkundungen des Infra-Ordinären, in: Paradigmata. Zeitschrift für Menschen und Diskurse. No. 1 (2010), 
86-89. 
 
Bedenkliches Gedenken, in: Progress 2008 (1), 14. 
 
„Arbeit macht das Leben süss, so süss wie Maschinenöl,” in: Wege für eine bäuerliche Zukunft. Zeitschrift 
der via campesina austria, Nr. 302, 2008, 28-29. 
 
Bist a Sozi oder bist a Nazi? in: Progress 2004 (1), 13. 
 
Meine Beobachtungen mit einer ungewöhnlichen Gruppe, in: Nikolai, Werner & Henry Lehmann (eds.) 
Grenzen der Gedenkstättenpädagogik mit rechten Jugendlichen. Freiburg im Breisgau: Lambertus, 2002, 
70-72. 
 
Book reviews 
Staudamm oder Leben? Der Widerstand an der Narmada, in: suedasien.info, 2011.  
http://www.suedasien.info/articles/2984 
 
Online Teaching Material 
Grundlagen sozialwissenschaftlicher Denkweisen (with Werner Zips). eLearning Zentrum der Fakultät für 
Sozialwissenschaften, University of Vienna, 2009. http://www.univie.ac.at/sowi-
online/esowi/cp/denkenksa/denkenksa-titel.html 
 
 
Organized Sessions 
“Developing control: the reconfiguration of space and the making of development on the ground.” 22nd 
European Conference for South Asian Studies, University of Lisbon, 25-28 July 2012. Organizers: Miriam 
Bishokarma, Pia Hollenbach, Sebastian Homm and Matthäus Rest. 
 
“‘Wild und Schön’ – Maskeraden von Männlichkeit.” 7. Tage der Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie, 
University of Vienna, 24-25 May 2012. Organizers: Matthäus Rest and Gertraud Seiser. 
 
 
Presentations 
The Amnesiac Bank. The World Bank and the cancellation oft he Arun-3 hydropower project in 1995. Paper 
presented at the 11th Nepal Study Day, Royal Botanical Garden, Edinburgh, 18-19 April 2013. 
 
Dam good Business? India and Nepal’s Arun-3 hydropower project. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Anthropological Association, San Francisco, 14-18 November 2012. 
 
A dam cancelled and reincarnated. The Nepalese Arun-3 hydropower project. Paper presented at the European 
Conference for South Asian Studies, University of Lisbon, 25-28 July 2012. 
 
“The electricity demand of Nepal’s interconnected power system.” India and the Arun-3 hydropower project. Paper 
presented at the EASA Biennial Conference, University of Paris Ouest Nanterre, 10-13 July 2012. 
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“The dam that wasn’t there.” Transnationaler Aktivismus, das Weltbank Inspection Panel und der Nicht-Bau des 
Arun-3 Wasserkraftprojekts in Nepal. Invited Lecture, Department of Ethnology, University of Hamburg, 15 
May 2012. 
 
Das Arun-3 Wasserkraftprojekt in Nepal. Spannungen und Widersprüche zwischen Gleichheit und Differenz. 
Paper presented at Momentum11: Gleichheit, Hallstatt, 27- 30 October 2011. 
 
Generating Power. Discourses on Development around the Arun-3 Hydropower Project in Nepal. Paper presented 
at the conference of the British Association for South Asian Studies, University of Southampton, 13 April 
2011. 
 
Arrested Development? Discourses on the Arun-3 project. Invited lecture, Project Labour in Development, 
Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi, 31 January 2011 and Faculty of Law, Nepal Law 
Campus, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, 19 December 2010. 
 
Water Power. The Nepalese Arun 3 Hydropower Project. Invited lecture, Department of Sociology, University 
of Pune, 27 February 2010. 
 
Globalisation, Migration and the Imaginary among the Yamphu Rai of Eastern Nepal. Paper presented at the 
Summer School “Cultural Translation” at the Graduate School Asia and Africa in World Reference 
Systems, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, 17 July 2008. 
 
“I money – I farm.” Transformationen und Kontinuitäten in Südostpolen. Paper presented at the 3. Tage der 
Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie,” University of Vienna, 27 April 2007. 
 
Denglawengl. Sound-Performance with Michael Gailer & Jan Blaschko on and about sharpening scythes. 
Conference of the International Society of Ethnobiology, University of Kent at Canterbury, 14-16 June 
2004. 
 
 
Teaching 
Autumn 2013 
Instructor (with Professor Elke Mader & Gertraud Seiser), University of Vienna (“The Krampuslauf in the 
county of Salzburg: performances of the un-human”) 
 
Autumn 2011 
Instructor (with Gertraud Seiser), University of Vienna (“The Krampuslauf of the Gastein valley: violence, 
masculinity, history”) 
 
Spring 2011 
Instructor, University of Zurich (“Introduction to Ethnology II”) 
 
Spring 2009 
Instructor, University of Vienna (“Qualitative Methods”) 
 
 
Languages 
German (first language), English (fluent), Nepali, Polish and French (proficient spoken and elementary 
written) 
